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 During the 1830s and 1840s, a unique set of economic, social, political, and 
environmental factors contributed to the rise and fall of Bent, St. Vrain & Co. as 
the preeminent American trading firm in the Southwest Borderlands.  Between the 
company‟s founding around 1830 and the destruction of Bent‟s Fort in 1849, the 
Bent brothers and Ceran St. Vrain conducted a wide-ranging, multifaceted trade 
with the United States, Mexico, and the Native American tribes of the Southern 
Plains.  Geographical and political isolation made it imperative for the partners to 
adhere to a strict set of social and economic protocols, especially the cultivation of 
business patronage and intermarriage with their clients.  The most important factor 
in the company‟s strategy was the weak presence of the State – either American or 
Mexican – in the borderlands.  The weakness of the State simultaneously presented 
the partners with both opportunities and challenges.  On the one hand, they were in 
a precarious position - unable to call upon the American government for protection, 
they went out of their way to avoid alienating the powerful tribes of the region.  On 
the other hand, the weakness of the Mexican State allowed the Bents and St. Vrain 
to circumvent national trade laws, become smugglers, and acquire land grants, all 
of which alienated the nationalist faction in New Mexico.  The arrival of the 
American State in the borderlands in 1846 set in motion a chain of events that 
ultimately brought down the company.  The conquest of New Mexico unleashed a 
wave of violence that destroyed the conditions that had allowed the partners to 
prosper.  By 1849, Bent‟s Fort – the symbol of company power – went up in 
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flames, abandoned by its proprietors.  Far from the centers of State power, Bent, St. 
Vrain & Co. flourished for nearly two decades.  American expansion rendered the 







































 During the 1830s and 1840s, Bent, St. Vrain and Company (hereafter Bent-
St. Vrain) became the most prominent American trading firm in the Southwest 
Borderlands due to a unique set of geographic, economic, and political factors.
1
  By 
studying the activities of Bent-St. Vrain, historians can gain a better understanding 
                                                 
1
 Borderlands literature is enormous, and defies precise categorization.  Studied by historians, 
anthropologists, archaeologists, political scientists, sociologists, and literary critics, the field of 
borderlands study has spawned its own, enormous, argot.  Theorists speak of “borderlands,” 
“bordered lands,” middle grounds, native grounds, alienated borderlands, coexistent borderlands, 
interdependent borderlands, integrated borderlands, intermediate borderlands, outer borderlands, 
infant borderlands, adolescent borderlands, adult borderlands, declining borderlands, defunct 
borderlands, quiet borderlands, unruly borderlands, rebellious borderlands, zones of interaction, 
“membranes of contact,” metropoles,  
peripheries, linear borders, zonal borders, paradigms of power, paradigms of negotiation, spheres of 
influence, strategic borderlands, nonstrategic borderlands, and ecumenes.  The only common 
denominators seem to be that borderlands are places of both violence and accommodation, as well 
as zones of interaction where people consistently utilize to border to benefit their own interests 
either by calling upon national power or ignoring it as the situation dictates.  Were I to define 
“borderlands,” I would chose Elizabeth Jameson‟s definition.  She calls them “zones – sometimes 
around borders – where diverse peoples come together to mingle.”  They can be social, political, or 
economic – or all three at once.  Furthermore, she notes that they assume importance proportional to 
the group in question.  I also appreciates David Thelen‟s characterization of “borderlands” as “not 
so much impenetrable barriers as wide and interactive places where people live everyday lives.”  
Those interested in borderlands theory should consult Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From 
Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American 
History” American Historical Review 104 (1999): 814-841; Adelman and Aron, “Of Lively 
Exchanges and Larger Perspectives,” American Historical Review 104 (1999): 1235-1239;  Peter 
Andreas, Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000);  
Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,” Journal 
of World History 2 (Fall 1997): 211-242;  Donna J. Guy and Thomas E. Sheridan, Contested 
Ground:  Comparative Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998); especially their chapter, “On Frontiers:  The Northern 
and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire in the Americas,” 3-15;  Elizabeth Jameson, “Dancing 
on the Rim, Tiptoeing Through Minefields: Challenges and Promises of Borderlands,” Pacific 
Historical Review 75 (February 2006): 1-24,(the Jameson quote comes from page 5); Kent G.  
Lightfoot and Antoinette Martínez, “Frontiers and Boundaries in Archaeological Perspective,” 
Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995): 471-492;  Oscar Martínez, Border People: Life and 
Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994);  Bradley J. 
Parker, “Toward an Understanding of Borderlands Processes,” American Antiquity 71 (2006): 77-
100;  David Spener and Kathleen Staudt, “The View from the Frontier:  Theoretical Perspectives 
Undisciplined,” in The U.S. Mexico Border: Transcending Divisions, Contesting Identities, eds. 
David Spener and Kathleen Staudt (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998): 3-34; and 
Thomas M.  Wilson and Hastings Donnan, “Nation, State and Identity at International Borders,” in 
Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers, eds. Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings 
Donnan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 1-30. 
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of how businesses operated west of the Mississippi River.  Traditionally, 
chroniclers have viewed Bent-St. Vrain as an exemplar of American domination, a 
fist in the wilderness, and a self-conscious forerunner of Manifest Destiny.  In order 
to achieve economic success, the partners tapped into a continent-wide network of 
markets and suppliers.  They utilized family bonds to cultivate a strong 
socioeconomic network that included Missouri merchants, Native American tribes, 
and Hispanic New Mexicans.  The key determinant in their business strategy, 
however, was the lack of strong national authority – either American or Mexican – 
in the borderlands.  The inability of the United States to exert a powerful economic 
or military influence in the region both forced the partners to tread lightly in local 
Native American politics while simultaneously allowing them to circumvent 
national trade laws in order to stymie rival white traders.  Mexico‟s weak hold on 
her northern frontier also placed the Bents and St. Vrain in both an advantageous 
and perilous position.  In a manner similar to John Sutter in California, Bent-St. 
Vrain abided by Mexican laws when it suited company interests, and ignored them 
when it did not.  Furthermore, like Sutter the acquisition of land grants and 
participation in the Indian trade had the potential to weaken further Mexico‟s 
position in the region, a fact that enraged Mexican nationalists.  Resentment built 
through the 1840s and culminated in the violence of the Mexican-American War.  
The extension of the American state into the borderlands destabilized local power 
structures and led to the violence that ultimately doomed the company in 1849.  In 
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the absence of a strong state presence, Bent-St. Vrain flourished.  Once the United 
States caught up, Bent-St. Vrain withered and died.
2
 
 This is primarily the study of how one American trading firm conducted 
business in an unstable borderlands environment.  Bent-St. Vrain presents a unique 
opportunity for historians to analyze the ways in which the Market Revolution 
unfolded in the trans-Mississippi West.  The base of the company‟s operations was 
geographically isolated, yet simultaneously enmeshed in continental networks of 
trade.  On the one hand, the Bents and St. Vrain utilized many important techniques 
similar to those practiced by eastern businessmen.  The partners recognized the 
usefulness of strategic diversification.  They kept keen tabs on consumer tastes and 
trends, and supplied themselves accordingly.  Bent-St. Vrain also tapped into vast 
networks of supply and credit.  They recognized that in order to succeed they 
needed the economic patronage of well-connected urban merchants, especially 
those in St. Louis.  Finally, when the opportunity presented itself, the partners 
played a willing role in less reputable, and often illegal, economic interactions with 
their customers.  In all these ways, business on the frontier resembled the well-
established practices of easterners who sought to maximize their profits as the 
Market Revolution penetrated every region of the country.
3
 
                                                 
2
 For an interesting parallel description of how state power affected business on the Mexican 
frontier, see Albert L. Hurtado, John Sutter: A Life on the North American Frontier (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2006); and  Kenneth N. Owens, ed., John Sutter and a Wider West 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994). 
3
 For a fine recent survey of the Market Revolution see John Lauritz Larson, The Market 
Revolution: Liberty, Ambition, and the Eclipse of the Common Good (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).  Perhaps the best work on the shadowy side of American capitalism during 
the antebellum years is Stephen Mihm, A Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men and the 
Making of the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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 The lack of a powerful state presence differentiated borderlands 
businessmen from their brethren in well-settled areas of the United States, however.  
The weakness of a strong military or regulatory presence in the Southwest 
presented more opportunities for regional entrepreneurs to participate the shady 
practices such as gunrunning and liquor smuggling.  Most importantly, the potential 
for violence was more prevalent in the West than in other parts of the country.  
Accommodation to Native American trade and social protocols, for example, was 
not only a way to corner trade, but just as importantly was a way to stay safe.  
Surrounded by powerful tribes, and unable to call upon military aid, the partners 
trod carefully in order to survive.  The weak presence of the Mexican state also 
presented Bent-St. Vrain with both opportunities and challenges.  Cooperating with 
New Mexicans who resented their central government, the Bents and St. Vrain 
became both legitimate traders and eager smugglers.  At the same time, they made 
use of intermarriage as a trade strategy.  However, their actions in procuring land 
grants and in the Indian trade alarmed Mexican nationalists who viewed the 
company as a potentially disruptive political and economic force in the region.  As 
the partners continued to enmesh themselves in local business and politics, tensions 
escalated throughout the 1840s.  Finally, when the United States extended its reach 
into the Southwest Borderlands and began its attempt to integrate the region into 
the rest of the nation, expansion undermined the carefully constructed political and 
socioeconomic system that had allowed Bent-St. Vrain to prosper.  The annexation 
of the region by American forces set off a chain of violent events that ultimately 
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destroyed the company.  Thus, while the potential for economic rewards in the 
borderlands was high, the potential for violence was equally so. 
 Some time during the late-1820s or early-1830, Charles Bent and Ceran St. 
Vrain formed a business partnership that lasted for nearly two decades.  Residents 
of St. Louis, both men were experienced traders and fur trappers.  As the 
monopolistic American Fur Company tightened its grip on the Missouri River fur 
trade, Bent and St. Vrain turned their attention to the expanding business 
opportunities opening up on the northern frontier of Mexico.  By the end of the 
1820s, the men combined their small, independent operations.  In the middle of the 
1830s, they, along with William and George Bent, oversaw a diverse, and 
expanding business operation.  By participating in the fur trade, Indian trade, and 
Santa Fe trade, the partners insulated themselves against an economic downturn in 
any one of these respective ventures.  Around 1832 they began construction of a 
large adobe trading post on the north bank of the Arkansas River.  Bent-St. Vrain 
was comfortably established by 1834, and prepared to expand its operations even 
further afield. 
 Because the partners accommodated themselves to Native American trade 
practices and social protocols, business with local Indian groups formed the 
backbone of Bent-St. Vrain‟s operations.  As the fur trade declined in the late-
1830s, the partners turned increasingly to commerce in buffalo robes.  In this 
venture, cooperation and adherence to native trade and social protocols was 
essential to the success of the partners.  Indian hunters gathered the buffalo hides, 
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which their women turned into marketable robes.  Wise traders, the Bents and St. 
Vrain quickly learned, took their business to the Indians directly, paid scrupulous 
attention to their tastes as consumers, and understood the paramount importance of 
ritualized gift giving.  Like many successful traders, William Bent married a 
woman from one of his client tribes.  Marriage broadened the network of potential 
customers on the one hand, and assured the new in-laws a reliable supply of trade 
goods on the other.
4
 
In the absence of a strong state presence, however, trade on the plains could 
be dangerous.  Tribes and tribal alliances were in constant conflict with one 
another.  Raiding for war honors, increased social status, and material gain was 
endemic.  Although marriage into the Cheyenne tribe guaranteed Bent-St. Vrain a 
reliable source of trade, it is probable that such an alliance also circumscribed their 
                                                 
4
 The literature on the Indian trade, kinship, and intermarriage is large.  For trade, see Thomas W. 
Dunlay, Kit Carson and the Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000);  Pekka  
Hӓmӓlӓinen, “The Western Comanche Trade Center: Rethinking the Plains Indians Trade System,” 
Western Historical Quarterly 90 (2003): 485-513; Joseph  Jablow, The Cheyenne in Plains Indian 
Trade Relations, 1795-1840 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954);  Alan M. Klein, 
“Political Economy of the Buffalo Hide Trade: Race and Class on the Plains,” in The Political 
Economy of North American Indians, ed. John H. Moore (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1993): 133-160; David La Vere, “Friendly Persuasions: Gifts and Reciprocity in Comanche-
Euroamerican Relations,” Chronicles of Oklahoma 71 (1993): 322-337; Howard Roberts Lamar, 
The Indian Trader on the American Frontier: Myth‟s Victim (College Station: Texas A & M 
University Press, 1977); William Swagerty, “Indian Trade in the trans-Mississippi West to 1870,” in 
Handbook of the North American Indians, ed. Wilcomb Washburn (Washington: Smithsonian 
Institute Press, 1988): 4: 351-374.  On marriage and kinship, see Gary Clayton Anderson, Kinsmen 
of Another Kind: Dakota-White Relations in the Upper Mississippi Valley, 1650-1862 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1984); James F.  Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, 
and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2002); Jennifer S. H.  Brown, Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996); Michael Lansing, “Plains Indian Women and 
Interracial Marriage in the Upper Missouri Trade, 1804-1868, Western Historical Quarterly 31 
(2000): 413-33; Tanis C. Thorne, “Marriage Alliance and the Fur Trade: Bent, St. Vrain, and 
Company, 1831-1849” (M.A. Thesis, University of California-Los Angeles, 1979); Sylvia Van 
Kirk, Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur Trade Society, 1670-1870 (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1980).     
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scope of business operations.  Ties with the Cheyennes could alienate their 
traditional enemies, making it dangerous for company traders to venture east into 
Pawnee territory, or west into the Ute country.  Most alarming was the conflict 
between the Cheyennes and Comanches.  Comanche hostility to the Cheyennes 
blocked the southward expansion of company trade.  Not until the tribes made 
peace in 1840 could the Bents and St. Vrain begin to trade in Comanchería.  Yet, 
although the potential for continued interaction may have helped predispose the 
Comanches and Cheyennes to reconcile their differences, both groups had reasons 
for making peace that had little or nothing to do with the partners.  Contrary to the 
arguments of historians writing in the first half of the twentieth century, the Bents 
did not call the shots on the Southern Plains.  Local Indian groups interacted with 
the company when it suited their interests, and ignored it when they wished. 
 Accommodation and interpersonal relationships proved just as important in 
Missouri as in the Cheyenne villages along the Arkansas River.  In order to 
function efficiently, Bent-St. Vrain also had to cultivate ties with the Missouri 
business community.  Utilizing longstanding social and familial relationships, the 
partners relied upon the Missouri merchants to supply their western ventures and to 
market the products of their Indian trade.  The Bents and St. Vrain lacked the 
economic clout to deal directly with wholesalers or fur dealers on the eastern 
seaboard, so they relied upon those in the St. Louis mercantile community who did.  
An arrangement with Pierre Chouteau, Jr., the city‟s best-connected trader, allowed 
the partners to import the goods necessary to their trade along the Arkansas and in 
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New Mexico.  Chouteau also acted as salesman for the buffalo robes the company 
wagon trains brought east nearly every summer.
5
 
 The weak presence of the United States government on the Great Plains 
allowed the company to circumvent national laws in order to rid itself of the 
competition it faced from independent American traders and New Mexican 
merchants for control of the Indian trade.  In response, the partners deviated from 
their generally accommodating business model.  They complained loudly that these 
traders used alcohol to attract clients, in direct contravention of national law.  
However, to check this menace, the Bents and St. Vrain fought liquor with liquor.  
While self-righteously condemning the actions of the smalltime whiskey peddlers, 
the partners spent thousands of dollars smuggling their own supply of booze into 
Indian Country.  Furthermore, the Bents did not shy away from using violence 
when they thought it would benefit business.  In 1834, William Bent ordered a raid 
on a peaceful band of Shoshones encamped at the trading post of rival John Gantt.  
                                                 
5
 Historians of the period have long recognized the connections between the fur trade and larger 
continental and international markets.  See T. Lindsay Baker, “From Beavers to Robes: Transition in 
the Fur Trade,” Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly 23 (Spring 1987): 1-8 and (Summer 1987): 4-
13; Bernard DeVoto, Across the Wide Missouri (New York: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1947; Mariner 
Books, 1998); John E. Sunder, the Fur Trade on the Upper Missouri, 1840-1865 (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1965).  The two best examinations of these connections are Barton 
Barbour, Fort Union and the Upper Missouri Fur Trade (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2001); and David J. Wishart, The Fur Trade of the American West, 1807-1840: A Geographical 
Synthesis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992).  The best study of the fur trade in the 
Southwest is David J.  Weber‟s The Taos Trappers: The Fur Trade in the Far Southwest, 1540-1846 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971).  Robert Glass Cleland‟s This Reckless Breed of 
Men: The Trappers and Fur Traders of the Southwest (New York: Knopf, 1950) is worth 
consulting, but is less useful than Weber.  On the Chouteaus and their business operations see 
Shirley Christian, Before Lewis and Clark: The Story of the Chouteaus, the French Dynasty that 
Ruled America‟s Frontier (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2004); Jay Gitlin The Bourgeois 
Frontier: French Towns, French Traders, and American Expansion (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2010); and Stan Hoig, The Chouteaus: First Family of the Fur Trade (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 2008). 
9 
 
Bent‟s men killed and scalped a number of Shoshones, they also captured women 
and horses.  This preemptive strike drove Gantt out of business.  In the course of 
the Indian trade, then, Bent-St. Vrain mixed peaceful accommodation with 
chicanery and occasional violence to protect business. 
 Bent-St. Vrain complimented its Indian trade by doing business in New 
Mexico.  Ceran St. Vrain first came to New Mexico intending to outfit the fur 
trappers who roamed the Southern Rockies.  Charles Bent arrived in New Mexico 
in 1829 with a caravan of Santa Fe traders.  As with the Indian trade, enterprise in 
New Mexico required the cultivation of a wide range of contacts at both ends of the 
Santa Fe Trail.  The same firms who outfitted the Bents and St. Vrain for the Indian 
trade supplied the partners with the goods sought by New Mexican consumers.  At 
the same time, the wisest American merchants formed connections in Santa Fe.  
American traders accommodated to local circumstances by learning Spanish and 
sometimes forming partnerships with Hispanic traders and merchants.  However, 
there was a seamier side to the commerce of the prairies.  Traders like the Bents 
and St. Vrain bribed customs officials and acquired reputations as smugglers.  Yet 
even these shadier practices also represented a form of pragmatic accommodation 
by all parties involved.  New Mexico relied heavily upon trade with the United 
States and when officials in Mexico City attempted to interdict this commerce with 
restrictions, embargoes, or prohibitively high tariff duties, officials in Santa Fe 
often ignored the directives of their superiors to the south.  Bribery and 
arrangements with local government officials represented a case where the 
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exigencies of local circumstances trumped potentially harmful policies emanating 
from the national capitals.
6
  In New Mexico, as along the Arkansas, the partners 
recognized the benefits of intermarriage with the local population.  Unions with 
New Mexican women, church-sanctioned or otherwise, functioned like marriage to 
Indian women.  Marriage had the potential to expand the circle of commercial 
contacts, both potential customers and suppliers.  Although the Hispanic population 
of northern New Mexico was nowhere near as wealthy or powerful as the ricos 
living south of Santa Fe, let alone the dons of California, marrying into a prominent 
Taos family had its own benefits.  New unions could bring political favors in 
                                                 
6
 Josiah Gregg‟s 1844 classic Commerce of the Prairies remains the best single account of the Santa 
Fe Trail.  I have also consulted David Dary and R. L.  Duffus.  The best recent survey of the trade 
with New Mexico is by Stephen Hyslop.  In the last twenty years, historians have begun turning 
more attention to the actions of Mexican traders and have sought to situate their activities within a 
market network spanning nearly the entirety of North America.  The best work on the topic is Susan 
Calafate Boyle‟s Los Capitalistas.  Other useful treatments include Sterling Evans, “Eastward Ho!” 
and the work of David Sandoval.  Max Moorhead‟s New Mexico‟s Royal Road is old, but still very 
relevant to the study of the Santa Fe Trail.  The best analysis of Missouri merchants and their 
connections to the Santa Fe trade and eastern markets can be found in the work of Lewis E.  
Atherton.  See Josiah Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, ed. Max Moorhead (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1954); David Dary, The Santa Fe Trail: Its History, Legends, and Lore (New 
York: Knopf, 2000); R.L. Duffus, The Santa Fe Trail (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 1930);Stephen Hyslop, Bound for Santa Fe: The Road to New Mexico and the American 
Conquest, 1806-1848 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002).  For Hispanic involvement in 
the Santa Fe Trade see, Susan Calafate Boyle, Los Capitalistas: Hispano Merchants and the Santa 
Fe Trade (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997); Sterling Evans, “Eastward Ho!: 
The Mexican Freighting and Commerce Experience Along the Santa Fe Trail,” Kansas History: A 
Journal of the Central Plains 19 (Winter 1996-1997): 242-261; David A. Sandoval, “Gnats, Goods, 
and Greasers: Mexican Merchants on the Santa Fe Trail,” in The Mexican Road: Trade, Travel, and 
Confrontation on the Santa Fe Trail, ed. Mark L. Gardner (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University 
Press, 1989): 22-31; Sandoval, “Montezuma‟s Merchants: Mexican Traders on the Santa Fe Trail,” 
in Adventure on the Santa Fe Trail, ed. Leo E. Oliva (Topeka: Kansas State Historical Society, 
1988): 37-60.  The best work on the Chihuahua Trail remains Max L. Moorhead, New Mexico‟s 
Royal Road: Trade and Travel on the Chihuahua Trail (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1958).  Lewis Atherton was the most thorough expositor of the connections between Missouri 
merchants and eastern businesses.  See Lewis E. Atherton, The Frontier Merchant in Mid-America 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971); “Business Techniques in the Santa Fe Trade,” 
Missouri Historical Review 34 (April 1940): 335-341; “James and Robert Aull – A Frontier 
Missouri Mercantile Firm,” Missouri Historical Review 30 (October 1935): 3-27; “The Santa Fe 
Trader as Mercantile Capitalist,” Missouri Historical Review 77 (October 1982): 1-12. 
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addition to the possibility of acquiring vast land grants.  By the late-1840s, Charles 
Bent and Ceran St. Vrain had established themselves as leaders of a pro-American 
political and economic faction in Taos. 
 If Bent-St. Vrain‟s Indian trade brought the firm great profit, it also 
threatened to undermine the political stability of New Mexico.  This is not to say 
that the company by itself caused New Mexico‟s weakened state by the time of the 
war with the United States.  Nevertheless, the Bents and St. Vrain caused some 
officials in Santa Fe great disquiet.  In the first place, Mexican nationalists viewed 
Americans like Charles Bent with deep suspicion.  Rumors spread that the emigrant 
community had abetted attempts by the Republic of Texas to annex New Mexico in 
1841 and 1843.  More important, through trade with nomadic Indians like the 
Comanches, Utes, and Cheyennes, the company presented a threat to the security of 
the province.  Critics such as the Taos priest Antonio José Martínez accused 
American traders like the Bents of supplying Indians with guns and alcohol.  These 
customers, well armed and well-lubricated, raided across Mexico‟s northern 
frontier, burning, killing, raping, and stealing.  Laden down with plunder, they 
returned to unquestioning American traders to dispose of the booty.  Records 
indicate that the partners did import guns and alcohol into Indian Country, although 
it is impossible to determine the precise extent of the company‟s involvement in 
this shadowy borderlands economy.  Furthermore, when critics like Martínez 
placed the blame for Indian raiding upon American traders, they disregarded the 
12 
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 The extension of American power into the Southwest during the war with 
Mexico simultaneously brought Bent-St. Vrain to the height of its influence and 
destroyed the company‟s long-term economic prospects. The success of the trade 
based out of Bent‟s Fort made the post a natural launching point for the invasion of 
New Mexico in 1846.  Guided part of the way by William Bent, the Army of the 
West marched into Santa Fe in August without firing a shot, where General 
Stephen Watts Kearny proceeded quickly to establish a new civil government.  
Rather than accommodate local New Mexican politicians, Kearny made Charles 
Bent governor, and appointed other influential members of the pro-American 
faction to positions of authority.  Discontent with the new regime – discontent that 
had deep roots – exploded in Taos in January 1847.  Mexican nationalists and their 
Indian allies killed Charles Bent and a number of his associates before being 
ruthlessly subdued by an American force from Santa Fe.  The death of Charles Bent 
and the extension of American power into the Southwest dealt Bent-St. Vrain a 
crippling blow.  By late 1847, William Bent and Ceran St. Vrain had dissolved 
their partnership.  The Mexican-American War led to increased traffic along the 
Santa Fe Trail.  With the larger volume of travelers and animals, local Indians had 
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to compete for rapidly dwindling natural resources.  So many new arrivals led to 
increased violence, which made William Bent‟s trading operation untenable.  
Furthermore, his best clients, the Southern Cheyennes, suffered from disease and 
drought.  Although Bent-St. Vrain rarely expressed any interest in the expansion of 
American influence in the Southwest, Manifest Destiny came anyways.  When it 
came, it came as a disruptive intrusion, profoundly altering the worlds of the Bents, 
St. Vrain, and their associates, both Indian and New Mexican.
8
 
 The story of Bent-St. Vrain is, ultimately, a story of pragmatic adaptation in 
and to a complex and fluid borderlands world.  Far from the centers of power, 
residents of the Southwest - Anglos, Hispanic, and native - sought to carve out their 
own space.  They either ignored or accommodated directives from Washington and 
Mexico City as local circumstances dictated.  Nevertheless, the Southwest 
Borderlands were not unattached to larger trends and markets.  The economic 
success of traders like the Bents and St. Vrain depended upon sustained contact 
with people, places, and markets far beyond the upper Arkansas River and Santa 
Fe.  The company conducted business at the intersection of trade networks that 
spanned much of the North American continent.  Goods and persons flowed back 
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and forth over long-established trade routes stretching east through Missouri to 
Atlantic port cities, west over the Old Spanish Trail to California, north to the 
Platte and Missouri rivers, and south along the Camino Real deep into the Mexican 
interior.  Thus, while local custom and circumstances informed the decision making 
process of borderlands residents, they could not escape or ignore their connections 
to the larger world.  The Bents and St. Vrain recognized the necessity of 
accommodation in this diverse environment, and they often adapted successfully.   
Disparate peoples came together in the Southwest Borderlands, to trade and 
to establish kinship relations.  However, enterprise in the borderlands could also be 
hazardous.  The partners had to navigate the treacherous political waters of the 
Southern Plains and New Mexico.  They could not dictate the terms of interaction.  
Yet, the ways they interacted with New Mexicans and Indians caused great unease 
to those seeking to keep the northern frontier attached to Mexico.  Suspicion was 
rampant, charge and countercharge flew back and forth.  The war between the 
United States and Mexico, and the Taos Revolt of 1847 demonstrated the limits of 
accommodation in the borderlands.  Cooperation, judiciously combined with illegal 
activity, had build Bent-St. Vrain‟s business enterprise.  Violence destroyed it.  
Thus, the borderlands of the Southwest were a place of great opportunity and, 
ultimately, great danger for the Bent brothers and Ceran St. Vrain.
9
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 The source material for this project is scattered across the United States, 
literally from coast to coast.  The nature of the source material raises an interesting 
issue, though.  I endeavored to write the history of a business that left no records.  
No Bent-St. Vrain ledger books survive.  Nor are there any consistently kept day-
to-day records of life at Bent‟s Fort.  Remarkably, however, the partners and their 
activities show up all over the place.  Anyone traveling through the region 
gravitated to Bent‟s Fort, and those who were literate usually recorded some 
impression of the fort, the partners, and the business.  The most sizable collection 
of material relating directly to the partners is a set of approximately eighty letters 
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composed by Charles Bent and addressed to the United States Consul in Santa Fe, 
Manuel Alvarez.  These letters deal primarily with issues regarding New Mexico.  
More scattered are the glimpses of the company‟s business operations that appear 
in the ledger books of Pierre Chouteau, Jr. and his St. Louis associates.  
Regrettably, the records are often incomplete:  a letter here, a brief mention there, a 
promissory note, an insurance policy, or an invoice.  Therefore, I have constructed 
my analysis of how Bent-St. Vrain ran its business largely based upon what 
historians know of other, better-documented trading companies.  Whenever 
possible, I have supplemented this broad discussion with examples specific to the 
company.  I feel confident in this approach because I have read nothing to indicate 
that Bent-St. Vrain was in any way an atypical western company, either in their 
trade with the Indians or in their commerce with Missouri and Santa Fe.  Finally, 
although this project takes a tentative stab at incorporating Mexican and Indian 
views of the company, I am not an ethnohistorian nor have I done more than dip a 
toe into the Mexican Archives of New Mexico.  This narrative centers upon Bent-
St. Vrain primarily, although I have attempted to situate their activities in as broad 
a context as possible. 
 This dissertation consists of fourteen chapters.  The introduction lays out 
the methodology and historiography. Chapter one gives a brief discussion of the 
history of the Southern Plains and Rockies from before European contact to the 
“opening” of the Santa Fe Trail in 1821.  This broad treatment seeks to illustrate 
the wide range of trade and social networks predating the construction of Bent‟s 
18 
 
Fort.  Rather than originators, the Bents and St. Vrain grafted themselves onto a 
web of trade that had existed for centuries.  Chapters two and three trace the early 
exploits of the Bents and St. Vrain.  By analyzing their activities up to 1834, we 
can see that they entered the borderlands with a wide range of business experiences 
and a host of eastern contacts to facilitate the establishment of their company.  
Chapters four through six deal with Bent-St. Vrain‟s Indian trade, the company‟s 
immersion in the world of Southern Plains Indian politics, and its contest with rival 
American traders along the South Platte River.  Chapters seven and eight cover the 
company‟s trade with New Mexico over the Santa Fe Trail, as well as the larger 
continental business connections that facilitated this commerce.  Chapters nine 
through eleven discuss the increasingly tense relationship between the company 
and their New Mexican neighbors.  Chapters twelve through fourteen are a 
chronological assessment of the conquest of New Mexico and the declining 
fortunes of Bent-St. Vrain between 1846 and 1849.  Rather than bringing enhanced 
prosperity, the American conquest of New Mexico helped undo the company.  
Furthermore, I demonstrate the ways in which politics, war, disease, and 
environmental degradation undermined both the tribes of the Southern Plains and 
William Bent‟s struggling business.  The history of the Southern Plains does not 
end when William Bent abandoned his Arkansas River post in the summer of 1849, 
nor does the story of the region‟s economic dynamism begin with the completion of 




Chapter 1 - Peoples in Motion, Trails to Everywhere:  The Southern Plains to 1821 
 
When the Bent brothers entered the upper Arkansas River Valley, they 
found a region with a well-established history as a crossroads of economic 
exchange and geopolitical confrontation.  Interregional trade between the plains 
tribes and the Pueblo world long predated the Spanish entradas of the sixteenth 
century.  The Spaniards, as well as later native arrivals like the Comanches and 
Cheyennes, grafted themselves onto preexisting trade networks, moving hides, 
buffalo meat, crops, textiles, pottery, and slaves back and forth throughout the 
region.  By 1821, the Mexicans and these tribes traded over a network of trails 
stretching in every direction:  east to the Mississippi River, west to the Pacific 
Ocean, north towards Canada, and south into the Mexican interior.  The upper 
Arkansas Basin was also a fluid political borderland.  Neither Spain nor Mexico 
could not control the region. Comanches and Cheyennes warred over it.  Americans 
like the Bents sought to carve out their own autonomous space within it.  The 
region‟s economic potential was great, but its politics were unsettled.  Exploitation 
of its resources required shrewdness and tact.  Around 1830, Bent-St. Vrain entered 
a borderland already contested by the Spanish and Native Americans for nearly 
three hundred years. 
 American traders like the Bents utilized a network of Indian trails that 
crisscrossed the Great Plains, a system linking the tallgrass prairies to the rest of the 
North American continent west of the Mississippi River.  Persons and goods from 
20 
 
the Mississippian civilizations, Rio Grande Pueblos, the Missouri River villages, 
the Columbia Plateau, and Canada passed through the Southern Plains.  Most trails 
followed rivers and streams, crossing the high dividing ridges between the 
drainages, leading trading parties from waterhole to waterhole.  The ease of travel 
along natural highways like the Arkansas River Valley kept Native American 
peoples in constant contact, contact that facilitated the spread of beliefs, goods and 
services.  The route of the future Santa Fe Trail, the artery that connected the 
Bent‟s and New Mexico to the Missouri frontier, was old centuries before 
Coronado.  As early as 1000 A.D., the point where the trail first met the Arkansas 
River, in present-day central Kansas, was a trading point for Hopewellian farmer-
traders and their counterparts from the Pueblos of the Rio Grande.  While no group 
may have traveled the full length of the route from its terminuses at either end of 
the plains, the east-west trail was well known.
1
 
 Ancient roads also connected the villagers of the upper Rio Grande with the 
civilizations of northern Mesoamerica.  Although goods never found their way to 
the upper Rio Grande in substantial amounts, the trade with Mexican city-states 
benefited outlying frontier trade centers like Casas Grandes in northern Chihuahua 
and the Hohokam towns of the Gila River Valley.  From these trade hubs, luxury 
goods and agricultural technology filtered north and west.  Turquoise from the 
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mines around Cerrillos, New Mexico found its way to Sonora, the Pacific Coast, 
and the edges of Mexico‟s central valley.  By the fourteenth century, the decline of 
Casas Grandes reoriented the patterns and directions of trade:  Mesoamerican 
products shifted primarily to Sonora, while the Puebloan peoples began looking 
towards the nomads of the Southern Plains.
2
 
 Trade between the Plains and Pueblos accelerated around the year 1400, 
solidifying a link between the two regions that continued well into the nineteenth 
century.  During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Athapaskan peoples from 
the Northern Plains and Rocky Mountains began following bison herds driven 
south by the onset of the Little Ice Age.  In the Rio Grande villages, these hunters 
found a ready market for their surplus bison products.  Trade intensified in volume 
during the next two centuries and by 1600 the Pueblo agriculturalists and Plains 
hunters were interdependent.  Located closest to the bison herds, Pecos, the 
easternmost Pueblo, reaped the largest share of the lucrative plains trade.  Although 
Taos and Picuris, located higher in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains challenged 
Pecos for this commerce, Pecos remained the primary gateway to the Plains until 
the early 1800s.
3
   
 Trade relations between the Plains and New Mexico developed 
symbiotically.  Each group specialized in products the other found necessary for 
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survival.  Rio Grande Pueblos, and later Hispanic New Mexican settlements, 
provided carbohydrates in the form of grains and vegetables, while nomads traded 
protein in the form of buffalo meat.  As long as New Mexican agriculturalists 
remained at peace with the nomads, the fields of the Rio Grande river valley proved 
a reliable source of garden products, which offset the occasionally unpredictable 
nature of the buffalo hunt.  On the other hand, the expanding population of New 
Mexico gave the plains hunters a dependable market for meat and the hides 
necessary for winter clothing, bedding, and export.
4
   
Not all of the interregional trade was licit, however.  Despite proclamations 
by Spanish authorities banning such activities, contraband in the form of guns, 
liquor, stolen livestock, and captives flowed from the Plains to trade fairs at Pecos 
and Taos, and from the New Mexican settlements eastward.
5
  While some of this 
trade took place at government-sponsored fairs, the rest of it occurred in informal, 
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unsanctioned gatherings at places like Ojo Caliente, Abiquiu, Las Trampas, Las 
Truchas, and Chimayo.  Legal strictures did little to prevent this illegal trade.  For 
example, in 1746 Governor Joaquín Codallos y Rabal banned the Comanches from 
trading at Taos and threatened any Taoseño who attempted to trade with the 
Comanches with death.  The decree had no tangible effect.  Prohibitions against 
selling guns to Plains Indians went unenforced, as did the ban on slave trading.  
When nomadic Indians stayed away from the New Mexican settlements, Hispanic 
and Pueblo traders went to them.  The area near Bent‟s Fort had long been a site of 
trade between parties from New Mexico and Indian bands.  The Purgatoire River 
valley provided a convenient path from the Arkansas River to the vicinity of Taos, 
and Hispanics referred to the trade site in the vicinity of the fort as „La Nutria,‟ the 
place of beaver.   
 Although New Mexican authorities and villagers attempted to harness the 
economic potential of the Plains trade, they could do little to secure their borders 
against Indian or potential European incursions from the north and east.  The Plains 
presented New Mexico with a paradox: they could be a rich source of hides, 
foodstuffs, and ideas.  However, the grasslands were also a source of death, chaos, 
and robbery.
6
  The rising power of the Comanches throughout the eighteenth 
century, coupled with the potential of French intrusions from Illinois and 
Louisiana, kept New Mexico‟s political borderlands in a constant state of upheaval.  
By the late-seventeenth century, French incursions on the eastern edge of the 
prairies forced New Mexican officials to direct more attention to the north and east 
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of Santa Fe.  From the perspective of Spanish policymakers, the activities of 
LaSalle in Texas, his lieutenant Henri Tonty on the Arkansas, and the probes of 
nameless traders from Illinois represented a potential threat to Santa Fe and, by 
extension, the rich silver mines of northern Mexico.
7
   
Between 1720 and the 1750s, rumors about Frenchmen meddling with the 
plains tribes, as well as the arrival of straggling bands of French traders in New 
Mexico itself heightened Spanish fears and reinforced the tenuousness of their own 
border defenses.  In addition to the French threat, New Mexico suffered grievously 
from Indian raids during the latter half of the eighteenth century.  Not until the late-
1780s did the Spanish reach a peace agreement with the Comanches, the most 
powerful tribe in the region.  The Comanche Peace with New Mexico held, more or 
less intact, into the 1840s.  Peace with the Comanches allowed Spaniards to resume 
exploration east and north.  One party, led by Pedro Vial, eventually approximated 
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the entire length of the Santa Fe Trail from New Mexico to Missouri.  However, by 
the earliest years of the nineteenth century, Americans replaced the French as the 
greatest potential non-Indian threat to the security of Spanish New Mexico.
8
 
New Mexico‟s economy grew modestly between 1609 and 1821.  Links to 
southern markets were crucial to the survival of the isolated colony.  While the 
balance of goods flowed up the Camino Real into Santa Fe, New Mexico exported 
sheep, blankets, buffalo robes, piñon nuts, and slaves.
9
  Still, high prices and 
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usurious credit rates, combined with the inability to obtain goods from non-Spanish 
markets hampered the development of an autonomous New Mexican economy.  By 
1821, the residents of the far north were primed to welcome American traders like 
the Bents.  The opening of the frontier to this commerce slowly shifted the 
province‟s economic orientation away from Chihuahua and Mexico, and east 
towards Missouri and the United States. 
Supply caravans set up to furnish the colony‟s missions provided the first 
outlet for the north-south trade.  Shortly after the Crown took over administration 
of New Mexico in 1609, it began to subsidize the resupply of the regional missions.  
Technically, these caravans were authorized to supply the Franciscans alone.  
However,  they provided the fundamental means of communication and supply for 
New Mexico during the seventeenth century.
10
  Under ideal circumstances, the 
caravans traveled to Santa Fe once every three years, with planners allotting six 
months to travel north, six months to dispose of the goods, and six months for the 
return trip.  However, departures were inconsistent, and colonists sometimes went 
six or seven years without seeing the caravans from the south.  This trend of 
official neglect continued into the Mexican Period; New Mexicans rarely held the 
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attention of administrators in the national capital for long.  By the 1760s and 1770s, 
direct trade with Chihuahua became the primary means of supplying New Mexico, 
until the establishment of trade with the United States in 1821.
11
  
  The Chihuahua trade accelerated during the mid-eighteenth century in 
response to the northern advance of New Spain‟s mining frontier.  Growing up 
around rich silver mines, Chihuahua, Parral, Guanajuato, and Durango gave New 
Mexican colonists a market for local products.  Sheep constituted the largest single 
export from New Mexico to the southern cities.  Although the Pueblo Revolt of 
1680 checked their growth, New Mexican flocks expanded rapidly during the early-
1700s in conjunction with the expanding mining frontier.  As the scale of supply 
and demand grew, the trade took on a more complex shape, with regularly 
scheduled caravans, called corodones or conductas, leaving New Mexico.  New 
Mexican sheep barons also relied upon specialized wool retailers in Chihuahua and 
other cites to dispose of their product and fill specific purchase orders.  A few 
families, centered on Albuquerque, rapidly grew to dominate the New Mexican 
export trade in general and the sheep business in particular.  By one estimate, the 
Armijos, Chávezes, Oteros, and Yrizarris controlled eighty percent of the colony‟s 
exports.
12
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 Despite their modest success on the regional level, New Mexican 
businessmen labored under the twin burdens of distance and Spanish trade policies.  
In an effort to protect domestic markets and maximize profits, the Crown forbade 
all trade with foreigners.  Because the preponderance of goods reaching the frontier 
flowed through the port of Veracruz to Mexico City, and north to regional 
distribution centers like Chihuahua, before finally reaching New Mexico.  In 
addition to the costs of shipping over such long distances, frontier consumers faced 
monopolies, price-fixing, excise taxes, and high credit rates.  Due to these factors, 
the price of goods often quadrupled between Veracruz and Santa Fe.
13
  Chihuahuan 
merchants quickly monopolized the New Mexican trade.  A key factor in 
Chihuahua‟s dominance was the fact that hard currency was in woefully short 
supply in New Mexico.  Because of the specie shortage, northern frontiersmen 
purchased most of their goods on credit, pledging future flocks or harvests as 
collateral.  Such disadvantages meant that New Mexicans would quickly take 
advantage of the situation if new suppliers and markets became available.  Such 
opportunities presented themselves in the first years of the nineteenth century, as 
American traders made tentative forays towards Santa Fe.  Although Spanish 
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officials greeted the Yankees coolly, by the time of Mexican Independence frontier 
residents readily embraced the opportunity for such contact.
14
 
 Despite the fact that many of the first expeditions to Santa Fe from the 
United States ended in incarceration or deportation, American traders viewed New 
Mexico as a potentially lucrative market and the New Mexicans themselves as 
enthusiastic consumers of American products.  Consistent attempts to breach 
Spain‟s economic blockade around her northern provinces began in 1804.  In that 
year, William Morrison, a merchant from Kaskaskia, Illinois sent his employee 
Baptiste LaLande to Santa Fe to scout out future trade prospects.  LaLande never 
returned to the United States.
15
  The arrival of Zebulon Pike, a United States 
military officer, and his men in 1807 caused Spanish authorities great 
consternation.  Ordered to explore the Red River country, Pike‟s company arrived 
at the foot of the Rocky Mountains in the late autumn of 1806-1807.  After 
tramping about in the Sangre de Cristos, Pike built a stockade on the Conejos River 
in Spanish territory.  Spanish soldiers arrested Pike and his men, and marched them 
to Santa Fe.  From the capital, authorities escorted the Americans deeper into 
Mexico before deporting them back to the United States.  Pike‟s private letters and 
his official reports caused a stir among Americans seeking economic opportunities 
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in the Southwest, spurring more attempts to trade with Santa Fe culminating with 
William Becknell‟s expedition in 1821.
16
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 If any American deserves the title “Father of the Santa Fe Trade,” William 
Becknell of Missouri warrants that distinction.  Becknell‟s 1821 trip to Santa Fe 
established regular annual contact between New Mexico and Missouri.  His salt 
business failing, and deeply in debt, Becknell placed an ad in the Missouri 
Intelligencer announcing a trading and wild horse catching expedition to the 
western prairies.  Becknell‟s decision to move on to New Mexico was a calculated 
gamble.  Although he knew the stories of imprisoned American traders, he had also 
heard rumors that Mexico had recently declared independence from Spain.  
Independence might mean new, trade policies.
17
  Becknell and a small party 
departed Missouri on September 1, 1821.  They traveled west along the Arkansas 
River, turned south near the Rockies, and reached Raton Pass in late-October.  
They crossed the pass into New Mexico, and met a contingent of soldiers on 
November 13.  From the troops, Becknell learned of Mexican independence and 
the willingness of New Mexicans to trade with the Yankees.  The Americans 
reached Santa Fe on the sixteenth, where they quickly disposed of their goods.  
Having sold out his stock, Becknell returned to Missouri for more.  The majority of 
his men remained in New Mexico, possibly trapping beaver during the winter of 
1821-1822.  Becknell turned a two thousand percent profit on his modest 
investment of $3,000.  Upon his return to the United States, he became a booster 
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for trade with Santa Fe.
18
  Although others had long before demonstrated the 
viability of an overland route to Santa Fe, Becknell proved that the venture could 
be profitable.  Most important, the New Mexicans welcomed trade with the United 
States.  Josiah Gregg wrote that, “The favorable reports brought by the enterprising 
Captain, stimulated others to embark in the trade.”
19
  The events of 1821 marked 
the beginning of an intensified relationship between Mexico‟s northern frontier and 
the far west of the United States, a relationship that Bent-St. Vrain took full 
advantage of a decade later. 
 From the early1700s until the middle of the nineteenth century, anyone 
seeking the main chance on the Southern Plains had to confront the most dominant 
military and economic power in the region:  the Comanches.  New Mexico‟s 
economic fortunes and frontier security hinged upon good relations with the tribe.  
During times of peace, goods flowed back and forth between the Rio Grande 
settlements and the plains.  When peace collapsed, no frontier settlement was safe.  
In addition to trade with New Mexico, the Comanches played an integral role in 
linking together the native economies of the trans-Mississippi West.  However, 
their vast horse herds – the source of their economic power – drew northern rivals 
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closer to the Arkansas River.  The arrival of the Cheyennes in the 1820s marked the 
beginning of nearly two decades of intertribal conflict over the region.  American 
traders like the Bents insinuated themselves carefully into a complex political and 
economic borderland where native peoples held the upper hand.
20
 
 It took only a generation for the Comanches to establish their dominance 
over the Southern Plains.  A Shoshonean people originating in the Great Basin, the 
ancestors of the Comanches migrated east into the Rockies before venturing onto 
the plains.  During the late-seventeenth century, Comanche bands split off from 
their Shoshone relatives.  Turning south along the Front Range, the Comanches 
followed the bison herds, drawing closer to the region‟s most reliable source of 
horses:  New Mexico.  With the help of the Utes, the Comanches quickly mastered 
the equestrian, nomadic lifestyle.  Soon the Ute-Comanche alliance was hammering 
New Mexico‟s northern frontier, dominating the region by the 1720s.  During the 
same decade, the Comanches also turned their attention east.  They clashed with the 
Apaches over access to the river valleys critical to the maintenance of horse herds.  
The Apaches, a semisedentary people, made an easy target for well-mounted 
Comanche war parties.  By the end of the decade, the Comanches held a firm grip 
on the upper Arkansas River Valley.  With the Apaches out of the way, the 
Comanches turned their attention back to New Mexico and Spanish Texas.  
Relations with New Mexico fluctuated between war and peace from 1760 into the 
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1780s.  When peace cam, it held into the 1840s.  Meanwhile, the Comanches 
continued their campaigns against native opponents: the Pawnees and Osages to the 
east, Apaches to the south, Navajos to the west, and the Cheyennes and Arapahos 
to the north.
21
    
 Comanche preeminence on the Southern Plains rested upon economic as 
well as military power.  By driving the Apaches out of the Arkansas Valley, the 
Comanches established themselves as the preeminent traders of the region.  They 
tapped into the long-established plains-Rio Grande trade, bringing buffalo hides, 
meat, horses and captives to the trade fairs at Taos and Pecos.  Their position along 
the Arkansas also allowed the Comanches to establish broad trading ties with other 
Indian groups throughout the Great Plains.
22
  Comanchería was the southern anchor 
of the plains trade system.  The Mandan and Hidatsa villages of the Missouri River 
formed the northern axis.  From the upper Arkansas River Valley, Comanche 
horses and mules flowed north and east in exchange for guns, metalwork and 
textiles.  Because of their domination of the Southern Plains trade networks, the 
Comanches often controlled the flow of important products like guns and horses.  
Through the control of such crucial technology, they held the regional balance of 
power until someone could displace them.
23
   
 The vast Comanche horse herds were the lodestone that drew native traders 
and raiders to the upper Arkansas.  Although meat and hides constituted a large 
                                                 
21
Calloway, One Vast Winter Count, 384; Hӓmӓlӓinen, Comanche Empire, 21-28, 31-37, 47-55, 74-
106, 117-140; Kavanagh, 178. 
22
 Hӓmӓlӓinen, “Western Comanche Trade Center,” 495-6. 
23
 Hӓmӓlӓinen, Comanche Empire, 72, 168-70; Hӓmӓlӓinen, “Western Comanche Trade Center,” 
487-501; Kavanagh, The Comanches, 177, 181. 
35 
 
portion of Comanche trade goods, their horse herds formed the backbone of the 
tribe‟s economic wealth and military power.  The river valleys of Comanchería 
were crucial to the growth and maintenance of the tribal herds.  The Arkansas River 
marked a critical environmental dividing line.  North of the river, year-round horse 
husbandry was difficult.  The harsh plains winters, especially north of the Platte, 
cut deeply into the herds of tribes like the Crows, Blackfeet, Lakotas, and 
Cheyennes.  Winters along the Arkansas were mild by comparison, a pivotal factor 
in the rapid natural increase of the Comanche herds.  However, natural conditions 
and the equestrian wealth they produced attracted raiders from the Northern Plains.  
The potential for their own horse wealth drew the Cheyennes south towards the 
Arkansas in the early-nineteenth century.  Rather than simply acting as 
intermediaries between the Comanches and the Missouri River villages, the 
Cheyennes hoped to carve out their own autonomous space within the region.
24
   
 Over the course of nearly a century, the Cheyennes transformed themselves 
from a woodlands people into equestrian nomads.  Around 1680, they began to 
move west towards the Mississippi River from their home in the Mille Lacs region 
of Minnesota.  It is impossible to state definitively why the Cheyenne migration 
began, but it most likely came about because of military pressure from the 
Chippewas, Crees, and Assiniboins.  By the 1770s, the woodlands refugees settled 
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along the Sheyenne River in North Dakota.  Here, they first acquired horses but not 
firearms.
25
  Despite the entry of the horse into Cheyenne culture, they maintained a 
semi-sedentary lifestyle throughout most of the eighteenth century.  The horse 
allowed them to supplement agricultural harvests with seasonal buffalo hunts.  
However, disease and Sioux incursions forced the Cheyennes west again.  Around 
1800 the lure of better trade opportunities and access to bison herds drew the 
Cheyennes further south and west across the Missouri, towards the Black Hills, 
where they completed their transition to nomadism.
26
 
 During the early years of the nineteenth century, the Cheyennes warred, 
allied, and traded with their plains neighbors.  When they first entered the plains, 
the Cheyennes were a small group, militarily incapable of challenging larger tribes 
like the Blackfeet or Sioux. Cheyenne vulnerability forced them to seek out allies.  
By the late-eighteenth century, they formed an indissoluble bond with the 
Arapahos.
27
  This new alliance commenced to war with the Shoshones, Utes, 
Kiowas, Crows, and Blackfeet over lucrative trade routes.  The Cheyenne‟s 
relationship with the most powerful tribe on the northern plains, the Sioux, was 
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more complex.  Sioux expansion up the Missouri and to the southwest of the river 
displaced numerous groups, including the Cheyennes.  In addition to forcing the 
Cheyennes towards the Black Hills, the Sioux attempted to displace them as the 
middlemen between the Arikara villages of the Missouri River and the western 
plains tribes.  Sioux pressure from the east pushed the Cheyennes up against the 
Kiowas, forcing a confrontation for control of the Black Hills.  Cheyenne military 
prowess displaced the Kiowas, pushing them south.  However, the Sioux kept 
coming, and the Cheyennes eventually abandoned the Black Hills for greener 
pastures south of the Platte River.
28
 
 The Cheyenne migration onto the Central Plains put them in an 
advantageous economic position.  They became the prime movers of goods 
between the northern plains tribes and the Comanches to the south.  The Cheyennes 
were perfectly positioned to take over the venerable role of plains trade middlemen.  
Through their contacts with the agricultural villages of the Missouri River, they 
obtained guns and manufactured goods filtering south from Canada.  The 
Comanche herds along the Arkansas supplied the demands of the northern tribes.  
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The Cheyennes skillfully inserted themselves between the two poles of trade.  They 
acquired large numbers of horses from the Comanches, either through trade or 
raiding.  Driving these horses north, the Cheyennes exchanged them for European 
products at trade fairs around the Black Hills and along the Missouri.  Guns and 
manufactured goods then flowed south.  A member of Major Stephen Long‟s 1819-
1820 expedition to explore the Great Plains noted with amazement the extent of 
this north-south trade and the Cheyennes‟ role in it.  He wrote that the Cheyennes 
“had been recently supplied with goods by the British traders on the Missouri, and 
had come to exchange them…for horses.  The Kiawas, Arrapahoes, etc., who 
wander in the extensive plains of the Arkansa and Red river, have always great 
numbers of horses, which they rear with much less difficulty than the Shiennes, 
whose country is cold and barren.” However, migration further south to the 
Arkansas River had the potential to put the Cheyennes in an even better position.
29
 
 The vast buffalo herds of the Southern Plains and the demand for horses 
pulled the Cheyennes toward the Arkansas.  According to George Bent‟s 
recollections, a band of Blackfeet travelers first relayed to the Cheyennes the news 
of the vast mustang herds ranging between the Platte and Arkansas.  The men of 
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the Hairy Rope Clan, the best mustang catchers in the tribe, led the move south of 
the Platte in 1826.  This new migration resulted in a permanent split within the tribe 
into distinctive northern and southern bands.  Establishing themselves among the 
wild horse herds gave the Cheyennes direct access to the horses craved so 
desperately by their northern neighbors.  The herds could also provide the animals 
necessary to support the Cheyennes‟ own expanding population.  Gaining control 
over the Arkansas Valley could give the Cheyennes and their Arapaho allies the 
same benefits the Comanches gained from the region:  easy access to far-flung 
markets, a salubrious environment for horse husbandry, and a bountiful supply of 
wild game.  The Comanches, however, would not give up the upper Arkansas 
without a fight.  The coming struggle over the region would test the diplomatic 
competence of Bent-St. Vrain during the 1830s.
30
 
 The Bent brothers and Ceran St. Vrain did not enter a vacuum when they 
came to the Arkansas River Valley in the early-1830s.  Although their company 
quickly became a major force, the partners had to play the region‟s political and 
economic games according to longstanding rules and alongside well-established 
players.  Success or failure would often depend upon how well Bent-St. Vrain 
adapted to their surroundings.  These men traveled ancient trails to markets already 
centuries old.  They established multiple trade connections.  They married into 
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local societies.  They became earnest, if not always enthusiastic, participants in the 
triangular geopolitical maneuverings of American, Mexican, and Indian interests.  
Over the course of two decades, the partners reaped large profits and ascended to 
the pinnacle of regional politics, only to be destroyed by their own success.  But, 
before the Bents and St. Vrain could attempt to become masters of their own 
destiny, they had to serve a decade-long apprenticeship in western enterprise along 
the banks of the mighty Missouri River and among the towering peaks of the 
Rocky Mountains.  
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Chapter 2 - Apprenticeship in Western Enterprise: The Bents and St. Vrain to 1828 
 
 The Bent brothers and Ceran St. Vrain spent roughly ten years learning how 
business operated in the trans-Mississippi West.  In the process, they discovered a 
number of things.  The Bents and St. Vrain learned the importance of maintaining 
close ties with the St. Louis business community.  Silas Bent, patriarch of the clan, 
was an associate of the city‟s leading French merchants, while St. Vrain clerked for 
others.  After 1824, St. Vrain used his connections to help underwrite his own 
expeditions in the Southwest.  By the time Bent-St. Vrain formed, the partners had 
enough practical experience to know the importance of economic diversification. 
The company had an interest in three different businesses:  the fur and robe trade, 
the Santa Fe trade, and the Indian trade.  By 1830, the partners had served 
apprenticeships in the first two enterprises and stood poised to enter into the third.  
Finally, both Charles Bent and Ceran St. Vrain learned leadership and 
organizational skills - Bent on the Santa Fe Trail and St. Vrain with the fur trapping 
brigades.  Thus, in the 1820s the partners gained the practical experience as western 
entrepreneurs that enabled them to build a highly successful company that lasted 
for nearly two decades. 
 Although not a member of the St. Louis aristocracy, Silas Bent, patriarch of 
the clan, was not a man without means or connections.  Born in Rutland, 
Massachusetts, in the 1760s, he moved to the Ohio frontier in the late-1780s, 
settling at Marietta in 1788.  During the 1790s, he moved to Wheeling, Virginia, 
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where he studied law.  While in Wheeling, he married Martha Kerr.  Their first son, 
Charles, was born November 11, 1799.  Besides practicing law, Silas ran a store, 
and worked as a surveyor.  Both his legal training and his surveying skills helped 
him advance rapidly.  He became an associate judge of the Court of Common Pleas 
for Washington County, Ohio, before moving the family to the Louisiana Territory 
in 1806.  The move came because of his appointment as the territory‟s principal 
deputy surveyor.  In 1808, he became auditor of public accounts for the St. Louis 
district.  In 1809, he was appointed presiding judge of the Court of Common Pleas 
in St. Louis.  He served on the bench with local French powerbrokers Bernard 
Pratte and Auguste Chouteau.  President James Madison appointed Silas to the 
Missouri Superior Court in 1813, a position he held until 1821.  Following 
Missouri‟s admission into the Union in 1820, Silas became a state senator, and 
clerk of the St. Louis County Court.
1
  While not a local grandee, Silas‟s important 
civil positions allowed his family to live comfortably.
2
  Records indicate that he 
owned a fine home, a few slaves, and a small flock of sheep.  His modest wealth 
and the public positions he held made it imperative for his sons to get an 
education.
3
  The story goes that Charles attended Jefferson College in Canonsburg, 
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Virginia.  Although he never graduated, family lore says Charles studied 
mathematics and medicine.  Another story says that he graduated from West Point, 
but this is a myth.
4
 
 The St. Louis of Charles Bent and Ceran St. Vrain‟s boyhood was the center 
of the western fur trade.  Anyone looking to make their fortune in furs had to 
contend with the Missouri Fur Company, and its driving personality, Manuel Lisa.  
Active on the Upper Missouri since the early-nineteenth century, Lisa served as 
point man for Missouri Fur (organized in the winter of 1808-1809) in the same 
region.  His success inspired conservative St. Louis merchants to risk investment in 
this potentially lucrative market.  Those who did not invest in the Missouri Fur 
Company risked getting locked out altogether.
5
   
 The Lisa company‟s fortunes fluctuated wildly during its sixteen-year 
existence.  Initially, all went well.  In 1809, the company established two posts, one 
on the Missouri River at Cedar Island, and another at the confluence of the 
Yellowstone and Bighorn rivers.  From this latter base, company trappers moved 
into the heart of some of the richest beaver country in the West, the Three Forks 
region of the Missouri River.  Following Lisa‟s death in 1820, the partners planned 
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for another grand push up the Missouri.  In the fall of 1821, the company 
established Fort Benton, at the mouth of the Bighorn.  From Fort Benton, company 
trappers again probed the Three Forks country.  Initially, all went well.  However, 
disaster struck in 1823 when Blackfeet ambushed the main brigade commanded by 
Robert Jones and Michael Immell.  Both Jones and Immell died during the fight.  
The company lost two valuable field commanders, and nearly $16,000 in fur.  
These losses, increased competition from John Jacob Astor‟s American Fur 
Company, and trouble with the Arikara Indians, forced Missouri Fur back to the 
lower river again.  By 1824, the company was bankrupt.
6
 
 Charles Bent got his first lessons in business as an employee of Missouri 
Fur.  Although he may have been clerking for Missouri Fur as early as 1818, the 
first definitive date for his presence on the Missouri River is 1824.  On May 13, 
James Kennerly, a company employee at Council Bluffs wrote, “2 Keel Boats 
arived from upper Missouri of the M.F. Co. – The 2 McDonels, Been, Bent & 
Papin….Mr. Bent presented us with 10 Buffalow Tongues of good quality.”
7
   
Bent‟s role in the company is unclear.  Although he may have served with Jones 
and Immell, there is no direct evidence for this.
8
   
 Former Missouri Fur men, including Charles Bent, formed Pilcher & 
Company in 1825.
9
  Why Bent became a partner is unknown, as is his day-to-day 
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role in the new concern.  Perhaps he demonstrated his clerking abilities while 
employed by Missouri Fur.  More probable, though, he used his family connections 
to come up with a share of the initial startup capital for the company, which totaled 
$7712.82.
10
    
 Pilcher & Company fell apart by 1827.  There was simply too much 
competition on the Missouri.  Trying to squeeze into the spaces left by the Western 
Department of the American Fur Company was difficult.  In addition to the Astor 
behemoth, Pilcher and his men sparred with Ashley‟s company, as well as 
numerous independent French outfits based in St. Louis.  Pilcher was stretched 
perilously thin – three hundred employees covering a thousand miles of river.  In 
addition to logistical problems, credit - an absolute necessity in the fur trade - was 
tight.  As the American Fur Company continued its inexorable march towards 
monopoly on the river, Pilcher had two options: absorption by the AFC, or 
abandoning the Missouri and plunging into the Rocky Mountain trade.  Pilcher 
chose the latter, and failed miserably.
11
 
  A disastrous 1827 Rocky Mountain expedition bankrupted Pilcher & 
Company, forcing its partners to seek their fortunes elsewhere.  The Pilcher & 
Company caravan left the summer rendezvous with a paltry twenty packs of 
beaver, hardly enough to keep the company solvent.
12
 By autumn, Pilcher & 
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Company ceased to exist.
13
  They “have broken up,” J.P. Cabanné wrote Pierre 
Chouteau, Jr.  Cabanné indicated that some of the partners, and “Perhaps Charles 
Bent,” wanted to return to the mountains.
14
  However, if they went back, they 
would not return as independent traders, but as employees of the American Fur 
Company.  
 Despite the failures of Missouri Fur and Pilcher & Company, Bent‟s years 
of employment were not wasted, for he had gained important insights into the inner 
workings of the fur trade.  How much he learned from his own observation and 
how much he learned from Pilcher is impossible to say; but Charles would have 
been wise to observe the man‟s experiences.  Pilcher had seen the fur trade from all 
angles.  In St. Louis, he learned how to unload, handle, and store furs properly, as 
well as the methods of auctioneers and buyers, as well as the vagaries of banking, 
credit and finance.  Courting Eastern outfitters or their Missouri subsidiaries was 
also crucial.  Playing up longstanding familial or business acquaintances could 
mean the difference between a timely loan and bankruptcy, between marketing the 
year‟s haul of peltry in New York and watching it rot in a St. Louis warehouse.  
Furthermore, unstable markets in Missouri, New York, and Europe could cut deep 
into annual profits, while reliable merchants and wholesalers were critical to 
success.  These were some of the lessons Charles Bent would have obtained, both 
from his father, and from his employment by the fur companies.  With the Missouri 
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River blocked by Astor, the Bent brothers turned towards the burgeoning markets 
of northern Mexico to seek their fortunes.
15
 
 Ceran St. Vrain‟s family held an even higher place in St. Louis society than 
that occupied by the Bents.   His grandfather, the Chevalier Pierre Charles de Hault 
de Lassus de Luzière, was a royal councilor to Louis XVI until the destruction of 
the monarchy during the French Revolution.  Ceran‟s uncle, Charles de Hault de 
Lassus served as lieutenant governor of the Louisiana Territory from 1799 until 
1803.  Jacques Marecellin Ceran de Hault de Lassus de St. Vrain, Ceran‟s father, a 
former French naval officer, immigrated to North America in 1795, and settled in 
St. Louis.  Jacques also held numerous minor civic positions, and speculated in 
land grants.  On May 2, 1796, he married Marie Felicite.  The couple settled at 
Spanish Lake in St. Louis County.  Here, Marie gave birth to Ceran St. Vrain on 
May 5, 1802.  Jacques died on June 22, 1818.  Following his father‟s death, Ceran 
entered the fur business.
16
   
 After his father‟s death, Ceran lived for a time in the home of Bernard 
Pratte, a prominent St. Louis merchant and fur trader.  Pratte had excellent 
connections within the city‟s French mercantile community, most notably through 
marital ties to the Chouteau family.  Such ties were crucial to anyone hoping to 
succeed in the St. Louis fur trade.  Not only did the Chouteaus have deep pockets, 
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refined social skills, and a keen business sense, their extended family was 
enormous.  Most of the city‟s upper crust was related in some way to the family.  
Anyone seeking to get into business solicited investment capital from the 
Chouteaus.  Ceran‟s new guardian was one of these Chouteau partners.  A one-third 
owner in Berthold, Chouteau and Pratte, Bernard was a pivotal player in the fur 
trade.  In 1822, Astor‟s American Fur Company established the western branch of 
its empire in St. Louis, buying pelts from Pratte‟s company, and acting as an 
occasional outfitter in return.  In 1823, Jean Pierre Cabanné joined Berthold, 
Chouteau, and Pratte; the new company took the name Bernard Pratte & Company.  
By 1827, the company became the sole western agent for American Fur, further 
solidifying its position within the business.
17
   
 Ceran learned the fur trade from Pratte.  Entering the business in December 
of 1822, Ceran clerked for nearly two years.  His name appears frequently in the 
Bernard Pratte & Company ledger books.  The charges were generally petty - $1 
for a pair of gloves, for example –sometimes larger.  On October 25, 1823, his 
name appears alongside a charge of $31.87 for shoes, drab cloth, and thread.  
However, his time as a clerk was short-lived.  While the exact circumstances 
surrounding the decision are unknown, by the fall of 1824, Ceran St. Vrain quit the 
employ of Bernard Pratte & Company.  Mounted upon a “fine saddle,” and 
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partnered with Francois Geuŗin, St. Vrain set out for New Mexico.  He had worked 
for Pratte for nearly two years, earning a modest $20 per month.
18
 
 The American fur trade in northern Mexico was in its infancy when the 
young man left St. Louis.  By late 1821, several groups of Americans trapped the 
New Mexican frontier.
19
  Although eastern market prices fluctuated according to 
consumer tastes, the rivers of the Southwest offered an inviting target for fur 
trappers.  Portions of the country, particularly the well-watered Gila River Valley, 
were prime beaver country.  The most notable advantage of trapping in the 
Southwest was the weather.  On the Northern Plains and in the Rocky Mountains, 
trapping operations ceased during the winter.  The comparatively mild climate of 
the desert Southwest made trapping a year-round endeavor.  Fanning out along the 
riverbanks, men might set eight traps in a day‟s work, the lucky ones bringing in 
four or five beavers a day.  These “hairy bank notes” weighed at least one and a 
half pounds.  After skinning the beaver, the trapper stretched the pelt out to dry 
thoroughly.  Once dry, camp attendants pressed the pelts into bales of sixty or so; 
these “packs” weighed close to one hundred pounds.  At the height of the fur trade, 
prime pelts fetched between four and six dollars per pound.  Known as “drab” 
beaver, the pelts of the Southwestern rodents were lighter in color than those of 
their northern relatives.  The product sold well on the New York market.  “Drab 
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Beaver pays better than any article from your country,” wrote William B. Astor 
wrote an associate in 1824.
20
   
The institutional weakness of the Mexican state on the northern frontier 
often placed American trappers in an ambiguous legal position.  Some Mexican 
officials took a dim view of the fur trade, creating a dilemma for authorities in 
Santa Fe.  Most of New Mexico‟s trade derived from the United States, whether 
furs, textiles, or manufactured products.  When policy makers in Mexico City 
issued directives restricting the activities of the Yankee merchants, or trappers, the 
New Mexicans could either submit to these edicts or ignore them and continue 
trade as usual.  From the point of view of frustrated American traders, there seemed 
little consistency in Mexican trade policy, which oscillated from free trade on the 
one hand to arbitrary impositions, duties, and arrests on the other.  In 1824, for 
example, authorities in Mexico City issued an edict banning Americans from 
trapping in New Mexico and the surrounding regions.  From 1824 to 1826, 
however, governors Bartolomé Baca and Antonio Narbona showed little inclination 
to enforce the law.  Yet, in 1826, Narbona suddenly changed his mind, and tried to 
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take steps to crack down on the American beaver men.  These restrictions, 
combined with over-trapping on the Upper Rio Grande, forced Anglos northwest 
towards the Great Salt Lake, and southwest to the Gila River.
21
 
Most American trappers chose the northern New Mexican village of Taos as 
their base of operations for both economic and political purposes.  The Taos Valley 
was a natural trade location.
22
  Located at the far northern edge of New Mexico‟s 
frontier, Taos offered American trappers a number of advantages.  While trappers 
in the Northern Rockies sold their pelts and resupplied themselves at the annual 
summer rendezvous, men trapping the Southern Rockies and Southwest had the 
luxury of well-established towns like Taos, Abiquiu, and Santa Fe at which to 
market their goods and refit.  If so inclined, trappers wintered among the comforts 
of civilization, with ready access to hot food, fiery whiskey, and female 
companionship.
23
  In addition, Taos was far from the center of government in Santa 
Fe.  Despite occasional efforts to patrol the border, the isolation provided by the 
surrounding mountains made it relatively easy for trading parties to enter the valley 
and dispose of their goods without paying duties.  Smuggling was common, and it 
was normal for perpetrators to escape detection and punishment.  For all these 
reasons, George Frederick Ruxton, an English traveler and keen observer of 
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mountain life, called the settlements of New Mexico “the paradise of 
mountaineers.”
24
  It was to Taos, that St. Vrain and Guerin headed.   
St. Vrain and Guerin‟s venture into the business of outfitting trappers lasted 
less than a year.  The men left St. Louis in November of 1824, and reached Taos 
after what St. Vrain called, “a long and trublesum voiage of five months.”
25
  
Mexican officials at San Miguel del Vado took note of their arrival in late March.  
Governor Baca wrote the alcalde of San Miguel, ordering him to inform the new 
arrivals that they must first travel to Santa Fe to pay import duties on their goods.  
In addition, the Governor forbade the men from trapping.  St. Vrain and Guerin had 
no intention of trapping.  Rather, the partners counted on supplying the American 
trappers who used Taos as their base of operations.  The realization that one could 
make more money from outfitting rather than trapping or hunting was an important 
lesson; Bent-St. Vrain made most of its profit trading, rather than fielding trapping 
brigades.
26
   
From the beginning, St. Vrain recognized the necessity of the backing of the 
St. Louis merchants.  In October 1824, he purchased $1413.27 worth of “sundries” 
from Pratte, who held a one-third interest in Ceran‟s ventures.
27
  The partners‟ 
plans fell through quickly.  St. Vrain informed Pratte, that after five weeks in Taos, 
“we have Sold but verry fue goods and goods is at a verry reduced price at 
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present.”  Despite the slow pace of business, Ceran hoped that once the trapping 
parties returned to Taos he could sell out his stock of goods to François LeClerc 
and Étienne Provost.  If these plans failed, St. Vrain wrote that he intended to “buy 
up goods and articles” for a mule purchasing trip to Sonora.  He was still optimistic 
that success in either enterprise would result in “verry profitable business.”  
Whether St. Vrain outfitted trappers or traded for mules, he would do so without 
François Guerin.  The two men dissolved their partnership, St. Vrain informed 
Pratte, “for reasons to tedius to mention.”  Guerin returned to St. Louis, bringing 
with him some mules and beaver pelts which he sold to Pratte.
28
   
St. Vrain was not without a partner for long, however.  After the dissolution 
of his partnership with Guerin, Ceran apparently worked alone for a short time.  In 
1825, he outfitted one or two Taos-based trapping parties.  In July he wrote his 
mother that he had “equipt some men to goe trapping thinking it will be the most 
profitable for me I have Sold the greater part of my goods a verry good profit…the 
men that I have equipt is all the best kind of traders, if they make a good hunt, I 
will doe verey good business.”
29
  The leader of one of these parties was Thomas L. 
Smith.  Reminiscing in the early 1860s, Smith told an interviewer that, “St. Vrain 
of St. Louis, a merchant of Taos,” outfitted himself and nine other men for an 
expedition to the tributaries of the upper Rio Grande.  The paths of Smith and St. 
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Vrain would intersect again.
30
  St. Vrain also got a new partner, Paul Baillio.  Prior 
to coming to New Mexico around 1824, Baillio worked as an Indian trader around 
Fort Osage.  Their partnership lasted until 1828.
31
 
In late 1825 and 1826, St. Vrain began trapping, backed by an old St. Louis 
acquaintance, Bernard Pratte‟s son, Sylvester.
32
  During this time, Pratte financed 
three separate trapping ventures.  Bernard Pratte & Company‟s entry into the 
Southwestern fur trade was auspicious.  Although the company helped underwrite 
St. Vrain‟s first trip to New Mexico, Pratte had never sent men directly to the 
region.  His son‟s arrival marked the first time a major fur company took the field 
in search of drab beaver.
33
  The first party, consisting of twelve or thirteen men 
trapped the headwaters of the Rio Grande.  Nothing is known of the second group.  
The third party, numbering about twenty men, headed for the country around Utah 
Lake, under the command of Ceran St. Vrain.  No details about St. Vrain‟s first 
venture as the field commander of a fur brigade have survived.
34
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While the intensification of American trapping efforts caused officials in 
Mexico City and Santa Fe consternation, St. Vrain and others took advantage of the 
inability of the regional government to restrict their activities.  The vast spaces of 
the northern borderlands, combined with the lack of a strong Mexican military 
presence, made it easy for Americans to operate without legal sanction. There were 
many ways to get around the restrictions.  Trappers banned from entering territory 
west of New Mexico acted as if they were returning to the United States, then, once 
well beyond the reach of authorities, doubled back to the restricted areas.  In 
addition, Americans might simply assert that they purchased furs from Indian 
groups or native New Mexicans, and then “legally” exported their haul back to the 
States.
35
  Furthermore, the actions of New Mexican officials themselves were 
sometimes suspect.  In 1826, four different American trapping brigades headed 
west and south from New Mexico towards the Gila River.  Governor Narbona, 
ignoring his government‟s 1824-1825 orders prohibiting foreign trapping, secured 
passports for all of the groups.  He even wrote Sonoran officials asking them to aid 
the Americans in obtaining licenses to trap that province.  Narbona‟s actions are 
not readily explicable.  Maybe the Americans duped him, promising that they 
would avoid areas not specifically enumerated on their licenses.  Perhaps the 
Americans bribed Narbona.  Finally, the governor might simply have recognized 
his inability to stop the Americans, and hoped that officials elsewhere would deal 
with the problem.  However, soon after issuing passports, Narbona changed his 
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 The 1826 American incursion into the Gila River country aroused the ire of 
both Mexican authorities and local Indian groups.  Sylvester Pratte intended to 
participate, but illness forced him to remain in New Mexico.  Instead, he backed 
two parties, one under the command of Miguel Robidoux, the other under William 
S. Williams and Ceran St. Vrain.  The bands planned to trap the Gila, San 
Francisco, and Colorado rivers.  Throughout the trapping season, rumors and the 
observations of Mexican authorities placed the Americans all over the map, from 
the Zuñi villages to the copper mines at Santa Rita, to the vicinity of Tucson.
37
   
Initially, these parties operated with official sanction from the authorities in 
Santa Fe.  On August 29, 1826, the governor issued a passport to Williams, “Seran 
Sambrano,” thirty-five men, and servants granting them the right to “pass to the 
state of Sonora for private trade.”  He further ordered that, “none are to offer any 
embarrassment on this march.”
38
 However, only two days after issuing the 
passports Narbona did an about face and wrote to the governor of Sonora, warning 
that one hundred men were about to descend upon the rivers of the province “to the 
known injury of our public treasury, in infraction of our laws.”  In the same letter, 
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he lamented his inability to prevent their coming.  He lacked the necessary cavalry, 
he wrote, to adequately patrol his own frontier.
39
   
Narbona was not the only Mexican to take umbrage at the American 
presence on the Gila.  From El Paso, James Baird wrote Mexican officials warning 
about the intentions of the trappers.  Their presence, he claimed, constituted a great 
danger to Mexican interests.  In the first place, the party‟s presence violated 
national laws banning foreigners from trapping in Mexican territory.  Furthermore, 
not only would their actions potentially decimate the region‟s beaver population - 
“the most precious product this territory produces” - but every pelt exported to the 
United States meant money taken away from the Mexican treasury.  The Americans 
were belligerent, Baird wrote.  They displayed “such arrogance and haughtiness 
that they have openly said that in spite of the Mexicans, they will hunt beaver 
wherever they please,” and that, “they are carrying powder and balls, in 
consequence of which no one is able to restrain them.”  Baird concluded that it was 
the duty of every loyal Mexican citizen to take any action necessary to protect the 
territorial and economic integrity of the republic.
40
   
Baird‟s letter helped set in motion a flurry of communications between 
Mexican authorities denouncing the American trappers and ordering local officials 
to be on the lookout for them.  St. Vrain‟s movements and day-to-day activities are 
largely a mystery.  Undoubtedly, he and his men were near Tucson, trading with 
the Maricopa Indians in October of 1826.  Although the Maricopas stole a number 
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of blankets and mules from the trappers, the outnumbered Americans could offer 
little resistance.  St. Vrain‟s party left the village when the Indians sent a courier to 
Tucson, alerting the commandant of the presidio to the American presence.  The 
commandant sent eight men to investigate the situation.  When the Mexicans 
arrived, the Indians reported that the trappers were gone, headed into the Apache 
country.  The soldiers retired to Tucson.  Other than that, few specifics are known.  
St. Vrain‟s men returned to New Mexico, where Pratte immediately began 
preparing another expedition for the fall.  Pratte‟s second party, under Robidoux, 
fared far worse.  Indians, either Apaches or Yavapais, killed twenty-seven of the 
brigade‟s thirty men.
41
    
In the autumn of 1827, stung by the Robidoux disaster, Pratte organized an 
expedition to recoup his losses.  Among those he recruited were a number of men 
bound to become famous in the annals of the western fur trade, including Old Bill 
Williams, Thomas L. Smith, and Milton Sublette.  Ceran St. Vrain accompanied the 
party as clerk.
42
  From Taos, they traveled north along the Front Range of the 
Rocky Mountains until they reached the headwaters of the North Platte.  Here the 
party divided.  Thomas Smith set out on his own to trap the Big Sandy, where he 
met with some success, until a band of Arapaho Indians cut his trail.  Rather than 
try to salvage his traps and pelts, Smith rode back towards the party‟s rendezvous 
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point in North Park.  Meanwhile, the main party trapped the headwaters of the 
North Platte, before turning west to rendezvous with Smith.  Some time during the 
expedition, Pratte fell ill with an unknown malady.  He died in North Park, 
sometime between September 1 and October 1.
43
  St. Vrain took up his pen, “with a 
trembling hand,” to inform the young man‟s father of the event.  Ceran stayed by 
Pratte‟s side “until the Last moment of his Life, and all the assistance I could give 
him was of noe youse.”  Pratte did not suffer long.  St. Vrain wrote that, “his 
Sickness Lasted but a very few days.”  Pratte‟s death momentarily staggered St. 
Vrain, who related that he had never felt such a dreadful sense of loss in his entire 
life.  Still, he wrote Bernard, “it is usles for me to Dwell so Long on that 
unfortunate subject, it was the will of God.”  Even with Pratte‟s death, the 
expedition had to press forward.
44
 
The rest of the expedition tested Ceran‟s leadership abilities.  After the men 
“had bured unfortunate P.,”
45
 St. Vrain took command of the expedition, at the 
“special request of the whole.”  Beyond the question of leadership, the trappers 
demanded to know who would pay their wages.  St. Vrain gave “his solemn 
promise and declamation that so far as he had or should have some property or 
funds of the said deceased in his hands or possession, so far they should be 
respectively paid their several demands.”  The men assented and “cheerfully” the 
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party continued to trap along the present-day Colorado-Wyoming border.
46
  
Tragedy continued to stalk St. Vrain‟s men.  Indians ambushed the party while it 
worked the headwaters of the North Platte.  Thomas L. Smith was the first to fall, 
struck by a bullet in the lower part of his left leg, near the ankle.  By the time the 
battle ended, the trappers estimated that nine Indians lay dead.  Minus Pratte and 
Smith‟s leg, which he amputated himself, St. Vrain led the party on to the Green 
River where it spent “the most vigurus winter” he could remember.  In April, St. 
Vrain determined to return to the Platte and continue trapping.  From there, he 
planned to head downriver to market their pelts in St. Louis.  However, about five 
days‟ journey down the river, the men ran across a “large Indian trace.”  There was 
no way of knowing how large the Indian band was, or whether they were hostile.  
Furthermore, the party‟s ammunition was running low.  Rather than risk a fight, the 
men turned south, arriving in Taos in late May.
47
  The loss of Sylvester Pratte 
squelched any future interest the St. Louis firms had in fielding trapping brigades in 




Shortly after their return to New Mexico, St. Vrain and his men fell afoul of 
authorities bent upon enforcing the laws that banned American trapping in the 
rivers of northern Mexico.  Around May 20, authorities at Abiquiu arrested some of 
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St. Vrain‟s men, in possession of eleven beaver pelts.  St. Vrain proceeded to Santa 
Fe to answer for the conduct of his men.  The alcalde of Santa Fe, Juan Estevan 
Pino, demanded to know under whose license St. Vrain had acted.  Ceran replied 
that he acted under Pratte‟s, but that he did not know the specifics of the 
arrangement with New Mexican authorities.  Pino then inquired as to the 
whereabouts of the rest of the party‟s furs.  St. Vrain was disingenuous.  His men 
lost about 150 pelts in the Rio Grande, he claimed.  Besides, his men were scattered 
throughout the province: three men remained on the Green, three more on the San 
Miguel, and one absent without leave.  Perhaps they could account for the rest of 
the pelts.  Pino‟s suspicions of foul play were well-founded, but with no evidence 
to convict St. Vrain of smuggling, he returned 32 confiscated traps and dropped all 
charges.  In reality, St. Vrain had somehow disposed of the expedition‟s catch 
already; 1,636 pounds of beaver, which eventually sold for $5706.50.
49
  This would 
not be the last time Mexican authorities rightly accused St. Vrain or the Bents of 
circumventing Mexican trade laws.  
 During the 1820s, the Bents and St. Vrain received their first lessons in 
western enterprise.  The young men attached themselves to men with long 
experience in frontier commerce.  The Bents and St. Vrain received a crash course 
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in all aspects of the fur trade, from trapping to marketing and resupply.  Most 
importantly, they recognized that any attempt to strike out on their own required 
the support and patronage of well-established St. Louis firms.  Ceran St. Vrain also 
caught a glimpse of the ways in which the political weakness of the Mexican state 
both aided and restricted the actions of American businessmen in the region.  On 
the one hand, when New Mexican authorities chose to ignore policies issued from 
Mexico City based on local economic self-interest, the two groups got along 
famously.  However, when New Mexican officials chose to enforce national 
regulations that curbed commerce, trappers like St. Vrain conducted their business 
outside the law, with varied degrees of success.  Over the course of the following 
years, the success of Bent-St. Vrain depended largely upon both the maintenance of 
economic ties to St. Louis and their ability to adapt to the ever-changing political 









Chapter 3 - Nations, Roads, and Private Interests: Bent-St. Vrain, 1829-1834 
 
Charles Bent learned a number of important lessons about business and 
politics from his first experience on the Santa Fe Trail in 1829.  Most practically, 
he learned the craft of freighting on the High Plains:  the route of the trail, the 
location of timber and waterholes, that oxen were a viable alternative to mules 
while crossing the prairies.  In addition to these necessary skills, Bent learned 
important lessons about politics and the role of the state in the borderlands.  The 
states, American and Mexican, failed to extend much of a reach over the region 
between the Missouri frontier and New Mexico.  The vast sweep of country 
between Independence, Missouri and Santa Fe was largely a political no man‟s land 
as far as both governments were concerned.  Indian tribes held sway, and traders 
learned to resist or accommodate them as the situation dictated, for neither 
government showed much of an inclination to protect trading caravans along the 
Santa Fe Trail.  However, the lack of government control over the plains, especially 
on their western edge, presented traders like Bent with opportunities.  Few troops 
and little official oversight made it easier to smuggle goods into New Mexico, a 
game that the Bent‟s and St. Vrain became adept at playing.  Finally, Bent learned 
to appeal to national and regional interests in order to advance his own fortunes.  
Although he generally ignored American officials, Bent appealed to the 
government when it best suited his economic interests.  It took Bent years to exploit 
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fully these opportunities, but in 1829, he recognized both the dangers and 
possibilities of borderlands commerce in an area of weak state presence. 
Recognition of the geographical affinity and the economic profits that tied 
Missouri to New Mexico gained the attention of some American politicians from 
the 1820s through the Mexican-American War.  However, with the exception of the 
1829 expedition, the realization of the Santa Fe trade‟s potential by those in the 
halls of power did not necessarily translate into direct action by the government on 
behalf of the prairie merchants.  Geography, the U.S. Consul in Santa Fe wrote to 
his superiors in 1843, predestined the strengthening of ties between his nation and 
Mexico.  “The Geographical situation,” Manuel Alvarez claimed, “and the interests 
of the two Republics, seem to me, to indicate that there should always be an 
intimate intercourse and relation between them.”  Despite the “uninhabitable and 
immense prairies that intervene between the state of Missouri and Santa Fe,” the 
route between the two points was a natural corridor of trade, “the best upon the 
continent,” he claimed.  Water, grass, and an abundance of the “finest meats” 
ensured the success of the caravans plying the Mexican Road.
1
  Over this trace, 
from Santa Fe, flowed a wealth of silver bullion, beaver pelts, and livestock.  Every 
year, observers noted, “This trade is increasing in importance and profit.”  In 1832, 
Secretary of War Lewis Cass informed President Andrew Jackson that the 
Missouri-New Mexico trade measured approximately $300,000, a paltry sum by 
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national standards yet a bonanza by frontier ones.
2
    Thomas Hart Benton of 
Missouri emerged as the Senate‟s greatest champion of western interests.  Keen to 
the needs of the Santa Fe traders, he exerted himself tirelessly to support a detailed 
survey of the trail, establish an American consulate in Santa Fe, and to provide 
military protection for the caravans through Indian country.
3
  
In the absence of an American or Mexican military presence, the tribes of 
the Southern Plains presented the greatest potential threat to the safety of merchants 
along the Santa Fe Trail.  Because of their vulnerable position, veteran frontier 
traders recognized the necessity of good relations with the region‟s Indian groups.  
A.  P.  Chouteau, for one, wrote the Secretary of War, that although “It is an 
acknowledged fact that the nearest and best route to Santa Fe is up the Arkansas 
River; the safety of navigation must however be secured by treaties with the Wild 
Indians or else the lives of traders would be in imminent danger.”
4
  However, as the 
volume of trade increased, so did the potential for violent conflict with Indian 
tribes.  Some observers felt that the fault for the rising number of conflicts lay with 
the traders as well as the country‟s native inhabitants.  Instead of cultivating useful 
trade relations, Josiah Gregg claimed, some traders went out of their way to 
antagonize Indians, even murdering them in cold blood.  Such acts accomplished 
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nothing but retributive raids by aggrieved tribesmen.
5
  The further west the 
caravans went, the greater the risk of Indian raiding.  Even if American troops 
accompanied traders to the international border, it was still two hundred fifty miles 
to Santa Fe, and Mexican authorities were unable to provide much in the way of aid 
and protection.
6
  By 1829, the increasing frequency of raids along the western parts 
of the trail finally compelled the American government to act.  For the first time, 
U.S. troops escorted the traders as far as the Arkansas River.
7
 
Charles Bent‟s peers elected him captain of the 1829 Santa Fe convoy.  The 
party was small by later trail standards.  Estimates of its total makeup ranged from 
thirty-six to thirty-eight wagons, and sixty to seventy-nine men.
8
  While encamped 
at Round Grove, the company came together to elect its officers.  Typically, such 
occasions were scenes reminiscent of election days back East.  The party gathered, 
and in true Jacksonian fashion set about debating the merits of each candidate.  
Stump speaking and impassioned harangues followed as adherents of each nominee 
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trumpeted their champion‟s qualifications.  Bent‟s election was far less colorful.  
Another trader, David Waldo, nominated Bent for the post.  The men of the party 
ratified the nomination by unanimous consent.  Bent‟s election to the captaincy was 
a strange one, for Waldo had prior trail experience.
9
  
  Bent was responsible for setting the pace of the day‟s march, choosing a 
campsite each night, maintaining harmony and order among the men, and 
supervising the assignment of night watches and caravan defense.
10
  However, the 
traders were an independent and unruly lot, often not well-disposed towards 
following orders.  “Truly,” Josiah Gregg wrote, “there is not a better school for 
testing a man‟s temper, than the command of a promiscuous caravan of 
independent traders.”11 
The typical Santa Fe caravan left the Missouri frontier in May, in order to 
take advantage of spring grass and to beat the humidity of the summer.  After 
establishing their government, the party settled into a regular routine.  The traders 
rose before dawn, ate, rounded up their stock, and hit the trail.  At Council Grove, 
about 150 miles west of Independence, Missouri, the caravans stopped to lay in an 
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extra stock of wood for the journey (principally for spare axles).  In the evening, 
the freighters formed their wagons into a square and, if in hostile Indian country, 
secured the oxen and mules inside, while the men slept outside the improvised 
corral.  This routine continued for approximately seven to eight weeks until the 
party reached Santa Fe.  Parties returning from Santa Fe with lighter wagons often 
made the trip back to Missouri in around 40 days.
12
 
Joined by four companies of the 6
th
 United States Infantry, Major Bennett 
Riley commanding, the caravan departed for New Mexico in June.  Except for a 
few cases of diarrhea, the expedition reached the international border without 
incident.  Here, Riley halted, for he was under orders not to cross the Arkansas.  
However, he informed his superiors that he intended to wait along the river for the 
return of the traders from Santa Fe.  In early July, the two groups parted ways.
13
 
Once Bent‟s caravan crossed the international border on July 10, it moved 
beyond the legal reach of the American state, for Riley could no longer protect the 
traders.  Aided by some Army teams and wagons, the entire party crossed without 
incident, and encamped on the opposite bank.  The following afternoon, they 
continued south.  Indians struck the caravan among the sand hills about six miles 
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south of the border.
14
  Before the traders crossed, Riley had advised them to stick 
together, and not to stray from the wagons.  The traders took few precautions.  
Deep sands bogged down their wagons, making it difficult to maintain any 
semblance of order.  Within a short time, the wagon train was spread out over the 
course of a mile.  Despite Bent‟s precaution of dispatching sixteen men as an 
advance guard, William Waldo recalled that when the Indians struck, “our surprise 
was complete.”  Concealed in deep ravines throughout the sand hills, the attackers 
“seemed to spring out of the ground like swarms of locusts.”
15
   
The traders estimated their attackers at between four and five 
hundred mounted warriors.  The Comanches had already killed and scalped 
one member of the advance guard, but before the Indians swept down on 
the wagon train, the traders brought a small cannon into use.  The fire from 
the gun arrested the Indian advance.  Meanwhile, the traders dug in for a 
siege.  Charles then sent a party of nine men with a message urging Riley to 
come to their aid.
16
   
   Heedless of his orders not to cross the international border, Riley 
immediately put his men in motion, and the soldiers began crossing the 
river around seven in the evening.  Although the Arkansas was nearly 600 
yards wide and six feet deep in places, the troops crossed safely, and 
commenced a moonlit march to relieve the traders.  The advance companies 
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reached the wagons after midnight.  Cooke found the situation less 
threatening than Bent‟s men reported, estimating the number of Indians as 
“probably not greater than fifty.”  Apparently unaware of the arrival of 
Riley‟s men, the Indians prepared to attack again, but fell back after hearing 
the bugler sound reveille. Before withdrawing to the river, Riley‟s men 
accompanied the traders a few miles deeper into Mexico to make sure the 
immediate Indian threat was over.
17
 
  The traders attempted to convince Riley to accompany them to Santa Fe.  
The presence of the international border should not hinder the officer from acting 
further on their behalf, they contended.  Bent and Waldo appealed to patriotism, 
precedent, national interest, self-interest, in an attempt to sway the officer.  Cooke 
recorded in his journal that Bent “presented the Commanding officer a lengthy 
paper,” begging him to carry on.
18
  The petition is a remarkable document, 
overflowing with florid and unctuous prose.  Beginning with the recognition of “the 
delicate ground” upon which Riley now stood – literally the soil of a sovereign 
nation – Bent pleaded with the major to reconsider.  Another attack by the “hostile 
and ferocious” Indians seemed imminent.  If they were this aggressive along the 
Arkansas, how much worse would they be the deeper the caravan traveled into 
Mexico?  No matter that Riley‟s orders forbade him from crossing the Arkansas in 
the first place; Andrew Jackson had not let orders deter him from crossing into 
Spanish Florida to chastise the Seminoles.  The traders went on to mix their own 
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self-interest with an appeal to Riley‟s emotions.  They purchased their goods on 
credit, they declared.  If the caravan did not go through, the traders would have 
nothing with which to pay off their creditors.  Furthermore, relatives had invested 
in the enterprise.  Failure could impoverish entire families, causing “our wives and 
children [to] be cast upon the cold charities of [a] friendless world.”  Riley need 
have no fear of arousing Mexican anger, the petitioners continued.  After all, the 
United States played a pivotal role in Mexican independence by acknowledging the 
fledgling republic when the European powers refused to.  Without a doubt, “the 
names of Washington, Clay and Jackson [are] as familiar to them as their own 
celebrated Hidalgo, Victoria and Guerrero.”  If an appeal to Mexican memory did 
not suffice, the authors of the petition pointed out, Indians raided New Mexico as 
well.  Should the troops continue on, the citizens of Santa Fe “would receive you 
with open arms.”  The force of Mexican arms alone was insufficient to protect a 
trade that brought such benefit to the two republics.  Finally, the petitioners gave 
Riley a history lesson.  If the New Mexican authorities resented his presence, the 
officer need only remind them that Spanish and Mexican officials had violated the 
territorial integrity of the United States by crossing the Arkansas to parlay with 
tribes north of the river.
19
  In this situation, Bent appealed to the American State to 
extend its power into the Southwestern Borderlands, even if it meant violating 
Mexican territorial sovereignty.  Riley did not budge.  The caravan proceeded to 
Santa Fe without his troops.
20
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The Bent wagon train‟s Indian troubles did not end after the engagement in 
the Arkansas sand hills.  William Waldo recalled that the party engaged in a forty 
day running fight with Indians, nearly to the outskirts of Santa Fe.  Although 
augmented by a contingent of 120 Mexicans, American trappers eventually had to 
escort the caravan to Taos.  From there, the traders moved on to Santa Fe.
21
   
Not only was Bent anxious to avail himself of American aid when 
necessary, he hoped to obtain the aid of the Mexican state by arranging an escort of 
local troops on the return trip to the Arkansas crossing.  Riley himself attempted to 
secure aid for the traders when he wrote Governor José Antonio Chavez that 
Charles Bent “is a gentleman of the first respectability in our own country” and 
urged Chavez to assist the traders on their trip north.  Riley stressed the mutually 
beneficial nature of the prairie trade, and hoped that Chavez would “feel an equal 
interest with the United States, and give it [the caravan] all the protection and 
assistance in your power whilst in your territory.”  The threat of Indian 
depredations, the major warned, was still imminent; they had been “very 
outrageous on both sides of the Line, and my Government have determined to 
protect it [commerce] on this side of the line – I hope therefore that the Trade is of 
such importance to Mexico that it will induce your Excellency to adopt a similar 
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   Chavez answered Riley‟s call to aid the traders.  He wrote the 
American officer that he willingly offered Bent the “small resources” of the New 
Mexican government, and arranged for an escort under the command of Antonio 
Jose Viscarra, “one of the most outstanding and highly thought of military men in 
the Mexican Republic.”  Viscarra wrote to Riley that communication and 
cooperation between the United States and Mexico was crucial to the safety of 
commerce on the plains, an assessment Bent would have heartily agreed with at the 
time.
23
  Viscarra, a body of about 200 Mexican soldiers and Indian auxiliaries, the 
traders, thirty American trappers, and a group of Spaniards expelled from Mexico, 
made up the body of the caravan on its return to the Arkansas.
24
   Although Riley‟s 
column had left the Arkansas for the United States, a messenger from Viscarra‟s 
escort reached them before they got very far.  The major returned to the river, and 
met the escort.  After fraternizing with the Mexican commander and reviewing the 
Mexican troops and Indian auxiliaries, Riley and the traders headed back to 
Missouri, carrying goods valued at nearly $240,000.
25
 
By the end of 1830, the Bents and St. Vrain put their decade‟s worth of 
experience into action, forming a partnership that lasted until the late-1840s.  The 
year began with the men back in St. Louis, outfitting for the spring caravan to New 
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Mexico.  St. Vrain continued to cultivate his longstanding ties with Bernard Pratte.  
During the spring of 1830, Ceran‟s name appears numerous times in the Pratte 
ledger books.  He drew extensively on the company in April, wracking up a bill of 
$244.76 on the thirteenth, and signing a promissory note worth $2570.63, due in 
nine months.  He also sold Pratte three mules, presumably purchased in New 
Mexico.
26
  St. Vrain, along with Charles and William Bent, departed Missouri with 
the spring caravan.  The party consisted of about 130 men, 60 of whom owned their 
wagons.  It is possible that St. Vrain captained the party, and that he and Charles 
Bent were proprietors of their own wagons.
27
    
  The party reached Santa Fe on August 4.  Along the Red River, a party of 
Mexican soldiers, under Viscarra rode out to meet the traders.  Their object, St. 
Vrain wrote Pratte, “was to prevent Smuggling.”  The presence of the troops, “had 
the desired effeck,” and they escorted the caravan into Santa Fe where the traders 
“all had to pay full duteys, which amounts to about sixty percent on cost.”  St. 
Vrain‟s wagon passed quickly through customs, but business, he wrote, was “verry 
Slow, So Slow that it was discureging, I found that it was imposible to meet my 
payments if I continued retaling.”  He sold his goods “hole Saile,” instead.  Upon 
reaching Santa Fe, Charles Bent applied for a passport and trading license to 
proceed to Chihuahua and Sonora.  He received the license on September 27, 1830.  
However, it appears that instead of going further into Mexico, Bent returned to 
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Missouri after St. Vrain loaned Charles the use of a wagon.
28
  Although St. Vrain‟s 
business had initially been “So Slow,” he returned a decent profit on the trip.  He 




 Following these transactions, Charles and St. Vrain discussed the 
possibilities of forming a permanent business arrangement.  The prospects for trade 
in New Mexico were low during the fall of 1830.  However, by keeping one foot in 
the Santa Fe trade and one in the fur trade, trade partners might succeed.  The 
partnership between Charles Bent and St. Vrain made sense.  David Lavender 
offers the best summary of the rationale behind Bent‟s thinking, “Charles, too, had 
learned a lesson:  continual time on the trail precluded the profits a man might 
make if he were free to regulate selling according to fluctuating demands.  
Particularly was this true of a person operating on short-term credit; he had to 
dump his goods fast and return home to pay off his notes.  The obvious answer, 
provided enough volume could be handled, was a partnership in which one member 
stayed in New Mexico while the other looked after transport.”
30
   In addition to his 
St. Louis contacts, St. Vrain had long experience in New Mexico.  He spoke 
Spanish, and had friends in Taos and Santa Fe.  Furthermore, he knew both the 
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mercantile and fur business.  Bent understood the fur trade.  He had proved himself 
a competent caravan captain, as well.  Keeping one man in New Mexico to oversee 
business, while the other shuttled goods back and forth between Santa Fe and 
Missouri was a more efficient way to do business.
31
   
Bent put the proposal of partnership to St. Vrain.  The arrangement, St. 
Vrain wrote Pratte, “will be to our mutual advantage.”  Ceran bought half of Bent‟s 
trade goods for cash.  While St. Vrain stayed in New Mexico to continue trading, 
“Mr. Bent goes to St. Louis for to bring to this Cuntry goods for him and my Self.”  
St. Vrain also sent $600 and a number of mules with Bent, intended as payment to 
Pratte.  Should Pratte not want the mules, St. Vrain wished his mentor to “doe me 
the favor to let Mr. Bent have them.”  Ceran hoped that, aided by his new 
partnership, economic prospects would improve.  Money was “verrey Scrse,” in 
New Mexico.  Trade goods still sold low.  Tariff duties remained “very hie.”  
Nevertheless, the prospects for business were still better in New Mexico than in 
Missouri, and the new partners intended to tap into both ends of the trade.
32
  
Records for 1831-1832 indicate that the new partners continued to 
strengthen their ties in both Missouri and New Mexico.  In January 1831, Charles 
Bent took out his third license for trade with the Interior States of Mexico.  As in 
previous years, it is difficult to tell whether he actually made the trip or not.  If he 
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did, it was a rapid one, for he was in Missouri by May.
33
  The lengths to which St. 
Vrain went to enmesh himself in the Mexican side of the company‟s trade became 
apparent in February of 1831 when he became a naturalized Mexican citizen.  In 
addition to his new citizenship, St. Vrain established a residence in Taos.
34
  In later 
years, both Bent and St. Vrain linked themselves further to social and economic 
opportunities in New Mexico.  They took common-law Mexican wives, resided in 
Taos, and cultivated contacts with powerful politicians and businessmen.  Along 
with these contacts, citizenship gave St. Vrain access to vast land grants.  Spring 
found Charles back in Missouri, outfitting wagons for a return to Santa Fe.  During 
this time, he established a new Missouri connection with the merchant brothers 
James and Robert Aull of Independence, who provided Bent with the credit to 
make his purchases.
35
  The 1832 caravan consisted of about 150 men, 70 wagons, 
and $140,000 in merchandise.  Possibly, Bent acted as captain for the trip to New 
Mexico.
36
  He returned to Missouri in the fall, bringing bullion, mules, and furs 
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 The scope of Bent-St. Vrain‟s business grew in 1833-1834.  In addition to 
continued participation in the commerce of the prairies, they opened a store in 
Santa Fe, completed construction of an imposing adobe fort on the American side 
of the Arkansas River,
38
 and took out their first license to enter the Indian trade.
39
  
Charles Bent continued to hold down the Missouri end of the company‟s business.  
He took out another loan from the Aull‟s before proceeding to St. Louis to continue 
outfitting.  By May 1833, signs pointed to a profitable trading season.  The Aull 
brothers wrote an associate that, “Captain Bent is taking out a large quantity of 
Goods this year, report says $40,000….I am inclined to think that the trade will be 
better this year than usual.  The goods are in fewer hands, which must be a grate 
advantage.”
40
  The traders departed Missouri, with Bent again filling the role of 
captain, exercising nominal command over 70 to 80 wagons.  The Missouri 
Republican reported that the party made slow time at the outset, suffering “very 
much from the badness of the roads, caused by …rains.”  Soldiers accompanied the 
traders to the Arkansas River, and from there the traders proceeded uneventfully to 
Santa Fe.
41
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In the winter of 1834, the company legally entered the Indian trade for the 
first time.  The United States government granted Charles Bent a trading license on 
December 14, 1834.  The license gave the company wide latitude.  The license was 
valid for two years.  It applied to twenty-nine employees, operating out of Fort 
William, the company‟s new post.  Their trading territory stretched from the north 
bank of the Arkansas, along the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains all the way to 
the Black Hills of Wyoming.  West, company traders could legally proceed to the 
Bear and Colorado rivers.  The government authorized Bent-St. Vrain to trade with 
the Cheyennes, Arapahos, Kiowas, Snakes, Sioux, and the Arickaras.  Bent posted 




By 1835, the company had established a three-cornered business scheme.  
By trading with Missouri, New Mexico, and the Plains tribes, profits from one part 
of the business could offset dips in the other.  Furthermore, the company delegated 
its tasks.  Charles continued plying the Santa Fe Trail, St. Vrain oversaw the New 
Mexican end of the business, and William took over as the company‟s primary 
Indian trader.
43
  The construction of an adobe fortress and trading post along the 
Arkansas River, probably between 1832 and 1834, solidified further the presence of 
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In order to establish themselves as the preeminent American traders on the 
Arkansas, the Bents first had to remove an established competitor:  former United 
States Army officer turned trader, John Gantt.  The Army had dismissed Gantt from 
service, alleging that he falsified pay reports.  Following his cashiering, Gantt went 
west to become a trader.  In 1831, he and a partner received a license to trade on the 
Snake, Columbia and Big Horn rivers.  Trapping in the winter of 1831-2 went 
poorly, and Gantt traveled south into New Mexico hoping to buy mules and market 
his furs.  From Taos, he wrote the governor a letter in which he laid out his plans 
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for the establishment of trade on the Arkansas.  Gantt‟s blueprint for trade, and the 
potential problems he foresaw, would apply to the future operations of Bent-St. 
Vrain as well.  First, Gantt wrote that he hoped to see the day when the United 
States government established “a military post in a suitable site” on the Arkansas.  
Such a post, he noted, would protect commerce and communications between 
Mexico and the United States, as well as establishing and maintaining friendship 
with the Indians, especially the Comanches.  Bent-St. Vrain, although not eager for 
the presence of the military, agreed with Gantt about the suitability of the Arkansas 
for a trading post, and his appreciation of cultivating close ties with the regional 
tribes.  Gantt informed the governor that the northern communities of New Mexico, 
especially Taos, might easily provision such a post.  In later years, the Company 
utilized Taos as such a base for resupply.  Gantt closed by soliciting the opinion of 
the governor on his project.  He wrote, “Your ideas concerning my proposed 
establishment of the post on the Napeste river, together with information on the 
laws which regulate intercourse with the Indians of this Republic, will be received 
by me with the respect which shall always characterize my actions in a foreign 
country.”  The Bents and St. Vrain would not be nearly as interested in Mexican 
opinions of their operations, nor in the technicalities of Mexican law.
45
  Gantt 
shuttled from Taos to the Arkansas to the North Platte and back to Taos in 1832 
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and 1833.  He began construction of a wooden stockade during the winter of 1832-




  Gantt provided not only the model for Indian trading on the Southern 
Plains, imitated by the Bents, but also an incentive for them to enter the region 
permanently.
47
  Although tradition ascribes to William Bent the honor of opening 
white-Cheyenne trade on the Arkansas River, that distinction goes to John Gantt.  
He should receive credit for being the first trader in the area to use wagons instead 
of mules to transport trade goods, and, more importantly, to recognize the 
ascendency of buffalo robes as the most lucrative product of the Indian trade.  
Bent-St. Vrain would use wagons as well.  More importantly, the Bents and St. 
Vrain also recognized that they would make their fortunes trading for buffalo robes 
from the Cheyennes, rather than for beaver pelts from American trappers.  Gantt 
also built the first adobe post in the region, an example the partners followed with 
great success.  Finally, contemporary sources ascribe to Gantt the dubious 
distinction of being the first American trader in the region to use liquor to lubricate 
the wheels of the Indian trade, a practice Bent-St. Vrain would also occasionally 
                                                 
46
 For Gantt‟s presence on the Arkansas, see J. P. Cabanné to Pierre Chouteau, Jr., January 12, 1832, 
CC, Reel 19 Frame 360; Lecompte, “Gantt‟s Fort and Bent‟s Picket Post,” 115-6. 
47
 Janet Lecompte argues that Gantt‟s success inspired the Bent‟s to settle down trading operations 
in the region.  Mark Lee Gardner takes exception to Lecompte‟s claims. See Gardner, “Resource 
Study,” 76-7.  Whether or not Gantt provided the catalyst for the company‟s move north is, I 
believe, largely irrelevant.  For reasons discussed below, the company had any number of incentives 
to build where they did, incentives that had nothing to do with another operator being there first.  
However, the company would eventually need to remove Gantt‟s competition.   
83 
 
follow.  Once again, they took advantage of preexisting forms and networks of 
trade, forms that they would effectively exploit in the coming years.
48
  
In July 1834, William Bent, frustrated with Gantt‟s competition, and 
probably eager to impress the Arapahos and Cheyennes, ordered his men to take 
action.
49
   In commanding this attack, Bent deviated from the Company‟s general 
pattern of accommodation and cooperation with its clients.  Bent‟s denunciation of 
the federal government is also indicative of a larger trend within the history of the 
Company – that of ambivalence towards the government and its policies.  
Throughout its history, Bent-St. Vrain damned and praised the United States 
government by turns.  They called upon it when it suited their interests and 
denounced or ignored it when it did not.  The Arapahos and Cheyennes descended 
on Fort Cass to attack a party of Shoshone traders.  According to another source, 
“Bill Bent (who never did like Comanches and Shoshones),” told the Arapahos and 
Cheyennes that “he would buy” any horses taken from the Shoshones.
50
  An 
unsigned eyewitness account goes into greater detail.  The Shoshones had returned 
from a trading trip into the Comanche country.  William Bent persuaded eleven of 
his employees “to assist him in attacking and defeating the Snakes.”  The 
eyewitness protested Bent‟s plan of action, pointing out that, “the step he was about 
to take was in my opinion an improper one and in all probability would not meet 
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the views of the Government.”  Whereas Charles Bent called upon the power of the 
Government to aid him and his fellow traders in 1829, William Bent allegedly 
responded, “Damn the Government, I do it now any how.”  During the attack, 
Bent‟s employees killed three Shoshones, and wounded one.  Friendly fire 
wounded one Arapaho.  The attackers scalped the dead, took prisoners in addition 
to 37 horses, and “many other articles such as Kettles axes ropes etc.”  The next 
day, the victors divided their spoils “by lottery.”  William apparently justified the 
attack on the basis that he believed the Shoshones were responsible for the theft of 
Bent-St. Vrain mules from the vicinity of Taos.  More likely, he simply saw an 
opportunity to rid himself of Gantt‟s competition, and as a way to impress his 
Cheyenne and Arapaho customers.
51
   
Located just north of the U.S.-Mexican border, Bent‟s Fort was in a prime 
position to take advantage of the many trade opportunities available in the 
southwest borderlands.  The Upper Arkansas Valley was an established crossroads 
of trade and interaction between the tribes of the Southern Plains.
52
  In order to 
support an effective post, traders needed several things: grass for their stock, wood 
for fuel, water, and ready access to an easy river ford.  The location of the fort, in a 
relatively sterile portion of the Arkansas Valley, later caused Bent-St. Vrain some 
difficulties.  Although the Arkansas River provided water, the denizens of the fort 
eventually had to travel to the foothills of the Rockies to cut their timber, and send 
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their herders miles afield to find forage for their stock.  In the earliest days of the 
company, the Cheyenne chief, Yellow Wolf, attempted to get the Bents to move 
their operations miles downstream to the Big Timbers of the Arkansas.  The Big 
Timbers, Yellow Wolf pointed out, had better shelter, grass, and wood.   It was also 
closer to the buffalo range.  In spite of these advantages, the Bents chose not to 
relocate.  There could be a number of reasons for the decision.  Perhaps the 
Company wanted to be able to take their goods on to New Mexico from the fort by 
way of Timpas Creek; establishing themselves at Big Timbers would have 
necessitated backtracking to the Cimarron Crossing in order to follow the Santa Fe 
Trail southwest into New Mexico.  Finally, the location of the fort had access to 
water, timber, grass, and a good river crossing.
53
 
In addition to the natural advantages, the fort‟s location planted the Bent-St. 
Vrain in an advantageous trading position with the Cheyennes and New Mexicans.  
One observer noted that the Bents specifically selected the location of the fort, “as a 
suitable site for a place of traffic with all the wild tribes of the desert.”  While 
another noted, years later, that the fort‟s proprietors, “carry on a brisk trade with the 
surrounding tribes.”
54
  The Upper Arkansas was one of the major crossroads of 
Indian Country in the trans-Mississippi West.  Although the Comanches held the 
country south of the river, and the Cheyennes dominated the north bank, tribes like 
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the Utes, Shoshones, and occasionally Crows visited or passed through the 
region.
55
  In addition, a location closer to the mountains enabled the partners to 
siphon off any beaver pelts brought south to New Mexico.  The fort straddled the 
route of the Old Trapper‟s Trail that led from Taos north all the way to Fort 
Laramie.  Furthermore, the Arkansas River Valley offered an easy thoroughfare 
between the post and the Missouri frontier.  Writing to Manuel Alvarez, Charles 
Bent reported that, “The rout up the Arkansas is not surpassed by any other natural 
road that I have ever traveled….the trip can be performed with loaded waggons in 
thirty-five or forty days.”
56
  Bent‟s Fort was also within easy travelling distance of 
Taos and Santa Fe.  Taos was especially important to Bent-St. Vrain.  In addition to 
being home to Ceran and Charles, the village provided a place to market their furs 
and some of their robes.  Farmers from around Taos also supplied the majority of 
the post‟s agricultural goods.  The traveling scientist Frederick Wislizenus wrote 
that, “Little expeditions go frequently to the former city (Taos), to barter for flour, 
bread, beans, sugar, etc.”  Access to Taos and New Mexico also allowed the 




The large adobe fort on the Arkansas symbolized the permanency and 
power of Bent-St. Vrain within the region.  The partners needed a large post to 
                                                 
55
 Lavender, Bent‟s Fort, 141-2. 
56
 Nolie Mumey, Old Forts and Trading Posts of the West: Bent‟s Old Fort and Bent‟s New Fort on 
the Arkansas River (Denver: Artcraft Press, 1956), 9; Enid Thompson, “Life in an Adobe Castle,” in 
Bent‟s Old Fort (Denver: State Historical Society of Colorado, 1979), 11; Charles Bent to Manuel 
Alvarez, September 19, 1842, Box 2 Folder 57, Benjamin Read Collection, New Mexico State 
Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe. 
57
 Montaignes, The Plains, 61; Frederick Wislizenus,  A Journey to the Rocky Mountains in the Year 
1839 (Glorieta, NM: Rio Grande Press, 1969), 141; Dary, Santa Fe Trail, 145. 
87 
 
accommodate the volume of trade they expected to conduct.  The edifice would 
provide protection in case of Indian hostilities, and serve as a reminder to both 
small independent traders and the Mexican government that the company intended 
to brook no rivals in the Upper Arkansas Valley.  “The appearance of the fort is 
very striking,” George Frederick Ruxton wrote, “standing as it does hundreds of 
miles from any settlements on the vast lifeless prairie, surrounded by hundreds of 
hostile Indians, and far out of reach of intercourse with civilized man.”
58
  The fort 
itself was constructed of adobe bricks.
59
  The walls reached to a height of over 
twenty feet.  A single large gate with two doors provided the only means of entry.  
The courtyard was rectangular, measuring about 100 x 150 feet.  A fur press stood 
at the center of the courtyard.  Set directly into the walls facing the courtyard were 
numerous rooms.  The fort had rooms for trading, storage, sleeping, eating, a 
blacksmith shop, a carpenter‟s shop, and a billiard room.  A large corral, topped 
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with prickly pear cactus, stood attached to the rear of the fort.  Sometimes 
accommodating over one hundred men at the height of the business season, Bent‟s 
Fort was the largest, strongest, most imposing structure between Santa Fe and Fort 
Laramie.  The fort attracted visitors from all over the West.  From it, the partners 
dispatched trading parties in every direction.  Bent‟s Fort served as an entrepot for 
Indian, American, and Mexican traders throughout the Southwest Borderlands.
60
  
The post was an inviting beacon to some, a looming, ominous presence to others.     
By the mid-1830s, Bent-St. Vrain prepared to put a decade‟s worth of 
frontier experience into practice on its own behalf.  The partners spent the 1820s 
and early-1830s learning the lessons necessary for success in the borderlands.  
They learned the importance of establishing a broad base of business contacts in the 
East and New Mexico.  They discovered the importance of diversification; 
spreading their men and capital over three different economic enterprises.  Bent-St. 
Vrain grafted itself onto longstanding trade networks, stretching from Missouri to 
the Platte and deep into Mexico.  The partners also learned to implore or ignore 
governments when it suited the company‟s interest.  The lack of a strong state 
presence in the Southwestern Borderlands brought both risks and opportunities for 
Bent-St. Vrain.  The Bents and St. Vrain would need to remember the lessons they 
learned, for the company was about to plunge headlong into a world of wide-
ranging and volatile markets where successful participants utilized any means at 
their disposal to get ahead.  Bent-St. Vrain used sex, citizenship, personal 
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friendship, accommodation, and occasional intimidation to secure their place in the 


















Chapter 4 – Bent, St. Vrain & Co. and the Indian Trade 
 
Bent-St. Vrain was rarely master of its own destiny on the Southern Plains.  
In the absence of a strong governmental presence to guarantee their physical safety, 
the partners took a pragmatic approach to business and politics, usually recognizing 
the necessity of accommodating themselves to preexisting conditions.  To make 
money and stay alive on the Great Plains, the partners had to be adaptable.  
Whether dealing with Indian groups or Missouri businessmen, the partners 
recognized the necessity of acting within well-established parameters of commerce 
and politics.  Keen attention to the needs of their Indian customers and cultivation 
of kinship ties helped assure Bent-St. Vrain the lion‟s share of the robe trade on the 
Southern Plains.  However, until 1840, the ties they cultivated with the Cheyennes 
placed company traders at risk of retaliation from Cheyenne enemies.  In order to 
succeed in the robe trade, the partners had to rely upon close cooperation with the 
Indians of the Southern Plains.  The maintenance of peaceful trade and political 
relationships stemmed directly from the social ties cultivated between white traders 
and Indian producers.  Lacking both the time and expertise to hunt and process the 
robes, the company relied upon its traders to procure robes directly from the 
Indians themselves.  Through the exchange of gifts and the cultivation of marriage 
ties, the white traders and their Indian clients developed an interdependent 
relationship that drew the whites deeper into the maelstrom of Indian politics and 
the Indians deeper into the world of the white-dominated market economy.  
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Adherence to Indian social norms guaranteed the company the majority of the 
Southern Plains robe trade.  But the ties the company formed with one group could 




  Although the company conducted most of its trade with the Cheyennes and 
Arapahos, its employees traveled everywhere to trade with numerous other Indian 
groups.   By casting their net so broadly, Bent-St. Vrain sought to maximize their 
profits by doing business with all comers.  However, their longstanding kinship ties 
with the Cheyennes sometimes placed their traders in precarious positions when 
trading with traditional Cheyenne enemies.  In addition to the Cheyennes, Bent-St. 
Vrain‟s initial trading license included the Sioux, Kiowas, Snakes, and Arikaras.  
Company traders traversed much of the Great Plains in search of customers.  
William Bent and his employees operated from the Texas Panhandle in the south, 
north through Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, into Wyoming and possibly even the 
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  The company had less success with the tribes to the west, but not for 
lack of effort.  Attempts at trade with the Navajos were spotty.
3
  The partners 
occasionally traded with the Utes, while also supplying other traders operating in 
Utah and western Colorado.
4
  Possibly, the company also traded with the Apaches 
as far south as the Gila River.  
Interdependency and adaptation characterized the trade between Indians and 
whites on the Southern Plains.  Trade initiated deep changes in the material life of 
Plains Indians, the scale of their hunting and robe production, and in their social 
and economic organization.  Even though the robe trade drew Indian groups into a 
larger economic world of forces beyond their control – supply, demand, credit 
rates, international markets, whims of fashion, and the like – a loss of complete 
economic autonomy did not automatically translate into degradation.  Tribes did 
not lose their cultural and political sovereignty overnight, as a direct result of trade 
with men like the Bents.  Rather, as Howard Lamar points out, the Plains tribes 
traded with whites for over one hundred and fifty years, “without a notable 
deterioration of their culture and strength.”
5
  Unscrupulous white traders, toting 
foofaraw and bad whiskey, did not dupe Indians into such exchanges.  Rather, 
Indian groups assumed and often embraced change.  They were shrewd traders and 
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judges of goods, selecting what they could use and incorporate into their traditional 
lifeways, discarding the rest.
6
  Perhaps Barton Barbour best characterizes the nature 
of these interactions.  He writes,  
The fur trade demanded mutual alliance among all participants:  
white men did not tan buffalo robes, and Indians did not make 
guns, steel knives, and so on.  Interdependency percolated 
through every aspect of life, and it characterized North 
America‟s fur trade frontier almost everywhere.  In time, that 
interdependency corroded and vanished, mainly because it did 
not conform to the United States‟ cultural and political 
imperatives.  Still, the trade probably had dual effects:  it made 
Indians‟ lives easier, but it also necessitated a reliance on exotic 




Successful Indian traders required a deep familiarity with, and often an 
affinity for, their clients.  By cultivating trade, the company‟s employees hoped to 
cultivate peace.  Economic and political stability on the Plains, the partners 
believed, redounded to everyone‟s benefit.   Indians outnumbered the white traders 
at every turn.  Because of this, pragmatism dictated policy.  If trappers, traders, and 
Indians had always been hostile, business in the West would have been impossible.  
Indian traders navigated between two worlds.  Bridging the gap required a nuanced 
understanding of geography, tribal politics, survival skills, trading acumen, facility 
with language, and adaptability.  Traders dressed like Indians, ate like them, and 
lived with them.8 
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In addition to cultural adaptability, company employees had to demonstrate 
tact and fairness to their clients.  As businessmen and keen observers of human 
nature, the traders had to know how much to pay each client for their product, 
carefully maintaining consistent prices for items of similar quality.
9
   William 
Hamilton, who traded with the Cheyennes in the early-1840s remembered, “A 
certain rule must be complied with in trading with Indians, which is that you must 
not pay one Indian…one iota more for a robe or fur of the same quality than you 
pay another.  If you do, you ruin your trade and create antagonistic feelings 
throughout the village.”
10
  Traders such as Hamilton needed to know when to be 
aggressive, when to ignore insults and threats, which presents to give to which 
headman, when to be generous, when to haggle, and when to capitulate.
11
   
Observers throughout the West generally recognized that the Bents knew 
the Indian business as well as anyone, and respected them accordingly.  William 
especially, received praise for his competence.  Although he occasionally went with 
company wagon trains to Missouri, he spent most of his time in Indian country, 
directing that aspect of the trade.  Most of his clients thought him “fair and open in 
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  Even Kit Carson, revered by the public and mountain men alike for 
his knowledge of Indians, regarded William Bent as a superior trader.
13
     
The company fort on the Arkansas River was the hub of its operations and a 
meeting place for trade.  Although the company generally sent its traders to the 
Indian camps, Indians sometimes made the trip to the fort itself to trade.  One 
observer noted that, “The trading posts or forts…are the hearts…through which the 
entire commerce of these western regions seeks a channel into distant countries.”
14
  
During the trading season, the fort hosted a polyglot contingent of customers and 
employees.  Travelers noted the presence of Cheyennes, Kiowas, Arapahos, 
Frenchmen, Spaniards, Mexicans, and mixed-bloods.  Farnham left perhaps the 
most colorful portrait of the fort during the trading season.15 
  Because of their close relationship with the proprietors, Cheyennes and 
Arapahos sometimes gained entrance inside the fort‟s walls.  Even these trusted 
clients were watched closely.  However, the proprietors allowed only the most 
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select group of Cheyennes to spend the night inside the fort; the rest had to sleep 
outside the walls.  Despite the volume of business they brought, the presence of 
Indian clients at the fort did not always please the employees.  Company clerk 
Alexander Barclay, for instance, groused to his brother that, “we have been in the 
habit of allowing the whole Nation of Arapahos in at one and any time.”  Barclay 
objected to this practice because he felt it put the employees in danger.  Not 
everyone trusted the Cheyennes and Arapahos as much as the Bent brothers did.
16
  
Still, the admittance of the Cheyennes and Arapahos into the fort to trade 
demonstrates the depth of trust between the two sides; showing favor to these 
groups further solidified trade ties.       
Bent-St. Vrain also utilized smaller, temporary posts in their Indian trade. 
The use of these satellite posts made its easier for the company to conduct trade 
farther afield.  Indians found these posts convenient for trade.  In their use of 
multiple trading locations, the company was not unique.  Rather, it followed a well-
established pattern practiced by other traders, most notably American Fur.
17
  
Besides the main fort on the Arkansas, the company eventually established a post 
on the Canadian River in the Texas Panhandle to serve the Kiowas and 
Comanches.
18
  Fort St. Vrain, on the South Platte, serviced the Cheyennes, 
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Arapahos, and occasionally the Sioux.
19
  By the spring of 1844, apparently, the 
company was using Fort St. Vrain only on a seasonal basis.  Solomon P. Sublette 
wrote his brother William that the partners, “have evacuated their Fort on the Platte 
in the summer,” and intended to use it only during the winter trading season.  In 
addition to these posts, it is possible that the company established a temporary post 
at the Big Timbers, downriver from the main fort.  Even if this reference is 
incorrect, traders frequented this popular Cheyenne wintering ground throughout 
the 1830s and 1840s.
20
 
The company‟s Indian customers found it most convenient if traders came 
to their camps.  Both employees and principals spent much of the year on the road.  
Alexander Barclay estimated that the partners were absent from the fort “about ½ 
and often 2/3 of the year.”
21
  By sending employees directly to the customers, the 
partners demonstrated their willingness to conduct business at the convenience of 
the Indians themselves.  Such trips could be potentially hazardous.  Because winter 
was the prime robe season, traders had to brave the frigid temperatures and icy 
winds of the Southern Plains to seek out the Indian camps.  Furthermore, the 
hunting season for prime robes was short.  If the Indians left the buffalo ranges to 
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bring their robes to one of the posts, they lost valuable hunting time.  Everyone 
benefitted if the traders came to the villages.  The Indians had the convenience of 
goods brought to their doorstep, while the traders garnered a larger haul of robes.  
The presence of Bent representatives in the Indian camps acted as a deterrent to 
small, independent traders.
22
  Prior to departure, each trader met with the clerk in 
charge of provisioning the expedition.  The men went over the list of trade items, 
gathered the goods from the fort‟s warehouse, and packed for the journey.  The 
traders used wagons or mule trains to transport the goods and robes, depending 
upon the terrain they crossed.
23
 
Once the traders reached their destination, they took up residence with their 
customers.  William Bent could not be in every village at once, so he dispatched 
trusted traders to each major village within the range of the company‟s operation.  
Usually, the traders specialized in trade with a certain tribe, or even a certain band, 
with which they had established good relations.  On occasion, a headman might 
request that the company dispatch a particular trader to his village.
24
  If the traders 
came upon a village unannounced, they made camp on its outskirts and requested 
permission to enter the next day.  Once the traders determined their clients were in 
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the mood to do business, they entered the village with their wagons or mules.  As a 
matter of course, they sought out the lodge of an important leader or elder for their 
residence.  Lewis Garrard, trading at the Big Timbers with Company employee 
John Smith, wrote that they wished to stay in the lodge of the Cheyenne headman 
Lean Chief.  “Without saying a word,” Garrard recalled, “or going in the lodge 
first, we unsaddled in front of it, put our „possibles‟ in the back part, the most 
honored and pleasant place.”
25
   
 Before the actual dickering began, the traders had to demonstrate their 
generosity.  This required a modest distribution of goods; a distribution, “on the 
prairie,” as the saying went.  Gifts were indispensable to establishing and 
maintaining trade relations.  Giving gifts indicated the generosity of the traders.  
Niggardly employees risked the anger of their clients and potentially the complete 
loss of their trade.  Presents given to Indian leaders cemented social ties – fictive 
kinship – with the Indian bands.  Traders became “family,” through this ritualized 
exchange.  Those who failed to follow this protocol remained “strangers,” outsiders 
under suspicion.  However, even after establishing this relationship, company 
traders had to strengthen their ties to the different bands through the continued use 
of gifts and other material assistance.
26
  Wise government agents and private 
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traders both recognized the necessity of gifts to the Indian trade.  William 
Fulkerson wrote Superintendent William Clark from the Upper Missouri Agency 
that, “All Indians expect from persons who are going among them to do business, 
some presents to be made and as far as my knowledge extends of the Indian 
character, they never transact business with each other without presents first being 
made.”  Indian customers who did not receive gifts, Fulkerson noted, “were 
exceedingly disappointed….and much dissatisfied.”  Failure to distribute gifts 
meant the potential loss of trade – in Fulkerson‟s case, lost trade to the Hudson‟s 
Bay Company.  He reiterated to his superiors that the Indians, “are very mercenary 
in their friendships, and small expenditures of presents will go far to secure their 
alliance and trade.”
27
  Company employees also knew the paramount importance of 
generosity and gift-giving.  Lewis Garrard noted that it did not take much to gain 
the confidence of the Indians: a bit of tobacco, a little ammunition, or “our dear-
bought Java at meal time.”  Compliance with Indian socioeconomic procedures, 
relatively small gestures sufficed to demonstrate the commitment of the company 
to fair dealing with its clients. Only after they had greased the wheels did they get 
down to business.
28
   
Once the visitors ensconced themselves in a prominent place, trade began.  
First, a crier went through the village, announcing the presence of the traders, their 
wares, and the products they sought.  During his stay at the Big Timbers with 
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Smith, Garrard remembered one crier, with a “stentorian voice” announcing that he 
and Smith had brought tobacco, blankets, knives, and beads to trade for mules.  The 
women brought their goods, usually buffalo robes, to the lodge where the traders 
stayed.  Here, the Indian men swapped robes for goods selected from the trader‟s 
cache.  The first robes that arrived generally set the price for future negotiations.  
Dick Wooton recalled that traders received one buffalo robe in exchange for “a 
good butcher knife,” two robes for one pound of gunpowder, caps, and 60 bullets, 
two butcher knives for an especially fine robe, a beaver pelt for about thirty cents 
worth of goods, and “a nicely-tanned buckskin” for three bullets and three charges 
of powder.  If the traders demonstrated their generosity and fairness, they earned 
respect among the tribe, status that they used in future visits.
29
 
 Hunting for this trade took place during the fall and winter, and targeted 
specific animals.  Buffalo robes are at their prime between November and March.
30
  
Cowhides were especially prized, both for the making of robes for trade and for 
their use as lodge coverings.  Dan Flores points out that Indian hunters targeted 
cows from two to five years old.  Not only was cow meat tenderer than bull meat, 
but their hides were thinner and easier to process.  Bull hides, on the other hand, 
were bulkier, and the hair not of uniform length.  Indians used bull hides for 
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clothing, bedding, saddle blankets, and rope. Flores also notes that targeting cows 
specifically played a critical role in the overall reduction of the bison herds.  
Relying on case studies of other ungulates, he notes that, “removal of breeding 
females at a level that exceeds 7% of the total herd will initiate population decline.”  
In addition to hunting for marketable robes, simply hunting for lodge coverings had 
the potential to cut deeply into the population of the buffalo herds.  Conservative 
estimates state that it took fifteen hides to cover a lodge.  Larger lodges required as 
many as twenty hides.  In these ways, hunting for the white market economy 
helped to undercut the main source of subsistence for Plains tribes.  George 
Frederick Ruxton was critical of the targeting of cows during the hunt.  He wrote 
that such hunting was reckless.  The native hunters “wantonly slaughter vast 
numbers of buffalo hides every year (the skins of which sex only are dressed), and 
thus add to the evils in store for them.”
31
      
 Indian customers expected, and got, a broad range of trade goods from 
Bent-St. Vrain.  Company traders marketed their wares at prices far above the 
wholesale cost.   Shipping and freight rates, agents and traders pointed out, had 
much to do with the high markup of prices on the prairies and in the mountains.
32
  
Cloth products and blankets constituted the bulkiest part of the trader‟s inventory.  
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The company hawked the famous Hudson‟s Bay blankets, or American knock-offs.  
Navajo blankets, however, commanded the highest prices.  These blankets, Rufus 
Sage wrote, “are superior in beauty of color, texture, and durability, to the fabrics 
of their Spanish neighbors.  I have frequently seen them so closely woven as to be 
impervious to water, and even serve for its transportation.”
33
  The company 
provided goods for personal decoration as well:  brass wires for bracelets, brass 
tacks used to decorate rifle butts, and rare abalone shells – which fetched up to four 
buffalo robes apiece.
34
  However, it is the surviving company invoices, drawn on 
Pierre Chouteau, Jr. and Company, that provide the clearest glimpse into the shear 
magnitude and variety of the trade goods Bent-St. Vrain brought to their Indian 
clients.  These items included belts of wampum, wampum shells, awls, thirteen 
“Battle axes,” hawks bells, brass kettles, tobacco, sugar from Havana, coffee, 
“Scarlet Chief‟s Coats,” bone-handled knives, powder horns, guns, looking glasses, 
finger rings, beads, “Red Cock Feathers,” and on and on.
35
  Trade had wonderful 
transformative powers:  it turned horses and mules into wealth and prestige within 
the tribe, it turned robes into cloth or blankets, slaves into guns, powder, or iron 
tools.  The robes and mules the Indians provided, the Bents turned into cash, credit, 
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and more clothes, guns, awls, and “Scarlet Chiefs Coats,” in St. Louis and the 
markets of the east coast.
36
 
 Company traders did not dupe their clients into trade; the Indians were 
extraordinarily shrewd bargainers and keen judges of trade goods.  Regarding 
Indian clients, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, William Clark wrote Senator 
Thomas Hart Benton,  
The Indians are peculiar in their habits; and, contrary to the 
opinion generally entertained, they are good judges of the 
articles which are offered to them.  The trade is not that system 
of fraud which many suppose.  The competition is generally 
sufficient to reduce the profits to a very reasonable amount, and 
the Indian easily knows the value of the furs in his possession; 
he knows, also the quality of the goods offered to him, and 
experience has taught him which are the best adapted to his 
wants….if our traders are unable to supply such articles as they 
have been accustomed to receive, they will resort to those places 




The Indians themselves requested the goods they wished the traders to bring, and 
the wise trader acceded to their demands.  Those who ignored the wishes of their 
clients lost business.  On one occasion, William B. Astor wrote Pierre Chouteau, Jr. 
regarding a shipment of trade goods.  Indian customers had rejected the blankets 
Chouteau traders offered in trade.  Astor wrote that he was sending a different 
shipment of blankets, “which we hope will produce articles to your satisfaction, 
and enable you to regain your good name with the Indians – we have also 
particularly requested that the little yellow point [blankets] be restored to its former 
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place in lieu of the Red and Green ones, so much disliked by the consumers.”
38
  
Indian traders were masters at pitting one white trader against another in order to 
ensure the best price for robes and the highest quality trade goods.  Keeping their 
clients happy required the company to go out of its way to maintain their business.  
For instance, Army officer James W. Abert witnessed Cheyennes at Bent‟s Fort 
“imposing upon the traders the obligation of feeding them.”  As thin as their 
resources were, the Bents had to accommodate, Abert noted that the company had 
to feed them, “or else lose the furs that the Indians may obtain in the fall.”  Abert 
concluded that, “instead of the Indians being imposed upon by the traders, it is they 
who impose upon the traders.  If two or fifty should come they think that they all 
must be fed and that they have a perfect right to everything.”
39
 
The Indian clients submitted each trade item to intensive scrutiny before 
offering up their robes in exchange.  Some observers, unfamiliar with Indian 
shrewdness, thought them fickle and indecisive.  Lewis Garrard, a complete 
greenhorn, wrote that he and Smith often had to deal with “precise savages, who 
would look at and handle a blanket or other commodity before concluding a 
bargain.”  The traders had to, “praise, and feel, and talk of the article in question, 
and seal the trade by passing the long pipe as a balm to their fastidious tastes.”  The 
native clients often got the better part of the bargain, prompted howls of 
                                                 
38
 Wishart, Fur Trade, 81.  David Lavender points out that Indians often preferred foreign made 
trade products, especially British goods, rather than domestically produced trade goods, Lavender, 
Bent‟s Fort, 45-6.  Astor to Chouteau, September 9, 1833, Reel 22 Frame 469, CC (emphasis in 
original). 
39





 Sess. H.ex.doc. 41, 424, 426; James W. Abert, Western America in 1846-
1847: The Original Travel Diary of Lieutenant J. W. Abert, ed. John Galvin (San Francisco: John 
Howell Books, 1966), 21. 
106 
 
indignation from the journals and reminiscences of company traders.  Occasionally, 
they offered backhanded compliments to the discriminating tastes of their clients.  
Dick Wooton, for instance, wrote, “I don‟t know whether or not the Indian has 
descended from the Jew, but I know he has some of the same instincts in trade.” 
Euro-American traders could also be shrewd and unscrupulous, though they stood a 
better chance of pulling off a boondoggle on unsuspecting white clients.
40
    
Clearly, the company traders had to accommodate to the tastes of their clients, and 
sometimes came out on the losing end of the trade.  If Bent-St. Vrain had been 
unscrupulous and corrupt, rather than flexible and accommodating, they would 
never have seen the successes they did in the Indian trade.  
Intermarriage with its Indian clients provided the company with expanded 
trade opportunities.
41
  The principals of Bent-St. Vrain recognized early on the 
important connection between trade and intermarriage, and moved quickly to 
establish kinship ties with local Indian bands, especially the Southern Cheyennes.  
However, it is important to recognize the genuine affection that characterized many 
fur trade/trader intermarriages.  Traders often mixed economic pragmatism with 
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love in their pursuit of profits and companionship.
42
  In addition to creating a 
bicultural society in the trans-Mississippi West, intermarriage inserted the trader 
into a new set of socioeconomic relations.  Linking oneself to an Indian band meant 
a greater potential for trade and access to new markets, while at the same time 
obligating him to provide for the needs of his new family group.  The Cheyennes 
took marriage very seriously, for the decision to enter into a marital alliance with a 
white trader affected the entire family, immediate and extended, as well as at the 
larger band, and potentially the whole tribe itself.  A well-made match between 
groups contributed to economic prosperity, social harmony, and political stability.  
In return for broader trade opportunities and female companionship, the trader‟s 
new in-laws expected reciprocity – gifts and continued access to a wide variety of 
trade products.  None of these practices was unique to Bent-St. Vrain.  Rather, they 
followed rules longstanding in Indian country.  Keen attention to preexisting 
cultural norms, and accommodating themselves to the practices of the country, 
helped the Bents and St. Vrain become the most influential Indian traders on the 
Southern Plains during the 1830s and 1840s.
43
   
Marriage introduced the white trader to a large set of new relatives.  At the 
broadest level, the trader became an adopted member of the tribe.  The next level of 
relations was that of the band, a series of extended families that spent much of the 
                                                 
42
 Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties, 33; Farnham, Travels, 1: 257; Thorne, “Marriage Alliance,” 35.   
43
Elliott West, The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1998), 80-1; William Swagerty, “Indian Trade in the Trans-Mississippi 
West to 1870,” in Indian-White Relations, vol. 4, ed. Wilcomb Washburn (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institute Press, 1988),351; Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties, 28-9; Fred Eggan, “Cheyenne-
Arapaho Kinship,” in Social Anthropology of North American Tribes, ed. Fred Eggan (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1955), 58; DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 46; Thorne, “Marriage 
Alliance,” 5-7; Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman, 10, 55, 81.  
108 
 
year traveling and hunting together.  Trade, marriage, religion, and war linked these 
bands together.  The obligations of the trader extended from the immediate family 
to the extended family, thence to the band level, finally to the tribal level itself.  
William Bent‟s marriage, for example, proved the company‟s most important link 
with the Cheyenne tribe as a whole.  Most of the company traders who intermarried 
had specialized relationships with a specific band.  The trader acquired an entire 
new set of brothers, sisters, aunts, and uncles.  Reciprocity and mutual obligation 
linked the family members to one another, and they expected a new family member 
to fall into line.  They expected the trader to demonstrate the same level of respect 
and support they showed one another.  In exchange, the trader could avail himself 
of the resources, help, and respect of the entire family and band.
44
 
Intermarriage proved mutually beneficial on many levels.
45
  New in-laws 
often received goods at reduced prices, a guaranteed supply of trade goods, and 
sometimes access to otherwise restricted goods such as guns or liquor.  Such 
perquisites raised the esteem of the family in the eyes of the band, and the esteem 
of the band in the eyes of the tribe.  From this reliable source, Indians received the 
means to enhance their material well-being, and to expand their power and prestige 
at the expense of their neighbors.
46
  The trader‟s wife also gained enhanced status.  
Thoughtful and indulgent husbands showered their new bride‟s with gifts.  Some 
wives also had a less onerous work burden.  James W. Abert observed the wife of 
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one trader at Bent‟s Fort.  He wrote that, “Having a white man for her husband, she 
has not been obliged to work.” Freedom from manual toils allowed her to keep 
herself in a beautiful and delicate state, Abert observed.
47
  The traders also gained 
numerous advantages.  In addition to an expanded clientele, they gained new allies.  
For, once they became kin – either fictive or real – their in-laws stood obligated to 
aid them with all of their own resources.  Cultural norms dictated that each side 
share its resources freely.  Traders also stood under the military protection of their 
new family members.  Marriage to a native wife sometimes facilitated a greater 
understanding of Indian languages and social customs, allowing the trader to 
enhance further his status within the family, band, and tribe.
48
  William Clark 
summarized the importance of the role of the trader in tribal societies when he 
wrote,  
The traders are generally married into influential families in the 
Indian country, and many of their men have Indian wives.  The 
Indians look to them for supplies which are essential to their 
comfort and subsistence.  The trader identifies himself with the 
band in whose country he is located, and in all disputes he 
espouses their case, partakes of their prejudices, and feels his 
own interest involved in theirs.  There is a source of protection 
on one side, and of dependence on the other.  The consequence 
of all this is, no important measure is adopted without the 
knowledge of the trader; and if his advice is not formally 
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William Bent provides the best example of the ways in which company men 
integrated themselves in Indian society.  In the first place, Bent chose his marriage 
partner wisely.  His first wife, Owl Woman, was the daughter of White Thunder, 
the keeper of the medicine arrows, the holiest objects in the Cheyenne religion.  To 
the extent that the Cheyennes had a tribal headman, White Thunder was it.  He 
provided spiritual leadership as well as political acumen.
50
  In Cheyenne culture, 
the wife‟s younger sister sometimes became a candidate to become a second wife.  
This sometimes was the case when the first wife died, as in William Bent‟s case.  
Also, the brother of a dead husband might take on responsibility for his sister in 
law.
51
  Although these strictures were not universal within Cheyenne society, 
William Bent abided by these common practices.  Around 1835, Bent married Owl 
Woman.  When she died in 1846, he followed this tribal custom and wed her sister, 
Yellow Woman.
52
  Bent also practiced seasonal matrilocality, generally spending 
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the winter living in their mother-in-law‟s village.  This represented another way in 
which Bent adhered to Cheyenne marital customs.
53
 
Company employees followed the lead of William Bent.  Observers noted 
that many of the firm‟s traders had Indian wives and children.  Ceran St. Vrain‟s 
brother, Marcellin, had numerous Indian wives and mistresses of different tribes.  
George Bent recalled that Marcellin married Pawnee Woman during his time as 
head trader at Ft. St. Vrain, on the South Platte.  Pawnee Woman was an imposing 
figure, standing over six feet tall.  Bent recalled, “she was strong and mean.”  
Another traveler, passing by Bent‟s Fort, wrote that, “One of the St. Vrain‟s has 
two Sou squaws.”
54
  Numerous other employees took up residence with Indian 
women.  The Company‟s best traders established marital ties with the Southern 
Cheyennes and Southern Arapahos.  One of the benefits of driving John Gantt from 
the Arkansas River Valley, was that the company acquired the services of trader 
John Poisal, the husband of the sister of Arapaho chief Left Hand.  Kit Carson 
married two different Indian women, one Arapaho and one Cheyenne.  Dick 
Wootton had a relationship with an Arapaho woman.  Charlie Autobees had 
relationships with women of both tribes.  In addition, Autobees established contacts 
with the Utes and Apaches.  John S. Smith became probably the company‟s most 
effective trader among the Cheyennes.  Hiring on with Bent-St. Vrain in the late-
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1830s, Smith quickly acquired a facility with the Cheyenne language, and became 
an interpreter at Bent‟s Fort.  As a trader, he married a Cheyenne woman and took 
up residence in her camp during the winter trading season.  He also followed her 
band during the summer.  Around 1842, Smith and his wife had a child together.
55
  
If not necessarily official company policy, intermarriage with the client base was a 
canny economic move.   
Adaptability and accommodation to Native American consumer tastes and 
trade protocols was critical to the success of Bent-St. Vrain.  Surrounded by 
powerful tribes, the partners and their employees had little choice but to dance to 
the tune called by their customers.  Any perceived slight or unsavory transaction 
might mean lost business or possible violent retribution.  In order to shore up their 
bottom line, the Bents and St. Vrain paid close attention to the goods desired by 
their customers.  Most importantly, though, the traders utilized kinship as a way to 
strengthen both the social and economic bond between themselves and local Indian 
bands.  Intermarriage created a web of mutually beneficial interdependence.  Native 
consumers obtained access to a wide range of trade goods, often at preferential 
prices, while the traders acquired not only an extended network of clients, but also 
a new set of political allies.  However, while these links might strengthen ties with 
one group, such alliances could alienate others.  Such a situation required the 
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partners to tread carefully, for the Great Plains could be a dangerous place in which 
to do business. 
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Chapter 5 - War and Peace on the Great Plains: Bent, St. Vrain & Co. and 
Intertribal Politics 
 
In order to maximize their trade profits, the Bents and St. Vrain had to 
navigate carefully the turbulent waters of intertribal politics on the Southern Plains.  
The company had a somewhat paradoxical political relationship with its customers.  
On the one hand, the presence of Bent‟s Fort as a trade market, and the company‟s 
insatiable demand for buffalo robes, contributed at least indirectly to the instability 
of the region, as tribes jockeyed for the most productive buffalo hunting territories.  
By virtue of William Bent‟s intermarriage with a prominent Cheyenne family, the 
partners established a strong bond with the tribe.  However, such a relationship had 
the potential to place traders in jeopardy of attack by enemies of the Cheyennes, 
most notably the Comanches.  On the other hand, both the partners and their clients 
came to recognize the necessary link between political peace and increased trade.  
The profitability of the robe trade, combined with tribal politics led to peace on the 
Southern Plains in 1840.  Peace, too, had paradoxical consequences.  The 
rapprochement between the region‟s most powerful tribes accelerated hunting 
efforts.  The increased number of robes led to greater short-term prosperity for 
Bent-St. Vrain and its clients.  In the long run, though, the increased hunting for 
American markets undercut the subsistence of the tribes on the Southern Plains. 
The Great Plains was a violent, politically unstable region.  Although 
intertribal conflict long predated the arrival of European and American traders, the 
arrival of outsiders wrought seismic shifts in the ways Indian groups hunted, 
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traded, raided, and organized tribal society.
1
 Indian groups had numerous reasons 
for warring with each other.  War brought glory and status.  Raids called for 
counter-raids.  Constant raiding shuttled horses, trade goods and captives from one 
end of the region to the other.  Tribes fought over access to the hunting grounds and 
the horse pasturage necessary for group survival.  The coming of traders like the 
Bents only intensified conditions and trends antedating their arrival.
2
  When peace 
came, it was often fragile.  At no time did peace prevail in all parts of the Great 
Plains.  Even when tribes made peace with one another, it rarely outlasted the next, 
inevitable, horse or slaving raid.
3
       
Wealth and leadership positions within Plains Indian societies was based 
upon status.  War and raiding was one of the primary avenues to obtain wealth and 
status.
4
   Regarding status, however, raiding cut both ways.  The successful leader 
of a raiding or war party acquired the public acclaim and spoils to become an 
important man within the tribe.  Unsuccessful leaders, on the other hand, lost status, 
and had a more difficult time organizing future expeditions.
5
  Military action 
played a pivotal role in advancing in Comanche society.  Raiders acquired the 
horses necessary to increase their hunting activities.  The more buffalo they killed, 
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the more hides they had for their women to process.  More hides to process meant 
the desirability of more wives, often obtained through raiding other tribes or 
striking deep into Mexico.  The more robes a Comanche man‟s wives processed, 
the more wealth he acquired.  Acquisition of wealth allowed men to sponsor the 
raiding activities of ambitious, but poor, young men.  These men, in turn, shared a 
part of their raiding spoils with their wealthy sponsor.  Even men too old to ride the 
war trails benefited from raiding.
6
   
More than anything else, horse raiding kept intertribal relationships in a 
state of flux.  For the Cheyennes and Arapahos, horse theft was the pinnacle of 
achievement for warriors.  Even more than killing an enemy, successful horse 
raiding brought recognition, acclaim, and status.  Large horse herds were essential 
for trading and hunting.  Groups with limited access to horses suffered accordingly 
in the trading markets of the trans-Mississippi West.  Cheyenne men with horses, 
like their Comanche counterparts, could hunt more effectively and trade a larger 
number of robes with whites like the Bents.  Well-mounted warriors raided far and 
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Revenge stimulated raids as well.  The loss of horses to enemies required 
counter-raids.  Deaths suffered in battle prompted the organization and departure of 
the largest parties of warriors.  Successful retaliation, the kind where warriors 
returned with enemy scalp locks dangling from their lances, brought closure for 
bereaved families.
8
 This consistent cycle of theft and retaliation frustrated white 
policy makers.  From his post at Bent‟s Fort, Indian Agent Thomas Fitzpatrick 
informed his superiors of his unenviable and difficult position as peacemaker.  
“The law of retaliation,” he wrote his superiors, “or some mode of remuneration in 
the shape of payment for the slain is the only law recognized by the nations of this 
country I have taken measures to put a stop to further bloodshed for the present – 
but when there is no law to punish individuals for committing depredations on 
other tribes…good fellowship must be in a very precarious state.”
9
  Furthermore, 
white observers noted that Indian raiders never thought of themselves as 
aggressors.  In their view, retaliation was completely justified.  Indeed, honor 
required retaliation.  As long as Pawnees stole horses from Cheyennes, as long as 
Cheyennes attacked Pawnee hunting parties, the cycle continued.
10
  In reality, there 
was more discipline to retaliation than white observers recognized.  Avenging war 
parties seldom turned to theft as a goal.  Conversely, horse raiders attempted to 
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avoid violent confrontation.  However, it was not always necessary for warriors to 
retaliate against a specific enemy band, encampment, or even tribe.  A Kiowa war 
party, for example, setting out to take revenge for a raid by Cheyennes, could 
satisfy their honor by taking the scalp of an Osage or Pawnee.
11
  Still, this 
combination of single-mindedness and opportunism ensured the continuation of 
political instability into the 1830s. 
The markets traders like the Bents provided, especially for buffalo robes, 
further destabilized Plains politics.  Access to a wide variety of trade goods 
depended upon a consistently large harvest of buffalo.  Although tribes had clashed 
over hunting territory for decades, if not centuries, the presence of American 
trading companies intensified the conflict over prime buffalo grounds.  Every 
movement to secure territory brought tribes into tense, often violent conflict with 
one another.  When resources became strained, erstwhile friends could turn into 
enemies.  Direct access to trading outlets undercut symbiotic trade relations, as 




The unpredictable, shifting patterns of buffalo migrations added further 
instability to tribal territorial politics.  William Boggs recalled that, “in those days 
there was deadly hostility existing between the various tribes that inhabited the 
plains and mountain ranges adjacent to their hunting grounds, which they never 
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permitted any of their enemies to trespass on.”
13
 Ironically, intertribal violence 
often protected the herds.  Throughout the Plains there existed “neutral zones,” or 
“buffer zones.”  In these areas, which often abutted the territory of several tribes, 
the herds flourished.  Hunters entered these areas at their own risk, for war parties 
constantly crisscrossed these zones.
14
   
Conflicts over hunting grounds on the Southern Plains intensified in the 
1820s.  The migration of the Cheyennes and Arapahos to the Arkansas River 
brought them into direct conflict with the Comanches and Kiowas.  This migration 
south, created new contested zones.  Between the Red River and the Arkansas 
River, conflict flared between the new arrivals and the Kiowa-Comanche alliance.  
Between the South Platte and the Arkansas, the Cheyennes and Arapahos clashed 
with westering Pawnee hunters, as well as mountain tribes like the Utes and 
Shoshones.
15
  In 1835, a U. S. dragoon expedition reconnoitered the contested 
ground between the South Platte and Arkansas.  Observers commented upon the 
richness and extent of the buffalo herds in the region; “the buffalo are very 
numerous in that part of the country,” the official report concluded.
16
  The 
abundance, one officer shrewdly observed, was due to raiding and military action.  
The region was, he wrote, “the theater of most of the petty wars among the 
different Indian tribes.”  Because of this, “it is seldom visited except by war 
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parties.”  The result of this constant warring, he concluded was that, “the buffalo, 
wild horse, elk, mountain sheep, antelope, and deer, here rove as lords and tenants 
of the soil, in comparative security.”
17
  The mission of the expedition was to bring 
about peace among the tribes of the Southern Plains.  Peace, the officers predicted, 
“will be of immense advantage to these Indians, as they will have an extensive 
country opened to them, covered with innumerable buffalo, where they can hunt in 
safety without the fear of being attacked by enemies.”
18
 
Peace indeed allowed for the renewed exploitation of these neutral zones.  
The 1840 treaty between the Cheyenne-Arapaho alliance and the Kiowa-Comanche 
alliance opened the country south of the Arkansas.  The country between the South 
Platte and Arkansas, and the buffalo grounds of the Republican, however, remained 
dangerous for some years.
19
  For a time, peace generally brought increasingly safe 
travel and lucrative hunting.  Political peace, Elliott West points out, placed 
increasing strain on the buffalo herds.  “When the buffalo neutral zone vanished,” 
he argues, “so did the bison.  Unfettered hunting was followed by growing hunger, 
and peace led to war more bitter than ever….the buffaloes‟ dying and the Indians‟ 
statecraft and politics cannot be understood apart from one another.  The fate of the 
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bison was initiated and complexly bound up with Indian emigrations.”
20
  In the 
short term, peace brought prosperity to Bent-St. Vrain, as their Indian clients 
increased their haul of buffalo.  However, by the late-1840s, the peace that once 
seemed so promising began to undermine the financial stability of the company, as 
well as the material wellbeing of the region‟s tribes.  The decline of the buffalo 
herds acted as one of the catalysts for the eventual dissolution of the Bent-St. Vrain 
partnership. 
Conflict was especially intense between the Cheyennes and Pawnees.
21
  
Despite Lakota pressure from the north, and Cheyenne intrusions from the west, the 
Pawnees were aggressive in their defense of the buffalo grounds along the Platte 
and the Republican.
22
  Bent‟s contemporaries reported on the connection between 
Cheyenne-Pawnee conflict and the creation of “neutral grounds,” especially 
between the forks of the Platte and along the headwaters of the Kansas.  The latter 
location, Rufus Sage wrote, “is considered very dangerous.”
23
    Observers noted 
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that the Pawnees, despite a lack of allies, seemed to war with everyone, frequently 
launching successful raids on Cheyenne, Sioux, and Comanches herds.
24
  Cheyenne 
tradition says that the two tribes came into conflict from the moment the former 
group began its migration across the Missouri River.  From the late-eighteenth 
century on, conflict was consistent.  There is no evidence the two groups ever 




Conflict between the Cheyennes and Pawnees accelerated in the early 
1830s.
26
  Around 1829, the Pawnees wiped out a party of Cheyenne horse thieves, 
cutting up their bodies and dumping them into a creek.  In retaliation, the 
Cheyennes moved against their enemies.  During the 1830 fight along the Platte, 
however, disaster struck the Cheyennes.  Prior to the fight, a Cheyenne medicine 
man named Bull tied the four arrows to his lance.  During the initial charge, he 
spotted a wounded Pawnee, and rode forward to count coup.  The crippled warrior 
dodged Bull‟s lance thrust, and wrenched the weapon from the medicine man‟s 
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grasp.  The Cheyennes rushed forward in an attempt to recapture the relics – 
without success.  Mortified by the loss, they fell back in total defeat.
27
   
While the loss of the arrows was a staggering blow for the Cheyennes, it 
dovetailed conveniently with attempts to restore peace on the Great Plains.  
Without their aid in war and hunting, the tribe would surely suffer.  When the 
Pawnees captured the arrows, George Bent recalled, the Cheyennes, “lost their 
medicine power.”
28
  In 1835, the Cheyennes opened peace negotiations with the 
Pawnees.  White Thunder traveled on foot to the Pawnee villages to beg for the 
return of the arrows.  The Pawnees, sensing their advantage, demanded that the 
Cheyennes come to some sort of peace arrangement.  As a result, the Pawnees 
returned one arrow to White Thunder in exchange for a promise to negotiate a 
peace at Bent‟s Fort in the summer of 1835.
29
 
That same summer the United States government entered into the politics of 
the Southern Plains.  Charged with restoring peace between the region‟s tribes, 
Colonel Henry Dodge, along with one hundred dragoons traveled up the Platte 
River to the Rocky Mountains before turning south to the Arkansas.  At Bent‟s 
Fort, Dodge met with representatives of the warring tribes, and informed them of 
the government‟s wish for concord.
30
  Although it is unclear the exact role the 
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company played in the peace negotiations, they at least provided a venue for the 
talks, and possibly advice about the need for regional peace.  At the very least, 
Ceran St. Vrain dined with Dodge, and provided accommodations for his officers.
31
  
After chiding their hosts for their previous aggressiveness, the Pawnees pressed 
Dodge to take up their case.  He, in turn, made a speech to the assembly touting the 
mutual benefits of peace.  The President, Dodge declared, “is desirous to be at 
peace with all his remote red children; he wishes you to smoke the pipe of peace 
with your enemies, and bury the hatchet of war.”
32
  Peace, the colonel argued, 
meant greater hunting opportunities along the Platte, “where there is buffalo in 
abundance.”
33
  Dodge reported to his superiors that both sides, “appear desirous of 
making a permanent peace,” and that they agreed to meet for a mutual buffalo hunt 
on the Platte the following winter.
34
  With the negotiations concluded, the former 
enemies exchanged gifts – the Cheyennes presenting the Pawnees with horses, the 
Pawnees giving the Cheyennes a number of guns.
35
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The Cheyennes also faced enemies to the west, especially the Shoshones 
and Utes.  Once again, much of the fighting centered on the headwaters of the 
Platte.  However, the wanderings of the Utes and Shoshones as far south as the 
Arkansas brought them into conflict with the Cheyennes and Arapahos.  Dodge 
reported that, “The whole route from the Platte to the Arkansas is frequented by 
large bodies of Blackfeet, Crow, Snakes [Shoshones], and sometimes Utes who live 
upon the waters of the Rio del Norte [Rio Grande], but frequently come through the 
mountain passes to steal horses from the Arapahos and Cheyennes.”
36
  Conflicts 
occasionally extended much further west; there is one report of the Cheyennes and 
Shoshones clashing near Fort Bridger in present-southwestern Wyoming.
37
  The 
political situation on the Plains affected the fortunes of mountain tribes like the 
Utes.  Conflicts between the Cheyenne-Arapaho alliance and the Pawnees and the 
Kiowa-Comanche alliance forced some Arapahos to encroach onto Ute lands.  The 
Great Peace of 1840, and possibly the Pawnee decline, created a new dynamic.  
Now, with raiding opportunities to the east and south limited, the Arapahos focused 
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their attention on the Utes, resulting in increasing numbers of incursions into the 
Ute country.
38
   
The greatest challenge to Cheyenne domination of the Southern Plains came 
from the Kiowas and Comanches, south of the Arkansas River.  Both groups were 
formidable warriors, and for over a decade, the conflict ebbed and flowed.  
Longtime plainsman Dick Wooton recollected that when the groups fought one 
another in the mountains, the Cheyennes and Arapahos were more successful.  
Fighting on the prairies, he claimed, favored the Kiowas and Comanches. 
Cheyenne tradition says that they and the Comanches “had been at war as long as 
anyone could remember.”  However, other sources indicate that the groups 




The vast horse herds of the Kiowas and Comanches attracted raiders from 
north of the Arkansas.  Salubrious climate, access to fertile river bottoms, and 
consistent plundering of the rich haciendas of northern Mexico made these tribes 
the primary source for horses on the Southern Plains.  While the herds made the 
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Comanches rich, the horses also provided an inviting target.
40
  Cheyenne oral 
traditions say that the Comanches and Kiowas had so many horses, “they could not 
herd them close to the villages.”  Ranging for miles on all sides of the camps, all 
but the finest Comanche horses roamed loose over the prairies.  Despite such easy 
pickings, George Bent remembered that the bravest Cheyenne horse thieves crept 
into the heart of the Comanche villages to steal the fine war horses and buffalo 
runners picketed outside the lodges.
41
  Cheyenne tradition says that a successful 
raid on Comanche herds by a party of Blackfeet convinced the Cheyennes to move 
south to the Arkansas.  The Cheyennes, George Bent told George Hyde, “were very 
jealous,” of the Blackfeet.
42
  Contemporary white observers noted the consistent 
southward movements of Cheyenne raiding parties, as well as the large herds of 
stock they drove north from Comanchería.  An officer traveling with Henry Dodge 
reported wrote that, “The Shians are now at war with the Camanches and Kioways, 
from whom they steal a vast number of horses and mules….war parties are 
constantly passing to and from one tribe to another.”
43
   
Despite their success in raiding enemy horse herds, the Cheyenne war 
record against the Kiowas and Comanches was less exceptional.  The Comanches 
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and Kiowas were also capable of striking deep into Cheyenne-Arapaho territory, 
both for violent retaliation and for horse theft.
44
  Comanche and Kiowa parties 
sometimes ranged as far north as the forks of the Platte.  In 1836, the Cheyennes 
surprised a party of Kiowas on Scout Creek, about forty miles east of the site of 
Denver.  The Kiowas fled to a stand of trees, and began erecting breastworks.  The 
Cheyennes, unable to penetrate these defenses, fell back, allowing the Kiowas to 
escape.
45
 Violence between the two groups accelerated in the late-1830s, with the 
Kiowa-Comanche alliance often holding the upper hand.     
The years 1837-9 were particularly disastrous for the Cheyennes.  As with 
their defeat at the hands of the Pawnees in 1830, religion played a pivotal role in 
the Cheyenne defeats.  Some time after the loss of the medicine arrows, and White 
Thunder‟s unsuccessful attempt to recover all of them, the medicine man made new 
arrows.  During the summer of 1837, a society of young, impulsive Cheyenne 
warriors, the Bow Strings, sought the blessing of the arrows to take the field against 
the Comanches.  White Thunder demurred; the murder of a Cheyenne by a fellow 
tribal member some time before counteracted the power the arrows would give to 
the raiders.  Rather than wait politely for White Thunder to conduct the proper 
ceremonies, the young warriors beat the old man with their quirts until he agreed to 
perform the necessary rituals.  However, the medicine man informed the Bow 
String warriors that they stood no chance of success.  Heedless of the warning, the 
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young men departed south.  On the trail, they foolishly used up most of their arrows 
shooting at game.  When they encountered the Kiowas along the Washita River, 
they were perilously low on ammunition.  The Kiowas and their Comanche allies 
killed and scalped every one of the nearly fifty Bow String warriors.
46
   
The following summer, the Cheyennes turned the arrows against the 
Kiowas and Comanches.  Defeat stalked this expedition as well.  Eager to avenge 
the defeat of the Bow Strings, Cheyenne warriors impulsively attacked a Kiowa 
encampment on Wolf Creek in present northwestern Oklahoma before White 
Thunder could properly conduct his arrow renewal ceremonies.  Calling on a 
neighboring Comanche camp for aid, the Kiowas threw up breastworks.  As at 
Scout Creek, the Cheyennes failed to penetrate the defensive works, and fell back.  
Although the Kiowas suffered heavier casualties, the Cheyennes paid a higher 
price; among the fallen was White Thunder, the most influential member of the 
tribe.  These disasters, compounded by the annihilation of a party of Arapahos 
during the winter of 1838-9, reinforced the high price of war with the Kiowa-
Comanche alliance.
47
   
In addition to the heavy losses incurred in the late-1830s, the Cheyennes 
and Arapahos had sound economic reasons for coming to terms with their enemies 
south of the Arkansas.  By 1840, the Bent‟s were firmly established as the most 
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powerful firm on the Southern Plains.  Peace with the Comanches and Kiowas 
would allow the Cheyennes and Arapahos to safely expand their hunting 
operations, and the opening of the neutral buffalo grounds meant increased trade 
opportunities at Bent‟s Fort.  Everyone on the Southern Plains knew the vast, 
largely untapped potential of market-oriented hunting between the Arkansas and 
the South Platte, but as long as war raged, intensive hunting remained risky.  Peace 
also allowed the Cheyennes and Arapahos to take advantage of free and open 
access to the huge Comanche and Kiowa horse herds.  The peace negotiations of 
1840 were the culmination of a long series of setbacks for the Cheyennes – the loss 
of the medicine arrows to the Pawnees, enemy incursions from south of the 
Arkansas, the disastrous Bow String expedition, the stinging defeat at Wolf Creek, 
and the death of White Thunder.  These factors, combined with the potential for 
vast economic opportunities, predisposed the Cheyennes to seek peace with their 
old enemies.
48
   
The Comanches and Kiowas had their own reasons – political, military, and 
economic – for coming to terms with the Cheyennes and Arapahos.  The traditional 
interpretation is that pressure from the east drove the Comanches and Kiowas into 
the alliance.  The expansion of the Osages and other tribes from the Indian 
Territory initially disrupted Comanche trade, as well as sparking violent 
confrontation.  The eastern tribes, well-armed with American guns, proved 
vigorous and determined opponents.  However, by the mid-1830s the Comanches 
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had established peace, albeit a tentative one, with their new neighbors in Indian 
Territory.
49
  According to this older view, Texan incursions into Comanchería also 
played a determining role.  In the years following their independence from Mexico, 
Texans often proved themselves aggressive expansionists.  Well-armed, they 
probed the eastern margins of Comanche territory, sparking a cycle of raid and 
counter-raid.  In the face of these conditions, the Comanches and their allies, 
needing guns and ammunition, reached out to their old enemies, hoping to tap the 
market at Bent‟s Fort.
50
 
The Cheyennes and Arapahos posed a greater threat to the safety of western 
Comanche villages than did the Texans or Osages.  As noted above, Cheyennes and 
Arapahos aggressively raided into Comanche territory in search of horses, plunder, 
and war honors.  George Bent drew a direct connection between Cheyenne success 
stealing Comanche horses, and the coming of peace in 1840.  He wrote that the 
former rivals, “have been at peace ever since the Cheyennes made it to hot for them 
in stealing horses…as many as 1000 head at a time.”
51
  The balance of these 
hostilities took place within Comanchería.  Despite the fact that the Comanches and 
Kiowas demonstrated both their ability to raid far north of the Arkansas, and to 
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Although both sides were beginning to recognize the benefits of a 
rapprochement, the peace negotiations began largely by accident.  Seeking to 
avenge their defeat at Wolf Creek, another Cheyenne war party headed south.  On 
their way, they stopped at an Arapaho encampment along the Arkansas.  Entering 
an Arapaho lodge, the Cheyenne raiders found themselves face to face with two 
Kiowa-Apaches who were visiting their Arapaho in-laws.  This unexpected 
encounter prompted the Kiowa-Apaches to inform the Cheyenne warriors that the 
Kiowas and Comanches were willing to make peace.  The Cheyennes replied that 
they had no power to make peace on the spot, but that they would return to their 
camps to deliberate.  The price of peace, they told the Kiowa-Apaches, was the 
return of the scalps of the Bow String warriors, and a substantial gift of horses.  
The Cheyennes held council.  Initially unable to reach a decision, they referred the 
matter to the Dog Soldiers, the most prominent Cheyenne warrior society.  The 
Dog Soldiers deliberated, and came out in favor of peace.  Kiowa tradition, 
however, says that the first peace overtures came from the Cheyennes.  Suspicious 
of Cheyenne intentions, the Kiowas rejected the initial offer.  When the Cheyennes 
made a second attempt, the Kiowas accepted their offer.
53
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The two groups established a firm and lasting peace sometime in 1840, 
along the banks of the Arkansas near Bent‟s Fort.  Prior to the meeting, the 
Cheyennes eagerly descended upon the fort, seeking the trade goods necessary to 
cementing ties between allies.  At the beginning of the negotiations, the Kiowas 
presented the Cheyennes with the scalps of the Bow String warriors; the Cheyennes 
refused to accept the proffered items, claiming that they would only resurrect 
painful memories.  A vigorous round of trade and gift giving commenced.   The 
Cheyennes, taking advantage of their connections with the Bents, provided the 
Comanches and Kiowas with blankets, cloth, beads, and brass kettles.  The 
Comanches and Kiowas reciprocated with an immense gift of horses.  Cheyenne 
tradition says that their new allies gave away so many horses that, “Even the 
unimportant persons received four, five, six horses.”
54
 
Peace brought both benefits and unintended consequences to all parties 
involved.  Most importantly, families on both sides slept easier knowing that the 
violence that wracked the region for a decade was at an end.   Both groups could 
now focus their attention on enemies elsewhere; the Cheyennes turned west, the 
Comanches south.
55
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wealth of their new allies, while the Comanches and Kiowas tapped into a new 
source of white trade goods – Bent‟s Fort.  Both sides agreed to share the territory 
along the Arkansas River, especially the valuable wintering ground at the Big 
Timbers, downriver from the fort.
56
  From an economic standpoint, the most 
important result of the peace was an intensification of market-oriented buffalo 
hunting.  No longer concerned about enemy reprisals, the new allies set about 
exploiting the vast herds that roamed between the Arkansas and the South Platte.  
The Bents and St.  Vrain were most likely ecstatic, for increased hunting brought 
more trade opportunities and revenues.  Furthermore, the company could now 
expand its operations into the previously closed areas south of the Arkansas.  Peace 
allowed the traders to establish lucrative new trade connections with the 
Comanches and Kiowas, meaning a steady stream of robes pouring into Bent‟s Fort 
from north, east, and south.  However, the opening of these neutral grounds had 
negative long-term consequences.  With the risk of violence now gone, Indian 
hunters cut deeply into the region‟s herds.  Peace brought increased opportunity, 
but also ultimately worked to undercut the subsistence and economic base of the 
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inhabitants of the Southern Plains, both Indian and white.  For the moment, 
however, all sides appeared pleased with the results of the negotiations.
57
 
Under optimum conditions, peace and nonintervention in Indian politics 
characterized the trade policies of Bent-St. Vrain.  Maintaining a respectful, healthy 
distance from Indian quarrels kept company traders safe.  Nonintervention also 
allowed the principals to cultivate a guise of neutrality, ostensibly allowing them to 
do business with all comers.  Favoring one tribe above another made travel and 
trade dangerous.  George Bent recalled that, “As the company was trading with all 
the tribes and the tribes were often at war with one another, great care had to be 
taken by the company to avoid trouble.  My father always ordered the men to keep 
out of the Indian quarrels and not to mix in when one tribe was fighting another.”  
Throughout the 1830s, the Bents and St. Vrain strove, not always successfully, to 
observe intertribal politics with Olympian dispassion.  The traders hoped to 
maintain Bent‟s Fort as a neutral middle ground, where all plains tribes could 
gather peacefully for trade.  However, the close nature of the ties the Bents 
cultivated with the Cheyennes made it impossible for the partners to remain 
completely neutral.
 58
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By becoming kin with the Cheyennes, by granting them a most-favored 
trade status, the company signaled its lack of neutrality to Cheyenne enemies, most 
notably the Comanches.  The traditional story of the roots of the Comanches‟ 
resentment of the company comes from George Bent.  Bent tells a story of his 
father and brother hiding a couple of Cheyenne horse raiders from a Comanche war 
party.  When the Comanches found Cheyenne moccasin prints all over the area they 
demanded that the Bent‟s turn over the thieves.  The brothers played coy, telling 
the Comanches that the Cheyennes were long gone, headed north.  The ruse 
worked.  The Comanches rode away, the Cheyennes escaped, and the prestige of 
the Bents increased.  The only problem with the story is that it probably is not 
true.
59
  Alliance with the Cheyennes exposed Bent-St. Vrain traders to reprisals as 
they journeyed throughout the Southern Plains in search of business.
60
  In return for 
the large number of robes the Cheyennes traded to the partners, they required trade 
goods, including guns and ammunition.  In a sense, by providing firearms to their 
main customers, the Bents undercut their chances of extending the scope of their 
trading operations beyond Cheyenne territory.  The Cheyennes could easily turn the 
guns they obtained at Bent‟s Fort against the Comanches, Kiowas, Utes, and 
Pawnees.  Should any of these groups trace the source of the weapons back to the 
Bents, their traders risked swift reprisals.  Although arming the Cheyennes did not 
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always keep their rivals from seeking out trade at Bent‟s Fort, interactions between 
the groups along the Arkansas could be tense; fighting and theft within the vicinity 
of the fort was not uncommon before 1840.
61
 
Violence often characterized the interactions between Bent-St. Vrain and 
the Pawnees.  Dick Wooton recalled that the Pawnees caused the company much 
trouble.  He wrote that they approached the fort under the guise of friendship.  But, 
if they caught any employee alone, “his life wasn‟t worth a cent if they could get 
near enough to him to kill him,” Wooton complained.  On one occasion, he wrote, 
the Pawnees killed two herdsmen within site of the walls of the fort.  Company 
wagon trains plying the Santa Fe Trail were not safe from Pawnee attacks either.
62
  
In September 1838, the Pawnees attacked a Bent-St. Vrain party traveling the 
Mountain Route of the Santa Fe Trail south to New Mexico.  The Indians struck the 
men while they were encamped along a tributary of the Arkansas River.  The 
caravan suffered one man killed and three wounded, in addition to the loss of their 
entire stock of merchandise.  The following year, Big Soldier, the leader of the 
Pawnee band informed the tribe‟s agent that the attack had been a 
misunderstanding.  He informed the agent that his men mistook the party for 
“Spaniards.”  The horses, mules, and merchandise provided a target too tempting to 
pass on, and the Pawnees attacked.  Big Soldier expressed remorse for the mistake, 
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lamenting the fact that, “these white men were not Spaniards, but my American 
brothers.”
63
  Following customary practice, the partners submitted a claim to the 
Office of Indian Affairs, demanding recompense for their losses.  The losses, 
Marcellin St. Vrain reported, were extensive.  The Pawnees made off with nearly 
three thousand yards of cloth, thirty-eight pairs of shoes, one hundred eighty yards 
of calico, ten pounds of musket balls, twenty five pounds of steel, nine mules, three 
horses, coffee, sugar, kettles, a camp axe, twenty-three buffalo robes, one rifle, 
twenty-five pounds of ink, and two “Latin missals” intended for the churches of 
New Mexico.  The total loss came to $3,273.13.
64
  However, Congress proved 
unwilling to act on the Company‟s claim.  The attack, investigators pointed out, 
took place in Mexico.  As a result, they noted, “When a trader leaves the United 
States, this government ceases to be responsible for any losses which may attend 
his adventures.”  Reimbursing American merchants for attacks on foreign soil, the 
investigating committee decided, would set a bad precedent.
65
  Whether or not the 
ties between the Bents and the Cheyennes dictated Pawnee actions is uncertain, but 
the potential for conflict sometimes made travel, especially on the eastern edges of 
the Great Plains, hazardous for company traders and wagon trains. 
Company relations with the mountain tribes – the Utes and Shoshones – 
were more ambiguous.  The only documented case of preemptive violence 
perpetrated by Bent-St. Vrain against an Indian tribe was directed against the 
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Shoshones at Fort Cass. Relations with the Utes could also be tense.  From the 
point of view of the Utes, the Bents, as allies of the Cheyennes and Arapahos, 
looked suspicious.  It is possible that, after the Great Peace, the Cheyennes and 
Arapahos, armed by the company, expanded the scope of their raiding west into 
Ute territory.  Because of raids by the Plains tribes, the Ute trade was dangerous for 
white traders along the Arkansas River.  The Bents first tried to trade with the Utes 
in 1839, and met with a chilly reception in their camps along the Uintah.  Unable to 
dispose of any of their goods, the traders returned to Bent‟s Fort.
66
  However, the 
following year, the Utes came to the fort to trade.  Their presence unnerved clerk 
Alexander Barclay; “the Eutaw tribe were admitted into the fort in overwhelming 
numbers and to a man might have annihilated us at any preconcerted signal while 
we were engaged in distributing the different articles,” he informed his brother.  
The Utes had the opportunity to strike a disastrous blow, yet they refrained, a 
shaken Barclay wrote.
67
  After the initial tensions of the late-1830s and early-
1840s, trade between the Utes and the company expanded slowly.  Sometimes the 
Utes came directly to the fort to trade, while at other times, the partners dispatched 
their employees west to the country around Great Salt Lake.  In the case of the 
trade between the Utes and Bent-St. Vrain, economic self-interest and the potential 
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for new markets overcame the suspicion resulting from the alliance between the 
Bents and the Cheyennes.
68
         
Largely because of their close ties to the Cheyennes, it took Bent-St. Vrain 
almost five years to establish trade relations with the Kiowas and Comanches south 
of the Arkansas River.  It is possible that the partners urged the Cheyennes to 
curtail their raiding into Comanchería, hoping to establish peaceful trade relations.  
As early as 1835, sensing the vast economic potential of the Comanche market, 
William Bent traveled to the Red River in an attempt to open trade.  Bent 
encountered a camp of about 2000 Comanches on the Red, and set about opening 
negotiations.  Although his hosts treated him with kindness, Bent returned to the 
fort having failed to establish trade ties.  A chronicler of the Dodge expedition 
recalled that Bent found the Comanches “very friendly disposed to the Americans.”  
Peace, the officer observed, would benefit all the tribes of the region.
69
   
The Comanches had their reasons for not opening a trade with Bent-
St.Vrain.  First, they had other markets.  Auguste P. Chouteau, scion of the St. 
Louis trading family, had constructed two posts in Comanche territory – one at the 
mouth of Chouteau Creek, north of the Cross Timbers, and one on Cache Creek 
near the future site of Fort Sill.  However, when Chouteau died in 1838, the posts 
closed, forcing the Comanches to seek out other markets, eventually including 
Bent‟s Fort.  Perhaps most important, though, was the close ties the company 
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forged with the Cheyennes and Arapahos, ties that made it extremely difficult for 
the Comanches and Kiowas to trade north of the Arkansas, or for company traders 
to operate south of the river.
70
  The marriage and trade ties the Bents cultivated 
with the Cheyennes made traders and company horse herds an inviting target for 
Comanche raiders.  In the summer of 1839, for example, nine Comanches stole a 
herd of horses as it grazed close to the walls of the fort.   Although the trading 
licenses issued to the partners in 1836 and 1838 included the Kiowas, there is no 
evidence that the Bents traded or built any permanent posts south of the Arkansas.  
However, as a result of the Great Peace in the summer of 1840, the principals took 
out its first license to trade with the Comanches.
71
 
Even after the Great Peace, the company‟s initial relations with the 
Comanches and Kiowas were tense.  In the spring of 1841, thirty-two Kiowas came 
to Bent‟s Fort, proclaiming themselves emissaries for both tribes.  The messengers 
offered to make peace in exchange for a trade.  As was customary, the traders 
distributed presents.  At the council that followed the Kiowas, “said that the nation 
expected we would send them a white man to the village to confirm the sincerity of 
our avowed peace inclination.”  The Bents sent a trader with the Kiowas, but the 
new trade partners killed the man and stole his string of horses.  Recognizing that 
such an action imperiled their chance to establish economic relations with the 
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company, the Kiowas took council among themselves, and agreed to return the 
body of the trader and an equal number of horses to Bent‟s Fort.  An Arapaho 
brought news of the killing to the fort.  Clerk Alexander Barclay wrote his brother 
in a rage, “As you may naturally suppose we heard of it with horror and a stern 
desire of retributive vengeance which will be very apt to be made if a good 
opportunity occurs even if we resort to their own weapon viz. treachery, indeed I 
shall feel justified if any reprisals becoming a party to expiate this flagrant 
aggression.”  Barclay continued, writing that he would never treat with the Kiowas 
again without a weapon close at hand.  The partners, however, were willing to 
accept the tokens of peace offered by the Indians.   Barclay hotly disagreed with the 
actions of his employers.  His letter continued, “I am sorry to say the principals of 
this concern are too much disposed to put unlimited confidence in any Indians who 
come with overtures of peace,” it was never safe to trust Kiowas or Comanches, 
Barclay concluded.
 72
   
The sentiments of the principals won the day, however, and the next fall 
they formally extended its trading operations into the Texas Panhandle, and 
constructed a log trading post on the Canadian River in the fall of 1842.  The post 
did good business, mostly dealing in buffalo robes and livestock stolen from 
Mexico.  Trade John Hatcher, who married a Kiowa woman, was the company‟s 
first permanent trader in the Panhandle.
73
  The log post was so successful that the 
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partners decided to build a more permanent adobe structure in the same area.  By 
1843, the Company trade with the Comanches was apparently profitable enough to 
offset any losses in other areas of their business. One observer wrote that, “The 
news from the Arkansas is that Bent & St. Vrain have done nothing, but look to 
their Comanche trade to bring them out, which, if report is true, will do so.”
74
  
Some time in early 1845
75
, Robert Fisher and John Hatcher constructed the adobe 
post twelve miles down the South Canadian, on a stretch of swampy, but well-
timbered land near the mouth of Bent Creek.  Ceran St. Vrain oversaw the trading 
operations of the new outpost, and for a time he was quite successful.  Lieutenant 
James W. Abert, charged with scouting a path through Comanchería in 1845 
remarked on the possibility that his party might meet “a large assemblage of 
Indians” awaiting the arrival of company wagons at the Panhandle post.  By the 
spring of 1846, however, relations with the Comanches became so strained that 
Bent-St. Vrain abandoned its operations along the Canadian.
76
   
The complexity of trade and politics on the Great Plains required Bent-St. 
Vrain to adopt a flexible range of actions to meet each challenge, actions that 
sometimes had unforeseen consequences for all groups involved.  Eagerness to 
establish close relations with the Cheyennes placed Bent-St. Vrain traders in a 
precarious political position.  By aligning themselves with the Cheyennes, traders 
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exposed themselves to reprisals from Cheyenne enemies.  Only in 1840, when the 
Cheyennes, Arapahos, Comanches, and Kiowas recognized the mutual benefits of 
peace could company employees move with relative impunity and safety across the 
Southern Plains.  When navigating the waters of intertribal politics, the Bents and 
St. Vrain recognized that success often required flexibility and a willingness to play 















Chapter 6 - Rivals and Rapprochement: Bent, St. Vrain & Co. and the South Platte 
Trade 
 
Bent-St. Vrain combined pragmatic alliance making with circumvention of 
national trade laws to combat the competition it faced from white traders along the 
South Platte and the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains.  Bent-St. Vrain was not 
without rivals for the robe trade on the Great Plains.  A four-cornered contest, 
centered on the upper Platte River basin, flared in the late-1830s, forcing the 
company to reach an agreement with American Fur in order to drive the smaller 
operators from the field.  Such an alliance was typical of the company‟s approach 
to conducting business with the large St. Louis firms.  While Bent-St. Vrain lacked 
the economic clout to combat American Fur on anything resembling equal terms, 
the Missouri merchants recognized that competition with the Bents and St. Vrain 
served the best interests of neither firm.  Competition reduced profits.  Therefore, 
the two companies decided to ally with one another and divide the Great Plains 
between them.  At the same time, the lack of a strong government presence in the 
region allowed Bent-St. Vrain to resort to illegal business practices when 
confronted by the small independent traders along the Platte and in the Southern 
Rockies.  The company distributed liquor to its Indian clients in direct violation of 
federal law.  Without the steadying regulatory hand of the state, Bent-St. Vrain 
responded to the threat of competition in both a practical and often illegal manner. 
146 
 
The center of American Fur Company operations on the Northern Plains 
was Fort Laramie, in what is now southeastern Wyoming.  The location of the fort 
was key to the exploitation of the western fur and robe trades.  The fort sat astride 
the main east-west route from St. Louis to the Rocky Mountains, and was the 
northern terminus of a trapper trail that ran all the way to New Mexico.  From 
Laramie, the AFC could tap into trade with the Arapahos, Cheyennes, and Crows.  
By 1846, the young aristocrat Francis Parkman wrote that “Fort Laramie is one of 
the posts established by the American Fur Company, which well-nigh monopolizes 
the Indian trade of this region.  Here its officials rule with an absolute sway; the 
arm of the United States has little force [here].”  The presence of Laramie, backed 
by the financial power of St. Louis, meant that it made little sense for Bent-St. 
Vrain to extend its operations much further beyond the South Platte.  By 1838, 
there were four adobe forts strung out along the South Platte within a dozen miles 
of each other.
1
  Competition from Lancaster Lupton, Vasquez and Sublette, and the 
Chouteau-backed Sarpy and Fraeb forced the Bents to establish a permanent 
presence in the area.  For a couple of years, the firms were at each other‟s throats, 
competing ruthlessly for the local Indian trade.  Traveler Frederick Wislizenus 
noted succinctly that, “There is much rivalry and enmity,” between the firms and 
their forts.
2
  Bent-St. Vrain responded to the stress of competition in a fashion 
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typical of its monopolistic counterpart, the American Fur Company.  Recognizing 
the futility of competition, the two companies divided the western trade between 
them in 1838.  However, the problem of small, independent operators remained 
unsolved.  In order to defeat these competitors, both American Fur and Bent-St. 
Vrain turned to the use of alcohol to secure their profits.  The utilization of their 
Missouri alliances, combined with an unscrupulous distribution of liquor 
demonstrates the flexibility of Bent-St. Vrain trade strategy.  When accommodation 
did not quell conflict, the partners turned to baser means to secure their western 
investments.  
Bent-St. Vrain reached the South Platte late; the honor of first arrival goes 
to Louis Vasquez and Andrew Sublette.
3
  It is possible that Vasquez reached the 
Upper Platte and constructed a post as early as 1832.  However, evidence for this is 
sketchy, for an 1835 Army expedition reported no post in the area.
4
  Even the dates 
on which Vasquez and Sublette formed their partnership are contradictory.  LeRoy 
Hafen, who wrote more about the topic than anyone did, gave the dates of their 
partnership as 1835 and 1836, and the issuance of their trading licenses as 1835 and 
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  Regardless of the exact date, it was not long before Vasquez and Sublette 
became successful.  Their brisk trade with the tribes of the South Platte caused 
AFC officials at Fort Laramie to take notice.  The Laramie traders complained that 
Vasquez and Sublette were succeeding at the expense of Company interests.
6
  The 
partners carried on their business in typical fur trade fashion:  they delegated 
responsibility.  Sublette made numerous trips between the fort and Missouri, 
hauling robes east, and returning with supplies and trade goods.  Trade took place 
both within the walls of Fort Vasquez and in the Indian camps themselves.
7
 
The company‟s most (in)famous employee, and one of William Bent‟s 
harshest critics, was James P. Beckwourth.  Beckwourth joined Vasquez and 
Sublette in 1838 or 1839, and immediately began trading with the Cheyennes along 
both the Upper Arkansas and the South Platte.  His actions brought him into direct 
contact, and conflict, with the Bents.
8
  Although his colleagues and rivals 
considered Beckwourth a champion liar, no mean feat among mountain men, his 
recollections provide an important glimpse into the less savory dynamics of the 
crowded South Platte trade.  Almost immediately, he clashed with William Bent.  
As Beckwourth remembered it, the two traders entered a Cheyenne village around 
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the same time.  Beckwourth brazenly followed Bent into the lodge of the principal 
chief.  Bent, “looked aghast,” and whirled upon the rival trader.  “My God! 
Beckwourth,” Bent exploded, “ how dare you come among the Cheyennes?  Don‟t 
you know that they will kill you if they discover you?”  Beckwourth, nonplussed by 
this veiled threat, brushed off Bent‟s comments, and proceeded to begin trading.
9
   
Allegedly, Beckwourth‟s success caused a great deal of consternation and jealousy 
among his rivals.  Up on the North Platte, he made “profitable bargains” with the 
Cheyennes.  His clients, he bragged, “thought me the best trader that ever visited 
them, and would not allow any other company to traffic with their villages.”  Such 
exclusivity “sorely vexed my rival traders.”  Beside themselves with envy and 
frustration, other traders attempted to murder Beckwourth, or so he claimed.  The 
secret to his success, besides natural ability, Beckwourth recalled, was an odd 
combination of scrupulousness and strong whiskey.  This potent formula reportedly 
allowed him to reap tremendous profits for Vasquez and Sublette.  Despite 
Beckwourth‟s boasting, Vasquez and Sublette never outperformed the Bents.  By 
1840, the firm was bankrupt.  During 1840 or 1841, they sold out to Lock and 
Randolph.  The new company proved no more adept at competing with Bent-St. 
Vain than their predecessors, and quit the region in 1842.  Ironically, Beckwourth 
entered the employ of Bent, St. Vrain and Company for a time.  He recalled that 
during the summer of 1840, the partners dispatched him to the Laramie Fork where 
he did brisk business.  There is no evidence that this story is accurate.  Following 
his brief stint with Bent-St. Vrain, Beckwourth repaired to Taos, where he entered 
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into a new business partnership, returning north with one hundred gallons of liquor, 
“and a stock of fancy articles.”  The Bents, naturally, warned him against going 
north.  Naturally, Beckwourth paid them no heed.  Naturally, the Indians were 
overjoyed to see him.  Inevitably, his haul of robes and pelts was large.
10
 
Less successful at competing with Bent-St. Vrain was Lancaster Lupton.  A 
classmate of Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston at West Point, Lupton saw 
frontier duty at St. Louis, Natchitoches, and Fort Gibson.  In the spring of 1835, he 
accompanied a dragoon expedition to the Rocky Mountains.  While on this 
reconnaissance, Lupton plied their guide, former Bent-St. Vrain rival John Gantt, 
for information on the fur trade.  Lupton resigned his commission in 1836 over 
some intemperate remarks about his superior officers.  Inspired by his 
conversations with Gantt, Lupton returned to the South Platte.  In either 1836 or 
1837, he constructed his own adobe trading post along the river, further muddling 
the trading situation.  Known by turns as Fort Lancaster and Fort Lupton, the post 
was a rendezvous point for independent trappers in the region.  The collapse of the 
fur trade forced Lupton to supplement his income through agricultural pursuits and 
livestock raising.  By the early-1840s, John C. Frémont observed that Fort Lupton 
“was beginning to assume the appearance of a comfortable farm,” complete with 
hogs, cattle, “different kinds of poultry,” and “the wreck of a promising garden in 
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which a considerable variety of vegetables had been in a flourishing condition,” 
before flood waters ruined them.  In 1840-1841, Lupton attempted to cut into the 
trade at Fort Laramie, constructing his own post within a mile or so of the fort.  He 
later sold out to the firm of Pratte and Cabanné.  Lupton apparently reached some 
sort of rapprochement with the Bents on the South Platte, because their rivalry did 
not seem to have been especially intense.  In 1846-1847, he moved south to the 
community of Hardscrabble, on the Upper Arkansas, where he continued his 
trading and agricultural pursuits.
11
   
In order to counter these rivals, Bent-St. Vrain constructed their own post 
on the river some time in 1837 or 1838.  Initially called Fort George, trappers and 
traders generally knew it as Fort St. Vrain.
12
  Ceran‟s brother, Marcellin, oversaw 
the post and trade in the surrounding country.  Situated about a mile and a half 
below the mouth of St. Vrain Creek, the post was impressive.  Its walls stood 
fourteen feet high, enclosing a space roughly 100x125 feet.
13
   Marcellin St. Vrain 
was born on October 17, 1815, at Spanish Lakes, Missouri.  He received two years 
of university education, before joining his brother in the western trade.  He first 
came to Bent‟s Fort in or around 1835.  Although never a full partner in Bent-St. 
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Vrain, he oversaw the operations at Fort St. Vrain until its close in 1845.  As noted 
earlier, during the 1840s much of the fort‟s operations were seasonal.  Like William 
Bent, St. Vrain married into Indian society.  He married a Sioux woman, with 
whom he had three children.  He also married a Pawnee woman; they had two 
children.  In 1848, Marcellin left the West, allegedly because he had accidentally 
killed an Indian in a friendly wrestling match.  Another source says he killed a 
Mexican muleteer, not an Indian.  Probably, he returned to Missouri because of 
poor health.  In 1849, he married Elizabeth Jane Murphy of Florissant, Missouri.  
He spent a brief period of time in New Mexico in the early-1850s, before returning 
to Missouri, where he died in 1871, allegedly by his own hand.
14
  Situating a post 
along the South Platte allowed the company to tap into the trade of the northern 
bands of Arapahos and Cheyennes, who seldom made it as far south as Bent‟s Fort 
along the Arkansas.  Trade with the Sioux, Crow, Pawnee, Shoshone, and Blackfeet 
was also possible from Fort St. Vrain.  On at least one occasion, the partners 
dispatched an expedition north of the Laramie.  Dick Wooton recalled that on this 
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junket, during the winter of 1836-1837, he and his fellow traders acquired “as fine 
a lot of peltry as was ever gathered up among the Indians.”
15
 
Despite this foray north of the Platte, the partners recognized the futility of 
competing with the American Fur Company, or any trading concern supported by 
its resources.  The third rival trading operation, Fraeb and Sarpy, had the direct 
backing of the Chouteaus.  In addition to this financial muscle, the partners were 
experienced, competent traders.  Henry Fraeb was well-known in the Rockies by 
1829.  He was one of the partners in the Rocky Mountain Fur Company, successor 
to Smith, Jackson, and Sublette.  After the RMFC folded, Fraeb probably made his 
living as an independent trapper.  Peter Sarpy was born in St. Louis in 1805.  His 
family were relatives of the Chouteaus.  Sarpy served his trade apprenticeship with 
the Western Department of the AFC, becoming one of its most trusted traders.
16
  
Fraeb and Sarpy joined forces in the spring of 1837, with the blessing of Pratte, 
Chouteau and Company.  The same year, the new firm constructed Fort Jackson on 
the South Platte.  Pratte, Chouteau and Company extended the credit necessary for 
Fraeb and Sarpy to purchase trade goods.  The St. Louis merchants also marketed 
the newcomers‟ robes and pelts.  Similar to their new neighbors, Fraeb and Sarpy 
operated over an extensive swath of territory.  Like their rival firms, they delegated 
responsibility.  Fraeb stayed at the fort, while Sarpy worked the North Platte.  
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James Robertson, a company employee, trespassed into Bent-St. Vrain territory, 
traveling as far south as the Arkansas.  The modest success of Fraeb and Sarpy over 
two trading seasons caused the Bents and St. Vrain no small amount of disquiet.  
With the backing of St. Louis, it seemed distinctly possible that the partners might 
only increase the volume of their trade at the expense of Bent-St. Vrain.  During the 
spring of 1838, Fraeb reached out the Ceran St. Vrain, offering to cooperate with 
the company.  Fraeb wrote to St. Vrain asking him if he might transport some of 
the smaller firm‟s robes back to the Missouri markets.  In exchange, Fraeb offered 
St. Vrain the use of “either my waggons or any of my oxen,” on the condition that 
he “not leave any of our property by so doing.” Unwilling, and unable to buck the 
Chouteaus, the Bents proposed to buy out Fraeb and Sarpy.  In addition to buying 
up the entire inventory of Fort Jackson, the partners paid $336. 551/2 to its 




Now rid of its most effective rivals, Bent-St. Vrain looked to define and 
solidify permanently its relationship with the Chouteaus regarding trade on the 
Plains.  Ending the small-scale trade war on the South Platte was in the best 
interests of both parties.  Needful of the Chouteau‟s capital and connections, the 
partners saw no need to antagonize the powerful firm.  Reeling from the Panic of 
1837, its trade on the Upper Missouri severely jeopardized by a massive smallpox 
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outbreak, the Chouteau‟s were also ready to deal.
18
  Some historians speculate that 
Ceran St. Vrain, by virtue of his long relationship with Bernard Pratte, acted as the 
main broker for the deal.  The agreement the two parties reached was brief and to 
the point, less than one full page, with no legal or business jargon.  It is strikingly 
nonchalant, yet staggering in scope.  On July 27, 1838, Bent-St. Vrain, and Pratte 
and Chouteau‟s Sioux Outfit promised, “not to enter into competition against each 
other in the business of the two firms or in any way interfere with their several 
interests in the business of the Indian trade.”  More specifically, the parties agreed 
that Bent-St. Vrain should not send its traders “to the north fork of the Platte and 
[the] Sioux Outfit shall not send to the South fork of the Platte.”  Cordiality did not 
come immediately, however.  That winter, William Bent brazenly crossed the 
North Platte to trade with the Cheyennes.  When a Chouteau employee reminded 
Bent of the contract, Bent replied brusquely that the Cheyennes were Bent-St. 
Vrain clients, and that as a senior partner, he could go wherever they went.  After 
this affair, however, the two firms strengthened their mutually agreeable ties.
19
  
With this simple contract, the two largest trading companies on the Plains divided 
between them the heart of the trans-Mississippi West.  Now, each was free to focus 
on consolidation and the elimination of all rivals.  Although some wags referred to 
Bent-St. Vrain as the Southern Department of the American Fur Company, in 
                                                 
18
 Lavender, Bent‟s Fort, 180. 
19
 Douglas C. Comer, Ritual Ground: Bent‟s Old Fort, World Formation, and the Annexation of the 
Southwest (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996),  96; Harold Dunham, “Ceran St. Vrain,” 
in MMFTFW, 5: 308; Lavender, Bent‟s Fort,  193; Agreement Between Bent, St. Vrain and 
Company and the Sioux Outfit, July 27, 1838, Reel 25 Frame 731, CC;  Frederick Laboue to P.D. 
Papin, December 15, 1838, Reel 25 Frame 1009, CC.   
156 
 
reality this was not the case.  American Fur was preeminent north of the Platte, the 
Bents and St. Vrain south of the river.  By the 1840s, the new partners were the 
most powerful companies in the West.
20
 
When accommodation, gift giving, and the patient cultivation of familial 
ties proved too slow or inefficient, liquor greased the wheels of the Indian trade.  
Despite the hue and cry raised against the use of alcohol by reformers, military 
officers, Indian agents, and some traders, it flowed all too freely onto the Plains – 
south from Canada, west from Missouri, and north from New Mexico.  Despite 
legislation from Congress banning the sale of alcohol in Indian Country, despite the 
efforts of frontier military officers to prevent smuggling and prosecute the 
perpetrators, the liquor trade continued to be a problem throughout the first half of 
the nineteenth century. Distance, budgetary shortfalls, the ingenuity and persistence 
of smugglers, and the vast potential for profit undermined the enforcement of 
prohibition.  Although the heads of the major trading firms, especially American 
Fur and Bent-St. Vrain, generally opposed the use of alcohol in trade, the stress of 
competition strained their scruples.  When faced with revenue loss at the hands of 
small, independent operators, the partners fought liquor with liquor. 
Despite its efforts, the government‟s success at halting the liquor trade was 
spotty, at best.  In May 1822, Congress authorized military officers and Indian 
agents to inspect all trade goods entering the Indian country.  A trader caught with 
liquor faced forfeiture of both his goods and the bond he put up for his trading 
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license.  However, crafty traders could get around some provisions of the law.  
Most notably, the 1822 law allowed employers to bring some liquor into Indian 
Country, provided they used it only to slake the thirst of their boatmen.  The result 
was predictable enough – the amount of liquor making its way up the Missouri 
River through this loophole was enough to incapacitate an entire armada‟s worth of 
boatmen.  Finally, in 1832, Congress declared an absolute ban on liquor in Indian 
Country, and issued directives placing frontier officers on high alert to prevent 
smuggling.  The law was almost impossible to enforce.  Government officials were 
isolated, underfunded, and understaffed.  The fur companies interested in using 
liquor were well connected and highly capitalized.  Furthermore, the traders often 
had the sympathy of the local whites.  Smugglers brought to trial for violating the 
liquor laws often had sympathetic juries.  If the government dammed one river of 
booze, a dozen more flowed on, unchecked.
21
 
Even where government agents were present, they were often unable to 
enforce the law.  Observers noted that violation of the law, “is a daily occurrence, 
and perpetrated almost in the very presence of the government officers.”
22
  Along 
the Missouri border, for instance, there were simply too many unscrupulous 
distillers and traders to monitor.  They, “hover along the frontier like ill-omened 
birds of prey,” an official wrote his superiors in Washington.  “The grog shops 
along the line in the State of Missouri furnish the Indians as much as they 
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desire….To expect an agent, alone and unaided, without any military force, to put a 
stop to all this, is preposterous.”
23
  Nevertheless, the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs in St. Louis urged his agents to be vigilant, to inspect as many trading 
caravans as possible.  During the spring and summer, the departure of trading 
caravans for the Plains and Upper Missouri was a common occurrence, and 
superiors reminded their subordinates of their inspection duties.  Those critical of 
both the liquor trade, and the efforts of the government to interdict it, scoffed at the 
efforts of military officers and Indian agents.  Simultaneously, critics marveled at 
the audacity of the smugglers who openly flouted the law.  The smuggling 
operations of many traders was the worst kept secret on the frontier, Rufus Sage 
complained.    It was impossible, he noted, to conceal the organization of a trading 
expedition.  News circulated for weeks in advance of departure.  The smugglers 
brazenly loaded their liquid cargo in broad daylight, “under the very noses of 
government officers, stationed along the frontiers to enforce the observance of 
laws.”  Furthermore, Sage wrote, the traders sometimes waited days or weeks to 
depart, plenty of time for government action that rarely, if ever, came.
24
   
 The sheer immensity of western distances also undermined the efforts of 
government agents.  An individual agent, responsible for hundreds, if not 
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thousands, of square miles of rugged terrain often labored in vain.  Andrew Drips, 
for instance, pointed out the reality of the situation to his superiors in St. Louis.  He 
was responsible, he wrote, for the entire country between the Yellowstone River 
and the North Platte.  “These two points are so far from each other that it is 
impossible for me to keep a watch on both at the same time and particularly the 
latter when Liquor can be so easily introduced from the Spanish country [New 
Mexico] and the United States without any possibility of it being detected before it 
reaches its place of destination.”
25
 
Officials were often at their wits end as to how to deal with the problem.  
Few of the solutions they proposed seemed to make a difference.  Revocation of 
trading licenses and forfeiture of the traders‟ bond seemed the most obvious 
answer.  Scrupulous enforcement of licensing was also proposed.  Proponents of 
this type of oversight argued that properly licensed traders were less likely to 
engage in the liquor business.  Licensing implied a long-term commitment to the 
trade, and the careful cultivation of trade ties with Indian clients.  Those with a 
permanent stake in the trade, observers pointed out, were less likely to pursue 
short-term profits.  Rather than providing liquor and “urging the Indians to kill 
large quantities of buffalo and other game, to swell up their profits for any one 
year, they would rather keep a watchful eye over the game to secure themselves a 
handsome yearly profit….They would be interested in preserving the Indian from 
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dissipation and in keeping him at regular hunting.”
26
  Drips proposed enlisting 
licensed traders, and even Indians, to help destroy any confiscated liquor; “it is 
lawful to employ them and I advise you to do it,” he wrote his subordinate Colin 
Campbell.
27
  Careful inspections, bond forfeiture, loss of trading licenses, 
destruction of inventory, none of these could be completely effective as long as the 
potential profits from the use of liquor remained high.  “The profits of the traffic 
are so great,” the Commissioner of Indian Affairs reported, “that the risk of 
detection and loss of the article is, and will be incurred without hesitation; and the 
fine is of little or no effect.”
28
 
       Indians could not handle their liquor, critics reported.  Violence, social 
and moral degradation trailed in the wake of their drunken bacchanals.  “I am every 
day more and more convinced of the ruinous effect that spirituous liquors have on 
the Indians of this country,” John Daugherty wrote William Clark.  Without 
complete prohibition, “the day is not far distant when they will all be reduced to the 
most abject misery ever inflicted by the hand of civilized man.”
29
  Alcohol 
removed any moral or social inhibitions the Indians may have had, George 
Frederick Ruxton complained.  At worst, violence followed drunkenness.  Reports 
of deaths, accidental and otherwise, were all too common.  It was tragic, observers 
noted.  The Indians awoke out of their stupor, and realized the immensity of their 
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actions.  The male clients got so bad, James Beckwourth remembered, that the 
women and children, fearful of physical harm, fled their villages while the men 




Traders like the Bents pointed out that the most egregious violators of the 
liquor laws were the small independent operators with whom the giants competed 
along the Platte, Missouri, and Arkansas.  Government agents and the well-
established traders laid the blame for this debauchery squarely upon the shoulders 
of the independent operators.  “Such trade is generally conducted by persons of 
little or no capital,” the Commissioner of Indian Affairs reported.
31
 Andrew Drips 
was even more specific.  He reported on “a nest of traders,” located on the South 
Platte, who imported their whiskey from New Mexico.  If their traffic continued 
unabated, Drips warned, licensed traders “will have to leave the country for they 
are not able to compete with those unlicensed peddlars.”
32
 Without the backing of 
the Missouri merchants, these traders relied upon the use of alcohol, and chicanery, 
to carve out their own piece of the lucrative robe trade.  Using liquor was bad 
enough, the Bents and Chouteaus complained, but the independents often cheated 
their clients out of their full share of liquid trade goods.  Strong whiskey, diluted 
over the course of trade negotiations often guaranteed high profits for the traders.  
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The strongest alcohol came out during the initial trades.  Once the client was well 
lubricated, traders proceeded to dilute, or even drug the liquor.  Cutting the alcohol 
with water was the most effective method;  three parts water to one part alcohol 
was a standard recipe, but sometimes the ratio rose to ten parts water to one part 
alcohol.  Traders also thrust their hands into the cups while pouring the liquor, “in 
order that it may contain less.”  Occasionally, they filled the bottom of their cups 
with a layer of melted buffalo fat to maximize their profits.
33
       
The independent traders, combined with the potential profits they plucked 
away, led the American Fur Company into its own pragmatic use of alcohol.  
Unrestrained use of liquor was bad trade policy, all the major companies – 
American Fur, the Bents, the Hudson‟s Bay Company – agreed on that.  In times of 
sharp competition, though, they rolled out their own kegs, moralizing and high-
minded platitudes notwithstanding.
34
  The use of liquor by the monopolies, then, 
“usually coincided with episodes of intense trade competition and may have been 
more closely linked to the nature of competitive capitalism than to Indians‟ 
unquenchable thirst for the stuff.”
35
 Under ideal conditions, then, the large 
companies would not have made such extensive use of alcohol.  But, until they 
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could establish monopolistic conditions, they made free use of the liquor, all the 
while piously decrying such actions and pleading necessity.
36
   
Like American Fur, the Bents and St. Vrain made use of alcohol when faced 
with competition.  Pragmatism, and an eye towards the company‟s bottom line, 
dictated their use of liquor in the Indian trade.  Although Charles Bent may have 
disapproved of the liquor trade in principle – and his contemporaries attested to his 
honest dealings -  he had no desire to see the partners lose money to a motley 
collection of competitors.  He did little to stop William from plying their native 
customers when he felt it necessary.
37
  Bent-St. Vrain could hardly give up the 
liquor trade as long as they faced competition from the independents.
38
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 It is possible that government officials gave the Bents and St. Vrain special 
treatment regarding the importation of liquor into the West.  The ledger records 
certainly attest to the size of the shipments that reached Bent‟s Fort.  In the summer 
of 1842, J.F.A. Sanford wrote Andrew Drips, the official in charge of halting the 
liquor trade, that the Superintendent of Indian Affairs expected Drips to inspect 
every trading expedition leaving Missouri.  Bent-St. Vrain, Sanford wrote, must 
“undergo the same rigid inspection and ordeal that the others are subjected to.”  He 
went on, “we traders never thought the Government in earnest when they spoke 
about Liquor – I hope you will teach us now that it is no longer a jest.”
40
   
Nevertheless, alcohol flowed.  On the South Platte especially, where 
competition was the most intense.  So many traders, crowded into such a small 
area, Robert Shortess lamented, debauched the Indian population.  Drinking, E.W. 
Smith reported, was the most popular pastime among whites and Indians alike.  
More melodramatically, Rufus Sage wrote of the Platte forts, “Ah, thought I, were 
those bricks possessed of tongues, full many a tale of horror and guilt would they 
unfold, to stand the listener‟s „hair on end,‟ and make his blood run cold! But, lost 
in silent unconsciousness, they refuse to speak the white man‟s shame.”
41
   
Like American Fur, with whom they divided the western trade, Bent-St. 
Vrain responded to the exigencies of competition with well-established methods.  
Monopoly and the best relations with the most powerful merchants of St. Louis 
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might be rendered meaningless if ragtag competitors consistently violated the 
territorial sovereignty of the major companies.  When the independents strayed into 
the bailiwick of the Bents, they responded with methods similar to those of their 
competitors.  When conciliation and accommodation failed, the partners broke the 




Chapter 7 – Bent, St. Vrain & Co. and the Sinews of Trade 
 
The nature and structure of the fur and robe trades linked Bent-St. Vrain to 
persons, practices, and markets far beyond the Arkansas River Valley.  The scope 
of the fur and robe trade was both national and international.  In order for the Bents 
and St. Vrain to succeed in their  corner of the West, they had to establish and 
maintain ties with St. Louis powerbrokers who, in turn, were linked to merchants 
and markets in New York, Boston, and Europe.  In his study of Bent‟s Fort, 
Douglas Comer writes, “Bent, St. Vrain and Company owed its considerable 
success to the ability of the principals to understand, and to skillfully operate 
within, the emerging capitalistic market and the North American trading systems.”
1
   
By themselves, the Bents and St. Vrain were ill-equipped to handle the costs, risks, 
and marketing strategies of the fur and robe trade.  Of necessity, they relied upon 
those with the capital and knowledge of national and international markets and 
economic infrastructures to act on their behalf. 
In this business, the longstanding ties the principals cultivated with the 
movers and shakers of the St. Louis business community paid off.  Only through 
these men could Bent-St. Vrain gain access to trade goods flowing into St. Louis 
from around the nation and the world.  Only through these men could the partners 
market their annual haul of beaver pelts and buffalo robes.  In this way, the 
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economic development of the Southern Plains was directly linked to metropolitan 
investments and knowhow.  Jay Gitlin writes, 
To be a successful merchant on this frontier, one needed good 
judgment, careful calculation, and connections.  Procuring 
goods on credit in anticipation of next year‟s production of furs, 
skins, and robes meant establishing a reputation for reliability 
and integrity.  Trust was crucial, but information was the key.  
Knowing about the conditions that would affect the market for 
all the goods being exported and imported required a network of 
correspondents….The fur trade was a global business.  Letters 
and ledgers were as important as pelts.  Good relations sustained 




St. Louis merchants like Bernard Pratte and Pierre Chouteau, Jr., were keenly 
attuned to business conditions on the East Coast and in Europe, as well as those on 
the Upper Missouri and Upper Arkansas.
3
  With a keen eye towards transportation 
costs, wholesale and retail prices, and the variety and quality of trade goods, these 
men tapped into global trade networks.  The Chouteaus, in particular, took 
advantage of contacts in New York. American Fur Company insiders, like their in-
law Ramsay Crooks, kept the family apprised of domestic and international market 
conditions.  Examining the fur trade in this context, Bernard DeVoto concluded 




Barton Barbour writes, trading posts like Bent‟s Fort acted as both “a 
regional collection and distribution center and a terminal point in a global 
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  Nearly everything the St. Louis traders provided the Bents and St. 
Vrain came from somewhere else.  The shear scope and variety of the trade goods 
necessary for supplying Bent‟s Fort and trading with Indians and Mexicans is 
staggering.   Three large company invoices extant demonstrate this fact.  Between 
1838 and 1840, Bent-St. Vrain ordered  shawls, pantaloons, “Fancy Calico Shirts,” 
powder horns, “Havana sugar,” kegs of powder, pigs of lead, bags of rice, brogans, 
butcher knives, frock coats, wampum, blankets, “wool socks and caps,” playing 
cards, candlesticks, fishing line, eyeglasses, awls, padlocks, brass nails, “Cane 
swords,” vermillion, beaver traps, tobacco, coffee, violin strings, Epsom salts, 
bacon, tin cups, yarn, spades, raisins, tar, dried apples, “English percussion caps,” 
fifty sets of ox shoes, yards of mosquito netting, pepper, indigo, two boxes of 8 x 
10 glass window panes, “Dutch scythes,” reams of “lined foolscap paper,” hawks 
bells, “War and Scalping knives,” soap, rum, quills, bank books, calomel, 
laudanum, saltpeter, castor oil, nitric acid, lancets, syringes, “blistering ointment,” a 
silk umbrella, copper stills, two “Blow Horns,” one “Table Bell,” a case of 
“Principle Segars,” and a book of naval history.
6
 An examination of the Chouteau 
Collection reveals the wide range of sources for many of these trade products.  
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Sugar came from Havana, and sometimes from Louisiana.  Beads came from 
Trieste and Vienna.  The Chouteaus imported gunpowder from Delaware, and guns 
from Pennsylvania.  Flour came from Louisville, whiskey from Cincinnati.
7
  
European beads, British woolens, Brazilian coffee, Cuban sugar, Chinese tea, 
German steel, Pennsylvania rifles, and Ohio whiskey - all flowed into Missouri 
before being loaded into Bent-St. Vrain wagons bound for Santa Fe, Taos, and 
Indian villages from the Big Timbers of the Arkansas to the South Platte and to the 
Ute country west of the Rocky Mountains.
8
 
However, access to such a wide array of goods was often subject to the 
vagaries of credit, overhead costs, and the hazards of transportation.  Missouri 
merchants provided the credit necessary for traders like the Bents and St. Vrain to 
purchase the woolens and brass kettles needed for trade, as well as the brandy and 
books that made life in a remote outpost more bearable.  In turn, the western 
merchants relied for their credit upon firms on the eastern seaboard.  The terms of 
credit extension sometimes made it difficult for western merchants and their 
customers to live up to the terms of their contracts.  Eastern merchants extended 
credit to Missouri merchants for twelve months, and expected prompt repayment at 
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the expiration of the term.  If the western traders could not meet their obligations, 
expensive and complicated negotiations were necessary to formulate new terms and 
conditions.  The Missouri firms, in turn, extended credit to their customers on a 
one-year basis as well.  Failure by these customers to pay up placed western 
creditors at risk.  Default meant higher rates for themselves, rates they in turn had 
to pass on to their western customers.  Furthermore, the nature of the international 
fur and robe trade complicated matters further.  The turnaround between the 
extending of credit recouping on the investment could take years.  Goods extended 
on credit to a firm like Bent-St. Vrain might not yield a return for the Chouteaus for 
two or three years.  However unwieldy the system might be, all parties involved 
recognized the necessity of doing business in this manner.
9
   
Once they established their creditworthiness, Missouri merchants found that 
simply getting their trade goods to St. Louis and beyond was an expensive 
proposition.  Goods coming from international markets were saddled with high 
transoceanic freight rates, in addition to American customs duties.  Trade goods 
intended for the mountains and prairies reached St. Louis by water, often by a 
combination of canals and rivers.
10
 Eastbound shipments of pelts and robes traveled 
to market by one of two routes.  The simplest route was down the Mississippi River 
to New Orleans, thence to New York.  However, the heat and humidity of the 
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southern route sometimes damaged the products.  The northern route took the Ohio 
River to Pittsburgh.  From Pittsburgh, goods could go to the coast either by way of 
the Pennsylvania Canal, or to Buffalo via the Ohio Canal, and from their on to New 
York City along the Erie Canal.   Such inland water transport could be expensive, 
and occasionally dangerous.  Steamboat technology proved both a blessing and an 
occasional curse for western merchants. Beginning around 1820, steamboats played 
an indispensable role in the growth of Missouri‟s economy, and her trade and 
communication with the West.  By the 1830s, writes Dorothy Dorsey, “the 
economies of towns and rural regions were definitely linked in an enterprising era 
of river „ports‟ with their economic life centering in the agricultural hinterland and 
a growing river commerce.”  However, steamboat travel could be dangerous.  
Wrecks were an all too common occurrence along western waterways.  In addition 
to the potential for the loss of life, steamboat wrecks threatened the profits of the 
fur trading companies.  For example, in 1834 the steamboat Citizen, carrying two 
hundred packs of beaver pelts, broke its rudder.  The crew had to unload the pelts, 
and repairs took nearly a month to complete.  Such lost time, proprietors worried, 
might mean lower prices on the eastern seaboard.  On another occasion, the 
steamboat Empire sank en route to Pittsburgh, with $10,000 worth of skins lost.
11
  
Merchants again had to pay for shipping, transferring the goods upon arrival, and 
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  Lewis Atherton estimates that these costs amounted to 
nearly one quarter of the total value of the cargo.
13
  Considering these high costs, 
merchants marked up the prices accordingly. Atherton notes that, “merchants 
considered 75% to 100% to be a fair markup, 50% barely acceptable, and 25% as 
insufficient to keep a man in business.”
14
  Thus, by the time the beads, alcohol, and 
other goods reached their final destination, the prices had risen astronomically.  




By the late-1830s, the beaver trade was in eclipse, and Bent-St. Vrain 
shifted its primary focus to buffalo robes.
16
 Overly aggressive trapping during the 
course of the 1830s severely reduced the beaver population in the West.  In 
addition, the whims of fashion were changing; silk hats came to replace beaver hats 
on the streets of New York, London, and Paris.  Finally, the discovery of another 
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aquatic rodent, the nutria of South America, provided hat makers with a less 
expensive substitute for beaver.  However, the decline of the fur trade dovetailed 
conveniently with a boom in the overland trade with Santa Fe and the growth of 
steamboat traffic along the upper reaches of the Missouri River.  The use of large 
wagons and steamboats allowed traders to begin dealing exclusively in buffalo 
robes, which were far bulkier and more difficult to transport.  Pragmatically, Bent-
St. Vrain threw itself headlong into the robe trade.
17
 
     The robe trade was big business in the West.  The largest operator, the 
American Fur Company, made money on the sheer volume of its trade.  The price 
per pound mattered little, for the Company sent huge numbers of robes down the 
Missouri River to St. Louis every year.  However, as early as the 1820s and 1830s, 
some observers warned that the increase in hunting for the robe trade was placing 
increasing strain upon the bison herds.  By the mid-1840s, on the Southern Plains, 
the herds could only be found at least one hundred miles from the Front Range.
18
   
Contemporary observers agreed that the number of robes shipped to market was 
staggeringly large.  Writing of the Southern Plains, Josiah Gregg reported that, “It 
is believed that the annual „export‟ of buffalo rugs from the Prairies bordering the 
„buffalo range,‟ is about one hundred thousand; and the number killed wantonly, or 
exclusively for meat, is no doubt still greater, as the skins are fit to dress scarcely 
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 Charles Kennerly estimated that, “Buffalo robes by the hundred 
thousand were brought down the Missouri into St. Louis.”
20
  John C. Frémont 
reported that western trading companies exported about 90,000 robes annually.
21
   
The exact volume of the company‟s robe trade is difficult to determine with 
any degree of accuracy.
22
  No record books survive.  However, despite the lack of 
specificity, it is obvious that the trade was profitable.  Had it not been a paying 
proposition, the principals would have abandoned it to seek out other pursuits.  
Compared to the robe trade on the Northern Plains and Upper Missouri, Bent-St. 
Vrain exports are negligible.  Still, Bent‟s Fort was the largest and most influential 
trading post on the Southern Plains, and its partners exercised a great deal of 
influence with the tribes of the area.
23
 
Once the employees returned from their trading ventures to the Indian 
villages, they sorted their haul, and loaded the robes onto wagons for shipment east.  
It is not clear whether or not the traders sorted the robes they received when they 
were out in the field, or whether they waited until returning to the fort to examine 
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them.  Sorting by size and quality was crucial, however.  It would be poor practice 
to try to foist subpar robes onto eastern clients.  Once sorted and separated, the 
robes were folded and pressed into large bundles.
24
  These packs measured, on 
average, two and a half feet long by twenty inches wide by eighteen inches tall.  
Each pack usually contained between ten and twelve robes, weighing from eighty 
to one hundred pounds total.  Packs of calf robes were lighter in weight, and 
contained about twenty robes.  Traders then bound the packs of robes with rawhide, 
manila cords, or hemp, before marking the outside of the pack to identify company 
ownership.
25
 Once sorted, pressed, and bundled, the packs were ready for shipment 
to Missouri.  For the most part, Bent-St. Vrain, and most other traders on the 
Central and Southern Plains, used wagons to haul their robes to market.  
Occasionally, however, the traders attempted to float their products downriver, 
especially along the Platte.  Low water levels usually rendered this a wasted effort, 
and on a couple of occasions, the partners unsuccessfully attempted to float their 
robes down the river.
26
  In a letter written to his brother while staying at Bent‟s 
Fort, Andrew Sublette observed that, “we have had a very mild winter and so little 
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snow it is believed by them that is most capable of judging that the boats with robes 
cannot get down the Platt this season.  Messrs Bent and St. Vrain are going to take 
all of their robes down in wagons.” Once the caravan reached the Missouri River 
towns, employees unloaded the wagons onto a steamboat.  The principals then 
boarded the boat for the downriver trip to St. Louis.  The wagons and men returned 
to a camping spot, where they awaited the return of the partners, supplies, and trade 
goods for the coming season.  Once these arrived, the wagons were reloaded, and 
the company returned to Bent‟s Fort.
27
 
Trying to assure the quality of the product on its way to market was critical 
to the success of robe traders. The confidence of the clients was paramount.  
Customers were not shy about complaining if they received shoddy goods, and the 
merchants who marketed the robes of traders such as the Bents instructed their 
agents to pay the strictest attention to quality control.  Damaged robes potentially 
meant lost customers, and smaller operators like Bent-St. Vrain could not afford a 
bad name in the Missouri markets.   
Any number of factors could damage the robes en route to the eastern 
markets.  The New Orleans route, especially hot and humid, was notoriously hard 
on robes.  Sometimes insects got into the robes, and upon reaching eastern markets, 
some merchants were dismayed to find their product full of holes.  The buyers 
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fortunate enough to make their robe and pelt purchases in St. Louis personally 
selected the wares they wished to buy.  Customers in the East were not so lucky, 
and when they discovered damaged or subpar robes, they complained to Astor and 
his lieutenants.
28
   
Word quickly reached the St. Louis merchants if their eastern counterparts 
found their products wanting.  Sometimes, those on the western end of the trade 
failed to weigh their pelts and robes properly.  John Jacob Astor, for instance, wrote 
Pierre Chouteau, Jr., complaining about that his shipment fell “very short in 
weight.”  Astor suspected fraud; “light weights, or the Beaver must have been put 
in a very damp place before it was weighed.”  He wished Chouteau to get to the 
bottom of the situation immediately.  “The buyer,” Astor chided, “ is not much 
pleased with his bargain.”
29
  Shortly thereafter, Ramsay Crooks took Chouteau to 
task over a shipment of buffalo robes.  The buyers in Boston refused to accept the 
shipment, Crooks complained.  The robes Chouteau sent, “appear to be the refuse 
of the Upper Missouri collection of the year and have not been kept free from 
damp.”  Wet conditions had damaged the appearance of the robes, giving them, “a 
dead, or not lively, appearance.” Crooks urged Chouteau to pay more attention to 
the storage of robes, especially in humid conditions.  A couple of years later, a firm 
from Cincinnati made the same complaint against Chouteau, pointing out that the 
                                                 
28
 Baker, “Beaver to Robes,” 7, 11; Edward Douglas Branch, The Hunting of the Buffalo (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1962),  97, 99; Sunder, Fur Trade of the Upper Missouri,  34-36;  
Wishart, Fur Trade,  106; John G. Stephenson to Pierre Chouteau, Jr., December 25, 1829, Reel 16 
Frame 182, CC.  Market whims could also dictate the pace and price of robe sales.  On demand, or 
lack thereof, see William B. Astor to Pierre Chouteau, Jr., April 14, 1832, Reel 19 Frame 865; Astor 
to Chouteau, May 14, 1832, Reel 19 Frame 940; Astor to Chouteau, June 6, 1833, Reel 21 Frame 
770.  All letters are in the Chouteau Collection. 
29
 Astor to Chouteau, November 18, 1829, Reel 16 Frame 54, CC. 
178 
 
buyer found the product “very inferior,” and concluding that, “they will not sell in 
our market.”
30
   
In addition to heat and rodents, improper packing and sorting methods had 
the potential to drive off perspective customers.  William Astor wrote Chouteau 
that inferior hogsheads allowed moisture and bugs to get into the robes, ruining 
many of them.  Furthermore, the customers found calf robes among the shipment.  
“I am aware,” Astor scolded, “it is now too late to ask more particular attention in 
packing the Robes, but, I beg you will bear in mind, that whenever calfskins are 
found among the Robes, it destroys confidence among our Customers who take 
them for what we represent them.”
31
 
For the Bents and St. Vrain a wide social and economic circle in St. Louis 
was critical to their success in western enterprise. The partners cultivated a wide 
array of contacts in St. Louis, where socialization and familial connections played a 
role as critical as business acumen when it came to marketing their products.  As 
noted earlier, St. Vrain spent some of his youth living in the house of Bernard 
Pratte, while Charles Bent‟s father was acquainted with the Chouteau family 
through business and service on the bench.  The Chouteaus used their broad 
connection with merchants and politicians to advance their family‟s interest, and 
the Company availed itself of the Chouteau‟s situation.
32
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Charles and William Bent also had family in St. Louis, some of whom 
moved within the city‟s highest social circles.  At lavish parties, amidst saddles of 
venison, “great pyramids of spun sugar,” and “candied oranges,” the Bents danced 
until dawn in the same ballrooms as the Chouteaus, Cabannes, Prattes, Carrs, and 
Bertholds.  Those were the days, Charles Kennerly wrote, when “The town was 
small enough…for people to know each other well.”
33
  Brother John Bent was a 
noted St. Louis attorney and skilled raconteur.  Sister Dorcas married into the 
politically powerful Carr family, becoming the wife of Judge William Chiles Carr.  
Although Juliannah Bent died young, she bore Lilburn Boggs two children.  Boggs 
went on to become governor of Missouri in the late-1830s, and the Boggs and Bent 
families remained close.  In short, as David Lavender writes, the St. Louis Bents 
were “part and parcel of the old aristocracy of the town.”
34
  It is also safe to assume 
that Charles Bent utilized his connections with the Masonic Lodge in St. Louis to 
further his business interests, although the connection between masonry and 
business success cannot be quantified.
35
 
Close business connections with the Chouteaus enabled Bent-St. Vrain to 
avail themselves of the resources and marketing expertise of one of the largest 
corporations in the United States at the time:  the American Fur Company.  From 
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his offices in New York City, John Jacob Astor had continental ambitions.  
Following his Astoria debacle, Astor slowly expanded his operations from the 
Great Lakes, west towards the Missouri River.  In 1822, Astor created the Western 
Department, a subsidiary of the AFC in charge of its westernmost affairs.  In 1826, 
the AFC placed the Western Department in the hands of Bernard Pratte and 
Company.  When Astor retired from the fur business in 1834, his successor Ramsay 
Crooks and the Chouteaus maintained the same arrangement.  The AFC supplied 
and marketed the furs and robes brought out of the Western Department, in 
exchange for a commission.  In 1839, Pratte, Chouteau and Company – successor 
to Bernard Pratte and Company – dissolved, and reorganized as P. Chouteau, Jr. 
and Company.  Bent-St. Vrain did the bulk of its Missouri business with this latter 
concern.
36
  Of Chouteau‟s company, Barton Barbour writes, “Pierre Chouteau, Jr. 
and Company‟s broad experience and excellent connections with foreign and 
domestic suppliers enabled them to provide goods of generally unimpeachable 
quality.  The company also purchased goods in such quantities that it often received 
discounts not available to other merchants.”
37
   
Lacking a retail store in St. Louis and contacts with eastern merchants, 
smaller firms like Bent-St. Vrain had little choice but to deal with the Western 
Department.  Each summer, the Bents sold their robes to the Chouteaus, who in 
turn sold the robes on commission to merchants throughout the country.  Many of 
these sales took place on a small scale.  Bent-St. Vrain robes often found their way 
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into national markets in dribs and drabs. For example, H.H. Cohen bought 83 
summer robes at $1.50 apiece; another time Cohen spent $763.75 on robes; Samuel 
Sacks bought 54 number 3 robes for $81; H. Leitchenstein purchased 10 number 3 
robes for $20; the Upper Missouri Outfit once bought a grizzly bear skin from 
Bent, St. Vrain and Company for $5.
38
  Bent, St. Vrain and Company first began 
selling robes to Pierre Chouteau, Jr. in 1839.  Prior to that, they apparently sold 
their robes to Powell, Lamont and Company, a rival of Chouteau‟s.  The 
arrangement proved mutually beneficial.  The robes brought by the partners from 
the Southern Plains augmented the Western Department‟s already gargantuan 
imports from the Upper Missouri.  Bent-St. Vrain benefitted from the family‟s 
ability to tap into global networks of trade and supply.
39
  The Bents and St. Vrain 
also utilized their contacts with Chouteau to purchase supplies, pay their 
employees, and take out small loans.  For instance, Charles Bent once drew a draft 
for $1050 on Chouteau in order to pay back a debt he owed to the United States 
Consul in Santa Fe, Manuel Alvarez.
40
 
From a careful examination of surviving sources, it is possible to provide a 
rough sketch of the size of the robe trade conducted by Bent-St. Vrain.  The first 
reference to the Company‟s robe trade came in 1835, when a dragoon officer 
estimated that they bought robes from the Indians for twenty-five cents in trade 
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goods, and sold them in St. Louis for between $5 and $6.  However, the same 
author also noted that, “the cost of transportation to and fro, together with the 
expense of keeping an armed force to protect the establishment, tends greatly to 
consume the profits arising from the trade.”
41
  In 1839, the company shipped an 
estimated 15,000 robes to St. Louis.  An observer employed by Chouteau wrote 
that, “they have about 600 packs Robes and Ten Packs Beaver.”
42
   
The trade in robes accelerated in the 1840s. The 1840 season proved 
“remarkably successful” for the partners, as they brought another 15,000 robes and 
“a considerable amount of furs,” in from the plains.
43
  Specific numbers for 1841 
are lacking, but correspondence indicates that the company had a solid year.  
William Sublette wrote William Drummond Stewart that, “Bent and Savery and 
Co. has just got in – the robe trade has been good this year.”  Charles Bent 
informed Manuel Alvarez that, “we made a fine trade last winter (1840-1841),” 
while the Missouri Republican reported that Bent‟s summer wagon train contained 
“a large lot of Buffalo robes and furs.”
44
  The most thorough record of sales comes 
from 1842, when the Company sold 2659 buffalo robes, 277 calf robes, 2319 
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beaver pelts, and assorted other furs for a total of $15,935.73.  The sales break 
down as follows:  972 #1 robes, 530 #2 robes, 70 #3 robes, 427 soiled #1‟s, 241 
soiled #2‟s, 24 soiled #3‟s, 148 #1 summer robes, 189 #2 summer robes, and 58 #3 
summer robes.  The robes sold at $2.70 apiece, for a robe sale total of $2659.  The 
company also sold 41 “Refuse and Half Robes,” 97 #1 calf robes, 28 #2 calf robes, 
67 soiled #1 calf robes, 32 soiled #2‟s, 45 #1 summer calf robes, and 8 #2 summer 
calf robes.  The 277 calf robes sold at $3.371/2 , for a total of $346.25.  Ironically, 
the sale of beaver pelts totaled more than the buffalo robes.  The company sold 895 
#1 beaver, 588 #2‟s, and 238 #3‟s, totaling 2319 at $3.371/2, for a sale of 
$7826.62.  In addition, they unloaded 4 otter pelts for $9.50, one mink and one 
marten for $0.50, 100 muskrats for $5.31, and one “Grisley Bear” pelt for $2.  
Finally, Bent-St. Vrain sold 1668 buffalo tongues, valued at $4 per dozen, totaling 
$556.00.  The grand total, as stated above, was $15, 935.73. 
45
 A Missouri 
newspaper reported that, “Yesterday morning a part of Messrs Bent and St. Vrain‟s 
company of Santa Fe Traders arrived here, bringing, as part of the proceeds of their 
labors and reward of their toils and privations, 283 packs of buffalo robes, 30 packs 
beaver, 12 sacks tongues, and 1 pack deer skins.  Confusingly, though, William 
Sublette wrote William Drummond Stewart in the fall that, “Bent and Savery trade 
was good but they did not get it down.” No numbers exist for the 1843 season, only 
conflicting accounts regarding the number of wagons the partners sent east.  
However, the trade must have been brisk, for Charles Bent wrote Manuel Alvarez 
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in February 1843 that “our people are making a greate many robes.”  In the, fall, 
the Missouri Republican reported the arrival of eleven Bent - St. Vrain wagons.  
That summer, however, Philip St. George Cooke, on the other hand, stated that he 
encountered “five wagons of peltries,” belonging to St. Vrain.
46
  Eighteen forty-
four was a good year; the partners sold 700 packs of robes, in addition to some 
beaver.
47
  Sales plummeted to about 200 packs in 1845, before rebounding the 
following year.  Charles Bent wrote Alvarez an enthusiastic account of the 
Company‟s trading in the winter of 1846-1847.  St. Vrain, trading on the Red 
River, brought in 750 robes, and thought “his prospects for a good trade fair.”  
William Bent was making “a good trade,” unopposed by competition in a camp of 
150 “lodges of Shyeanes.”  On the South Platte, Marcellin St. Vrain also traded 
without competition, where “the Indians had a great many Robes.”  George Bent 
reported that he had 1400 robes in storage at Bent‟s Fort.  Bent crowed that, “at all 
the different villages Buffalo are plenty the Indians are surrounding dayly.”
48
  
Records are lacking for the last three years of Bent‟s Fort, 1847-1849.  In 1849, 
though, Indian Agent Thomas Fitzpatrick wrote his superior that “two separate 
firms” on the Arkansas and South Platte brought in a combined 13,000 robes, 
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totaling $39,000.  “This would seem to be a heavy profit,” he pointed out, “but 
when all risks and expenses are counted up, the profits are by no means so much as 
is imagined.”   It is likely that Bent-St. Vrain was one of these two firms.  The 
memoirs of traders give some indication of the profitability of the trade, even if 
they often exaggerated.  Dick Wooton exaggerated when he wrote that he could 
make his employers $25,000 in a single season.   Smalltime operators also pecked 
away at the edges of the company‟s enterprise, usually with little success.  For 
example, former employee Alexander Barclay sent 121 robes to St. Louis by 
wagon in 1846.  Simeon Turley, the notorious whiskey distiller from Taos also 
dabbled in the robe business occasionally.   Large overhead costs also cut into 
Bent-St. Vrain‟s profits.  No matter how well the robe sales went, the partners still 
had to maintain an extensive payroll of traders, cooks, clerks, teamsters, wranglers, 
hunters, and construction workers.  Livestock and wagons were another expense.  
Room and board in St. Louis, insurance on the robes, and lost revenue for damaged 
robes all reduced the profit margin.  As noted earlier, due to the lack of detailed 




The products Bent-St. Vrain brought into Missouri from the plains and 
mountains served a number of purposes in the markets of the Midwest and eastern 
seaboard.  Bison products were used primarily for winter clothing in the United 
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States.  The wealthy used buffalo robes as lap blankets for their carriages and 
sleighs.  Robes also provided material for overcoats, mittens, gloves, boots, and 
hats.
50
 Although traders like the Bents relied upon foreign markets to supply many 
of their trade goods, the market for buffalo robes never extended beyond the United 
States and Canada.  Every year, the Chouteaus exported thousands of robes to 
Canada, but that was the extent of the foreign market.  A project to provide buffalo 
robes for military coats in Europe fell through when sheepskin proved cheaper.  
The European markets snapped up the pelts of other American animals – deer, 
beaver, raccoon, and muskrat – rather than the robes of the large western 
quadrupeds.
51
  In addition to the robes, buffalo tongues found a place in the market.  
Westerners relished all parts of the buffalo – hump ribs, the fleece, intestines, and 
the tongue.  “Most every part of the buffalo is good eating,” Thomas Boggs 
claimed.  As with robes, packing tongues for transport was critical, for even well 
salted tongues could spoil before reaching market.  Gourmands in St. Louis and the 
East relished the arrival of this western delicacy, and Bent-St. Vrain played a role 
in supplying this demand.
52
  
The purchase of “sundries” by Bent-St. Vrain recurs repeatedly throughout 
the Chouteau records.  Most of the time, the partners purchased these goods from 
other merchants and charged the purchases to their Chouteau accounts, redeemable 
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at the next shipment of robes.  These unexplained, miscellaneous purchases drained 
hundreds, even thousands of dollars out of the company‟s coffers.  A sample of 
these sundry purchases indicates that the partners spent anywhere from $30.49 up 
to $3125.26.  The average purchase ran into the hundreds of dollars.
53
  At times, the 
purchases are enumerated.  The partners purchased a corn mill from Thomas Meier 
for $8, a bullet mould and coiled rope from Chouteau.
54
  Other business expenses 
had nothing to do with the purchase of blankets or kettles or syringes.  The 
company charged travel expenses on their account with Chouteau, or to send 
documents to Washington, D.C.
55
  The partners also availed the opinions of 
prestigious St. Louis lawyers like William Bates.
56
  The Bents and St. Vrain also 
drew on Chouteau funds to support their high living while they sojourned in St. 
Louis.  Expensive horses and carriages conveyed them about town, while they 
spent their evenings at the luxurious Planter‟s House hotel.
57
  In addition, the 
Chouteaus generally acted as creditors for Bent-St. Vrain employees returned from 
the plains to Missouri.  The men drew on the Chouteus to purchase small, though 
essential items, such as saddlebags, blankets, pants, shirts, shoes, and sometimes, 
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small cash advances.  They took out these loans in the summer, the partners 
repaying the creditors in the autumn, after receiving the proceeds of their robe 
sales.
58
    
Marketing robes, buying supplies, socializing, planning business strategy, 
visiting family and friends – St. Louis played a crucial role in maintaining and 
advancing the fortunes of the Bents and St. Vrain.  Accommodating themselves to 
preexisting modes of doing business, as well as the cultivation and maintenance of 
important social contacts, was critical to the success of the partners.  The ties the 
company established and maintained with the Chouteaus and the rest of the 
business community guaranteed that people, pelts, messages, and money flowed 
back and forth on an east-west axis, firmly tying the development of enterprise on 
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Chapter 8 - To Santa Fe and Beyond: Bent, St. Vrain & Co. and Business along the 
Mexican Road 
 
Like the fur trade, the commerce over the Santa Fe Trail between Missouri 
and New Mexico tapped into market networks that stretched from the Rocky 
Mountains to the port cities of the eastern seaboard – linkages that presented New 
Mexican authorities with both an economic and political conundrum.  Mexican 
trade policy sometimes made it difficult for Americans to conduct business in Santa 
Fe.  Sensing the tenuousness of the region‟s ties to the rest of the nation, the 
directives issued from policymakers in Mexico City intended to preserve the 
territorial and economic integrity of the country‟s northernmost frontier.  At the 
local level, however, New Mexican officials often proved more willing to 
accommodate the Missouri traders, at times in direct contravention of national 
laws.  When accommodation within the confines of legal market interactions 
proved difficult, traders and government officials took part in more shadowy 
economic ventures.  When it suited their own interests, American traders like the 
Bents and St. Vrain adhered to the stipulations of Mexican trade laws.  However, 
when these policies interfered with company business, the partners did not hesitate 
to smuggle trade goods into and out of New Mexico in violation of the law.   
 The stories and the silver that traders like William Becknell brought back 
from Santa Fe in the early-1820s caused Missouri merchants to take notice of the 
potential windfalls of commerce with New Mexico.  By the middle of the decade, 
the trade was well-established, and border merchants experimented with the best 
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ways to obtain goods for the growing prairie trade.  Although St. Louis 
businessmen gained some share of the market, most Santa Fe traders outfitted with 
merchants residing in western Missouri.  Among the most prominent of these 
merchants was Samuel C.  Lamme and Company, which had branches in Franklin, 
Liberty, and Independence.  James and Robert Aull kept establishments in 
Lexington, Richmond, Liberty, and Independence.  While men like Lamme and the 
Aulls ran diverse businesses, outfitting the Santa Fe traders was crucial to their 
profit margin, and the merchants moved quickly to establish trading ties with 
wholesalers located in cities along the eastern seaboard.  American traders residing 
in Santa Fe took advantage of their connections with these western merchants, 
placing orders with the Missouri companies each year.  Families like the Waldos 
and Glasgows, along with companies like Giddings and Gentry, serviced traders 
who chose to remain in Mexico year-round.
1
 
 In order to insure that they accommodated the tastes of their New Mexican 
customers, many Missouri merchants traveled east to select personally their stock 
of trade goods.  While Baltimore and Philadelphia dominated the western 
wholesaling business during the 1820s and into the 1830s, by 1840 New York had 
secured a practical monopoly on the business.  The most resourceful Missouri 
traders recognized that they could get better deals on better trade articles in the 
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eastern cities than they could from local merchants operating in the St. Louis 
market.  Wholesalers in New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia not only had 
strong manufacturing sectors themselves, but longstanding ties with European 
producers as well.  Furthermore, wholesaling as a business was still practically 
nonexistent in western markets like Missouri.  Traders like James Aull often made 
yearly purchasing trips east, leaving shortly after the New Year and returning in the 
early spring.  Traveling by boat, they often stocked up at various markets before 
they even reached the coast.  For example, in Pittsburgh, they purchased readily 
available iron products like stoves, axes, and plows.
2
  Buying from the eastern 
firms was wise policy.  A wider selection of trade goods, as well as liberal credit 
policies made the trip attractive to Missourians like the Aulls and Glasgows.  
Eastern credit for the Santa Fe trade was often generous – usually offered on a 
yearly basis with no interest for the first six months, and six percent if the account 
ran into the second half of the year.  In the years before credit bureaus, western 
merchants relied on eastern contacts to provide letters of recommendation, 
endorsing their creditworthiness to the coastal wholesalers.  Back in Missouri, the 
merchants extended credit to the Santa Fe traders in May.  However, it often took 
two years before the merchants saw a return on their investment, a condition that 
                                                 
2
 Lewis E. Atherton, The Frontier Merchant in Mid-America (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1971), 80-1; Stephen Hyslop, Bound for Santa Fe: The Road to New Mexico and the 
American Conquest, 1806-1846 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002), 86, 264; Leiws E. 
Atherton, “James and Robert Aull – A Frontier Missouri Mercantile Firm,” Missouri Historical 
Review 30 (1935), 5; Dary, Santa Fe Trail, 109-10. 
192 
 
made it necessary for them to diversify their business endeavors beyond outfitting 
the prairie travelers.
3
   
Western traders from as far away as El Paso del Norte and Santa Fe relied 
upon good relations with eastern bankers and merchants.  For example, Edward 
Hoffman wrote John McKnight from El Paso, asking him to “procure a draft,” 
redeemable in Philadelphia, New York, or Baltimore.  Manuel Alvarez, a trader and 
the United States Consul in Santa Fe, usually did his banking in Philadelphia.  
However, in 1841, his partner David Waldo informed Alvarez that he had to go to 
the mint at New Orleans because of low water on Ohio.  Alvarez also traveled east 
himself.  A bill of purchase at Francis B. Rhodes and Company in New York City 
reveals the variety of Santa Fe trade goods offered by the eastern companies.  
Alvarez purchased $163.73 worth of goods from Rhodes, including buttons, combs, 
beads, toothbrushes, soap, thimbles, scissors, medicine, bugles, cotton goods, a 
gross of Jew‟s Harps, and nine packages of violin strings.  Even the wagons that 
carried these goods over the trail to Santa Fe came from the east, especially the 
sturdy Conestogas manufactured in Pittsburgh.  Costing an average of about $150 
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From the eastern markets, trade goods flowed into the prairie ports of 
western Missouri, the eastern terminus of the Santa Fe Trail.  The main outfitting 
point shifted west with the increasing volume of trade between the 1820s and the 
1850s.  The first outfitting and rendezvous point for the Santa Fe traders was 
Franklin.  In his classic travel account, Commerce of the Prairies, Josiah Gregg 
called Franklin “the cradle of our trade.”  Conveniently located along the Missouri 
River, the rich agricultural hinterland surrounding the town complimented its rise 
as the first major center of the Santa Fe trade.  However, a disastrous flood in 1828 
caused the town to slide into the Missouri, forcing its inhabitants to retreat to higher 
ground.  Franklin remained an outfitting point into the 1830s, but by then the locus 
of trade had shifted west to Independence.
5
 
Throughout the 1830s and into the 1840s, Independence remained the most 
advantageous outfitting and departure point for the Santa Fe traders.  By 1832, 
following the construction of a landing on the banks of the Missouri, Independence 
became, in the words of traveler Thomas Jefferson Farnham, “the usual point of 
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rendezvous and „outfit‟ for the overland traders to Santa Fe and other Mexican 
states.”  During the late-1840s, George Frederick Ruxton found the town a lively 
place, full of “bustle and confusion,” as traders and emigrants jostled each other in 
the crowded streets, purchased livestock, hired teamsters, and laid siege to local 
mercantile establishments.
6
  Independence had much to recommend it as a 
rendezvous and outfitting point.    New Orleans journalist Matt Field reported that 
the location of the town was “well chosen, salubrious, and has many advantages,” 
compared to its eastern neighbors.  The town was a natural transit point between 
waterborne traffic along the Missouri River from St. Louis, and overland traffic 
arriving from the Southwest.  Fresh pasturage for the vast herds of livestock 
surrounded Independence.  Furthermore, the town‟s merchants provided every 
service needed for the westbound merchant or emigrant, from food and dry goods 
to gunsmiths, coopers, and wagon repair. Independence held its preeminence until 




These Missouri towns linked together a trade network than spanned more 
than half the length of the North American continent.  They served as the western 
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terminus for trade goods transported along the great interior waterways from New 
York City, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.  The prairie ports also became a transition 
point for trade goods flowing into Missouri from the Rocky Mountains and 
northern Mexico.  Pennsylvania wagons, loaded with dry goods from New York 
met traders driving herds of mules laden with New Mexican wool and Mexican 
silver, as well as other wagons groaning under their cargo of buffalo robes gathered 
by Bent-St. Vrain along the Arkansas and Platte rivers.
8
  Silver from the mines in 
Durango, Zacatecas, and Chihuahua had an especially salutary effect on the 
Missouri economy.  Mexican silver helped stabilize Missouri‟s economy, even 
during the severe national economic downturns of the late-1830s.
9
   The very 
nature of the exchanges the Santa Fe traders made, manufactured goods purchased 
on credit from merchants with eastern connections, exchanged for Mexican silver 
and mules, enmeshed men like the Bents and St. Vrain into a continental economy.  
Susan Calafate Boyle concludes, “By the 1850s the Santa Fe trade was linked to the 
commercial hubs in Mexico, the United States, and Europe, where commission 
merchants, wholesalers, and agents completed intricate transactions, which required 
advanced planning and information on prices and demand, a complicated credit 
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system, coordination of various types of transportation, and considerable risk 
taking and entrepreneurial skills.”
10
 
The costs for an enterprise as far-flung as the overland trade with Mexico 
were sizable.  Veteran trader Manuel Alvarez informed the Secretary of the 
Treasury, that freight costs alone were high.  He estimated that the average cost of 
shipping a wagonload of freight, 4500 pounds worth of goods, from New York to 
New Mexico averaged close to $12 per 100 pounds.  Combined with the flat duty 
rate of $600 per wagon imposed by Mexican customs officials, shipping and 
handling proved costly.  Bent-St. Vrain and other sizable outfits had additional 
expenses to consider.  The cost of wagons and livestock, salaries for their traders, 
hunters, and drovers, steamboat shipping costs, and insurance premiums all cut into 
their bottom line.  However, the potential profits covered the expenses, and 
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Although the costs of outfitting for a Santa Fe expedition could be high, the 
potential profits made the venture worthwhile for traders like Charles Bent and 
Ceran St. Vrain.  As early as the 1820s and 1830s, frontier officials boosted the 
potential of the prairie commerce to their superiors in Washington.  In 1831, 
William Clark wrote the Secretary of War that, “This trade may by proper means, 
be placed upon a footing more permanently useful than the mere acquisition of 
furs….The exchange of our cotton goods alone…for the articles already 
enumerated as received, from the Mexicans will give employment to thousands of 
our enterprising citizens.”  Even when traders sold their goods in Santa Fe for less 
than the going market price in Missouri, they still made money.  Profits decreased 
slightly during the 1840s, rarely exceeding 40% on the investment, and sometimes 
as low as 10%.  However, the number of traders and investors grew throughout the 
decade.
12
     
The Bents solidified the economic ties between Missouri and Santa Fe when 
they acted as shipping agents for friends in New Mexico.  Manuel Alvarez used the 
services of the Bent wagons.  In 1844 the company took charge of 10,485 pounds 
of Alvarez‟s trade goods, including an iron safe, coffee, gunpowder, brandy, a 
valise, one hat case, and a saddle “to be delivered without delay in like good order 
and condition, at Santa Fe, New Mexico, the dangers of the Road and Fire only 
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excepted,” according to the contract.  The partners charged Alvarez nine cents per 
pound.  The next fall they reached a similar agreement, this time for 10, 796 
pounds shipped at $9 per 100 pounds, “the dangers of the Road and unavoidable 




  The importance of the Santa Fe trade predisposed many New Mexican 
officials to accommodate the Americans, sometimes even at the expense of 
ignoring directives issued from Mexico City.  The revenue generated by trade with 
the United States accounted for nearly seventy percent of the territory‟s budget by 
the 1830s.  This money funded a gamut of New Mexican projects; it paid the 
salaries of many public officials and soldiers, as well as funding pensions for 
widows and orphans.  Recognizing the isolation of New Mexico, and the sacrifices 
on behalf of the territory defending the frontier from Indian incursions, the 
Mexican government exempted the inhabitants from taxation to the central treasury 
from 1838 to 1845.  The central government also exempted New Mexicans from 
the forced loans it occasionally levied upon the nation‟s population.  In order to 
help fund frontier defense, the central government attempted to procure money 
from Chihuahua and Mazatlan for shipment to Santa Fe.  However, these funds 
rarely reached New Mexico, forcing the territorial government to become even 
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Accommodation was a two-way street, however, and the most successful 
American traders attempted to play the game by Mexican rules.  At the most 
fundamental level, communication was critical to the success of trade.  In this 
regard, American traders bowed to local custom.  Fluency in Spanish was a 
necessity for successfully conducting business.  Traders like the Glasgows and the 
Bents were fluent in Spanish, allowing them to conduct their own business easily, 
and also to serve as middlemen between Mexican merchants and consumers, and 
their counterparts in the United States.  Josiah Gregg noted simply that “As the 
Mexicans rarely speak English, the negotiations are mostly conducted in Spanish.”  
It was in the best interests of Anglo traders to learn the language as quickly as 
possible, or at least to maintain cordial relations with bilingual residents.  
Americans who learned the language, journalist Matt Field wrote, became men “of 
great importance,” in Santa Fe.  Former company clerk Alexander Barclay 
considered entering direct trade with New Mexico in 1845, but only after he had 
“made some attainment of the Spanish language.”  Those without a working 
knowledge of Spanish were in an awkward situation trying to conduct business 
involving the Santa Fe trade.  Samuel Wethered wrote Manuel Alvarez from 
Baltimore, complaining that “I have not been able to make out all your letter as it is 
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in Spanish, you will please write to me on receipt of this and address me in my own 
language.”  Traders and politicians like Alvarez played a critical role as cultural 
mediators in the Southwestern Borderlands.
15
   
Knowledge of Mexican consumer tastes was also critical to any successful 
trading venture.  While the teamsters used their downtime to visit fandangos and 
try their luck at the gaming tables, most traders set up shop in the small stores 
lining the plaza.  The American traders did little of their business in Santa Fe on 
credit.  Rather, they purchased their stocks of goods with an eye towards the 
inexpensive tastes of the ordinary New Mexican consumer.
16
  An examination of 
the customs lists and invoices of the traders demonstrates both the simplicity and 
variety of their inventory.  Textiles were especially important.  American traders 
imported calicos, handkerchiefs, gingham, aprons, crape, and ribbons.  For the 
more discerning, and wealthy, they provided “fancy striped cashmere,” silk, and 
black velvet.  Aside from textiles and fabric, the list was almost endlessly diverse:  
butcher knives, chintz mugs, apothecary scales, bottles of snuff, turpentine, table 
settings, combs, vermillion, cloves, coffee, and a limited stock of guns and 
gunpowder.  The Bents and St. Vrain were typical in the kind of merchandise they 
imported.  Textiles made up the bulk of their most valuable imports into New 
Mexico.  Customs receipts and trade passports indicate that Charles Bent imported 
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blankets, linens, flannel, buttons, lace, knives, caps, neckties, and handkerchiefs 
into Mexico during this period.
17
 
Partnerships with Hispanic merchants also proved important to some 
American traders.   Rather than competing against one another, some formed 
mutually beneficial business partnerships.  Anglo merchants provided their 
Hispanic counterparts with contacts and introductions in the markets of Missouri 
and New York.  Americans also acted as financial advisors and bankers for their 
new colleagues.  Mexican traders sometimes reciprocated by navigating their 
partners through the Byzantine world of customs houses, tariffs, and trade licenses.  
As agents and translators, Mexican traders provided the Americans with crucial 
information and an entrée into markets stretching from Vera Cruz to Mazatlan, 
Acapulco to Santa Fe.  The two groups extended credit to one another, traveled 
together, and sometimes married into each other‟s families.
18
     
Cultivating these ties, and accommodating consumer tastes proved even 
more critical as American traders probed south, deeper into Mexico.  American 
goods saturated the New Mexico market as early as 1826, forcing traders to seek 
new retail outlets further south along the Camino Real.  Chihuahua was a natural 
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market.  Not only was the city much larger than Santa Fe, it boasted a richer 
hinterland, and an expansive clientele seeking both practical necessities and luxury 
goods.  Between the early mid-1820s and mid-1840s trade with Chihuahua 
burgeoned from an average of $19,000 per year to nearly $90,000 annually.
19
  
American traders rented store space in Chihuahua and disposed of their goods, 
either at retail or at wholesale prices.
20
  Although it is unknown whether they 
actually made the journey or not, Charles Bent and Ceran St. Vrain both received 
numerous passports to trade with the interior states of Mexico.  Other men involved 
in trade along the Arkansas also apparently engaged in this trade on a limited 
basis.
21
  Traders extended their reach beyond Chihuahua as well, traveling to 
Zacatecas, Hermosillo, Guanajuato, Durango, and the great trade fair at San Juan de 
los Lagos in Jalisco.  Such activities, by both Anglo and Hispanic merchants, David 
Sandoval writes, “transformed New Mexican society from a Spanish imperial 
outpost to the gateway of international economic activity.”
22
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At the same time they cultivated more intensive economic contacts with 
American traders, the ties that held New Mexico and the northern frontier to the 
rest of the nation, began to weaken.  While some nationalists in Mexico City 
attempted to integrate New Mexico more firmly into the national body politic, 
increased opportunities for trade and growing discontent with the central 
government caused many New Mexicans to reevaluate their true personal and 




From the perspective of officials and merchants in Santa Fe, the actions of 
the central government often seemed at odds with local interests.  At best, the 
national government ignored the frontier.  At worst, bureaucrats from Mexico City 
only added to the considerable troubles the northern province faced.  Confronted 
with an almost annual cycle of political unrest and revolution, officials in Mexico 
City paid little attention to the problems that inhibited frontier development.  
Complaints from Santa Fe about underfunded militiamen and the destruction 
caused by Ute and Navajo raiders rarely resonated with southern officials.  Fed up 
with being ignored, New Mexicans often acted according to their own interests, 
even if such actions placed them at odds with directives from the national capital.  
They failed to communicate regularly with Mexico City, passed their own laws 
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without congressional approval, and often ignored tariff and import laws.  The gap 
between national law and local practice grew.
24
  
Americans like Charles Bent occasionally found themselves caught up in 
the political unrest that resulted from the resistance of New Mexican frontiersmen 
to actions taken by politicians in Mexico City.  Discontent with the policies of 
Santa Anna‟s government exploded into open violence in 1837.  In an attempt to 
consolidate power, the central government passed a series of laws designed to tie 
the frontier more closely to the rest of the nation.  The most onerous piece of 
legislation rescinded New Mexico‟s exemption from direct taxes levied by the 
national congress.  For years, in recognition of the burden New Mexicans 
shouldered defending themselves from Indian raiders, residents of the territory paid 
no taxes to Mexico City.  Elevation to the status of a department within the republic 
nullified this exemption.  Furthermore, Santa Anna placed an outsider, Albino 
Perez, in power as governor of New Mexico.  Although Perez had a reputation as a 
competent military man, he was unfamiliar with the situation in Santa Fe.  The new 
governor‟s questionable moral conduct, onerous new militia duties, and a 
disastrous 1836 campaign against the Apaches pushed New Mexicans into open 
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  In the following weeks the New Mexicans defeated Perez in 
battle, captured him, beheaded him, and set up a new government.  The new 
government lasted but a short time, before conservative forces under Manuel 
Armijo regained power.
26
  Rumors circulated throughout New Mexico about who 
bore the responsibility for the violence.  Some Americans blamed Armijo for 
masterminding the plot, while many Mexicans blamed foreign agitators.  
Apparently, both factions drew supplies from American merchants in New Mexico, 
including Charles Bent.  Bent‟s actions landed him in prison in Taos.  However, 
through bribery, bluster, and the threat to call upon his employees to ride south and 
burn the town, Bent gained his freedom.  Regardless of their veracity, rumors of 
American involvement made many New Mexicans suspicious, and in the coming 




Despite the predilection of New Mexicans for trade with the United States, 
authorities in Mexico City sometimes attempted to curb this commerce.  On the one 
hand, Mexican officials sought to insulate domestic producers and manufacturers 
from foreign competition.  In order to accomplish this, the government raised tariff 
rates, and restricted altogether the import of some items, such as gunpowder.  
Foreign affairs also played a role in the formulation of Mexican trade policy 
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regarding the northern frontier.  The failure of the Texan invasions of 1841 and 
1843 alarmed many officials, and in 1843, President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna 
issued a set of restrictive trade laws.  In retaliation for Texan actions, he ordered the 
closure of customs houses at Taos, El Paso del Norte, and Presidio del Norte.  
Numerous items were added to the prohibited import list.  Finally, in September 
foreigners were prohibited from entering the retail trade, although throughout 1843 
Armijo permitted some exceptions to this rule.
28
   
The correspondence of American traders indicates that both they and the 
population of New Mexico grew restive under the restrictions imposed by the 
Mexican state.  Because of the new directives, no spring caravan left Missouri in 
1844.  For Americans willing to become Mexican citizens, the restrictions proved 
little enough to overcome. Those unwilling to naturalize faced a more difficult 
situation.  James Josiah Webb had grown used to Armijo‟s lax enforcement of 
government issued tariff directives.  Rather than enforce the rates specified by 
Mexico City, Armijo charged a flat rate of $500 per wagon.  Furthermore, Webb 
wrote, “many goods contraband under the Mexican tariff were admitted by him and 
no examination made.”  Armijo‟s successor, Mariano Martínez de Lejanza, proved 
less accommodating.  The new governor demanded $750 per wagon, and that the 
imported goods all “go through the customhouse with the formality of 
inspection.”
29
 However, Solomon Sublette wrote that Charles Bent paid $600 in 
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import duties in the fall of 1844.  Another certificate noted that he paid $100 in 
customs duties.  Sublette‟s letter may be inaccurate.  However, William Boggs later 
recalled that Bent had a great deal of influence with customs officials, and “could 
do much toward getting the exorbitant duties reduced on American merchandise.”
30
 
Writing from Bent‟s Fort in the spring of 1844, Andrew Sublette apprised his 
brother William of the situation.  A new governor “from the South,” was on his 
way to unseat Manuel Armijo, Santa Fe remained closed to trade to all “except 
those that have become citizens and have Families resided in the country.”  He 
advised William not to try to trade in Santa Fe that year.  The following month, 
Andrew wrote of rumors of discontent against the trade restrictions.  “The port of 
Santa Fe is closed,” he related, “and they have a new governor at present but it is 
the general belief that there will be a rebellion the citizens prefer Armijo.”  Samuel 
Wethered wrote Manuel Alvarez that he received much the same reports: the arrival 
of a new governor, restrictive trade laws, and that, “New Mexicans seem to be 
much vexed by Santa Anna‟s proceedings,” as trader Samuel Owens reported.
31
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Enforcement of these customs laws was often difficult, however, even 
under the best of circumstances.  In the first place, Santa Fe had the only 
customhouse in New Mexico, despite the directive from the central government to 
construct another at San Miguel del Vado.  Taos, long a center of smuggling 
activity, never had one of its own.  Such a situation made it much easier for traders 
to avoid paying duties, as well as facilitating the import of contraband into the 
province.  Compounding these problems, there were few customs agents.  Those 
who did serve often lacked education and experience.  Perhaps most importantly, 
however, New Mexican customs agents often accepted bribes to supplement their 
poor salaries.  While Mexican nationalists labeled such activities traitorous, and 
American traders self-righteously scorned the avariciousness of customs officials, 
frontier agents acted in their own economic self-interest by conveniently ignoring 
the law.  Strict enforcement might mean a drop in trade, and the loss of revenue 
from the American traders represented a potential body blow to the New Mexican 
economy.
32
   
American traders fully accommodated themselves to this system of lax 
customs enforcement and became experts at bribery.  Bribes and gifts simply 
greased the wheels of the Santa Fe trade.  Handicapped by meager resources and 
pitiful wages, many customs house agents readily collaborated with the American 
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  Traders Josiah Gregg and James Josiah Webb give the best accounts 
of the customhouse inspection routine.  Prior to entering Santa Fe, the caravans 
dispatched an advance party to travel to the capital.  These men secured supplies, 
arranged for accommodations for men and wagons, and visited the customs 
inspectors.  The purpose of the visit to the customhouse, Gregg wrote, was “to 
obtain an agreeable understanding,” with the inspectors.  Upon arrival, the 
inspection was often lackluster; “it is rarely carried on with rigid adherence to 
rules,” Gregg observed.  The inspectors, motivated by their desire to promote trade 
and supplement their income, hardly ever opened all the parcels or checked the 
cargo against the manifest.
34
  Webb elaborated, “As our whole interests were not 
under the protection of law, but subject to the will of one man, and being 
recognized and confessed contrabandists, it was necessary for the traders to start 
early and take a long and rapid journey ahead and see how the land lay.”  Webb 
gave a rough estimate of the amount of money needed to expedite the inspection 
process.  Traders gave the officials “small loans” or “small presents” in order to 
avoid harassment.  These payments ranged from $25 to $100 depending upon the 
value of the cargo.  The trader claimed that the funds the inspectors and soldiers 
received were at least as great as the salaries their counterparts further to the south 
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received.  The leniency of the inspectors, Webb continued, significantly eased the 
financial obligations that burdened the Armijo administration.   
Ceran St. Vrain had ample opportunity to pick up the finer points of 
smuggling from American residents of Taos like the mountain man Ewing Young, 
who had a dubious history of confrontation with Mexican authorities over the issue. 
St. Vrain may have been considering smuggling as early as 1830.  That fall, he 
wrote Bernard Pratte in St. Louis that their wagon train encountered a mounted 
Mexican escort on the Red River.  He informed Pratte that, “the object in coming 
out so fare to meet us was to prevent Smuggling and it had the desired effeck.”  
The escort placed St. Vrain‟s wagons under guard until they reached Santa Fe, 
where “all had to pay full duteys, which amount to about 60 per ct on cost.”
35
   
By the early 1840s, Charles Bent had an unsavory reputation as a smuggler.  
In January of 1841, Mexican officials searched his home in Taos, on a tip they the 
trader was hiding contraband.  Bent wrote Manuel Alvarez claiming that the tip 
came from an American living in the community, “a damd Lyer,” Bent called 
him.
36
  In 1842, the Departmental Treasurer warned officials in Taos to be on the 
lookout for Bent.  Apparently, the trader was cagey, for the Treasurer cautioned the 
border guards to observe him “with much reserve in order not to give him any 
warning or advance notice that the Governor is aware of his activities.”  During the 
winters of 1842 and 1843, Bent, St. Vrain and Company employees smuggled 
goods out of New Mexico, in direct violation of a directive that banned the 
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exportation of goods forbidden by the Mexican government.  Evidence of such 
illegal activities is admittedly slight, but the implication of a letter from Charles 
Bent to Manuel Alvarez indicates that, on some occasions, the former sought to 
avoid payment of import duties.  On November 12, 1844, Bent wrote Alvarez from 
Taos that, “I received a letter from George Bent dated the 5
th
 inst he was then at the 
foot of the mountain at the crossing of the las Animas with our waggons….You had 
better not mention that your have heard from the waggons for feare that an escort 
might be sent out before he leaves theas waggons.”  Such shady business practices 
allowed critics of the company to paint the Bents and St. Vrain as unscrupulous 
traders who self-consciously flouted the sovereign laws of New Mexico.
37
   
Despite their consistent circumvention of Mexican import laws, American 
traders still griped incessantly about the discrimination, real and imagined, they 
faced at the hands of New Mexican officials.  The first cause of American 
discontent regarded import duties.  While New Mexican merchants had to pay 
duties, they usually amounted to half what the Yankee traders paid.  Josiah Gregg 
complained that the Mexican tariff imposts were “extremely oppressive,” to 
American businessmen.
38
  Tariff discrimination figured largely in Consul Manuel 
Alvarez‟s correspondence with his superiors in Washington.  In 1839, Alvarez and 
other merchants petitioned Armijo to lower the import duties.  The governor denied 
their request on the grounds that these funds were the only way for the government 
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to outfit its campaigns against Navajo raiders.  The Mexican exemptions and the 
tariffs exacted from American merchants, Alvarez wrote the following year, were 
in direct violation of treaties signed by the two nations.  Furthermore, wealthy New 
Mexicans fully exploited their advantages, traveling to the United States to 
purchase goods, thereby undercutting their Anglo competition.  Inaction was not an 
option, Alvarez wrote, “should we submit quietly to this imposition, it would only 
induce the authorities here to proceed from one injustice to another until eventually 
the citizens of our country would be prohibited from even disposing of their goods 
in this Department.”  In 1842, Alvarez noted that the Americans still paid nearly 
double the import duties that New Mexicans did.
39
 
The lack of redress from Armijo, combined with the increased success of 
New Mexican merchants in the Santa Fe trade, prompted American observers to 
search for some conspiracy to deprive them of their natural economic rights and 
privileges.  Again, Alvarez led the charge.  He placed the lion‟s share of the blame 
directly at the governor‟s feet.  Armijo was behind the harassment and 
discriminatory policies, the consul claimed.  Yet, the governor was too wily a 
political operator to get his own hands dirty.  Rather, “he gives the cues to his 
subordinates,” who, “completely dependent upon him, not only for their pay but 
also for their political existence,” carried out an unofficial program of harassment.  
These cronies, Alvarez wrote indignantly, seized “upon the most trivial pretexts 
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and excuses, to vex, harass, and oppress every one that is imagined to be in the way 
of the Governor.”
40
  All these petty actions, Alvarez feared, might add up to 
economic failure for American traders.  Not only did Armijo seem to control 
everything that went on in New Mexico, but the actions and promptings of 
Mexican traders seemed to further erode the position of the Anglos in Santa Fe.  
The consul reported that these merchants whispered in the governor‟s ear, urging 
him to take unjust actions.  “The leading object appears to be,” he concluded, “to 
present the citizens of the United States in the most unfavorable light to the public, 
cherishing the idea of excluding us from the market of Santa Fe.”
41
 
Traders like Charles Bent were not averse to calling upon the power of the 
American state to come to their aid in New Mexico.  Although only rarely 
interested in the extension of American influence into the Southwest, the Santa Fe 
merchants clothed their lobbying efforts in the robes of national economic interest.  
American traders faced other disadvantages aside from Mexican tariff duties.  They 
paid duties twice, first on any trade goods imported from Europe, then again in 
Santa Fe.  These payments forced the traders to raise the price of their goods, which 
made it difficult to compete with Mexican traders who paid lower duties for goods 
imported either through the New Mexican capital or port cities like Veracruz.  
American observers pushed Congress to adopt a Drawback Bill, reducing the duties 
Yankee traders paid on European imports.  Such an action, “would entirely secure 
the entire commerce of the rich state of Chihuahua with parts of Sonora and 
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Durango, thus augmenting our trade over the Prairies to two millions…annually, 
giving employment to from eight hundred to one thousand wagons.”
42
   
Furthermore, both Alvarez and Charles Bent wrote of the baleful effects of 
foreign influence over Mexican trade policy, and its potential consequences for the 
frontier economy.  Alvarez wrote the Secretary of State that, “It is well known to 
those familiar with Mexican affairs that they are controlled by England,” especially 
in the rich states of the interior.  Charles Bent placed much of the blame upon the 
inaction and timidity of the American government.  Mexican officials never 
harassed English or French traders for fear that their governments might retaliate, 
Bent claimed.  American traders could expect no such protection at present.  “We 
see daily the rights of American citizens violated most outrageously, for which 
none have been redressed,” he complained to Alvarez.  Further government apathy, 
the trader warned the consul, would be disastrous.  American traders would have to 
abandon completely the market to French and English traders.  Loss of the Mexican 
market would be disastrous for the Missouri economy, so reliant upon “the precious 
metals” of Mexico.  On the other hand, should the government finally take action to 
redress the wrongs inflicted upon its citizens, trade would again flourish, and the 
western economy would remain on a sound footing.  Alvarez‟s wish for decisive 
government action came true when congress approved a Drawback Bill.  In 1845, 
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the longsuffering consul wrote James Buchanan, confidently predicting a large 
increase in American trade with Mexico‟s northern frontier.
43
 
 While the Santa Fe trade presented Americans with a tremendous economic 
windfall, the strengthening ties between New Mexico and the United States 
complicated the relationship between the Mexican state and the citizens of the 
northern frontier.  In order to supply Mexican consumers, traders like the Bents and 
St. Vrain tapped into a market network that stretched from the Mississippi River to 
the Atlantic coast.  Incapable of muscling into the wholesale supply business, Bent-
St. Vrain established connections with prominent Missouri merchants in a manner 
reminiscent of the company‟s dealings with the Chouteaus and American Fur.  
Success on the Santa Fe end of the trade also often required accommodation to 
local strictures and circumstances.  For the New Mexicans, the situation was more 
complex.  As the province‟s economy drew closer to that of the United States, the 
Mexican state attempted to halt the process through the issuance and enforcement 
of stricter import laws.  Northern frontiersmen often proved ambivalent to these 
instructions, and conducted business in a manner best-suited to local needs and 
interests.  However, the disconnect between Mexico City and Santa Fe created an 
unstable situation.  Although New Mexicans often proved accommodating to 
Yankee traders, any foreign threat to local autonomy had the potential to create an 
intense anti-American backlash. 
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Chapter 9 - Texan Troubles: Bent, St. Vrain and Co. and the Filibusters, 1841-1843 
 
Despite deep business ties, tensions between New Mexicans and Bent-St. 
Vrain escalated dangerously in the early-1840s.  Mexico City‟s inability to 
incorporate the northern borderlands more fully into the nation left the frontier in 
an exposed position.  In 1841, largely because of its own precarious political and 
economic situation, the Republic of Texas launched an expedition that intended to 
seize Santa Fe.  Although the Texans proved unsuccessful, their actions placed 
Americans in the region in a precarious position.  Threatened by a foreign power, 
New Mexicans suddenly found themselves intensely patriotic.  Because of this 
nationalistic surge, the local population became extremely suspicious of traders like 
Charles Bent, whom they suspected of being in league with the invaders.  Another 
attempted invasion in 1843 further soured relations between Hispanics and Anglos 
in New Mexico.  The events of 1841-1843 laid the groundwork for the increasingly 
acrimonious relations between Bent-St. Vrain and Mexican nationalists in the 
coming years. 
In 1841, political unrest again caused many in New Mexico to look with 
suspicion upon American traders like Charles Bent.  Unlike the internal upheaval of 
1837, this threat was international in origin.  From the earliest days of its 
independence, the Republic of Texas struggled economically.  By 1841, the 
Republic was broke, the national debt was astronomical, business and commerce 
stagnant.  Eyeing the flow of goods between Missouri and New Mexico, Texan 
leaders began speculating about how they might divert the profits from precious 
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metals and livestock into the empty coffers of the Republic.  Acting upon the 
assumption that the citizens of New Mexico would welcome annexation to Texas, 
President Mirabeau Lamar authorized an expedition to bring the Mexican territory 
into the Texan orbit.  Poorly organized and ill conceived from the beginning, the 
march of the three hundred-man force fell apart before it even reached its 
destination.  As the exhausted adventurers staggered into the province‟s 
easternmost villages, Mexican soldiers captured them easily, and marched them 
south to prison.  Inglorious as the Texas-Santa Fe Expedition was, it planted seeds 
of distrust between the Anglo and Hispanic communities of New Mexico, seeds 
whose roots sank deep into the psyches of many Mexican nationalists by the time 
of the American invasion in 1846.
1
 
 Rumors of American collusion with the Texans swirled throughout New 
Mexico, leading to resentment, suspicion, and ultimately, violence.  The Texan 
invasion made the position of United States Consul Manuel Alvarez especially 
hazardous.  In addition to his activities as consul, Alvarez acted as a Santa Fe trader 
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and confidant of Charles Bent, activities which alienated him from nationalistic 
New Mexicans.  Although some within the American community undoubtedly 
welcomed the prospect of annexation, it is probable that most of the merchant 
community viewed the Texans as troublemakers, and feared that their actions 
would cause an anti-American backlash in New Mexico.  Charles Bent, for 
example, warned Alvarez that reports of Texan movements circulated throughout 
northern New Mexico. On January 16, he wrote,  “We have many 
reports…respecting Texas…I should like to know the truth if you have any 
authentic nuse from the interior respecting Texas.”  He also informed Alvarez that 
“five or six Americans” as well as some Shawnee renegades had left Santa Fe, 
intending to waylay a party of New Mexican traders.  “You can aprize theas 
Gentlemen of this if you see proper,” Bent concluded.  On the twentieth, Bent 
requested Alvarez to secure “leters of security” from Armijo for all the American 
residents of New Mexico, evidently fearing a native backlash should the Texans 
invade.
2
   
The stories Texan deserters told to Armijo heightened the anxieties of the 
American population, for the informants told the governor that numerous 
prominent Americans were in cahoots with the adventurers.  “These false reports 
caused great exasperation in the public against the peaceable and unoffending 
American traders,” Alvarez informed Secretary of State Daniel Webster, the 
following year.  Not only did Texans spread rumors, but the consul accused the 
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governor himself of telling tales in order to procure military aid form authorities in 
Chihuahua.
3
  In order to prevent violence against Americans in Santa Fe and the 
surrounding communities, Alvarez requested Governor Armijo‟s aid, Guadalupe 
Miranda, to instruct local officials to protect the lives and property of the foreign 
residents.  Armijo‟s secretary responded that all Americans, “shall be protected and 
respected, and that it shall not be permitted to any to persecute or insult them.”  
However, should any American attempt to actively aid the invaders, “that person 
shall be held as an enemy, and shall be proceeded against forthwith conformably to 
law.”  The official advised Alvarez to make the American community aware of this 
directive.  Two days later, Armijo forbid any Americans or other foreigners from 
leaving Santa Fe or New Mexico.  Despite Armijo‟s directives, arrests of 
Americans took place throughout New Mexico.
4
 
 Americans and American sympathizers faced the potential for violent 
attacks because of their supposed collusion with the Texans.  The American 
citizens of Santa Fe wrote a plaintive letter to the Secretary of State, in which they 
complained of the “innumerable insults, injustices, and unlawful oppressions, to 
which we are daily subjected,” going on that such actions proved “clearly to us the 
inveterate feeling that this governor with many of his citizens have towards us.”  As 
the Texans drew closer, the concerned citizens claimed, the governing class began 
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to stir up the common folk against the Americans.  The frightened Americans went 
on to claim that, “we consider our lives and properties in imminent danger; and it is 
our fear that long ere this shall have reached Washington we shall have been 
robbed and probably murdered.”
5
  An attack on Manuel Alvarez himself convinced 
Americans of the opposition they faced in Santa Fe.  Shortly after Armijo took the 
field against the Texans, his nephew, whom the governor placed in charge of the 
Santa Fe garrison, rode his horse up to the front door of the consul‟s home.  Along 
with a number or soldiers and townspeople, the officer entered the dwelling and 
confronted Alvarez, “whom they grossly insulted personally abused and wounded 
in the face,” according to later testimony.  Before the mob could proceed further, 
“some of the better disposed of the Mexicans,” broke up the crowd.  However, 
before leaving, Armijo‟s nephew, “stated in the public street and in hearing of a 
large multitude of the citizens that after these Texans he would return with his 
troops and destroy all us foreigners.”
6
  Crowds assaulted other Americans as well.  
Alvarez reported to Webster that a mob in Taos beat to death Francis Lecompte, a 
deaf-mute American citizen.  The consul implored the secretary to take action.  
Inaction could prove fatal.  He continued, “should no notice be taken of the 
grievances suffered by our citizens, and no satisfaction demanded, the American 
citizens not only of New Mexico, but throughout the Republic, will be more cruelly 
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treated than heretofore, even by the class which now respects them, and the 
authorities of New Mexico encouraged by want of success in obtaining redress, will 
attempt greater excesses than those already committed.”
7
 
 Americans residing near Taos also faced suspicion from locals.  New 
Mexicans claimed that Charles Bent, John Rowland, and William Workman acted 
as point men for the Texan invasion.  Prior to the invasion, President Lamar sent an 
agent, William G. Dryden, to make contact with Rowland and Workman, in an 
attempt to enlist their services to convince the New Mexicans to accept annexation.  
Although Workman‟s pro-Anglo sentiments were well known throughout northern 
New Mexico, and some suspected him of conspiring with the rebels in 1837, it is 
possible that Workman and Rowland had no idea of Lamar and Dryden‟s actions.
8
  
Regardless of Workman‟s actual sympathies, he faced intimidation from New 
Mexican authorities.  Alvarez informed Webster that while Workman was away 
from his home in San Miguel del Vado, “his house was entered by the Juez de Paz, 
and his goods taken, because it was said he was a friend to the Texians.”  Workman 
and Rowland left New Mexico for California shortly thereafter.
9
 
It is possible that New Mexicans fingered Rowland and Bent as co-
conspirators as early as February of 1841.  During February and March, Bent and 
Workman engaged in a running argument with Taos attorney Juan B. Vigil.  
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Whether or not the controversy stemmed from Vigil accusing the men of preparing 
the way for the Texan invasion is unknown.  However, the violence that followed 
the accusations Vigil made certainly did little to endear the two Americans to the 
local Hispanic population.
10
  Around noon on February 19, 1841, Bent and 
Workman confronted Vigil, and demanded an explanation of his accusations 
against them.  Bent “asked him how he dare meake such false representations 
against us,” whereupon Vigil countered that he stood by the truth of his statements.  
Hardly had he finished speaking, “when Workman struck him with his whip,” Bent 
informed Manuel Alvarez.  Workman continued to beat the man with the whip for 
some time, before dropping it and commencing to pummel Vigil with his fists until 
Bent, “thought he had given him enough.”  Then, the trader pulled Workman off 
the Mexican.
11
   
The same afternoon, the local magistrate summoned Bent to account for his 
actions.  Vigil made “a great deal of talk and a good many threats…against the 
Justice and myself,” Bent wrote.  In particular, the lawyer threatened “to raise his 
relations and friends if the Justice did not doe him justice, according to his will.”  
The judge ordered Bent remanded to prison, whereupon the trader began to argue 
his case.  The judge eventually placed Bent under house arrest. The trader remained 
confined for two days, before being summoned to post bond.  Eventually, the judge 
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suspended further proceedings against Bent, pending a review of the case by the 
governor.  Although Bent heard the Vigil was making a personal trip to Santa Fe to 
present his case before Armijo, the American was confident Armijo would dismiss 
all charges.  The American trader apparently sweetened the deal for Armijo, for he 
sent Alvarez one keg of gunpowder and ten pounds of coffee to present to Armijo.  
Bent fumed that although he “could posibly have had Vigil araned for trial for 
Slander,” such a charge would bring him no satisfaction.  Rather, he wrote Alvarez, 
“I had rather have the satisfaction of whiping a man that has wronged me than to 
have him punished ten times by the law, the law to me for a personal offence is no 
satisfaction whatever, but cowards and wimen must take this satisfaction.”
12
   
Nearly a month later, Bent was still railing against Vigil.  Bent reported 
rumors that, before the lawyer left town, he had acquired a Bowie knife and “a pair 
of Horsemans Pistols,” with the intention of sending “one heritic,” Bent, to hell.  
The trader thought this boast somewhat odd, for he wrote Alvarez that he had 
encountered Vigil twice.  The man was “as meak as a lamb,” on both occasions.  
Bent later heard that Vigil intended to have him publically whipped.  Should the 
man want further satisfaction, Bent and Workman were only happy to oblige.  “If 
he is not satisfied with what he had of Workman I think W. would be right glad to 
settle the affair,” the trader boasted.
13
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It is possible that Bent did indeed seek further “satisfaction” against Vigil.  
On the night of March 20, four armed men approached the house where Vigil was 
staying.  The barking of dogs woke Vigil, and he fled “nearly naked” across the 
plains to Rio Grande, “and laid thare all day,” before making his way to the town of 
Cordova and from there back to Taos.  Bent reported that Vigil requested an escort 
out of the country from the alcalde.  Bent gloated that, “I think that Juan Vigil will 
be heartely tired of the valley of Taos…I think if he gets fairly away this time, he 
will be verry apt to creape away.”
14
 
Charles Bent and anyone associated with the company fort also came under 
suspicion.  Authorities in Taos arrested Bent and brought him to Santa Fe for 
questioning.  Alvarez intervened, and Bent was released.  “The reason for his 
arrest,” Alvarez wrote, “was said to have been a misunderstanding of the orders 
received by the officer in Taos from head quarters.”  Not even Americans coming 
into New Mexico from Bent‟s Fort were free from suspicion.  Alvarez reported that 
Mexican officials arrested three Americans coming into New Mexico from the 
Arkansas on business.  Despite the fact that, “they gave good references, and had 
done nothing against the laws of Mexico, nor could have been suspected as 
Texians….they were arrested, sent to Santa Fe, and there imprisoned,” the 
indignant consul informed his superiors.
15
 
The consul was a key component to the economic, social, and political pro-
American faction Charles Bent helped create in northern New Mexico.  Alvarez 
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was well positioned to act as a go-between for the Bent interests and those of 
Governor Armijo.   Alvarez was a remarkable figure in his own right.  Born in 
Spain in 1794 he immigrated to Mexico in 1818.  From Mexico, he traveled to 
Cuba and to the United States.  Returning to Mexico, he opened a store in Santa Fe.  
In 1829, when the Mexican government evicted Spanish citizens from Mexico 
Alvarez headed for the mountains.  He trapped as far north as the Yellowstone 
River, working in the employment of the American Fur Company and advancing to 
the position of brigade leader.  By 1834, he was back in Santa Fe.  In 1839, 
although not an American citizen, the United States government appointed Alvarez 
consul in Santa Fe.  The Mexican government withheld official recognition at first, 
but allowed Alvarez to fulfill his normal consular duties.
16
 
 Alvarez‟s political position, his business acumen, linguistic skills, and 
knowledge of New Mexican society made him a natural partner for the Bents.  
Indeed, as a merchant, Alvarez never separated his economic interests, or those of 
the American community, from his responsibilities as consul.  He did business 
freely with Charles Bent and other American merchants residing in New Mexico.  
Although Bent and Governor Armijo remained on something resembling friendly 
terms, neither man trusted the other, and both turned to Alvarez to act as a go-
between.  For his part, Bent sometimes informed Armijo, through Alvarez, of the 
news and rumors passing back and forth along the Santa Fe Trail.  Armijo then 
sounded out Alvarez in an attempt to determine the accuracy of the reports sent 
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south by Bent.  Although Alvarez‟s position did not guarantee the success of 
American business ventures, or even their complete personal safety, he took his 




One of the touchiest matters Alvarez dealt with was the murder of a number 
of Americans in northern New Mexico.  Over the course of three years, the consul 
received outraged letters from Bent and other Americans demanding justice from 
Armijo.  Alvarez forwarded these complaints to Washington, adding his own 
opinion that the American government take action.
18
  Ironically, Bent‟s first 
complaint to Alvarez about murders near Taos dealt with an American.  The trader, 
along with “the Foreigners living heare,” sent a petition to Armijo via Alvarez 
urging the governor to try William Langford for murder.  Langford‟s “crime is one 
of the most auteragiaus actes, and one that could not have bean comitted by any 
other than a hardened villian destitute of all fealling of humanity,” Bent wrote.  The 
bloodthirsty fiend might well kill again “to satisfy his inadinant thirst for blood,” 
Bent warned.  The man had threatened the lives of numerous residents, despite his 
incarceration.
19
   
More typical, though, were complaints about the murder of Americans by 
the Mexican population.  In December, 1840, an outraged Bent wrote of the murder 
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of an American citizen near Mora, “the fourth murder that has bean committed on 
American citizens within the past fue years, and as yet neather of the murderers 
have been punished.”  The local authorities seemed unwilling to dispense justice, 
thinking, Bent continued “that it is too much to put to death two or more men for 
the murder of one heritic.”  Bent raged on, should twenty Mexicans murder one 
American, “let us insist upon the whole being punished, and with nothing short of 
death.”  The authorities should confiscate the property of the murderers and sell it 
off at auction to defray any expenses incurred by a trial and execution.  Alvarez‟s 
duty, Bent reminded him, was to report these outrages to the Mexican government 
in order to secure redress.  Should the Mexicans balk, Alvarez should write directly 
to the American minister in Mexico City, “a man that will not be trifled with,” Bent 
concluded.
20
  Alvarez received another letter to the same effect from J. H. Lyman.  
Lyman complained that as long as Armijo was in power, no American could ever 
get justice from the government.  Despite the killings, Armijo had done nothing, 
and the murderers “are not punished,” Lyman complained.  Alvarez passed these 
concerns on to the American minister to Mexico, Powhatan Ellis.  He had consulted 
with the governor, who promised that “he would use all diligence that justice 
should be administered,” Alvarez reported.  Still, he went on, “I cannot help but 
remark that between his saying and doings there is a very wide difference.”  
Alvarez hoped that Armijo would remain firm, and make an example of the 
murderers, so that the population would realize that, “they cannot with impunity 
assassinate or at will and pleasure take the lives of free born American citizens.”  
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However, two years later, little changed.  Armijo still refused to take action against 
those who killed Americans.  Rather, the culprits, “were permitted more liberty 




In 1843, another expansionist gambit by the Lone Star Republic again 
placed Americans in New Mexico, including Charles Bent, in a precarious position.  
The initial impetus for the 1843 expeditions came from Charles A. Warfield, son of 
a prosperous New Orleans family, with long experience trapping, traveling, and 
filibustering.  Warfield proposed to raise a force to capture New Mexican territory.  
Sam Houston, overseeing a bankrupt nation, and itching to atone for its 
filibustering failures in New Mexican and along the Lower Rio Grande, gave 
Warfield a commission in August 1842.  Charged with seizing Mexican property 
and goods along the Santa Fe Trail in territory claimed by Texas, Houston 
authorized Warfield to split any loot, half to the Republic, half to Warfield and the 
troops.  Furthering Houston‟s enthusiasm were reports of New Mexican discontent 
with Governor Armijo and a willingness to accept Texan annexation.  Upon receipt 
of his commission, Warfield traveled to New Orleans, thence to Missouri to begin 
recruiting men.  Although he recruited better in the western portion of the state, not 
everyone was enthusiastic about his venture.  Solomon Sublette, for one, wrote his 
brother William, expressing his concerns about Warfield‟s intentions.  The Texan 
attempted to recruit Sublette, making him “a great many promises if I should go 
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with him as a Left Tenant Colonel and pay but I would not join him for I was of the 
same opinion as you that he is for no good,” Solomon concluded.
22
 
Warfield‟s recruiting attempts in the vicinity of Bent‟s Fort placed company 
employees in a difficult situation.  From the Platte River, W.D. Hodgkiss wrote 
Andrew Drips, “Mr. Charles Warfield now a colonel in the Texian Service is 
raising recruits at the Arkansas,” and that, “he has been joined by many of the old 
mountain men…their intention is to waylay the Mexican party on the way to the 
States this Spring, the Mexicans will have a large amount of gold and silver and if 
they succeed it will render a vast service to the Texian cause.”
23
  Warfield did most 
of his recruiting at the South Platte posts.  Rufus Sage encountered him at Fort 
Lupton.  There, bearing a colonel‟s commission signed by Sam Houston, Warfield 
attempted to gather men to “annoy the Mexican frontier, intercept their trade,” and 
force them to make peace on terms favorable to the Lone Star Republic.  In 
exchange, Sage wrote, “Great inducements, by way of promises were held out,” 
and a number of men consented to “rally beneath the banner of The Lone Star.”
24
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Warfield expected to rendezvous with the recruits near Bent‟s Fort in March 
1843.  However, only twenty-four men showed up when the colonel returned.  
Undaunted, Warfield marched south towards Point of Rocks, along the Santa Fe 
Trail, where he intended to rendezvous with the rest of the recruits, headed west 
from the Missouri settlements.  When the men from Missouri failed to arrive, 
Warfield marched his tiny command west, into New Mexico.  Near Mora, they 
attacked a camp of New Mexican buffalo hunters, killing three and driving off their 
herd of seventy horses.  The ciboleros, however, pursued.  They overtook the 
Texans, and drove off their entire horse herd.  Dismounted and dejected, the 
recruits walked back to Bent‟s Fort and disbanded.  Warfield headed south for 
Texas, only to meet another party of Texans encamped along the Santa Fe Trail.
25
 
This band, under the command of Jacob Snively, also held a commission 
from the Texas government to harry any Mexican wagons passing through territory 
claimed by the Republic.  Snively‟s men, described by one participant as “hardy 
Frontiersmen, inured to toil and danger, and the use of arms,” marched west for the 
Santa Fe Trail on April 25, 1843, and arrived there on May 27.  Four days later, 
Snively‟s scouts met the eastbound Bent-St. Vrain caravan.  From the traders, the 
Texans learned that they had missed the “Chihuahua Carry Vans” by two months.  
However, they were expected to return in a little over two weeks.  More 
importantly, Snively learned that Governor Armijo dispatched an escort of about 
500 militiamen to the border to escort the caravan safely to Santa Fe.  In order to 
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check this new threat, Snively dispatched a portion of his command, under the 
direction of the newly-arrived Warfield, to meet the Mexicans.  Warfield 
encountered an advance guard of one hundred men under Captain Ventura Lovato 
near Cold Spring, on the Cimarron River.  A one-sided contest followed.  The 
Texans killed eighteen Mexicans, wounded eighteen more, and captured sixty-two.  
The fleeing survivors made their way back to Armijo with the news.  Distraught, 




What Snively did not expect, was the arrival of the United States Dragoons 
that accompanied the traders.  Worried about the unrest the Texans caused along 
the trail, traders appealed to the government for an escort.  In response to their 
request, Stephen Watts Kearny dispatched Philip St. George Cooke, with four 
companies of dragoons to escort the caravan.  Cooke rendezvoused with the 
caravan at Diamond Spring on June 6.  He found the traders of both nationalities 
uneasy.  The Mexican traders especially, expressed “many fears of robbers, and a 
desire to be with us.”  Eight days later, Cooke encountered Charles Bent along with 
fourteen wagons and a herd of cattle, bound for Missouri.  The trader informed the 
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officer of Armijo‟s march towards the border.
27
  While marking time with Cooke, 
Bent awaited the arrival of St. Vrain, who had taken wagons back up the Arkansas 
to retrieve five stranded boatloads of robes and pelts.  The trader arrived in Cooke‟s 
camp on June 22, bringing “important news for the caravan.”  St. Vrain informed 
Cooke that Snively and 180 men awaited the arrival of the caravan at Arkansas 
Crossing.  The Texan told St. Vrain that “he intended to remain in the country; and 
would most assuredly capture the Mexicans and their wagons, wherever they went, 
whenever they separated from the escort.”  Furthermore, St. Vrain informed Cooke 
of Warfield‟s defeat of Lovato and Armijo‟s subsequent retreat, expressing his 
fears that the Texans would assuredly plunder the wagon train if Cooke did not 
accompany it.
28
  Anticlimax followed.  Overwhelmed by boredom, nearly half of 
Snively‟s men deserted.  Cooke encountered the Texans at the end of June and 
curtly informed them that they were on United States soil, and engaged in illegal 
activity.  The officer threatened to fire upon the Texans if they refused to give up 
their arms and disband peacefully.  Snively had little choice.  For the second time 
in three years, a Texan army, bound for New Mexico, failed ignominiously.
29
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Despite the failure of the Texans, suspicions once again swirled around the 
American community in New Mexico.
30
  Rumors that the Texans planned to invade 
New Mexico from the vicinity of Bent‟s Fort found some credence with Armijo.  
He received word from Las Vegas that local officials had captured two “thieves,” 
former employees of Bent-St. Vrain who seemed to possess an intimate knowledge 
of Texan intentions.  Although unsure of the number of Texans, the prisoners 
informed the authorities that the filibusters were trading with Indians and biding 
their time until the caravan passed through.  Given the general suspicion 
surrounding Americans in New Mexico, it is ironic that Charles Bent and Manuel 
Alvarez worked actively to keep Armijo apprised of the Texans‟ movements.  From 
Taos, Stephen Louis Lee brought word from Bent of the Texan plans.  Alvarez 
acted as the go-between, relaying Bent‟s information to the governor.
31
 
Despite the information provided by Bent and Alvarez, New Mexicans 
remained uneasy about the potential of American collaboration with the Texans.  
Charles Bent complained about these suspicions in a letter to the consul.  The 
native population looked upon the Americans “as intruders,” he wrote.  Only fear 
of the Americans‟ fighting ability kept the New Mexicans from committing “a 
great many more assassinations than there is,” he claimed.  Only direct action by 
the United States government on behalf of her citizens in New Mexico could 
guarantee an end to interethnic violence, Bent proclaimed.  Although he fingered 
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the “rabble” as the main perpetrators of the violence, they were undoubtedly 
“excited…by some of the first citizens of the country.”
32
   
Bent‟s dissatisfaction with his Taos neighbors only escalated when they 
involved him in a frivolous lawsuit.  Bent got into a dispute with a Taos resident 
named Antonio Montero.  Montero brought suit against Bent for $800.  Unable to 
dispose successfully of the case in Taos, Bent traveled to Santa Fe to take the issue 
up with Armijo.  Despite the governor‟s assurance that Bent would have justice, the 
trader cynically pointed out that, “He has made very fair promises; how far these 
promises will be verified, time will show.”  There was little use in putting 
confidence in Mexican promises, he reminded Alvarez.  Upon arrival in Santa Fe, 
Montero apparently stirred up the people against the American trader, “by 
slanderous reports,” Alvarez informed the Secretary of State.  The locals almost 
mobbed Bent, who fled Santa Fe by night for the Arkansas, although he later paid 
the fine.
33
   
Further confirming Bent‟s fears of anti-American sentiment, violence 
erupted in Taos.  When a crowd looted Charles Beaubien‟s store, local officials, 
including Padre Martínez‟s brother Pascual, did nothing to prevent it.  Manuel 
Alvarez seconded Bent‟s opinion‟s in a letter to the Secretary of State.  The actions 
of the Texans, “caused considerable excitement,” among New Mexicans, the consul 
wrote.  Rumors that prominent Americans were in league with the freebooters only 
intensified anxieties.  Because of these suspicions, Armijo summoned a number of 
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Americans from throughout New Mexico to Santa Fe to undergo questioning, a 
process that “caused much trouble and vexation to many of our innocent and 
inoffensive citizens.”  Aside from violent reprisals, the actions of the Texans had a 
potentially crippling effect on commerce between Missouri and Mexico.  Unless 
the government did something to restrain the “predatory bands of Texians…roving 
upon the Caravan route,” American traders would lose business as Mexicans 
shifted their attentions to purchasing from the southern seaports and foreign traders.  
The actions of Warfield and Snively cost the American merchants $200,000 in 
trade, Alvarez concluded. 
34
   
Maneuverings by the Texans in 1841 and 1843 helped sew the seeds of 
discontent between rival nationalist Mexican and mercantile pro-American factions 
in Taos for the next couple of years.  Nationalists, headed by Padre Antonio José 
Martínez, already suspicious of the Bents and St. Vrain, would accuse the 
American traders of business and political practices that threatened to undermine 
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Chapter 10 - Taos: Many Tender (and Tenuous) Ties 
 
The alliances the Bents and St. Vrain formed in the frontier community of 
Taos heightened the tensions between the Americans and Mexican nationalists in 
the wake of the failed Texan invasions of 1841 and 1843.  The partners recognized 
quickly the utility of marriage into prominent Taos families.  Similar to the bonds 
the company formed with Native American groups, marital ties opened up new 
economic and political opportunities.  Marriage expedited the citizenship process 
for some Americans, which could in turn lead to the acquisition of substantial land 
grants.  What the Bents and St. Vrain saw as a tremendous opportunity, Mexican 
nationalists viewed as a potentially dire threat.  The weakness of the Mexican state 
had left New Mexican in a precarious position, and the prospect of men like 
Charles Bent gaining access to millions of acres of land represented a further 
destabilization.  In a similar manner, the ties the partners established in Taos might 
translate into political power.  The ascension of a pro-American faction threatened 
further the hold of Mexican authorities on the territory north of Santa Fe.  These 
interrelated issues – marriage, land, and politics – were the basis of the increased 
estrangement between the pro-American and pro-Mexican forces in the region 
around Taos.  
Bent and his associates formed the nucleus of the foreign-born community 
that eventually challenged the nationalist faction for political and economic control 
of northern New Mexico.  They also played a prominent role in the economic and 
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social life of the town.
1
  The American clique comprised many men who married 
into local families.  John Tharp, David Waldo, William Wolfskill, John Workman, 
and occasional Bent-St. Vrain employee Dick Wooton, all married Mexican 
women.  Another Bent associate was Stephen Louis Lee.  It is possible Lee came to 
New Mexico as early as 1824.  Regardless, local authorities soon suspected him of 
smuggling, but proved nothing.  He became a Mexican citizen in 1829, and likely 
continued trapping and trading.  By 1838, Lee was one of the principal traders in 
Taos, making the occasional deal with Bent-St. Vrain, although he had an unsavory 
business reputation.  He became a politician, landholder, and eventually sheriff of 
Taos, before his death in the 1847 Taos Revolt.
2
   
Outside of St. Vrain, Bent‟s closest ally in Taos was probably Carlos 
Beaubien.  A Canadian, Beaubien was one of a long series of French traders who 
entered the Southwest, beginning with the Mallet brothers in 1739.  Multilingual, 
Catholic, and accommodating, Frenchmen like Beaubien settled easily into New 
Mexican society.  Well-educated, Beaubien first came to New Mexico in 1826.  
The following year he married a local woman, Paula Lobato, with whom he had 
nine children.  An increasingly prosperous merchant, he eventually became a 
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Mexican citizen and the alcalde of Taos.  His receipt of a large land grant 
strengthened his ties with Bent, much to the chagrin of local Mexican nationalists.  
Beaubien played an important role in New Mexico following the Mexican-




Mexican nationalists rallied around Padre Antonio José Martínez, the parish 
priest of Taos, and scion of the most powerful native family in the Rio Arriba 
country of northern New Mexico.  As with the pro-American faction, intermarriage 
knitted the Martínez‟s to other notable clans, including the Valdezes, Vigils, 
Jaramillos, Lovatos, and Trujillos.  Unknown circumstances drew the Martínez 
patriarch, Don Severino, to Taos.  Antonio José Martínez was one of the most 
remarkable New Mexicans of the period.  Not initially destined for the priesthood, 
he married in 1812.  However, his wife died fourteen months later, leaving 
Martínez with a baby girl.  Rather than remarry, he decided to become a priest.  
New Mexico lacked educational opportunities, so Martínez traveled south to 
Durango, where he attended the Tridentine Seminary on scholarship.  While in 
Durango, he freely imbibed the philosophies and nationalism of Mexican 
revolutionaries like Father Hidalgo.  He returned to New Mexico in 1823, and took 
up duties as parish priest at Tomé, before moving on to Abiquiu.  In 1826, the 
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Bishop of Durango secularized the Taos parish, and Father Martínez became the 
local priest.
4
   
Once established in Taos, the padre began a long and distinguished career 
of civil and religious service to the community.  He served as a deputy to the New 
Mexico Departmental Assembly in 1831-32, 1837-38, and 1845-46.  He began a 
preparatory school to train young men for the seminary in Durango - eventually 
eighteen alumni of Martínez‟s school became priests.  He also operated New 
Mexico‟s only printing press from 1835 to 1847.  A firm believer in social justice, 
Martínez became an outspoken champion of the local population.  A long and rich 
oral tradition ascribes to the priest a reputation as “a kindly figure and defender of 
the Mexican people, worthy of the deepest respect.”  Martínez‟s nationalism, and 
his burden to speak out in behalf of the local Hispanic population put the priest on a 
collision course with Bent and Taos‟s foreign merchant faction.
5
 
Charles Bent and Padre Martínez clashed bitterly over issues of trade and 
local politics.   Economically, the priest opposed the trader because he alleged that 
the company corrupted the Indians.  Martínez was not alone in accusing American 
traders like the Bents of selling guns and liquor to the Indians in exchange for 
captives and livestock stolen from New Mexico and the states further south.  As a 
nationalist, Martínez viewed Bent and the Americans around Taos as a potentially 
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disruptive political and social force, one that threatened to cut the already fraying 
bonds that held New Mexico to the rest of the nation.  Politics was another arena of 
conflict.  Elections in Taos proved hotly contested during the 1840s, and the faction 
with the most sympathetic officials in power stood to benefit at the expense of the 
other.  Bent, in particular, spent a good deal of time grousing to Manuel Alvarez 
about the political influence of the priest‟s family, and the miscarriages of justice 
they perpetrated.  Finally, the issue of land grants rubbed nerves raw on both sides.  
In an attempt to develop the isolated northern frontier, New Mexican governors like 
Manuel Armijo issued princely grants of land to ambitious citizens.  When it 
became apparent that Charles Bent intended to expand his influence through land 
acquisition, Martínez vigorously opposed his actions.  Thus, throughout the 1840s, 
the situation in Taos was often tense.  Recriminations flew in both directions, as the 
factions jostled for political, social, and economic power.  The actions of the Bents 
and St. Vrain, and traders like them, proved critical in this contest, for the manner 
in which they conducted their business had the potential to destabilize Mexico‟s 
northern frontier, a fact of which Martínez was only too well aware.
6
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The Bents and St. Vrain recognized the great economic and political 
potential of marriage into prominent Hispanic families in Taos.  Marriage offered 
numerous advantages for both parties involved.  American men, especially 
merchants, gained access to a wider range of customers, while the local New 
Mexican families gained political and economic influence through intermarriage 
with well-placed Anglos.  While some men, like Ceran St. Vrain, became Mexican 
citizens, others did not.  Citizenship allowed Anglos easier access to land grants, as 
well as the ability to conduct business during periods when the central government 
attempted to restrict commercial intercourse between the United States and Mexico.  
Charles Bent and St. Vrain both adhered to venerable local traditions regarding 
their marriage practices and living habits.  However, while intermarriage 
strengthened the ties the partners formed with influential members of New Mexican 
society, such alliances only heightened tensions with the Martínez faction, as both 
groups vied for economic and political advantage throughout the 1840s.  In this 
way, accommodation through intermarriage brought the partners the potential for 
both material advantage and the possibility for future conflict. 
Intermarriage between Anglo men and Hispanic women often brought 
advantages to both sides of the union.  This was especially the case around Taos, 
where nearly three-quarters of these unions occurred.  Although documentation is 
scarce, it is reasonable to assume that the New Mexicans initially welcomed Anglo 
newcomers, so long as they adapted themselves to local cultural norms and caused 
no trouble for the authorities.  Indeed, numerous newcomers attained positions of 
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power and authority, both formally and informally.  Hispanic women proved 
valuable to Anglo men as mothers, companions, and lovers, as well as for the 
economic links they helped forge between the two communities.
7
  Because of the 
high value New Mexicans placed on family life and reciprocity, most residents of 
the region were linked to one another through marriage or through godparenthood.  
Thus, American men who married local women tapped into an extensive political, 
social, and economic kinship network.  Hispanic families also benefitted from the 
marriage.  They acquired easier access to American trade goods.  The New 
Mexican mercantile community also forged links to suppliers, creditors, and 
marketers, in the United States through their new in-laws.  Even for those New 
Mexicans of a lower or modest standing, intermarriage provided them with an 
opportunity to augment their position within society.
8
 
Marriage provided a path to Mexican citizenship, which, in turn, could 
facilitate broader economic opportunities for Anglos.  During the late-1820s and 
early-1830s, numerous Anglo trappers and traders, tired of evading Mexico‟s 
economic laws, decided upon formal citizenship.  Citizenship legitimized economic 
ventures previously illegal. Citizenship laws became more codified and specific 
over the course of the 1820s.  The colonization law of 1823 was rather vague; it 
guaranteed civil rights to all professing Roman Catholics and well as streamlining 
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the rules for land distribution.  In 1828, the government passed an official 
naturalization law, which laid out the specific conditions for citizenship.  To 
become a Mexican citizen, an individual had to have lived in Mexico for two years, 
be Roman Catholic, and have a record of good behavior.  Although the law did not 
require marriage to a Mexican woman, many applicants believed such unions 
expedited the process, and they let officials know of their status.
9
  In 1829, a spate 
of foreigners who would play prominent roles in the affairs of Taos became 
citizens.  The list included Charles Beaubien, John Rowland, Antoine and Luis 
Robidoux, and Thomas Boggs. Ceran St. Vrain became a naturalized Mexican 
citizen in 1831. David Waldo provides a good example of the process Americans 
went through to become Mexican citizens.  In 1831, he presented a petition to the 
ayuntamiento of Taos, requesting naturalization papers so that he could apply for 
citizenship.  After his arrival in Taos, Waldo took notice of the “good organization 
and government of this Republic,” and decided to become a Mexican citizen.  He 
became a Roman Catholic, giving the local priest as a reference attesting to his 
faith and piety.  Waldo, “of course,” renounced allegiance to any other nation, and 
pledged to “bind myself to support effectively the constitution, decrees, and general 
laws of the United States of Mexico.”  Upon summoning witnesses to verify 
Waldo‟s truthfulness, and reviewing his memorial, the town fathers decided that the 
man‟s “ability and industriousness as a merchant are sufficient enough to insure 
him a decent livelihood,” and that “his character and the way he has conducted 
himself and conducts himself is generally known to be politically, socially, and 
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religiously upright and restrained.”  Therefore, they acquiesced to his request, 
paving the way for him to become a Mexican citizen.
10
 
Not all New Mexicans saw advantages in intermarriage, however.  Indeed, 
historian Deena Gonzalez argues that accommodating intermarriages were the 
exception, rather than the rule.  She writes, “In their haste to accept intermarriage 
as examples of cultural unity, some scholars have overlooked the examples of 
social disharmony and raging turmoil.”
11
  Most prosaically, probably fewer women 
of elite status were of a marriageable age.  As noted above, parents often played a 
pivotal role in approving perspective matches.  Since the Spanish Period, many 
New Mexican parents objected vigorously to unions with those below their own 
socioeconomic and political status.  Furthermore, by the 1830s and 1840s, the 
richest families in New Mexico had already consolidated enough economic power 
and foreign mercantile contacts on their own that they did not require kinship ties 
with Americans.  There are no recorded instances of intermarriage between 
Americans and families like the Armijos, Pereas, Pinos, or Senas.  Not everyone, 
then, sought or approved of intermarriage with the Anglo newcomers.
12
 
The Bents, St. Vrain, and a number of their employees and associates saw 
the advantages of marrying into local families.  American contemporaries of the 
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partners noted the kindness and attractiveness of their New Mexican wives.  Lewis 
Garrard wrote of Charles Bent‟s wife, “Señora Bent was quite handsome; a few 
years since she must have been a beautiful woman – good figure for her age; 
luxuriant raven hair, unexceptionable teeth, and brilliant, dark eyes, the affect of 
which was heightened by a clear, brunette complexion.”  The young man also 
found St. Vrain‟s wife appealing, describing her as “a dark-eyed, languidly 
handsome woman.”
13
   
Charles Bent adhered to New Mexican folk marriage customs in the fact 
that he never received the clerical approval for his marriage.  Apparently, he never 
even tried to legitimate the union.  There might have been several reasons for 
Bent‟s failure to do so.  Anti-Catholicism might have played a role.  Perhaps he 
feared that marrying a Mexican woman would stigmatize him in the eyes of his 
family back in Missouri.  Some time between 1832 and 1835, he began his union 
with María Ignacia Jaramillo.  Twenty years old at the time she took up with Bent, 
Jaramillo was a widow with one child of her own.   William Boggs, a Bent relative, 
recalled that Charles attempted to acculturate his wife to an Anglo lifestyle - living, 
dressing, and presumably speaking, like Americans.  Bent and his wife had at least 
five children, two of whom, Juan Andres and Maria Virginia, apparently died 
during infancy.  Their second child, Alfredo, was born February 14, 1837 and 
baptized the following day.  Estefana Jaramillo was born August 3, 1839, and 
Maria Teresa on October 25, 1841.  The baptismal register lists each child‟s father 
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as “unknown,” although their paternal heritage was well known throughout the 
community.  The family‟s twenty-year-old Ute servant, Maria Guadalupe 
Jaramillo, was also baptized.
14
 
Marriage to María Jaramillo and the obligations of godparenthood linked 
Charles Bent to several important families in Taos, including the Vigils, Lunas, 
Valdezes, and Luceros.  Although folklore has it that the Jaramillos had a rich, 
aristocratic bloodline, the truth is less dramatic.  The family was of the middling, 
respectable sort, not the Spanish aristocracy.
15
  Attachment to the Vigil family 
proved especially important, for they wielded a great deal of influence in the 
region.  María Jaramillo‟s mother, María Apolonia Vigil, came from a family with 
large ranching and farming interests in northern New Mexico.  The Vigils also 
participated in the Santa Fe trade and politics.  On the local level, Cornelio Vigil 
served alternately as alcalde, prefect, and probate judge, and also became a 
business associate of St. Vrain.  The two men collaborated to receive the massive 
Vigil-St. Vrain Land Grant, of which they made Charles a one-sixth partner.  
María‟s cousin, Donaciano Vigil served as Territorial Secretary under Manuel 
Armijo, and became the acting governor of New Mexico following Bent‟s 
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assassination in 1847.  Juan Bautista Vigil y Alarid served briefly as Lieutenant 
Governor after Armijo fled the province in the summer of 1846.  Clearly, Bent‟s 
marriage brought him into close contact with local New Mexican powerbrokers, in 
addition to Taos‟s American community, which grew in strength and influence 




Others associated with the company established liaisons with Mexican 
women.  St. Vrain had a series of three mistresses, each of whom bore him a child.  
Charles Bent‟s brother George took María de la Cruz Padilla as a common-law 
wife, and they had two children together.  Although both Bent and St. Vrain 
provided handsomely for their children in their respective wills, they were less than 
generous with the women in their lives.
17
  The most famous intermarriage 
associated with Bent-St. Vrain was that between sometime employee - turned 
famous guide - Kit Carson and María Jaramillo‟s sister, Josefa.  Carson most likely 
met Josefa while visiting his employers in Taos.  Whether her parents opposed the 
match is unknown.  However, unlike the Bents or St. Vrain, Carson converted to 
Catholicism and married her with benefit of clergy.  As with those involved 
primarily in the Indian trade, the men of Bent-St. Vrain understood the potential 
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advantages, socially, politically, economically, and physically, of associating 
themselves with the local female population.
 18
 
In terms of economic potential, intermarriage was critical to Anglos hoping 
to take advantage of New Mexico‟s generous land grant policies during the 1840s.  
Mexican land policy encouraged foreigners to become Mexican citizens and marry 
local women.  While the social status of the women had little to do with the grants, 
and although only about ten percent of Anglo men who intermarried received 
substantial grants, men like Carlos Beaubien, Stephen Lee, and Ceran St. Vrain 
married or began cohabiting shortly before they received their grants.
19
  Although 
the government never questioned whether Mexican citizens had foreigners or 
naturalized citizens for partners, citizenship expedited the process of obtaining the 
grant.  Naturalized citizens or foreigners applying for grants in their own name 
faced a long wait while local authorities forwarded their petitions to Mexico City.  
Between 1840 and 1847, the government in New Mexico issued twenty-three land 
grants, most of them made by Manuel Armijo.  Foreigners took advantage of the 
governor‟s largesse, and during the first half of the decade there was scarcely an 




Land grants formed a critical component of the Mexican state‟s attempt to 
defend and settle its isolated northern frontier.  One thing the republic had was 
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plenty of land.  However, what the frontier lacked was a large native population 
capable or willing to develop the land.  Prior to the great grants of the 1840s, 
foreigners sometimes purchased small plots of land directly from Mexican citizens.  
Mexican policymakers hoped that native citizens or European migrants would 
settle on the frontier, acting as a check against local Indian tribes and an 
increasingly expansive United States.  Yet, when the government failed to develop 
viable colonizing plans, local officials turned to private citizens.  In addition to 
frontier development, governors like Armijo used land grants to curry political 
favor, pay off political debts, and keep the departmental bureaucracy functioning.  
Eventually, Armijo granted 31,000,000 acres of land to individuals, much of it 
abutting the international border at the Arkansas River.  For Armijo, self-interest 
overlapped with national interest; he became a partner in two sizable grants.  Still 
unable to attract much interest from native born Mexicans, Armijo turned to 
naturalized citizens like Beaubien and Lee to settle the northern frontier.  Despite 
the amount of land Armijo granted, New Mexico failed to attract much migration.  
Furthermore, Armijo‟s willingness to grant lands to men like Beaubien and Ceran 
St. Vrain aroused the suspicion and ire of nationalists like Martínez.  Land grants 
offered almost limitless economic potential for the Bent faction in Taos, but it also 
combined with complaints about their Indian trading ventures to deepen the rift 
separating the two groups.
21
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Controversy first arose over the lands granted by Armijo to Carlos Beaubien 
and Guadalupe Miranda.  Due to long association with Americans like Charles 
Bent, as well as accusations of smuggling, Beaubien sought out a well-connected 
native New Mexican as a partner.  He settled on Guadalupe Miranda, who served as 
the Secretary of the Mexican Departmental Government in Santa Fe and as 
collector of customs.  The two men argued for the grant based upon economics - 
should Armijo grant the application, they could begin ranching and agricultural 
activities in an area previously underdeveloped.  The governor granted their 
petition on January 11, 1841.  However, the anti-American sentiment roused by the 
abortive Texan invasion of 1841 forced Beaubien and Miranda to put their plans for 
development on hold.  Not until two years later, in January 1843, did they take 
possession of their grant.
22
  
Padre Martínez vigorously opposed Armijo‟s generosity on both ethical and 
political grounds.  In the first place, the fact that Armijo received a one-quarter 
interest in the grant struck the priest as highly suspect.  Perhaps more importantly, 
though, was the fact that Beaubien and Miranda deeded a quarter interest to Charles 
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Bent in return for beginning to develop the ranching interests on the new property.  
The priest pointed out that Armijo had no authority to grant land to foreigners.  
Since Bent was not a Mexican citizen, his involvement should have voided the 
entire transaction.  Furthermore, the grant infringed upon the rights of local 
Pueblos, Jicarilla Apaches, and Mexicans who used the land for hunting and 
grazing.  Upholding the rights of Beaubien and Miranda would severely curtail the 
ability of the local natives to subsist.  The priest traveled all the way to Durango to 
present his case to the authorities.  The government in Durango overturned the 
claim, a decision upheld at the local level by Governor Mariano Chávez.  Beaubien 
and Miranda vigorously - and disingenuously - objected to the governor‟s decision.  
Bent had no interest in the grant, they claimed.  They also grossly and intentionally 
underestimated the size of their new holdings, claiming the grant was only for 
100,000 acres when in reality it consisted of nearly 2,000,000 acres.  They also 
argued that Martínez‟s protest interrupted the economic development of the 
province‟s frontier.  Their arguments bore fruit.  In the winter of 1844 the 
provincial assembly decided that Martínez‟s accusations were invalid, and on April 
18, 1844 Governor Felipe Seña upheld Armijo‟s original grant.  Now secure from 
interference, Bent began a ranching settlement on the Ponil River.  However, in 
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Not all of Charles Bent‟s land dealings aroused the attention of the vigilant 
padre.  In 1843 and 1844, the trader gained an interest in another land grant 
submitted by his partner, Ceran St. Vrain and Cornelio Vigil.  Although a 
naturalized citizen, like Beaubien, St. Vrain recognized that attaching the name of 
an influential native New Mexican to the petition greatly strengthened his chances 
of success.
24
  On December 8, 1843, the men wrote to Governor Armijo, stating 
that they desired to “encourage the agriculture,” of the frontier.  They had 
examined and registered the land encompassed by their petition – the valleys of the 
Huerfano, Apishapa, and Cucharas rivers to their junction with the Arkansas and 
Animas – with great care.  Armijo‟s approval of their petition was all that was 
necessary for the development of an area containing “fertile land for cultivation,” 
and “an abundance of pasturage and water.”
25
  The governor granted their request 
the next day, and on Christmas Day, 1843 Vigil and St. Vrain requested that the 
authorities in Taos act quickly to place them in formal possession of the land.
26
  In 
March, Vigil and St. Vrain split up the interest in the new grant, conveying a one-
sixth interest to themselves and to Charles Bent, Governor Armijo, Donaciano 
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Vigil, and Eugene Leitensdorfer.  Soon after this division, Charles‟s brother 
William began using the land to raise livestock and crops.  However, by 1847, 
Indian raiders made such projects untenable.  Had Martínez been aware of Bent‟s 
involvement, he most assuredly would have protested, but there is no record of his 
opposition to the Vigil - St. Vrain grant.
27
  
In addition to land grants and the Indian trade, the Bent faction also clashed 
with the Martínez faction over control of local politics in Taos.  Whether dealing 
with citizenship applications, land grants, or workaday courtroom procedures, allies 
in local government sometimes meant the difference between economic success 
and failure. As such, local political elections often became heated, with each 
faction pushing its own candidates.  While Carlos Beaubien often sought positions 
on behalf of the American faction, Padre Martínez often boosted his brothers for 
local office.  All these men had records of public service in Taos and beyond.  
Pascual Martínez served as a militia captain during the Texan invasion of 1841, and 
earned a commendation from President Santa Anna.  Pascual also served as justice 
of the peace in Taos in 1845 and 1846.  Santiago Martínez served as subprefect of 
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Taos in 1837, as an agent of the Mexican National Bank in New Mexico in 1839, in 
addition to at least one term in the New Mexico Assembly.
28
 
Political rivalries that had simmered just beneath the surface during the first 
half of the 1840s reached a boiling point in 1846.  Interestingly, prior to the antics 
of Snively and Warfield, Padre Martínez does not appear to have offered much 
opposition to Beaubien serving as justice of the peace in Taos.  In 1842, Charles 
Bent wrote Alvarez that the priest actually seemed pleased with Beaubien‟s 
election, apparently taking, “the credit for himself for the appointment,” although 
Bent found it hard to believe that the electors consulted the priest before the vote.
29
  
Any bipartisan feelings that might have existed in 1842 had disappeared by the 
time Beaubien ran for the same position in 1846.  Bent spent a good deal of his 
correspondence with Alvarez during the winter and spring of 1846 ranting about 
the priest and his political machinations.  Even elections for electors roused Bent‟s 
indignation.  When the community held such an election Bent reported that the 
padre, “is exerting himself for his brother Santiago,” boosting him as the only man 
in the Taos Valley competent enough to hold the position.  The trader snidely 
remarked that the priest must have great intuitive powers, for before this time, 
“none before him have been able to discover theas hidden, Legal, qualitys,” in 
Santiago.  Initially, Charles also felt confident in Beaubien‟s chance to defeat 
whichever candidate the Martínez faction put up for justice of the peace.  Bent took 
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a great deal of pleasure in reporting that the priest, “is getting allarmed, he begins 
to doubt whether he will suxcead in getting one of his brothers ellected justice.”
30
   
By the end of March, the trader accused Martínez of actively “meddling” in 
the election process.  “The Priest Martínez appears determined to suffer no one in 
authority heare unless he submit to be dictated to by the priest,” Bent griped.  
Election of any Martínez to the position of justice of the peace could be potentially 
dangerous for the American faction, “for a great many think they are bound to say 
as the priest directs them,” in their political actions.  The trader continued, “The 
Priest will spair no meanes to injure me, but if he will attack me fairly publicly and 
above board, I am certain he will not accomplish his end, but underhandidly as he 
is no doing, wishing to make Cats Paws of the superior authorities, to doe his dirty 
work, if he can suxcead in this thare is no telling what he may accomplish.” When 
Martínez eventually won the election, Bent cried foul.
31
 
Tensions, so long pent up, exploded in Taos on May 3, 1846.  That day, a 
mob attacked George Bent and his friend Francis Preston Blair in the town square.  
Blair, Charles wrote, “was in Liquor,” and George was attempting to escort the 
intoxicated young man home, when the mob jumped them.  Almost immediately, 
Charles pointed out that a number of “servants of the big famely” were involved in 
the attack, and pressed Alvarez to present the case directly to Armijo.  As long as 
the Martínez faction was in the ascendency, acquiring justice for the beaten men 
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would be impossible.  The local populace continued to make threats, and Charles 
warned darkly, that “if anything further is done heare I would not like to answer for 
the consiquences,” before adding that, “I am much excited at this moment.”
32
 His 
subsequent May 3 letters to Alvarez added detail to the story.  Bent continued to 
collect the names of the assailants, and noted that about thirty men took part in the 
beating.  Furthermore, “Some of the ring leaders are the Priests and brothers 
servants, who I have no doubt will sustain them.”  Following the beating, the men 
continued to harass George and Blair.  They gathered outside the former‟s house, 
insulting the men.  Charles apprised the authorities of the situation, but expressed 
little confidence that they would take any steps to curb the abuse.  Indeed, the 
justice, Charles wrote, refused to interfere “because it was Sunday.”  Furthermore, 
rumors reached the trader that authorities had informed the mob that they could do 
as they wished, without fear of reprisal.  As a result, he reported that, “they are 




As Bent elaborated, he singled out Pascual Martínez as a prime mover in 
the attack, and begged Alvarez to present his complaint to Armijo for arbitration.  
The justice of the peace would take no actions against the mob.  Bent‟s anonymous 
informant told the trader that Martínez had witnessed the whole event.  Though the 
two men were “very much beaten,” Blair suffering severe cuts to his head before 
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being left for dead in a mud hole, the justice of the peace did nothing to stop the 
assault.  In addition, Bent‟s source informed him that Pascual Martínez 
masterminded the entire affair, giving specific orders to his servants to attack the 
two Americans.  “While this family is in authority,” the fortunes of the Americans 
“are not secure,” Bent concluded.  He pressed Alvarez to intercede on his behalf to 
the governor, and warned the consul that any investigation must take place far from 
Taos; “it must be done, intirely out of reach of the influence of theas men who are 
in power heare….If we are no longer protected by the authorities we had better 
leave as soon as possible,” Bent wrote.  Armijo ordered a thorough investigation 
and apprehension of the guilty parties.  However, although Taos authorities arrested 
some of the attackers, they were set free before a hearing took place, further 
aggravating the American faction.
34
 
Unsurprisingly, Bent also took every chance he got to mock the priest 
personally, taking great relish in repeating salacious stories and mocking 
Martínez‟s intellectual pretensions.  A Bent letter from January 1841 is especially 
sarcastic.  In this communication, the trader informed Alvarez that the priest had 
recently returned from a visit to Durango.  Upon his return to Taos, he immediately 
began to spin improbable tales of his reception for the easily duped provincials.  
Everyone Martínez met in Durango praised his abilities, labeling him “as one of the 
greatest men of the age as a literary, and eclestiastic, a juror, and a philanthropist,” 
Bent scoffed.  The Duragueños marveled that such a man, marooned on the furthest 
frontiers of the nation “could possibly make himself so eminent in almost every 
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branch of knowledge that can only be acquired by other men of ordinary capasity in 
the most enlightened parts of the world.”  The Taoseños were certainly fortunate to 
have such a Solomonic among them.
35
 Bent also delighted in reporting anecdotes 
where Martínez displayed decidedly un-priestly characteristics.  During the 
Christmas season of 1842, for example, the priest became drunk, prompting Bent to 
write that, “I think he is more sinsearly devoted to Baccus than any of the other 
Godes.”
36
  The priest was also extremely gullible.  Bent took particular relish in 
relating a story in which Martínez believed that the American had tunneled under 
the parish church and planted three kegs of gunpowder, which he intended to 
detonate during mass on Good Friday.  So overwrought was Martínez that he urged 
his brother to search Bent‟s home.  Pascual, “fool as he is, told the Priest he could 
not doe so, it was too ridiculous to believe that such a thing was possible.”
37
 
Bent‟s view of Martínez was more broadly indicative of the American 
trader‟s attitudes towards most New Mexicans in general, intermarriage and 
business ties notwithstanding.  Despite his union with the Jaramillo‟s, despite his 
political and economic connections to men like Cornelio Vigil, Charles Bent and 
most Anglos like him had little use for Mexicans.  In an unguarded moment, Bent 
showed his deepest racial feelings in a letter to Alvarez.  “Thare is no stability in 
theas people,” he complained.  They were servile and ignorant, incapable or 
unwilling to express their own opinions regarding anything.  Their religion was a 
complete sham, consisting “entirely in outward show;” they had no concept of true 
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spiritual devotion, relying rather upon crooked and greedy priests to mediate 
“between the supreme being and themselves,” he continued.  They cheated, lied, 
and stole with impunity.  New Mexican officials were greedy, venal, and 
incompetent.  They were neither patriotic nor did they possess the character and 
wherewithal for self-government.  “The Mexican character,” Bent concluded, “is 
made up of stupidity, obstinacy, ignorance, duplicity, and vanity.”
38
  Bent 
apologists like David Lavender expressed shock at the trader‟s withering 
assessment of the New Mexicans.  After all, Bent had Mexican friends, and married 
a Mexican wife.  “I find the whole thing inexplicable,” Lavender confessed.  
However, Charles Bent‟s letter fits perfectly into the overall racial conceptions and 
opinions Anglo-Americans held of Mexicans during the nineteenth century.  
Although many observers made exceptions - generally for business partners, 
women, and politicians willing to accommodate themselves to advancing American 
interests - most found little to admire in their Hispanic neighbors.
39
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 The actions of the partners in the mid-1840s simultaneously strengthened 
and weakened their ties to the Mexican community in Taos.  Similar to the Indian 
trade, the Bents and St. Vrain broadened their economic and political opportunities 
through marriage into prominent Rio Arriba families.  Marriage extended the 
company‟s clientele and guaranteed the partners economic patronage.  Most 
importantly, these relationships brought the potential for the acquisition of huge 
land grants.  Finally, as Charles Bent and Ceran St. Vrain settled into Taos society 
they and their allies began to compete for political power within the community.  
These actions roused the ire of nationalists in Taos.  These men worried that the 
success of the Americans further weakened the already tenuous hold of the 
Mexican state upon the frontier.  The animosity between the two groups intensified 
during the 1840s as they grappled for power in the fluid political and economic 
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Chapter 11 - Traders and Raiders: Bent-St. Vrain, the Indian Trade, and the New 
Mexican Frontier 
 
The business conducted by American trading companies like Bent-St. Vrain 
represented one of the gravest threats to the security of New Mexico.  Distracted by 
a continuous series of revolutions, authorities in Mexico City left the frontier 
largely unprotected.  Surrounded by powerful Indian groups, chronically short of 
cash, men, and supplies, northern leaders found themselves in a precarious position.  
Furthermore, the presence of Americans ready and willing to trade guns and 
alcohol to Indian raiders in exchange for livestock and captives guaranteed the a 
continual state of warfare in the region.  The trade carried on at places like Bent‟s 
Fort, in conjunction with the partners‟ political and economic exploits in and 
around Taos drove the wedge deeper between the American and Mexican 
nationalist factions.  While neglect on the part of Mexico City regarding Indian 
raiding alienated some New Mexicans from the capital, others like Padre Martínez 
grew even more disenchanted with the Bents and St. Vrain.  The specter of 
violence and theft added to the discontent between the two camps. 
The defense of Mexico‟s northern frontier languished during the 1840s 
because of the political and economic chaos that wracked the nation‟s core.  The 
majority of the military funds and manpower in Mexico went towards keeping 
order in the most populous states of the country‟s core.
1
  Lacking an overall Indian 
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policy applicable to the entire nation, politicians and military officers found it 
difficult to plan, much less implement, a coherent Indian policy for the northern 
frontier.  Orders to bolster frontier defenses, the issuance of reports and stirring 
circulars, and the occasional appropriation of funds constituted the bulk of Mexico 
City‟s attempts to curb Indian raiding.  Even when leaders cooperated long enough 
to plan offensive strikes into the homelands of the northern tribes, lack of funding 
and the inability to coordinate between states and provinces rendered most 
campaigns meaningless.  It became evident to many frontier leaders, military and 
civil, that they would have to shoulder much of the burden of self-defense.  
Donaciano Vigil spoke for many of his disaffected New Mexican compatriots when 
he criticized the lack of responsiveness from Mexico City regarding frontier 
petitions for military aid.  Ultimately, the initiative and manpower must come from 
New Mexico herself.  “To expect much protection from the Supreme Government 
of the Nation is to expect in vain,” he complained, “particularly in the present 
reduced state of the Republic by reasons of the different factions that are constantly 
being formed for personal gains and aspirations, therefore, I believe that for our 
own interest and security…we should not rely upon more protection and resource, 
than what New Mexico can furnish.”
2
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Despite Vigil‟s rousing call for New Mexicans to take action in their own 
defense in the absence of aid from the state, the province faced a number of 
daunting challenges.  Lack of funds often crippled frontier defenses.   Lack of 
manpower, combined with a barebones operating budget to produce a largely 
moribund military presence in New Mexico.  For example, as late as 1841, the 
garrison at Taos, responsible for protecting the hazardous northern border, 
comprised only twenty-seven soldiers.  The nature of the provincial economy also 
made the area an inviting target for Indian raiders.  Many New Mexicans raised 
livestock for a living.  Horses and sheep required pasturage, often far from the 
villages.  The exposed flocks and their shepherds were easy prey for Ute and 
Navajo raiders.  Furthermore, frontier garrisons often struggled to protect their own 
horse herds from hostile incursions.  Thieves struck the presidial horse herd at 
Santa Fe so often, that the garrison had to import remounts from Chihuahua.  Lack 
of good horseflesh made pursuit, much less sustained offensive actions infeasible.  
Even had the soldiers been well-mounted, cynical Anglo observers noted that the 
Indian raiders were far superior as both warriors and riders.  Francois Des 
Montaignes wrote, “T‟is vain…for the cowardly and impotent Mexicans to 
endeavor retaliation, or even a pursuit,” because the raiders, “can disappear in a few 
hours to such a distance as to defy all pursuit.  They are indeed the Bedouins of 
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  Restrictive trade policies also limited the access New Mexicans had to 
quality guns and gunpowder.  Donaciano Vigil urged the assembly to petition the 
central government to allow New Mexicans to import guns and ammunition duty-
free.  The majority of fighting men had only lances, slings, and bows and arrows, 
Vigil claimed.  Should the frontiersmen be able to obtain good firearms, they could 
well hold their own, he continued.  Indeed, even observers as acerbic as Josiah 
Gregg noted that the rancheros of New Mexico, properly armed, were courageous 
fighters, capable of defeating Indian war parties.  Failure to act could be disastrous, 
Vigil concluded.  Lack of direct action would continue to retard the economic 
growth of the frontier.  However, New Mexicans faced a daunting challenge, for in 
every direction they turned they encountered powerful Indian groups.
4
 
The challenge of confronting these tribes necessitated a flexible policy 
approach on the part of New Mexican leaders.  Flexibility was especially 
important, for direct military action against Indian incursions was often impractical 
without aid from the central government.  New Mexicans responded to their Indian 
situation in a number of ways.  They might distribute gifts to Indian guests, or they 
might relax stringent trade regulations to allow for more open economic 
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intercourse.  Settlement of the frontiers was another option.  Military action - 
regular patrols or sustained field campaigns followed by treaties - was the most 
direct policy.  Governors like Manuel Armijo, possessed enough experience to 
know that military action rarely kept the peace for long periods.  Rather, trade 
offered the best avenue to amicable relations with the Indians of the northern 
frontier.  Practicality and self-interest, best revealed by localized trade 
arrangements, characterized New Mexican Indian policy. Yet, when the 
opportunity presented itself, New Mexicans revealed the iron military fist they 
concealed under the velvet glove of commerce.
5
 
A state of constant, low-intensity, warfare characterized relations between 
New Mexico and the Navajos.  Despite launching seven campaigns against the tribe 
during the late-1830s and into the 1840s, New Mexican governors accomplished 
little but two short-lived peace treaties.  New Mexicans and Navajos engaged in a 
constant cycle of raid and retaliation.  The Hispanic population launched slaving 
raids deep into Navajo country.  In return, the Navajos launched their own raids, 
carrying off scores of prisoners and thousands of horses and sheep from 
communities as far east as Las Vegas.  Such attacks led to direct military action by 
New Mexican authorities, and the occasional cessation of hostilities.  However, 
raiding soon broke out again, and the cycle continued into the American period.  
New Mexicans complained about not only the lack of aid that came from Mexico 
City, but the incompetence of the help when it arrived.  Speaking of Governor 
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Mariano de Lajanza Martínez‟s actions against the Navajos, Donaciano Vigil 
lamented the man‟s lack of skill as an Indian fighter and negotiator.  The governor 
had the upper hand against the Navajos, Vigil admitted.  Yet, once the sides began 
negotiations, “he showed that he was unacquainted with the disposition of the 
savage, and with the artifices they use.  He was a mere puppet in the hands of the 




Relations with the Utes were only slightly better.  On-again, off-again 
warfare, raiding, and trading continued throughout the 1830s and 1840s.  During 
the 1830s, the Ute-New Mexican relationship had not been entirely unfriendly.  
The provinces governors allowed inhabitants to travel into Ute country to trade, 
although the more unscrupulous traders dealt in slaves and rustled livestock.  
Because of these policies, intermittent raiding rather than full-scale warfare 
characterized any violent confrontation between the two groups.  Conflict erupted 
in the early 1840s because of expanding opportunities for trade with Americans, 
and the ineptitude of New Mexican governor Mariano de Lajanza Martínez.  
Writing to the Commissioner of Indian affairs in 1846, Charles Bent characterized 
the Utes as, “a hardy, warlike people, subsisting by the chase, and several bands of 
them have been carrying on a predatory war with the New Mexicans for the last 
two years and killed and taken prisoner many of the people and driven off large 
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amounts of stock.”  Conflict continued between New Mexicans and the Utes 
following the American conquest, into the 1850s.
7
 
New Mexican pragmatism and self-interest displayed itself most 
prominently in relations with the Kiowas and Comanches.  Although many 
communities in northern Mexico established trade relations with Comanche bands, 
New Mexico adopted the policy of conciliation on a much broader geographical 
scale.  Beginning in the 1820s, the province quickly began deflecting Comanche 
aggression through open and peaceful trading.  Furthermore, faced with Navajo and 
Ute raiders from the north and west, as well as Apaches to the south, New 
Mexicans could ill-afford armed conflict with the most powerful coalition south of 
the Arkansas River.  This relationship might occasionally become strained, 
according to George Wilkins Kendall.  The Kiowas and Comanches, “appear to be 
on terms of peace with the New Mexicans so far as it suits their interest and 
convenience – no farther,” he wrote.  Gift giving and direct trade, both in New 
Mexico and Comanchería, kept the province at peace with these tribes throughout 
the Mexican Period.  Regarding these tribes, New Mexican policy was at direct 
odds with the bellicose directives issued by the central and state governments.  
Writing to the Minister of War and the Navy, Governor Armijo explained New 
Mexico‟s tenuous situation.  Any directive to war against the Comanches and 
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Kiowas, he wrote, would be suicidal for his territory.  Although perfectly aware of 
the chaos these tribes created elsewhere in Mexico, Armijo informed the minister 
of New Mexico‟s peaceable relations with these groups, and the potential 
consequences of war.  He wrote, “since the Comanche nation is at peace for such a 
long time it would lead to a terrible war in which the Comanches could destroy 
many habitations on our fertile frontier.”
8
 
Although conflict between New Mexico and the Cheyenne-Arapaho 
confederation was neither as intense nor longstanding as that between the province 
and the Utes or Navajos, the plains tribes also struck the region from time to time.  
Evidence of Cheyenne and Arapaho raids into Mexican territory was apparent to 
American observers.  George Nidever recalled that, although the groups traded with 
one another, woe to the lonely Mexican who fell into the grasp of the Cheyennes or 
Arapahos.  Conversely, the Mexicans repaid in kind, sparing “no Arapaho who 
might fall into their hands.”
9
 Conflict between the tribes of the Arkansas River and 
New Mexico intensified during the 1840s, spurred by grievances over captive 
taking, horse theft, and hunting grounds.  One military officer reported that the 
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Arapahos “were daily coming in with herds of cattle and numbers of Mexican 
scalps.”  Lewis Garrad, traveling with company traders, encountered another 
Arapaho war party returning from New Mexico.  They had “several scalps, two 
prisoners, and thirty or more horses and mules,” with them.
10
  Not every 
southbound band of Cheyennes and Arapahos reached their New Mexican targets.  
In 1847, Thomas Fitzpatrick wrote the Superintendent of Indian Affairs that he had 
encountered a war party of thirty-five Cheyennes bound for New Mexico.  The 
agent informed the warriors that the region was now American territory and its 
inhabitants under the protection of the United States.  The grumbling warriors 
turned back to their villages, wondering “why we should take such interest in the 
affairs of a people with whom we are at war.”
11
 
In addition to Mexico City‟s failure to provide for frontier defenses, the 
presence of American traders like the Bents and St. Vrain further destabilized the 
relations between the northern frontiersmen and the region‟s Indian tribes.  If 
Mexicans could maintain a trade monopoly, they could use the market as the 
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primary forum for conducting diplomacy.  The arrival of more American traders in 
Texas and north of the Arkansas River, however, threatened to upset this delicate 
balance by providing alternative trading venues.  Although Indian groups had their 
own reasons for raiding Mexican settlements – acquisition of horses, captives, war 
honors, and to avenge fallen comrades – the presence these new traders and their 
superior goods, helped embolden Indians to strike deeper into Mexico.  Tribes like 
the Apaches, Utes, and Navajos continued to raid New Mexico, sure that the booty 
they secured would find American purchasers north of the international border.  
Although not every American trader actively sponsored or supported such raids, 
knowledge of these markets led Mexican nationalists to decry the actions of the 
Yankee merchants.  Donaciano Vigil had a slightly different take.  He argued that 
restrictive New Mexican trade policies and the harassment of American traders 
forced many to relocate north of the border, where they conducted trade to the 
direct detriment of the region‟s inhabitants.  By swapping guns and liquor for pelts 
and buffalo robes previously bound for Santa Fe, the American traders caused the 
Indians to “lose all respect they had formerly shown us,” Vigil cried.  Not only that, 
because they were now armed with guns, the Indians were, “not afraid to attack 
[New Mexico] which they did constantly.”  By sponsoring or encouraging such 
Indian actions, directly or indirectly, American traders, including the principals of 
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On rare occasions, though, Americans like Charles Bent complained to New 
Mexican officials that the weakness of the state caused attacks upon United States 
citizens by tribes at peace with Mexico.   Bent claimed that both “the Eutaws and 
Apachies of the Mountains,” routinely crossed into American territory north of the 
Arkansas River, where they “almost invariably commit depradations on us,” the 
trader informed Manuel Alvarez.  On July 5, 1841, a party of Utes attacked an 
American caravan on the North Canadian River.  Following the attack, the Utes 
proceeded to Taos, where they “threatened all the citizens of the United States they 
met, also, visited their houses insulting and abusing their families,” Alvarez wrote 
Daniel Webster.  The consul informed Governor Armijo of the actions of the Utes, 
then at peace with New Mexico, and demanded action on behalf of the Americans.  
Armijo and his associates assured Alvarez that they would take steps to “quiet the 
exalted spirit of that tribe.”  The governor ordered local militia leaders to reprimand 
the Utes, and inform them that they must cease attacks on Americans, since the two 
nations were at peace.  However, the governor pointed out that American traders 
had an obligation to treat the Utes and other Indians allied with Mexico well also.  
If the Utes continued to agitate the Americans, the latter were completely justified 
in waging a retaliatory war, so long as they kept it north of the Arkansas.  
Regarding attacks on Americans north of the international border, Armijo could do 
nothing.  “I shall consent to those mischiefs because it would be neither just nor 
                                                                                                                                        
History of the Hispanic Southwest, 121-2, 131; Weber, “‟From Hell Itself:‟,” 111;Vigil, Arms, 
Indians, xi; DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 212, 224-5; DeLay, “Independent Indians,” 58; 
Blackhawk, Violence Over the Land, 119, 133, 145-6; Andrés Reséndez, Changing National 
Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 104-5; Vigil to Departmental Assembly, Ritch Collection; Comer, Ritual Ground, 14. 
272 
 
rational if it were possible,” to halt such attacks the governor wrote Alvarez.  Bent 
and the Americans got no satisfaction on this occasion.  Over a year later, Bent 
wrote that they “have never had redress,” from New Mexican authorities.
13
 
The lucrative livestock trade, both licit and illicit, formed one of the bases 
of the Southern Plains economy during this period.  Although this trade long 
antedated the arrival of American traders like the Bents, following Mexican 
Independence in 1821, the trade expanded in its geographical scope and possibly in 
its volume.  Horses and mules provided critical services to frontiersmen and eastern 
customers.  Used both for transportation and as draft animals, agriculture, the fur 
trade, and the Santa Fe trade relied absolutely on horses and mules.  Capable of 
carrying a load of four hundred pounds, while negotiating difficult terrain, mules 
were especially valued as pack animals.  Anglo observers readily admitted that 
Mexicans were master livestock breeders, and the United States provided a 
bottomless market for horses and mules from as far away as Chihuahua, Sonora, 
and Alta California.  This Mexican stock, combined with American jacks, produced 
the renowned Missouri mule.  They sold for high prices at the eastern terminus of 
the Santa Fe Trail.  In 1832, for example, William K. Rule wrote that, if they could 
stand the cold, Mexican jacks sold for up to $250 apiece in Missouri.  Even colts 
fetched high prices: jennets at $50 apiece and jacks from $50 to $100.  Traders who 
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brought livestock to the Missouri markets found a lucrative way to supplement 
their other business interests.
14
   
Although it is impossible to state specific numbers, a significant portion of 
the livestock driven east from Mexican territory to the United States was stolen.  
American traders were not overly scrupulous about whom they purchased livestock 
from, nor did they express much interest in where it came from.  Insatiable demand 
in the United States – for the overland trade, for agriculture in the Midwest and 
Cotton South, and in Indian Territory – helped fuel the intensification of horse and 
mule theft in northern Mexico.  Although they did not ask questions about the 
origin of their purchases, American traders well knew that they trafficked in rustled 
stock.  For one thing, everyone knew the best horses and mules came from the 
haciendas of northern Mexico.  They also knew that livestock raiding formed a 
critical component of the Indian socioeconomic system.  Even as far north as Fort 
Laramie, observers knew the source of the horses the Indian rode and sold.  
Frederick Wislizenus observed that, “The Indian horses are said to have come 
originally from Mexico.”
15
  Sometime Bent-St. Vrain employee Dick Wooton, 
always candid in his opinions of Mexicans and Indians, wrote of this trade, 
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The Indians were at war with the Mexicans about that time, and 
that was a good time for an American to trade with them.  That 
was the time when they always had plenty of mules and ponies.  
That they ran a great many of them away from the ranches of 
the Mexicans I had no doubt, but they were shrewd horse 
thieves and had a way of effacing the brands, so that I had no 
means of knowing what animals rightfully belonged to them and 
what ones were stolen.  Even if I had known I could not have 
refused to trade for anything that they wished to dispose of 
without giving them great offense and perhaps getting in serious 
trouble.  They didn‟t set a very high price on either their mules 
or their ponies.  The mules usually cost me ten or twelve dollars 




The influence of the American livestock trade at posts like Bent‟s Fort 
spread as far west as Alta California.  In 1829, New Mexican traders began a direct 
overland trade with California.  Caravans laden with woolen blankets made their 
way west over the Old Spanish Trail, and the merchants returned driving herds of 
California horses and mules.  These herds caused a stir in Santa Fe, for the coastal 
stock was larger and stronger than local horses and mules.  This lucrative trade 
soon gave rise to wholesale rustling, a cooperative venture between Indians like the 
Utes and white mountain men, most infamously Thomas L. “Peg-leg” Smith, Ceran 
St. Vrain‟s former associate.
17
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The Bents bought California horses, no questions asked.  In 1839, for 
example, Bill Williams embarked on a great rustling foray.  There, they rustled a 
sizable herd, although many died or scattered on the trip to the Arkansas.  In 1846, 
Joseph Walker drove a herd of horses, probably stolen, east from California 
towards the fort.  Overland traveler Edwin Bryant met Walker‟s party and about 
five hundred horses near Fort Bridger in present southwestern Wyoming.  Bryant 
wrote that Walker intended to sell the horses – “high-spirited animals, of medium 
size, handsome figures, and in good condition” – to American buyers.  The same 
year, the young Boston Brahmin, Francis Parkman encountered two men “who had 
just come from California, with a large band of horses, which they had sold at 
Bent‟s Fort.”  George Frederick Ruxton provided a semi-fictionalized account of a 
California horse rustling party around the same time.  He wrote that the Americans 
rested the herd along the Front Range of the Rockies, before traveling downriver to 
Bent‟s Fort to sell them.  The stock “found a ready sale,” at the fort.  Ruxton‟s 
narrator went on to report that, “every season the Bents carried across the plains to 
Independence a considerable number [of horses and mules] collected in Indian 
country, and in the upper settlements of New Mexico.”  If stolen California horses 
never constituted the backbone of Bent-St. Vrain‟s livestock trade, they were a 
common enough sight around the fort not to elicit much comment.  Although 
indirectly, the market provided by the Bents allowed unscrupulous American 
traders to expand their enterprise as far west as the Pacific Ocean, linking through 
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theft the economies of the Upper Arkansas and San Joaquin river valleys, and 




The Bents and St. Vrain got most of their rustled livestock much closer to 
New Mexico, however.  David Lavender, usually a Bent-St. Vrain apologist, is 
candid in his assessment of the Company‟s horse and mule trade:  “Though the 
partners might resent having their own stock raided, they nonetheless did not 
question the ethics of the matter when the thievery was committed on someone 
else.  Readily, they bought all animals offered for sale, without questioning the 
source.”
19
  The company‟s purchase of stolen livestock did little to endear them to 
their critics in New Mexico.  Sometimes the company received stolen livestock via 
white traders living in Mexico.  For example, the infamous scalp hunter and 
mercenary James Kirker sometimes drove livestock stolen in Chihuahua north to 
markets in El Paso del Norte, Santa Fe, Taos, and Bent‟s Fort.  Most of the animals, 
however, came from Indians near the Upper Arkansas or northern New Mexico.  In 
1841, Charles Bent complained that Padre Martínez‟s brother, Ignacio, was 
spreading rumors that the company consciously purchased stolen Martínez horses 
from a Mexican renegade name Juan Nicholas Mestas.  On another occasion, a 
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Cheyenne chief, Old Wolf, told the Bents that, in exchange for their wonderful 
liquor, his men would provide the company “with all the horses and mules he 
wanted by sending out parties and making raids into Mexico.”  The partners, “had 
no conscientious scruples about the way the Indian obtained them.”  The 
Comanches were especially good providers of Mexican stock.  They often came to 
the company posts in the Texas Panhandle to exchange horses and mules for trade 
goods.  Army officer Philip St. George Cooke wrote that Bent obtained robes, and 




Sometimes, however, Bent sought redress from New Mexican authorities 
for stock stolen from the company or the Cheyennes.  Just as American traders 
purchased stolen Mexican livestock from Indian raiders, so to did New Mexicans 
purchase horses and mules stolen from American territory.  In 1839, Bent reported 
to Alvarez the theft of a number of horses and mules from the vicinity of the fort.  
The raiders disposed of their haul in New Mexico.  When Bent protested the 
purchase to the prefect of Taos, the man rebuffed him.  The trader then asked the 
consul to contact Governor Armijo directly to see if he might do anything to aid 
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Bent.  Specifically, Bent wished to know whether the purchases were legal, and if 
not, whether Mexican authorities might recover the stock and return it to its rightful 
owners.
21
  The governor‟s response to Alvarez‟s inquiry was cryptic.  The Mexican 
government allowed New Mexicans to purchase horses and mules from the 
Apaches, Navajos, and Comanches, so long as those tribes remained at peace with 
Mexico.  However, regarding horses stolen from outside of Mexico, Armijo was 
vague.  He informed the consul that, “In regard to the robberies that may be 
committed upon Mr. Bent at his fort, he can have recourse to the competent 
authorities for the justice he may require.”  Livestock stolen in the United States 
was, apparently, American business only.
22
  In 1845, another incident took place 
that caused Bent great disquiet.  A party of Mexicans stole about thirty horses from 
the Cheyennes.  The trader urged Alvarez to impress upon the New Mexican 
government the gravity of the situation, and to make immediate redress.  Bent told 
the consul to inform the governor that, “if there is not a stop put to this…theas 
Indians will revenge themselves upon all Mexicans they meete with, the caravans 
will be the greatest sufferers…you are also aware that if the Indians commit any 
depradations on the Mexicans they will say we are the cause of this outrage.”  
Bent‟s sarcasm is indirect evidence of the frequency with which New Mexicans 
accused the firm of complicity with Indian raiders.
23
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In the late winter of 1846, Bent‟s alleged complicity with Ute raiders 
heightened the tensions between the trader and Padre Martínez.  On February 15, 
1846, the Utes made off with 8,000 sheep and 400 head of cattle belonging to 
Martínez and his brothers.  Efforts by the priest, aided by local soldiers, failed to 
find the raiders or recover the livestock.  Rumors quickly circulated throughout 
Taos that the American community, Charles Bent in particular, had foreknowledge 
of the raid.  The vindictive padre, Bent wrote, was “determined to fix this theft on 
us is he can find the least pretext for doing so.”
24
  The priest initially claimed that 
Cheyennes, “our people,” had stolen the livestock, although “he has since bean 
convinced to the contrary.” Martínez expanded his argument for Bent‟s complicity 
in the raid by trying to connect the trader‟s activities with the population of Pueblo 
and the other Upper Arkansas settlements.  This accusation infuriated Bent.  The 
company did not employ anyone at these posts, nor were they “any ways connected 
with us,” he fumed.  Bent urged Alvarez to present his case to Armijo, “for fear that 
that the Governor and Comidante, should receive this information and give 
credence to the information of the Priest, I wish you to request these functionaries 
to suspend thare oppinion in this case until he se or heare from me.”  Such 
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In addition to finding markets for their stock in Missouri, Bent-St. Vrain 
also turned its attention north, to supply the ever-increasing volume of emigrants 
traveling the overland trails to Oregon and California.  George Bent informed 
Francis W. Cragin that some of the stock his father and uncles drove north was 
stolen.  The Kiowas and Comanches, especially, provided the animals.  “Bent and 
Company bought herds from them and took their ponies to Missouri and to Platte 
River to trade to gold hunters that were going to California,” he wrote.
26
   
Not all the Mexican stock the Bents drove to market was stolen, however.  
Over the years, the company engaged in direct horse and mule trades and purchases 
in New Mexico and further south.  Traders like John Hatcher, Tim Goodall, and 
Tom Boggs accompanied one of the partners.  George Bent recalled that all the 
traders were “good men,” fluent in both Spanish and sign language.  The traders 
procured the livestock from Mexican ranches and drove the herds north to the 
trails.  Bent recalled that on one occasion, the traders returned with a sack full of 
$50 gold pieces.  Thus, the company‟s trade in livestock linked together Indian 
traders and raiders, Mexican ranchers as far west as California, westbound 
emigrants, Missouri farmers, and Southern plantation owners.
27
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The sale of guns and ammunition to the Indians presented an even greater 
menace to New Mexico‟s security than did the purchase of stolen livestock.  The 
markets for firearms provided by American traders gave Indian groups another 
incentive to form trading ties with new partners at the expense of the Mexicans.  
These traders also repaired and maintained the weapons they offered for sale.  The 
illegal sale of guns and ammunition to the Indians took place across Mexico‟s 
entire northern frontier, from Sonora to Texas.  Unscrupulous American traders like 
James Kirker ran guns and stolen livestock along a line from Chihuahua as far 
north as Taos and the Arkansas River.  Guns and ammunition allowed groups like 
the Comanches and Apaches to grow even more powerful.  Some tribes were better 
armed and mounted even than the Mexicans.  In 1847, Thomas Fitzpatrick, the 
Indian Agent in charge of the Upper Arkansas, wrote his superiors that Mexicans 
were actually traveling north to trade with the Indians for guns and ammunition.  
Fitzpatrick warned that the Mexicans intended to arm either themselves or the 
Indians of New Mexico for an uprising against the United States.   The sale of guns 
to tribes like the Utes provided another incentive to strike at the settlements of 
northern New Mexico, causing nationalists like Padre Martínez and Donaciano 
Vigil to demand action from the central government.
28
  As with most of their 
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involvement in the shadow economies of the Southwestern Borderlands, the extent 
to which Bent-St. Vrain traded guns to the Indians is unclear.  An officer attached 
to Henry Dodge‟s 1835 Dragoon Expedition wrote from Bent‟s Fort that, “Some 
few of them have guns and ammunition that they have bought of American traders 
for robes and fur.”  In 1843, Philip St. George Cooke wrote that the Cheyennes 
were armed with guns procured “at the trading houses – sundried brick „forts‟ – of 
American trading companies…exchanging buffalo robes and some beaver.”
 29
  
While the company probably sold guns to their native customers, analysis 
suggests that the weapons were of minimal quality.  The partners most likely kept 
the best guns for themselves or their employees.  Indians had little trouble 
procuring guns and ammunition from American traders throughout the West.  
However, traders generally provided their customers with specific types of 
weapons.  There is no definitive evidence, for example, that traders provided the 
Indians with high-quality Hawken rifles, the weapon of choice for most traders and 
trappers.  However, by the early-nineteenth century Indians had access to a fairly 
distinctive trade gun, known alternately as the “Hudson Bay fluke,” “Mackinaw 
gun,” or “North West gun.”  These firearms were modeled on light English fowling 
pieces.  They were light, with a short barrel, and cheaply constructed.  Most were 
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approximately sixteen-gauge, or .66 caliber, capable of firing either fine shot or a 
heavy ball, and accurate to fifty yards.  Later, traders did provide rifles to Indian 
customers.  Taking note of the fastidiousness of their customers, traders paid much 
attention to the quality of the guns they delivered.  However, it is unlikely that the 
traders would deliver weapons of the same quality as those carried by company 
employees or independent trappers.
30
 Extant company invoices indicate that they 
shipped a good deal of weaponry into the Indian Country.  An 1838 trade invoice 
lists the purchase of over one hundred “common” North West guns in addition to 
fifty with forty-two inch barrels, and fifty with thirty-three inch barrels.  In addition 
to the North West guns, the partners purchased ten “English rifles,” twenty 
“American rifles,” percussion caps, and one hundred pounds of Du Pont 
gunpowder.  Later invoices also reveal the purchase of flints, caps, and powder as 
well.  The archaeological record further indicates the presence of both lower quality 
trade guns and more advanced percussion rifles.
31
  However, how many guns made 
it into Indian hands, or how the Indian customers used the weapons is unknown.  It 
is not unlikely, though, that guns purchased at Bent‟s Fort ended up firing at 
Mexican targets. 
In the absence of a strong state presence, the liquor trade was another 
potential source of trouble for residents on both sides of the international border.  
                                                 
30
 Carl P. Russell, Guns on the Early Frontiers: A History of Firearms from Colonial Times 
Through the Years of the Western Fur Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957); 60-
76; 103-105, 131-4; Carl P. Russell, Firearms, Traps, and Tools of the Mountain Men (New York, 
Knopf, 1967), 60, 71, 94. 
31
 Bent, St. Vrain and Company Invoice, Ledger Z, 1838, Fur Trade Ledger Collection, 426-433, 
MHS; Ledger DD, July 21, 1840, July 24, 1840, FTLC, 76-89; Jackson Ward Moore, Jr., “The 
Archaeology of Bent‟s Old Fort” (Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1968), 111-112, 115. 
284 
 
Carried north from Taos into the United States by both Hispanic and Anglo traders, 
alcohol constituted an extremely lucrative item in the Indian trade.  However, many 
critics, most associated with the United States government, pointed out that the 
liquor trade was bound to cause problems.  Liquor, they claimed, debauched the 
Indians.  Unscrupulous traders took advantage of drunken Indians to bolster their 
own bottom line.  When the Indians drank, they fought.  Furthermore, the sale of 
liquor by unlicensed traders of either nationality took business away from 
legitimate, licensed traders, critics argued.  Perhaps most importantly, the liquor 
trade threatened the delicate balance of power between the region‟s Indians and the 
United States and Mexico.  Officials on both sides of the border complained of the 
actions of liquor traders.  Mexicans claimed that American traders provided liquor, 
in addition to guns and moral support, to Indians who then raided into Mexican 
territory.  American screeds against “Spanish” liquor peddlers made much the same 
point.  In these ways, the liquor trade potentially threatened the moral, economic, 
physical, and political well-being of all the inhabitants of the Southwestern 
Borderlands. 
Whether peddled by Mexicans or Americans, most of the liquor that flowed 
across the Southern Plains originated in New Mexico, especially from Simeon 
Turley‟s distillery at Arroyo Hondo, near Taos.  As early as 1835, American 
soldiers commented upon the actions of Mexican traders.  Spaniards from “Touse” 
met Dodge‟s men along the Arkansas River that summer.  They carried with them 
both whiskey and flour to trade to the Indians and the soldiers.  The settlements just 
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outside of Taos constituted the epicenter of the Southwestern liquor trade.  George 
Frederick Ruxton found “Several distilleries” in the area in the late-1840s, most of 
them belonging to American men married into Mexican families.  From these 
locations, they dispensed “a raw fiery spirit” for sale to both the region‟s remaining 
trappers and its Indian traders.  The Indian traders, especially, found liquor to be 
“the most profitable article of trade with the aborigines,” Ruxton wrote.
32
 In the 
New Mexico liquor business, Simeon Turley was king.  Born in Kentucky, Turley 
migrated to New Mexico from the Boonslick country of Missouri in 1830.  He 
settled in Taos and began operating a store with Job F. Dye.  In 1831 or 1832, 
Turley bought land at Arroyo Hondo and constructed a two-story still.  Turley 
faced stiff competition from fellow Anglo distillers until 1841, chiefly from 
William Workman and John Rowland.  However, their departure from New 
Mexico in the wake of the Texas-Santa Fe Expedition solidified Turley‟s position 
as the primary distiller in the region.  Turley wrote to his brother of the situation, 
“Roland and Workman is Silling Whiskey at half price to Sell out and gowe to 
Caleforni and until thay sell out I Shall have to say Silent and Sell none.”  By 1843, 
Turley was writing his brother in Missouri, requesting that he purchase another still 
and equipment for his enterprise.
33
  Turley soon expanded his operations north 
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towards the Arkansas River and beyond.  Sent by mule train from Arroyo Hondo 
up the San Luis Valley and over Sangre de Cristo Pass to the Upper Arkansas, 
Turley‟s liquor found a ready market at the region‟s small trading posts, as well as 
the posts along the South Platte.  By 1845, traders made the trip to Arroyo Hondo 
to purchase from him directly.  Turley‟s death in 1847 during the Taos Revolt, 
combined with stricter supervision by government agents, largely quashed northern 
New Mexico‟s liquor trade.
34
 
  The independent trading posts along the Upper Arkansas were a natural 
market for Turley‟s liquor.  Alcohol formed the backbone of their trade, much to 
the chagrin of the Bents and St. Vrain.  The first major post constructed in the area 
was Pueblo.  George Simpson, Joseph Doyle, and former Bent-St. Vrain clerk 
Alexander Barclay began construction of Pueblo in late-1841.  Occupied steadily 
until about 1850, Pueblo functioned as the main base of operations for minor 
traders who traveled throughout the entire Rocky Mountain West, distributing 
Turley‟s liquor from the international border north to the vicinity of the overland 
trails near Fort Laramie and west to the Ute country.
35
 
The polyglot population of the smaller posts like Pueblo had an unsavory 
reputation throughout the Great Plains and Rocky Mountains.  These small 
communities acted as a lodestone for those at loose ends, be they French, Mexican, 
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Indian, or American.  Especially as the larger companies like the company 
tightened their grip over the buffalo robe trade, out of work traders, or employees 
dismissed by the companies gravitated to the Front Range.  David Lavender wrote, 
uncharitably, “Pueblo was a collecting spot for the scum of the mountains.”
36
  
Contemporary observers were seldom less critical.  Francis Parkman found Pueblo, 
“a wretched species of fort, of most primitive construction,” inhabited by a 
desultory population of Indians and Mexicans.  George Frederick Ruxton reported 
that, as long as the liquor lasted, “the Arkansa resounded with furious mirth.”  
However, these bacchanals could quickly turn dangerous, for a drunken trapper “is 
quick to give and take offense,” Ruxton wrote.  Many times, they settled their 
disputes with duels.
37
   
Government officials worried about more than the drunken revels of a few 
unwashed mountain men, for the men who operated out of places like Pueblo 
threatened the business of upstanding traders, Indian agents and soldiers wrote their 
superiors.  The traders were, “outlaws,” and “men of desperate character,” who, 
fired by reputable traders, congregated in the area to barter whiskey and “trinkets” 
to the local Indians, much to the dismay of licensed traders.
38
  Stephen Watts 
Kearny warned that these men were “causing much difficulty and doing much 
harm,” to both the Indians and reputable traders.  He suggested the appointment of 
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a sub-agent, based at Bent‟s Fort, to stop the liquor trade in the area.  Thomas 
Moore seconded Kearny‟s assessment, pointing out to the Superintendant of Indian 
Affairs in St. Louis that the independent traders and the “half breeds and profligate 
men in their employment,” defied all government authority.
39
 
Padre Martínez expanded upon this connection between the liquor trade and 
its threat to Mexico‟s territorial integrity in an 1843 letter to President Santa Anna.  
The priest began by noting that, under Spanish rule, Americans had been unable to 
erect trading posts along the international border, for fear they might stir up the 
Indians.  Under Mexico, however, they built forts with impunity.  In addition to 
trading legitimate goods, the traders peddled liquor to their new customers.  This 
trade created such a powerful thirst for alcohol, that the Indians began an 
indiscriminate slaughter of buffalo on the Southern Plains, in order to barter robes 
for liquor.  Furthermore, the desire for illicit trade goods prompted them to make 
raids into New Mexico and further south.  The slaughter of the buffalo, facilitated 
by the American demand for robes also threatened the economic and physical well-
being of New Mexicans used to supplementing their crops with bison meat.  As the 
herds retreated further east and north onto the Plains, it became more difficult and 
hazardous for the ciboleros to bring home meat for the winter.  Martínez suggested 
that, in order to counteract the baleful influences of American traders like the 
                                                 
39





 Sess. S. doc. 1, 213; Thomas Moore to William Medill, May 14, 1846,  UMA.  On the 
whiskey peddlers taking business away from licensed traders, see Hamilton to Harvey, July 5, 1844,  
UMA; Andrew Drips to Harvey, April 11, 1845, UMA; Drips to Harvey, October 1844, Letterbook , 
Reel 2 Volume 8, page 212, William Clark Papers; Mitchell to Andrew Drips, October 6, 1842, 
Box1, Drips Papers, MHS; Hamilton to Drips, December 4, 1843, Box 1, Drips Papers, MHS. 
289 
 
Bents, the Mexican government should sponsor a civilizing project for local 
Indians – setting aside land and livestock for their use, and teaching them to read, 
write, and become productive citizens.  Despite the clear and present danger 
foreseen by Martínez, the central government took no action on his proposals.
40
 
Perhaps most alarmingly, liquor traders threatened to disrupt the political 
balance between the United States and Mexico in the region by encouraging 
intoxicated Indians to raid and kill on both sides of the international border.  Bent‟s 
Fort could play a pivotal role in monitoring the activities of the American and 
Mexican traders, observers noted.  Dodge recognized the strategic value of the post 
on his visit in 1835.  Situated on the international border, the fort provided a base 
from which, “the movements of the Mexicans could be watched; and in case any 
encroachments are committed, the earliest intelligence might be received.”
41
  
Charles Bent himself recognized the propitious location of the Company‟s post, 
even if he rarely drew the government‟s attention to it.  However, when faced with 
the possibility of competition, either economic or political, from Mexican traders, 
Bent couched his self-interest in terms of national interest.  Should the government 
choose to build a post on the Arkansas, the vicinity near Pueblo would suit 
admirably.  From this location, Bent wrote Manuel Alvarez, American troops could 
prevent the Mexicans from “exciting the Indians to comit depredations on our 
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frontiers,” in case of war between the two nations.  Already Mexican traders 
crossed the border with impunity, Bent complained.  They came in “large partys,” 
sometimes upwards of three hundred men, “for the purpose of trading with the 
Indians, and hunting,” he informed the consul.  Furthermore, their presence aroused 
the hostility of the Indians towards Americans.  Bent wrote that, to his knowledge, 
any actions taken to stir up the Indians resulted from individual initiative, rather 
than conscious policy on the part of New Mexican leaders.  However, the presence 
among the Indians of “Collars and Staffs,” of New Mexican origin roused his 
suspicions, for Mexican negotiators used these items in the same way the United 
States used peace medals to cultivate ties with Indian groups.  Nearly a year later, 
Bent wrote to the Superintendant of Indian Affairs in St. Louis, making much the 
same argument about the unlicensed traders.  “It is all important,” he urged, “that 
some measures should be taken on the part of our Government to prevent 
traders…into the territory of the United States for the purpose of trading with the 
Indians, the greatest objection to traders from New Mexico is that they introduce 




The presence of the liquor traders unsettled other American officials as 
well.  The mischief the traders caused adversely affected both the United States and 
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Mexico.  Liquor peddlers helped sew seeds of distrust between the two nations, he 
wrote.  The New Mexican market more than made up for any shortfalls in illegal 
liquor shipments from the United States.  Brought north by “large parties of 
Mexicans,” who “are daily selling it to the tribes within our borders,” caused chaos, 
the consul continued.  Drunk on Taos Lightning, the Indians disputed and quarreled 
with everyone.  Frequently, Alvarez informed the Secretary of State, the actions of 
the Indians “recoils upon the Mexicans themselves.”  However, Mexican 
authorities blamed only American traders, presumably the Bents in particular.  
“These thefts, robberies, and murders, when they happen to the Mexican he is said 
to refer exclusively to the influence of our legally authorized trader, instead of the 
true and natural causes,” he griped.  American traders, especially those operating 
out of Pueblo, shared much of the blame for the theft, murder, and plunder that 
sometimes accompanied the sale of alcohol.  Alvarez urged his superiors to reach 
out to the Mexican government to solve the liquor problem.  He implored, “Could 
some understanding be had with the Government of Mexico, so as to prohibit the 
transportation of spirituous drinks across the mountains to within our Territory, it 
would tend greatly to the good understanding between the citizens of the two 
countries, as well as to the gradual amelioration of the situation of Indian tribes 
along our Western border.”  Unfortunately, for Alvarez, the Mexican government, 
distracted by other issues, took no steps to solve the problem from the supply 
side.
43
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Even in the wake of the American conquest of New Mexico, Indian Agent 
Thomas Fitzpatrick also complained about Mexican liquor traders crisscrossing the 
region.  He vehemently opposed any interactions between these men and the 
Indians, “well knowing that such intercourse will not terminate favorably to us.”  
Despite the danger, Fitzpatrick complained that American military men in Santa Fe 
gave him no advice; neither did they take action to remedy the situation.  Without 
such support, Fitzpatrick warned ominously, “the time may again arrive when more 
American throats may be cut which by a little timely and judicious action might 
easily be prevented.”  Mexican intrigue, lubricated by bad liquor, had the potential 
to “cause a serious rupture between us and the Indians,” the agent concluded.
44
 
While railing against wily Mexicans and unscrupulous independent traders, 
Bent-St. Vrain undoubtedly took advantage of the lack of the state‟s regulatory 
authority and engaged in the liquor trade as well.  As previously noted, the 
company imported vast quantities of alcohol, in direct violation of American laws.  
There was no shortage of liquor around Bent‟s Fort.  The surviving company 
invoices testify to both the amount and variety of alcohol that made its way across 
the plains to the fort.  The partners ordered alcohol for both trade and personal 
consumption.  An 1838 invoice reveals the purchase of nearly 1200 gallons of 
alcohol, in addition to two copper stills, 117 and 124 gallons respectively.  In 1839, 
they ordered over 1100 gallons of alcohol, and two more stills.  More raw alcohol 
and stills show up in 1840, as well.  In addition to these purchases, the partners 
purchased finer spirits.  The invoices show purchases of rum, claret, shrub, gin, and 
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two casks of “best brandy.”  Archaeological evidence shows that the partners also 
enjoyed fine red wine from France, possibly for entertaining purposes.  The copper 
stills in the St. Louis invoices apparently found their way into New Mexico, 
because there is no record of the company operating a still at any of their posts.  
Thus, Bent-St. Vrain may have inadvertently supplied the very competitors they 
railed against to the government. Following Stephen Watts Kearny‟s arrival at 
Bent‟s Fort in the summer of 1846, one of his troops noted that the company sold 
rum for $24 per gallon.  Although the partners kept a substantial stash of spirits for 
their own private use, especially for a minty, iced specialty known as a “hailstorm,” 
George Bird Grinnell claims that the partners kept close tabs on how much alcohol 
they distributed to their employees, let alone to the Indians.
 45
    
However, there is anecdotal evidence for the company‟s attempts to curb 
the liquor trade in the vicinity of the fort.  In 1843, Benjamin Clapp wrote to Pierre 
Chouteau, Jr., informing him of a discussion with the Oregon missionary Dr. 
Marcus Whitman.  Whitman passed through Bent‟s Fort on a journey from the 
Pacific Northwest to Washington, D.C.  Clapp wrote that Whitman, “had 
opportunities of seeing much of the operations, etc. of Bent‟s people and spoke 
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highly…of the good effects produced by them not having any liquor in the country.  
Their trade was good and the prospects promising.”
46
  
Further compounding the irony of the company‟s cries against the residents 
of Pueblo was the fact that the partners and the employees at Bent‟s Fort enjoyed a 
great deal of interaction with the independent traders.  Many former company 
employees found their way to Pueblo, and women from the community often 
traveled downriver to the fort to attend dances and celebrate saint‟s days.  




In addition to horses, guns, and liquor, human beings constituted part of the 
shadow economy of the borderlands.  Slave raiding and buying had a long tradition 
in New Mexico, despite official protestations.  However, New Mexicans could 
bypass restrictions by purchasing and then converting an Indian captive to 
Christianity.  The captive then became merely a servant.  Although outlawed by 
presidential decree in 1865, slavery continued, underground, in New Mexico for 
some years.  Even the Martínez family had owned Indian slaves.  Tradition said 
that the servants indentured to the priest and his brothers were descendants of 
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Indian raiders, especially the Comanches, provided most of the slaves 
purchased by American traders.  Whether the Comanches raided with the intention 
of procuring slaves for sale, or simply to replenish their population, is unknown.  
Whatever the reason, there was no doubting the intensity and results of their raids.  
While New Mexico maintained a peace with the Comanches, their raiding 
concentrated upon the departments of Chihuahua, Durango, and Coahuila.  Charles 
Bent reported that the Comanches carried out, “an incessant and destructive war,” 
with these departments, “from which they carried off and still hold as slaves a large 
number of women and children and immense herds of horses, mules, and asses.”
49
  
Donaciano Vigil lamented the reports he heard of Indian captive taking throughout 
the entire northern frontier of Mexico.  Young Mexican women, he informed the 
New Mexican Assembly, “are compelled to satisfy the brutal lust of the barbarous 
bucks,” and often tortured and killed.  Should the government not take action, he 
would “blush with shame to see to what an extent misfortune has befallen our 
nation and what may befall many persons whom I esteem if proper steps be not 
taken to prevent such degrading misfortunes.”
50
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Although purchasing captives from Indian raiders never constituted a major 
component of its enterprise, former Mexican slaves made up at least a portion of 
the company labor force.  Given the choice between living in peonage in Mexico or 
residing in the Indian camps, George Bent wrote, was not really much of a choice.  
Captives far preferred their new situation.  The company purchased the majority of 
the captives from the Kiowas and Comanches.  Trader John Tharp once purchased 
two captives, a young Mexican and an African American, from the Kiowas.  The 
youngster was from Durango, but had spent so much time among the Comanches 
that he barely remembered his former home.  James Hobbs reported that Charles 
Bent ransomed him from the Comanches for “the trifling consideration of six yards 
of flannel, a pound of tobacco, and an ounce of beads.”
51
  The most famous 
company-related captive story deals with a woman captured in Durango.  After 
spending several years with the Comanches, they traded her to the Kiowas.  The 
Kiowas brought her to Bent‟s Fort, where an employee purchased her.  The couple 
then departed for Pueblo.  Shortly thereafter, the woman‟s Mexican husband 
appeared, after traveling 1500 miles from Durango.  The man wanted his wife back.  
Her new husband refused to give her up, and the “poor Duragueño returned to his 
home alone, his spouse preferring to share buffalo-rib and venison with her 
mountaineer before the frijole and chile colorado of the bereaved ranchero,” 
George Frederick Ruxton jocularly proclaimed.  Another version of the story says 
                                                 
51
 George Bird Grinnell, “Notes on Bent‟s Fort,” MS 5 Folder 32-2, ANC; Hyde, Life of George 




that William Bent adjudicated the dispute over the woman, finally determining that 
she should return to Mexico.
52
 
More ominous for the stability and safety of the New Mexican frontier, 
though, was the continued use of Indian captives by the Mexican population.  
During one particularly tense situation in 1841, Bent kept up a steady stream of 
correspondence with Alvarez, warning the consul to advise Armijo that conciliation 
was New Mexico‟s best chance to avoid a costly war with the Plains tribes.  
Apparently, Bent acted as a go-between at some point, but documentation 
regarding the final resolution of the conflict is missing.
53
  The trouble began when 
Mexicans purchased some Arapaho slaves from a party of Utes.  Should the 
Mexicans not return the captives, Bent warned that trouble would follow.  He 
expected 1500 lodges of Indians – Arapahos, Cheyennes, and Sioux – on the 
Arkansas the following spring.  It was possible that the Arapahos could convince 
their allies to join them in retaliatory action against New Mexico.  Furthermore, the 
Indians had “one or two Mexicans with them which will serve as guides.”
54
  The 
Arapahos offered the Mexicans one horse apiece in exchange for the captives, and 
Bent urged the authorities in Taos to take them up on the offer.  A month later, 
there was still no progress, for Bent wrote Alvarez that, “The Indians from the 
Arkansas still continue to threaten theas people, and no doubt will comit 
depridations on the first they fall in with.”  Should threats fail, and the Indians take 
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action, “they will play the devil with the frontear settlements.”  Furthermore, 
conflict with the Apaches and Navajos would do little to prepare the New Mexicans 
for facing the formidable warriors of the Plains.
55
   
Although Bent informed Armijo of the dangers posed by the Plains tribes, 
the trader resented the suspicion with which many New Mexican authorities viewed 
him.  He explained his frustrations to Alvarez.  Some in New Mexico, he 
complained, felt he was playing a double game, that while attempting to calm a 
volatile situation, he was actually preparing to profit from the chaos an Indian war 
might create.  Bent forthrightly admitted that, in theory, a war between New 
Mexico and the Plains Indians would be greatly to his advantage.  The Indians 
would raid Mexican herds, “and the more animals they steal the more they will 
have to sell and at lower prices, so you se the war between the Mexicans and them 
would be to my advantage.”  Should the Indians attack and route the Santa Fe 
caravan, Bent estimated he could possibly rake in between eighty and one hundred 
thousand dollars worth of goods for about $20,000 worth of trade goods.  However, 
he had informed Armijo of the situation, hardly the actions of someone plotting to 
sew discord.  If he really sought war, he told the consul, “I should be exerting 
myself to detain the prisoners whare they are, well knowing that this will be the 
cause of war between them and theas people.”  Instead of gratitude, all he got was 
suspicion and accusations.  Should more trouble arise, he informed Alvarez, he 
might not be so forthcoming to New Mexican officials, “I gave the information 
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respecting the disposition of theas Indians because I felt it my duty so to doe and I 
can assure him I had not the most distant idea of deriving any benifit from thare 
being returned. From this forward I shall be verry careful how I intrude myself by 
giving information if it should come to my Knollidge of any disaster that may 
befall theas people,” he concluded.
56
   
By spring, Arapaho patience was exhausted.  Bent reported that a war party 
made camp on the Animas River, bringing with them eight Mexican scalps, ten 
horses, and two guns.  He had “no doubt they will kill all the Mexicans they can,” 
in frustration over the refusal to free the prisoners.  They might attack as far south 
as Pecos, in the vicinity of Santa Fe.  He had done his part, he had warned the 
Mexicans, Bent wrote Alvarez.  However, “The Arapahos will listen to us no 
longer when we solicit them to cease” fighting the New Mexicans.  Captive taking 
and slave raiding threatened to disrupt life for everyone in the region.
57
 
 The deep involvement of Bent-St. Vrain in the shadow economies of the 
borderlands posed a severe threat to Mexico‟s northern frontier.  By supplying arms 
and ammunition to Indian raiders in exchange for horses, mules, and captives, 
American traders helped perpetuate the violence that had plagued New Mexico for 
years.  The lack of a strong state presence – either American or Mexican – 
guaranteed the continuation of military and economic instability on both sides of 
the border.  However, despite occasional violence north of the Arkansas River, 
New Mexico bore the brunt of the raiding.  Bent- St. Vrain‟s well-known 
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complicity in the underground economy made the company a target of accusations 
by nationalists like Padre Martínez, who viewed American traders as a dire threat to 
the territorial integrity of northern Mexico.  These raids, coupled with the Texan 
invasions, the acquisition of land grants, and the political maneuverings of the pro-
American faction further poisoned the atmosphere of Taos.  The situation would 
only get worse, for in 1846 word reached the area that the United States and 














Chapter 12 - Apogee: 1846 
 
On April 25, 1846, a party of American scouts clashed with a detachment of 
Mexican soldiers on the north back of the Rio Grande River in south Texas, 
prompting President James K. Polk to announce that the Mexicans had shed 
American blood upon indisputably American soil.  Polk seized upon the clash to 
declare war on Mexico, the culmination of years of fruitless attempts on the part of 
the United States to acquire territory through negotiation, purchase, and belligerent 
diplomacy.  The president called upon state governors to raise tens of thousands of 
volunteers for the coming war, and Missourians responded with alacrity.  In the 
summer of 1846, the Army of the West, Brigadier General Stephen Watts Kearny 
commanding, began its march along the Santa Fe Trail, bound for Santa Fe.   
Kearny‟s march and the bloodless conquest of the New Mexican capital 
initially seemed like a culmination of years of work for the Bents and St. Vrain.  
Charles Bent‟s appointment as the first American governor of New Mexico assured 
the American faction political and economic influence stretching far beyond Taos.  
Bent and his American associates now seemed to have the upper hand on the 
Martínez faction.  Kearny‟s use of Bent‟s Fort as an outfitting depot also seemed to 
bode well for the prosperity of the company.  However, although the 
accommodations and business alliances American traders formed with their New 
Mexican counterparts had slowly drawn the northern frontier into the orbit of the 
United States, discontent with the new government and the Americans in general 
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boiled over in January 1847.  Mexican and Indian residents of the Rio Arriba rose 
up, killed Charles Bent, and tried to overthrow the new regime.  Although they 
failed in their attempt to roll back the American conquest, the rebellion and 
bloodshed demonstrated their extreme discontent.  The political and economic 
interests pursued by the Bents, St. Vrain recoiled on them.  The Taos Revolt 
showed the limits of accommodation and sowed the seeds for the ultimate 
destruction of Bent-St. Vrain as an institution in the Southwestern Borderlands. 
The men marching with Kearny‟s army justified their endeavor by 
appealing to racial, political, and patriotic rationales.  Conventional wisdom held 
that the New Mexicans had failed utterly to develop their own viable social, 
political, and economic institutions.  Race figured prominently in the arguments of 
American expansionists.  Fueled by the eyewitness reports of travelers and traders 
like Josiah Gregg, George Wilkins Kendall, and George Frederick Ruxton, Anglos 
formed a distinctly unfavorable view of Mexicans, arguing that the mixture of 
Indian and Hispanic blood created a hybrid race characterized by cruelty, greed, 
venality, treachery, superstition, and general backwardness.  By comparison, 
Americans possessed superior intellects, values, socioeconomic, and political 
institutions.  Furthermore, devastating Indian raids along the whole of Mexico‟s 
northern frontier convinced American policy makers of that nation‟s inability to 
defend itself and develop its own territory.  Thus, Americans viewed their 
campaign as one of regeneration and patriotic duty.  Only Americans, with their 
republican institutions, could adequately capitalize upon the opportunities offered 
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by the annexation of Mexican territory.  Finally, they marched to defend national 
honor.  Feeling repeatedly snubbed by an arrogant government in Mexico City, 
Kearny‟s men determined to demonstrate their heroism and martial skills.  They 
brought freedom and opportunity with them, they told one another.  Why would the 
New Mexicans, dull as they were, not welcome them as liberating heroes?
1
 
Despite the expansionist enthusiasm sweeping many parts of the nation, 
Charles Bent and some other Americans in the Southwest were not initially thrilled 
about the possibility of war.  Polk‟s election caused some traders great disquiet.  In 
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January 1845, Bent expressed his Whiggish disappointment with Polk‟s elevation 
to the White House.  He wrote Manuel Alvarez in Santa Fe, thanking the consul for 
forwarding news from the United States, “all except the ellection of Polk…I am 
fearfull that this election will cause difficulty between this and our country,” Bent 
confided.  Trader James Josiah Webb‟s reaction to the news was far less subdued.  
“I was a Whig,” he wrote, “Henry Clay was now my idol, and defeated by such a 
man as Jim Polk! My Country! Oh, my Country! What are we coming to, when my 
countrymen make such a choice! To wait three months for news, and then get such 
news, was more than I could sleep over.”
2
  Presidential politics in Mexico also 
caused anxiety on the northernmost frontiers of the republic.  Bent reported that the 
ascent of Mariano Paredes y Arrillaga to the presidency met with a cool reception 
in Santa Fe.  The trader worried that Paredes, whose anti-American views were 
well-known, might expel United States citizens from New Mexico, “or due worse,” 
and that the Anglos “should be prepared and on our guard.”
3
 
Mindful of Bent‟s extensive experience in New Mexico and the strategic 
benefits of the company fort, yet apparently unaware of the trader‟s ambivalence 
towards American designs in the Southwest, strategists moved to incorporate the 
man and Bent‟s Fort into their plans to invade the province.  In addition to 
mobilizing Kearny‟s men and calling on the governor of Missouri to raise one 
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thousand volunteers, the Secretary of War, William Marcy, dispatched trader 
George T. Howard west to warn Americans along the Santa Fe Trail and in New 
Mexico of the impending war.  The mission required “great discretion,” the 
secretary wrote Howard.  Howard was to inform the American community in Santa 
Fe of the situation, while simultaneously trying to keep word from leaking out to 
Mexican authorities.  To facilitate the mission, Marcy recommended that Howard 
apprise Charles Bent of the mission.  The secretary wrote Howard, “You will 
communicate your instructions to Colonel Bent at Bent‟s Fort so that he may be 
placed upon his guard.  He is a brave enterprising and excellent man whose advice 
may be of great service to you.”  By July, Howard completed his mission, and 
informed Kearny that the populace of New Mexico had no desire for war, but that 
the leaders of the province were raising an army to contest the general‟s march.
4
 
Others also recognized the strategic advantages of Bent‟s Fort.  The same week 
Marcy wrote to Howard, the St. Louis Reveille printed a letter from a visitor to the 
fort, which forecast that it was “destined to become of deep importance,” to the 
United States because of its location on the border.
5
  
By late May, Kearny began dispatching detachments of troops west along 
the Santa Fe Trail.  The Army of the West consisted of three hundred regulars from 
the First United States Dragoons, supplemented by about one thousand volunteers 
of the First Missouri Mounted Infantry, under the command of Colonel Alexander 
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Doniphan.  Kearny‟s orders were to march to Bent‟s Fort, and to use the post as a 
supply depot and staging ground for his march into New Mexico.  Despite the fact 
that no one informed the Bents or St. Vrain of this development, Kearny expected 
no trouble from the traders.  Realizing that rations and teams for the wagons and 
artillery would be in short supply, Kearny commanded his men to stagger their 
marches in order to preserve supplies.  Therefore, the Army of the West did not 
march as one body.  Rather, Kearny dispatched detachments from late May into 
early July.
6
  Although undersupplied, the men of the Army of the West “bore the 
evils of the march with Roman fortitude,” one man recalled, and the lead 
detachments of the army reached Bent‟s Fort during the third week of July.  Kearny 
arrived at the end of the month.
7
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Charles Bent and Ceran St. Vrain learned of the state of war existing 
between the United States and Mexico while traveling east with their summer 
caravan.
8
  Rumors circulated at both ends of the Santa Fe Trail.  In Missouri, a 
story spread that Mexican forces had marched north and sacked Bent‟s Fort.  
However, the Missouri Republican assured its anxious readers that, “there is no 
truth in the report.  It is believed that it originated from an unguarded expression of 
one of the men who came from the Fort.”  Although they had no definitive news of 
the state of war, rumors of American intentions circulated throughout New Mexico 
as well, and the partners must have been uneasy as they traveled east.  Somewhere 
in western Kansas, they encountered a courier who informed them that the two 
nations were at war.  The traders proceeded to Fort Leavenworth, where they 
reported to General Kearny.
9
 
At Leavenworth, Bent and St. Vrain apprised Kearny of the situation in 
New Mexico, and speculated that the locals would not put up much of a fight.  
There was still some confusion among the Americans as to whether or not the 
Mexicans even knew a state of war existed.  One source has Bent saying that the 
citizens “were totally unapprised of the existence of the war,” but that Armijo and 
his inner circle “had some news of it.”
10
  Lacking hard intelligence, Bent could 
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only report rumors to the commanding general.  The most disturbing rumor was 
one the trader got directly from a conversation with Governor Armijo.  Armijo 
reported that a Mexican army was on its way north to Santa Fe.  Gathered from 
Sonora, Zacatecas, and Durango under the command of General José Urrea, the 
army‟s intention, the governor informed Bent was to quell a series of uprisings 
reportedly springing up across northern Mexico.  Although Bent could not vouch 
for the veracity of Armijo‟s report, the possible presence of three to five thousand 
Mexican troops in the north indicated to Kearny and other observers that the Army 
of the West might face a fight after all.  Urrea, the Missouri Republican reported, 
“is said to be a man of approved courage and military capacity.  Should he make 
his appearance there in time…he may give the command of Colonel Kearny 
something to do, before possession of New Mexico is obtained.”  The American 
trader remained sanguine, though.  Urrea had not yet arrived in New Mexico, and 
the Missouri papers reported that, left to his own devices, Armijo would not make 
any resistance to Kearny‟s takeover of the province.  Furthermore, Bent reported 
that there was little love lost between Armijo and Urrea.  Kearny wrote to the 
Adjutant General that, “Mr. Bent is of the opinion that there can be no good feeling 
between Urrea and Armijo and that if I can get there in time, the services of the 
latter may be made against the former, even if he should come with the largest 
number of troops reported to be with him.”  Following his conference with Kearny, 
Bent traveled on to St. Louis, where he gave much the same report; a Mexican 
309 
 




  Upon his arrival at Bent‟s Fort, the principals greeted Kearny and his 
officers in high style.  Decades later, William Bent‟s son George recalled the 
general‟s arrival.  The employees and their families “in gala dress” flocked to the 
walls of the fort, gazing eastward at the large cloud of dust drawing nearer.  
Through this dust, Kearny and his officers appeared.  Bent reported that the Indians 
near the fort, “were wonder-struck,” not knowing that so many white men existed 
in the entire world.  The Bents ran a huge American flag up the flagpole and 
ordered a salute fired from the company‟s brass howitzer.  The Bent brothers and 
Ceran St. Vrain greeted Kearny and his officers with mint juleps and a fine dinner.  
Following dinner, the partners sponsored a fandango to honor the new arrivals.
 12
 
Kearny‟s soldiers had more prosaic duties to perform during the Army‟s 
brief sojourn at the fort.  In addition to resting their weary feet, some enlisted men 
took advantage of the opportunity to explore their new surroundings.  George 
Gibson ventured into the fort, and found it “quite convenient and capacious, 
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affording all kinds of accommodations to travelers,” including a blacksmith, 
gunsmith, and store.  Many other soldiers simply stayed in camp, bathing in the 
Arkansas, shaving, washing clothes, writing letters home, and catching “some fine 
fish.”  There was some trouble, though.  One soldier got drunk, got in a fight, went 
for a swim, laid down under a tree, and died of apoplexy.  Furthermore, despite the 
vigilance of the herders, the Army‟s horses stampeded.  Although the troops 
recovered most of the animals, some nearly fifty miles away, they still lost sixty-
five of the best mounts.
13
   
The arrival of so many soldiers, in addition to the company‟s regular 
employees, made the fort and its environs seem like a bedlam, and strained the 
traders‟ ability to provide supplies and space for the army‟s provisions.  Traders, 
soldiers, and Indians all jostled each other in the fort‟s courtyard.  The incessant 
noise – the clang of the blacksmith‟s hammer, neighing horses, braying mules, 
laughing children, scolding mothers, and fighting men, “are all enough to turn my 
head,” Susan Shelby Magoffin reported.  “The Fort is crowded to overflowing,” she 
wrote, “Colonel Kearny has arrived and it seems the world is coming with him.”
14
  
Kearny had failed to consult with the partners when he selected Bent‟s Fort to be 
the army‟s supply depot.  However, there was little the Bents and St. Vrain could 
do but comply.  Troops beset the fort‟s quartermaster with requests for food and 
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whiskey, the quartermasters demanded space to store supplies, and 20,000 animals 
vied for grass along the banks of the river.  George Bent noted, laconically, “The 
fort was headquarters for the commissary department and many supplies were 
stored here.”
15
   
“Many supplies,” was an understatement.  From the outset of the campaign, 
the quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth intended to supply the Army of the West 
with rations for six months.  In addition to finding space for so much stuff, the 
partners also had to accommodate the teamsters and animals who freighted the 
cargo west from the Missouri frontier.  By August 1846, those in charge of logistics 
wrote of an increasing stream of goods about to descend upon the outpost.  The six 
months of supplies ordered to outfit the army consisted of, among other things, 
33,000 pounds of pork and bacon, 89,000 pounds of flour and hardtack, nearly 
12,000 pounds of coffee, over 19,000 pounds of sugar, “exclusive of the other 
smaller portions of the rations.”  The goods kept coming throughout 1846 and into 
1847.  During the winter and spring of 1847, Bent‟s Fort held nearly 140 tons of 
government supplies.  The army sent thirty wagonloads of rations south to New 
Mexico every week during this period.  By the fall, the fort was out of provisions.  
The impositions the army made upon the company‟s resources soured William 
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When not drinking juleps, chasing horses, or worrying about logistical 
issues, Kearny and his men spent their time attempting to gather more information 
about Armijo‟s intentions.  Despite Bent‟s report concerning the governor‟s 
disposition, doubts and contradictory rumors continued to plague the army.  
Christian Cribben wrote with some trepidation that the civil and religious leaders of 
New Mexico had inflamed the passions of the rabble against the Americans, 
magnifying Kearny‟s modest force into a bloodthirsty horde of barbarians, 50,000 
strong.  Yet, Armijo himself seemed uninvolved in the rumormongering.  He still 
seemed, “uncertain and irresolute in purpose,” Cribben wrote an unknown 
correspondent.  Others, including Philip St. George Cooke and Abraham Johnston 
complained about the existence of the rumors themselves, blaming “something in 
the atmosphere of the prairies which prompts men to lie.”
17
   
Although information on New Mexico remained muddled, the Americans 
had a chance to display their military might to local Indians and Mexican spies.  A 
band of Arapahos visited the encampment, intent upon meeting with Kearny and 
inspecting the “big guns.”  Their chief, according to an observer, “expressed his 
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admiration of the Americans,” and assured them, “that the New Mexicans would 
not stand a moment before such terrible instruments of death, but would escape to 
the mountains with the utmost dispatch.”
18
  Kearny‟s men also captured a number 
of Mexican spies.  Armijo had apparently dispatched them with the intention of 
spreading rumors and sewing discord among the Americans.  However, Kearny 
showed the men every courtesy, and allowed them an unrestricted inspection of his 
men and material.  The general then released the prisoners, telling them to return to 
Santa Fe posthaste and inform Armijo of all they had seen.  Kearny hoped that their 




Kearny spent his last days at Bent‟s Fort formulating proclamations and 
letters intended to convince the New Mexicans of the pointlessness of resisting his 
march.  He informed the citizenry that he marched “for the purpose of seeking 
Union with and ameliorating the conditions of,” the people of New Mexico.  He 
urged them to remain peaceably at home.  If they offered no resistance, the troops 
would not molest them.  However, should they decide to take up arms, he would 
regard them as enemies and treat them accordingly.
20
  Kearny also wrote directly to 
Armijo reiterating his pacific intentions and his warnings about resistance.  He 
urged the governor not to resist and, “for the sake of humanity call upon you to 
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submit to fate and to meet me with the same feelings of Peace and friendship which 
I now entertain for and offer to you and all those over whom you are Governor.”  
Should he chose to resist, the blood of the citizens of New Mexico would be upon 
his head, and instead of blessing him, posterity would make the name of Manuel 
Armijo a byword for foolishness.  Thus, informing his superiors that “I have done 
all in my power to obtain possession of the Country quietly and peaceably,” Kearny 
marched the Army of the West south towards New Mexico.
21
 
The army departed Bent‟s Fort on August 2, 1846, marching south along 
the Mountain Branch of the Santa Fe Trail.  On the day of departure, the inhabitants 
of the fort lined its walls, wished the troops well, and again raised the enormous 
American flag in salute.  The march southwest from the fort to Raton Pass was a 
difficult one.  Along Timpas Creek, one officer complained that it seemed as if the 
area “had not been refreshed by a shower since the day‟s of Noah‟s flood.”  The 
sun had baked the ground rock hard.  The soil was sandy, the grass spotty, and 
water hard to find.  Hot winds from the west further dampened the spirits of the 
men.
22
  Compounding the misery of the soldiers, the quartermaster cut rations, 
allotting each man only a half-pound of flour and three-eighths a pound of pork per 
day.  Some officers and men blamed the Bents for misleading statements about the 
nature of the land and trail between the Arkansas and Raton.  Along the Purgatoire 
River, H.S. Turner griped that the army, “found no grass on the bottom although 
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assured by Mr. Bent that it would be abundant.”  Nevertheless, the army reached 
Raton Pass on August 8, and spent two days crossing over the treacherous terrain.  
Traveling into New Mexico by way of the Mountain Branch of the Santa Fe Trail 
had advantages for Kearny.  Taking that route allowed him to utilize Bent‟s Fort as 
an outfitting point, furthermore, the Cimarron Route crossed more Mexican 
territory.  Finally, many in New Mexico deemed the route over Raton Pass to be 
too difficult for a large party of men encumbered by wagons to cross successfully.
23
 
While at the fort, Kearny secured the services of William Bent as a guide 
and scout for the march to Santa Fe.  On July 31, Bent approached Kearny and 
offered his services, along with those of his employees.  The two men proceeded to 
dicker over wages, and Bent left in a huff, convinced the general had vastly 
undervalued his talents.  However, the following day, he returned, and reached an 
agreement with Kearny, who hired Bent and six of his men to accompany the 
column.  Relations between William Bent and any government officials remained 
strained, however.  Kearny‟s niggardliness, and his appropriation of the fort for the 
army‟s use rankled the trader.  Despite the tension, Bent and his scouts left the fort 
on August 1, intending to scout as far as Raton.
24
   
The most valuable service Bent and his scouts provided was their capture of 
numerous New Mexican scouts and spies.  On August 10, Bent‟s men brought the 
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first prisoners into the American camp.  The information obtained from these 
scouts indicated that New Mexican authorities intended to resist Kearny as 
vigorously as possible.  The men carried orders from the Prefect of Taos calling 
upon the local inhabitants to take up arms against the invaders, and threatening 
anyone who failed to do so with death.  They also had instructions to halt every 
traveler they found along the roads, demand a passport, and detain anyone 
attempting to leave the province.  William H. Emory wrote that, “mounted on 
diminutive asses,” the Mexicans, “presented a ludicrous contrast by side of the big 
men and horses of the first dragoons.”  An encounter with another party of 
Americans confirmed Bent‟s information about Mexican intentions.  This source, 
“confirms the news of Mr. Bent that there is some prospect of a fight, and it puts all 
in a good humor, and we set about making preparations for such an event.  The 
probable force of the Mexicans is variously estimated, but we think we can meet 
any that will be brought against us.”
25
 
Bent‟s men continued to gather information as the army moved from Raton 
south towards Las Vegas.  The scouts continued to bring captured Mexicans to the 
general.  On August 11, they detained eight prisoners, four more on the thirteenth.
26
  
The information the Mexicans provided to Bent and Kearny was muddled.  The 
men said they came from Las Vegas, and that six hundred men were assembled 
there, waiting to give battle.  Another American traveler confirmed the story of the 
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Mexicans at Las Vegas, and added that Armijo had marched out of Santa Fe with 
12,000 men in order to fortify a canyon fifteen miles outside of Santa Fe.  The 
reaction of the residents of Mora, north of Las Vegas, indicated otherwise to 
Christian Cribben.  While Armijo may have raised an army, “The people were little 
disturbed at our approach and rather hailed it as a delivery from their oppressors, 
and protection from the danger threatening them from the surrounding Indian 
tribes.”
27
  Despite the rumors and information provided by the scouts, Kearny faced 
no opposition on the march to Las Vegas.  One soldier, who itched for combat, 
dismissed the rumors as nothing but Mexican “braggadocio.”  Yet, stories of 
Mexican troops in the area persisted.  On August 15, Bent‟s men informed Kearny 
that between one and two thousand Mexicans, armed with lances and bows and 




Kearny ordered the populace of Las Vegas assembled in the town plaza to 
inform them of his pacific intentions.  The United States had a just and 
longstanding claim to this portion of New Mexico, the general began.  For this 
reason, he came peacefully.  “We come among you as friends – not as enemies, as 
protectors not as conquerors.  We come among you for your benefit – not for your 
injury,” he informed the tense assembly.  He assured the locals that the stories 
spread by meddlesome priests – that the soldiers would rape the women and brand 
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the men on their cheeks like mules – were false.  Further, the government of the 
United States had no intention of interfering with the religious practices of the New 
Mexicans.  “I am not a Catholic myself,” the general informed them, “ I was not 
brought up in that faith, but at least one-third of my army are Catholics, and I 
respect a good Catholic as much as a good Protestant.”  Kearny absolved the 
citizens of their allegiance to Armijo and Mexico, promising that the troops would 
respect private property and take “not a pepper, nor an onion,” without 
compensation.  He concluded with an ominous warning.  Anyone who promised to 
remain peaceful, and then took up arms against the United States would hang.  
After administering an oath of allegiance to the still baffled audience, Kearny 
continued the march to the capital.
29
 
Despite the consistent rumors of Mexican mobilization near Santa Fe, the 
Army of the West encountered no resistance from Armijo as it marched towards the 
capital.  Kearny and his men approached Apache Canyon, just outside Santa Fe, 
with a mixture of anxiety and anticipation.  The general‟s information stated that if 
Armijo made a stand, he would make it in this easily defensible position.  However, 
no Mexicans appeared to challenge Kearny‟s approach.  As they marched through 
the narrow defile, the Americans marveled at Armijo‟s lack of nerve.  Had he 
wished to, the governor could have made a vigorous defense, holding up Kearny‟s 
advance indefinitely.  Thomas Fitzpatrick wrote Robert Campbell incredulously, 
“Had Armijo acted as a brave and patriotic man…in defence of the country…and 
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taken advantage of the strong position which the country afforded him together 
with the exhaustion of our men and horses after our long march he could certainly 
have given us hard work to perform and he would have now held a very different 
position in the opinion of his own people…but he has fallen to rise no more.” 
Abraham Johnston concurred with Fitzpatrick‟s assessment.  “Had Armijo‟s heart 
been as stout as the walls of rock which nature gave him to aid in the defense of his 
country, we might have sought in vain to force this passage,” he concluded.
30
  
Casting about for an explanation, the Americans received one from another 
prisoner, the son of a high-ranking Mexican officer.  The youth informed Kearny 
that his father and Governor Armijo had bickered with one another about strategy.  
The discord among the leadership, and a general apathy among the soldiers, led to a 
mutiny.  Fearful for his life, the governor fled south, opening the road for Kearny to 
march into Santa Fe, unopposed.
31
   
Over a year later, the Santa Fe Republican toasted August 18, 1846, the day 
the Army of the West marched into Santa Fe, as the day that “gave New Mexico 
political and religious liberty.”
32
  Despite the fact that some of his men found Santa 
Fe intensely disappointing – Marcellus Ball Edwards called it “a dirty filthy place 
built entirely of mud and flat roofed houses,” with “women pissing right in the 
street in plain view” – the general was well pleased with his achievement.  Kearny 
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wrote a colleague, “I have to inform you that on the 18
th
 Instant, without firing a 
gun or spilling a drop of blood, I took possession of this city….Everything here is 
quiet and peaceable – the People now understand the advantages they are to derive 
from a change of Government and are much gratified with it.”  One of Kearny‟s 
soldiers was less overtly optimistic.  The people, “although civil and well-
disposed,” were still quite shy, and gave little indication of receiving the Americans 
“as deliverers.”  Fortunately, the civil authorities appeared to be more welcoming, 
and the writer felt assured that this attitude “no doubt will influence the balance and 
bring them to the same state of mind.”
33
  Somewhat uncertain of the American‟s 
intentions, acting governor Donaciano Vigil sent an official to meet with Kearny.  
The general informed the New Mexicans that his men would in no way molest the 
local population.  By August 24, the Army of the West was settled in the ancient 
city.  “We are not as yet „reveling in the Halls of the Montezuma‟s‟ but…the 




Unsure of Armijo‟s ultimate intentions, Kearny had left little to chance.  
From Bent‟s Fort, he dispatched an envoy to the governor in an attempt to convince 
Armijo to acquiesce peacefully to the American invasion.  In consultation with 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton, President Polk referred James Wiley Magoffin to 
Kearny.  Magoffin was an excellent choice for the delicate mission.  The eldest son 
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of a family of traders with long experience in Mexico, Magoffin had impeccable 
credentials.  He had traded on his father‟s behalf in Mexico as early as 1825.  In 
addition to a deep familiarity with Mexican society and business, the trader was 
fluent in Spanish, and married to the daughter of a prominent Chihuahuan family.  
Appointed Commercial Agent for the United States in Chihuahua and Durango in 
1830, Magoffin served the American government off and on until 1846.  The trader 
was also a gregarious host, “a man of wealth, with unlimited capacity for drinking 
wine and making friends,” Hubert Howe Bancroft wrote.
35
  A detachment of 
dragoons under the command of Philip St. George Cooke accompanied Magoffin to 
Santa Fe.  Kearny chose Cooke in part because of the officer‟s actions during the 
1843 Texan filibustering expeditions.  His dispersal of the Texans, Kearny felt, 
might aid the envoys in their attempt to negotiate with Armijo.  The peace party left 




Although it is impossible to state definitively that Magoffin‟s mission paved 
the way for Kearny‟s occupation of Santa Fe, the trader certainly felt that way.  On 
August 12, 1846, Cooke and Magoffin held a private meeting with Armijo and his 
top advisors.  Magoffin repeated the strength of Kearny‟s force, and reiterated the 
general‟s claims that he came with the best intentions.  Cooke later wrote that the 
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meeting proved that the governor and most of his advisors inclined towards 
peaceful accommodation.  The one obstacle, the officer continued, was Colonel 
Diego Archuleta, an ardent nationalist who urged Armijo to resist.  Magoffin 
mollified the young officer by stating that Kearny intended to annex New Mexico 
only as far as the eastern bank of the Rio Grande; Archuleta might keep control of 
the territory west of the river.  Under whose authority Magoffin made this offer is 
unknown.
37
  Perhaps Magoffin‟s stock of liquor helped ease the tensions.  The 
trader traveled in style, and Cooke recalled that his stock of wine, “defied all 
human exigencies.”  In the meticulous claim he submitted to the United States 
government, Magoffin included a charge of $2,000 for entertaining Mexican 
officials, both in Santa Fe and further south, containing entries for a substantial 
amount of claret and champagne.  Whether through cultural awareness, personal 
charm, the alcohol, or outright bribery, Magoffin was certain that he had played a 
pivotal role in the conquest of New Mexico.  He wrote officials in Washington, 
D.C., “Bloodless possession of New Mexico was what President Polk wished.  It 
was obtained through my means.”  He continued, “I went ahead of General Kearny 
and secured his unopposed march into Santa Fe.  I went down the country and 
conciliated the people.”  Magoffin informed the government that he would be 
satisfied with a refund of $40,000 for his services; the official in charge of 
inspecting Magoffin‟s claims recommended that the government refund him to the 
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  Although it is impossible to prove that Armijo accepted a bribe 
in return for not resisting Kearny, it is probable that Magoffin‟s mission played a 
role in convincing the governor to leave the province peacefully.
39
 
  However, a host of other problems unique to New Mexico beset Armijo, 
which further undermined any inclination he may have had to fight the Army of the 
West.  Lack of concrete evidence of American intentions hampered the governor‟s 
attempts to prepare New Mexico for invasion.  News of the annexation of Texas by 
the United States reached Santa Fe on July 1, 1845.  Such news, local officials 
realized, made war almost inevitable.  The following month, Armijo issued a 
stirring circular throughout New Mexico urging the inhabitants to prepare for 
battle, and instructing militia officers to keep careful records of their men and 
weapons.  By the autumn of 1845, New Mexico was practically cut off from the 
rest of the nation, and the flow of official correspondence all but ceased.  Armijo 
received his last substantive communication from Mexico City on June 4, 1846, 
informing him that Mexico and the United States had broken off diplomatic 
relations, and that war was inevitable.  Still, Armijo had no knowledge of the 
existence of a state of war until later that month.  By July 9, 1846, an official from 
Taos informed Armijo that, “beyond doubt the invading forces of the United States 
are on the march to this Department,” probably from the direction of Bent‟s Fort.  
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Even the United States Consul in Santa Fe, Manuel Alvarez, was unaware of 
Kearny‟s march until late-June.  Once he received confirmation of this intelligence, 
Alvarez took it upon himself to consult with the governor.  During a meeting with 
Armijo, the consul wrote that he used his, “best endeavors to convince him, that it 
would be better for himself and the people…to capitulate, and far preferable to 
become an inconsiderable portion of a powerful republic, than a considerable one 
of a nation continually engaged in revolutions, with no stability in the public 
administration of their affairs.”  Although he apparently had little success with the 




Beset with economic, military, and political problems, New Mexicans 
found it difficult to form a united front against the coming American invasion.  
Other issues loomed larger than the state of war between the two nations.  Raids by 
hostile Indians, the threat of bankruptcy, and contentious relations with the central 
government in Mexico City posed as much of a threat to New Mexico as did the 
Army of the West.  Politics divided New Mexicans at the highest level of society.  
Nationalists like Padre Martínez urged the central government to take aggressive 
steps to check the influence of the pro-American faction within the province.  
Those with mercantile interests tied to the United States, on the other hand, 
resented any attempts by Mexico City to dictate political or economic policy to the 
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frontier.  Furthermore, the political instability of the Mexican core made it difficult 
to formulate coherent policy for the areas surrounding the national capital, let alone 
for the northernmost regions.  Raiding by hostile Indians, particularly the Navajos, 
also commanded Armijo‟s attention.  Despite the news of Kearny‟s march, the 
tenuous situation on New Mexico‟s western border diverted precious men and 
weapons away from Santa Fe.  The specter of bankruptcy also hovered over the 
region; civic officials and soldiers alike went unpaid, causing some in the military 
to desert their posts, spreading dissension further throughout New Mexico.  
Kearny‟s approach merely compounded these preexisting problems.  As rumors 




The staunchest nationalists urged the governor to resist vigorously.  On 
August 9, 1846, Armijo called a meeting in Santa Fe to determine a course of 
action.  Many in the assembly preferred to submit peacefully to the American 
demands, but a more vocal faction headed by Miguel Pino, Diego Archuleta, and a 
number of priests urged resistance.  Eyewitness reports from those later critical of 
the governor stated that, “after a long discussion in which all expressed their most 
patriotic sentiments…his excellency stated that he was ready to sacrifice his life 
and property in the defense of his country.”  Realizing no aid was forthcoming 
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from Chihuahua or Durango, the governor then called upon the Assembly to raise 
one thousand pesos to defray the costs of defense.
42
 
Upon receiving accurate news concerning the size of Kearny‟s force, 
Armijo mustered the entire militia and marched to Apache Canyon, where he began 
defensive preparations.  Four thousand men, sans those who contributed between 
$20 and $100 to the governor, assembled at the canyon.  The militia turned out 
despite the danger the Navajos still posed to the frontiers of the province.  Upon 
arrival at the canyon, Armijo called together the Departmental Assembly and again 
inquired whether they should fight or not.  The politicians answered in the 
affirmative, as did the militia leaders.  Witnesses stated that the governor then 
decided to disband the militia and face the Americans with regulars only, news that 
was “received with shouts and acclamations of pleasure.”  However, as soon as the 
militia retired, Armijo countermanded his previous statement about standing to 
fight, and fled ignominiously towards Chihuahua.  The governor‟s abrupt action 
mortified many of his subordinates, as well as the soldiers.  An old story goes that 
when the people attempted to stop Armijo from fleeing, the governor threw a 
handful of gold and silver coins onto the ground and fled while the crowd jostled 
for the money.  Despite the attempts by hardliners to rally the troops in the face of 
Armijo‟s retreat, Manuel Alvarez informed the Secretary of State that the men 
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dispersed in disgust at the conduct of their leaders.
43
  In view of the obstacles he 
faced as governor, combined with the martial superiority of Kearny‟s force, 
Armijo‟s withdrawal was probably the most practical course of action.  The retreat 
certainly forestalled bloodshed, and possibly a drawn-out guerrilla war.
44
 
Shortly after his arrival in Santa Fe, Kearny began the process of wooing 
local leaders and the construction of a new government.  On August 22, he issued a 
general proclamation to the citizens of Santa Fe, repeating his promises to respect 
the property, beliefs, and persons of all New Mexicans cooperating with the new 
regime.  He also stressed the importance of forming a government to replace the 
old one.
45
  In order to reinforce his message of friendship, the general held a lavish 
ball for local luminaries at the Palace of the Governors.  Magoffin wrote, “The 
palace was crowded and many bottles of generous wine was drunk,” adding that the 
festivities were, “universally attended by all the respectable citizens of the city, and 
passed off in handsome style.”
46
  Following the celebration, Kearny put Doniphan 
to work drafting a new government for the territory.  Doniphan worked closely 
with David Waldo, Francis Preston Blair, Jr., and Charles Bent in crafting the new 
laws and governing structure.  The men drew on a wide range of sources: the laws 
of both Mexico and the United States, the state of Texas-Coahuila, and the organic 
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law of the Missouri Territory.  Manuel Alvarez translated the laws into Spanish for 
distribution to the public.
47
  The new laws created a government with an executive 
branch consisting of the governor and his secretary, a territorial legislature elected 
by the citizens, and three judges for a superior court.  The laws also created 
counties, and appointed justices of the peace, sheriffs, and tax collectors.  The 
Kearny Code, as it came to be known, also mandated the separation of Church and 
State, called for a standing militia, direct taxation, and a system of public schools, 
all revolutionary concepts to the New Mexicans.
48
 
The Kearny Code and the men the general appointed to lead the new 
American government caused great discontent among many New Mexicans.  In 
June 1846, the Secretary of War had advised Kearny regarding civil appointments 
in New Mexico.  “In performing this duty,” Marcy wrote, “it would be wise and 
prudent to continue in their employment such of the existing officers as are known 
to be friendly to the United States, and will take the oath of allegiance to them.”  
Manuel Alvarez suggested the same approach to his superiors at the Department of 
State in early September.  He wrote Buchanan, “a good portion of the Public 
Offices should be filled by native citizens, all this will contradict the thousand 
reports that are in constant circulation among the poor ignorant dupes, that we 
intend to make slaves of them, or at least grind them into the dust.”  The consul 
recommended that these men remain in place for a couple of years until the rest of 
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the populace learned the rudiments of republican government.  Another observer 
reported that the New Mexicans themselves seemed willing to fill offices in the 
new government.  Men that had been “eager to fight the battles of their country, 
would now lay down their arms in order to fill a petty office in Santa Fe.”
49
  
Kearny‟s appointments pleased few New Mexicans.  Americans and 
American sympathizers dominated the highest offices: Charles Bent became 
governor, Donaciano Vigil secretary, Blair the United States District Attorney, 
Charles Blumner treasurer, Eugene Leitensdorfer auditor, and Joab Houghton, 
Carlos Beaubien, and José Otero justices of the superior court.  Naively, the general 
snubbed the leading families of New Mexico, the Senas, Archuletas, Ortizes, 
Delgados, Pinos, Pareas, and Chavezes.  Even the appointment of Vigil and Otero 
to the new government could not salve the wounded egos of the local aristocracy.  
Nationalists viewed both men as collaborators with the pro-American faction.  Had 
Kearny had more experience with New Mexico politics, had he bothered to consult 




The Americans, of course, were pleased with the new government 
functionaries.  “The choice of Mr. Bent as governor is a most excellent one,” 
Christian Cribben wrote.  No one else, in his opinion, was as suited as Bent to the 
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task of governing New Mexico.  In addition to his long experience as a trader, the 
local population seemed to like him immensely.   Of the other officials, the soldier 
concluded, “The appointment of Don Asiano Vigil is said to be a popular one 
indeed so are all the appointments.”
51
  Lieutenant James W. Abert, who had spent 
much time at Bent‟s Fort, wrote, “I called upon Governor Bent, who, to all the 
qualifications necessary to his office, possesses those of a long residence in this 
country, a constant intercourse with the people, and an intimate knowledge of their 
language and character.”  Early twentieth-century historians agreed with these 
assessments.  Paul Walter, for example, wrote glowingly of Bent‟s “tact, prudence, 
and cordiality,” as well as his knowledge of local language and culture.  The New 
Mexicans, Walter went on, adored Bent, loved and trusted him.
52
 
For many Anglo observers, the arrival of Kearny‟s army and the 
appointment of the new government promised a bright future for an appreciative 
local population.  Kearny brought order, liberty, peace, and the prospect of future 
prosperity, they enthused.  So long as the American flag flew over Santa Fe, it flew 
as a beacon of hope for a previously downtrodden and benighted population.  Less 
than a week after his arrival, Kearny wrote his superiors in Washington that, “The 
people of the Territory are now perfectly tranquil and can be easily kept so – The 
intelligent portion know the advantages they are to derive from the change of 
government and express their satisfaction at it.”  Other letters composed within the 
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same week repeated Kearny‟s optimistic assessment.  “Kearny is fast reaping for 
himself a crown of unfading laurels for his affable and kind treatment of the people, 
and the wise and statesmanlike policy which he pursues,” Cribben wrote.  Magoffin 
agreed wholeheartedly with Cribben‟s assessment, and stressed Kearny‟s “mild and 
persuasive manners,” and his promises of protection from Indian raiders.
53
 
Throughout the autumn, the occupiers radiated confidence in the efficacy of 
their mission and the satisfaction of the local populace.  Thomas Edwards wrote a 
relative in Missouri that the New Mexicans “appear perfectly friendly and I believe 
the majority of them are highly pleased, if you meet one of them he will say…‟you 
Americana me Americana too.‟”  By the middle of September Kearny was 
confident enough of his position that he wrote to the Adjutant General that the only 
source of disquiet in the entire region was the continued raiding by Utes and 
Navajos.  The general‟s subordinates continued to marvel at his abilities.  It seemed 
that peace and tranquility reigned – except on the frontiers – and that, “The work is 
over, the war ended and „General Estefan Kearny is great and Don Carlos is his 
Prophet.‟”  The Americans told themselves that they brought justice, industry, 
thrift, honesty, generous Christianity, and protection in degrees never before 
experienced in New Mexico.  Order overcame anarchy, and the development of 
republican political institutions continued apace.  These praiseworthy actions and 
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characteristics, Americans gushed, did more credit to Kearny and the Army of the 










                                                 
54
 Fitzpatrick to Campbell, September 3, 1846, UPA; Thomas L. Edwards to Joseph D. Edwards, 
September 15, 1846, Box 1, MWC; Kearny to Adjutant General, September 16, 1846, Letterbook 
page 57, KP; Cribben to Unknown, September 26, 1846, typescript page 20, MWC; Connelley, War 
with Mexico, 206, 246-47. 
333 
 
Chapter 13 - Backlash: 1846-1847 
 
The consolidation of American power over New Mexico provoked an 
intense nationalistic backlash in late 1846 and early 1847.  Despite the glowing 
accounts of the region‟s passivity, the actions of the occupying forces, combined 
with discontent over Kearny‟s civil appointments boded ill for the stability of the 
new government.  In January 1847 the pent up tensions burst into violence in Taos.  
On January 19, nationalist New Mexicans aided by Indians from the Taos Pueblo 
killed Charles Bent and a number of his key collaborators.  The rhetoric of the 
rebels, combined with their careful selection of targets indicated their deep 
antipathy against the American regime in general and the pro-Bent faction in 
particular.  The conquest of New Mexico only added to the hatred and mistrust of 
Bent and his allies that dated back to at least 1841. 
Despite the optimism that radiated from the correspondence of Kearny and 
his men, a strong undercurrent of discontent was still evident.  War, and rumors of 
war, still threatened to upset the tranquility of the new American province.  The 
keenest observers recognized that demagogues might still sway a “fickle” and 
“ignorant” populace to the undoing of the region.
1
  If unrest came, many Americans 
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believed that it would spread from the actions and rhetoric of New Mexico‟s 
Roman Catholic clergy.  Upstanding republican Protestants that they were, 
Kearny‟s men feared and loathed the Church of Rome for its supposed bigotry, 
backwardness, and opposition to enlightened political philosophy.  Recognizing 
that an overwhelmingly Protestant army might cause the Catholic population great 
distress, Polk attempted to secure the services of a respected and well-placed 
churchman to accompany Kearny and allay any fears the New Mexicans might 
have.  The army never implemented the suggestion.  Even on the march to Santa 
Fe, the rank and file of the Army of the West speculated upon the craft and guile of 
the New Mexican padres.  Indeed, they were more to be feared than any soldiers 
the Americans might encounter.  Cribben speculated that, “The worst enemy whose 
movements we shall have to counteract will, in all probability, be an ignorant and 
fanatical clergy, disposed to oppose us from motives entirely their own.”  Alvarez 
warned his superiors of the necessity of keeping a strong garrison in New Mexico, 
“as well to guard against the machinations of intriguing clergy, as to meet any 
armed force from the interior.”  Despite Magoffin‟s assurances to the Secretary of 
War that Kearny‟s meeting with local prelates had allayed all of their fears, 
suspicion remained.
2
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New Mexicans did not need plotting priests or American defeats to stir their 
anger against the occupying force; the actions of the volunteers themselves 
exacerbated tensions over the course of the autumn of 1846.  Having little respect 
for the New Mexican people or their customs, the Missourians garrisoning Santa Fe 
soon showed themselves to be rude occupants.  Although volunteers proved their 
fighting abilities throughout the Mexican-American War, their lack of discipline 
and their strained interactions with the civilian population limited their 
effectiveness as garrison troops.  Over the course of the war, complaints about 
outrages committed by volunteer soldiers filled the accounts of the Army regulars.  
Following the departures of Kearny and Doniphan, Sterling Price had a difficult 
time controlling his men.  Even the officer corps was divided between Whigs and 
Democrats, making the enforcement of discipline more difficult.
3
  The 
condescending attitude most of the soldiers exhibited towards the locals helped 
matters not at all.  Christian Cribben thought them juvenile, “but children 
unaccustomed to be governed or to govern themselves,” he felt.  Still, he lamented 
the behavior of his comrades.  They were idle, insubordinate, and undisciplined.  “I 
do not exaggerate at all when I say that not a day passes but what some outrage, 
some crime is committed by the American soldier, whose victims are usually 
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Mexicans.  The state of things here is indeed deplorable,” he lamented.
4
  Other 
observers confirmed Cribben‟s characterization of the volunteers as swaggering 
bullies.  They went about letting everyone know how they were “the freest and 
„smartest people in creation,‟” Lieutenant Jeremy Gilmer complained.  British 
writer George Frederick Ruxton described “Crowds of drunken volunteers,” filling 
the streets, “brawling and boasting,” of their superiority.  Shortly thereafter, he 
added, “I found all over New Mexico that the most bitter feeling and most 
determined hostility existed against the Americans, who certainly in Santa Fe and 
elsewhere have not been very anxious to conciliate the people, but by their bullying 
and overbearing demeanor towards them, have in a great measure been the cause of 




Some time around December 1, prominent New Mexican nationalists 
alienated by the actions of the new regime began holding secret meetings to discuss 
a plan of action.  The conspiracy, “seems to originate with a few men of desperate 
fortunes, who wish to expel us that they may take the Government in hand,” wrote 
Richard Smith Elliott.  Anglo accounts recorded rumors of “secret cabals” held in 
shadowy places – a rented room, or the roof of an abandoned building.  American 
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sources, corroborated by the testimony of native New Mexicans years after the fact, 
listed the primary conspirators.  These sources named many of the most prominent 
men in the territory on this list.  Included were Santiago Armijo, Tomás Ortíz, José 
María Sanchez, Agustín Durán, and Manuel Pino.  Diego Archuleta, Nicolas Pino, 
and Manuel Antonio Chaves initially acted as leaders in formulating the 
revolutionary plan.  Each man had strong nationalist credentials.  Archuleta, 
apparently dissatisfied with Kearny‟s refusal to give up the west bank of the Rio 
Grande, had served as a militia captain during the Texas troubles of 1841, a Deputy 
to the Mexican Congress, and Armijo‟s second in command during Kearny‟s 
invasion.  Pino was the son of Don Pedro Pino, one of the most prominent 
politicians in New Mexican history to this point, as well as a firm advocate of 
defending Apache Canyon.  Chaves was a seasoned Indian fighter who fought with 
Archuleta against the Texans, and served under Armijo at Apache Canyon.  Ralph 
Emerson Twitchell, the most ardent American historian of early New Mexico also 
states, without evidence, that Padre Martínez collaborated with these men.  At some 
point, the ardor of Chaves and Pino cooled considerably.  Chaves biographer, Marc 
Simmons, writes that the men voiced their opposition against “unbridled 
bloodshed, and when they could not carry the others with their arguments for 
moderation became lukewarm to the intrigue.”
6
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     The initial plan called for the New Mexicans to rise up on December 19.  
The conspirators reached this decision on December 15, at the home of Tomás 
Ortiz.  After further deliberation, however, the men rescheduled the date for 
December 24, “when the soldiers and garrison would be indulging in wine and 
feasting, and scattered about through the city at the fandangos, not having their 
arms in their hands,” according to one Anglo.  The rebels would meet at the parish 
church in Santa Fe.  There, they would ring the church bell as a predetermined 
signal for the assault.  They planned to divide themselves into groups, seize the 
American artillery, and capture Governor Bent and Colonel Price.  Anglo sources 
are more lurid; they claimed that the conspirators planned to kill every American in 
the area, along with those New Mexicans perceived as collaborators.
7
 
The plan never came to fruition, for someone tipped off the American 
officials.  Bent himself was vague on the source of the plotting when he wrote 
James Buchanan on December 26.  The governor noted simply, “I received 
information from a Mexican, friendly to our government, that a conspiracy was on 
foot among the native Mexicans, having for its object the expulsion of the US 
troops and the civil authorities from the territory.”
8
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H.ex.doc. 70, page 17. 
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Bent and Price mobilized their forces swiftly to quash the planned rising.  
Upon receiving the news of the plot from the “friendly” Mexican, Bent and Price 
moved to round up the conspirators.  “I immediately brought into requisition every 
means in my power to ascertain who were the movers in the rebellion,” Bent wrote 
Buchanan.  Elliott praised the governor who had been, “very active in ferreting out 
this conspiracy,” primarily on account of his wide network of contacts, “sources of 
information which but few other men in the country possess.”  Had anyone but 
Bent held the governor‟s chair, Elliott speculated, the outcome might have been 
much worse.  The soldier saved some praise for Price.  The colonel, “has displayed 
promptness in all his movements since this conspiracy [began],” Elliott concluded.  
Bent and Price‟s sweep of Santa Fe netted “seven of the secondary conspirators,” 
the governor informed his superiors in Washington.  The Americans arrested 
Chaves and the Pinos as they sat outside the Exchange Hotel in the capital.
9
   
 In the wake of the aborted rising, an uneasy calm settled over Santa Fe 
during the Christmas holiday.  Bent turned the arrested conspirators over to Price 
for trial believing that, “these persons might be dealt with more summarily and 
expeditiously than they could have been by the civil authorities.”  According to 
Kearny, all New Mexican citizens were now American citizens, ergo anyone rising 
in arms against the United States was guilty of treason.  The defense attorney for 
Chaves, a Missouri lawyer who commanded two companies of infantry, argued that 
as long as  a state of war existed between the United States and Mexico it was 
illegal to charge Chaves with treason.  Only Congress had the authority to 
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determine the legal status of those in conquered provinces.  Technically, Chaves 
was still a Mexican citizen.  The court agreed, acquitting and releasing him.
10
  
Although Bent noted to his superiors that the aborted uprising made necessary the 
continuance of a military presence in Santa Fe, he dismissed the leaders of the plot.  
They “cannot be said to be men of much standing,” he wrote Buchanan.  Writing of 
the December events weeks later, perhaps with the luxury of hindsight, Price 
differed with the governor‟s assessment of the conspirators.  The colonel wrote the 
Adjutant General that, “a full investigation proved that many of the most influential 
persons in the northern part of this territory were engaged in the rebellion.”  
Regardless of the social status of the conspirators, Price put his men on high alert, 
declaring martial law, and a curfew.
11
  The unease created by the conspiracy did not 
keep the governor from enjoying the holiday, however.  On the evening of 
December 26, Bent hosted a lavish banquet at the Palace of the Governors, 
complete with shad, oysters, preserves, and “delightful champagne in the greatest 
abundance.”  The governor seemed jovial.  He joked and yarned with a former 
company employee who “noticed that he was unusually gay and cheerful, telling 
me many funny stories about his recent experiences in his character of governor 
over that semi-civilized community.”
12
 
                                                 
10
 Connelley, War with Mexico, 519; Hyslop, Bound for Santa Fe, 381-82; Bent to Buchanan, 
December 26, 1846, H. ex.doc. 70, 17; Simmons, Little Lion, 100-101. 
11
 Bent to Buchanan, H.ex.do. 70, 17-18 (quote is from page 17); Price to Adjutant General, 




 Sess. H.ex.doc. 1,  520; Crutchfield, Tragedy at Taos, 97; 
Shalhope, Sterling Price, 60-1. 
12
 James W. Abert, Western America in 1846-1847, ed. John Galvin (San Francisco: John Howell 
Books, 1966), 75; Abert, “Examination of New Mexico,” 512-13 (quote is from 512); James B. 
Hobbs, Wild Life in the Far West: Personal Adventures of a Border Mountain Man; Comprising 
Hunting and Trapping Adventures with Kit Carson and Others; Captivity and Life Among the 
341 
 
Taos became the epicenter of anti-American activity after the New Year.  
Despite the insistence of Anglo reminiscences that the inhabitants of Rio Arriba 
maintained an outward show of peace and satisfaction, trouble brewed just below 
the placid surface.  Regardless of their tenuous ties to Mexico City, both the elites 
and non-elites of the Rio Arriba bridled at the expansion of American influence 
before the war, and Kearny‟s imposition of the new order the previous autumn.  
The period between Kearny‟s entrance into Santa Fe and the outbreak of violence 
in Taos was a transitional period.  The old order was gone, but the Americans had 
yet to consolidate complete control over the province.  The revolutionaries in 
northern New Mexico may have felt that the proper time had come to rise up 
against the Americans.
13
 Longstanding grievances, as well as new rumors 
contributed to the unrest.  The Martínez faction, of course, resented the Bents, and 
had opposed their commercial and land acquisition schemes for years.  The Pueblo 
Indians also had long memories.  Thomas Chavez speculates that the 1843 Texan 
expeditions predisposed the local Indians towards anti-Americanism.  The majority 
of those who fell in battle with Warfield‟s men had been residents of the Taos 
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Pueblo, and it is possible that they believed that the Americans had been in cahoots 
with the Texans.  More immediately, rumors circulated that the American 
government intended to levy new taxes, and that the Anglos planned to encroach 
upon, or perhaps confiscate outright, tribal lands.  George Frederick Ruxton found 




Bent recognized that tensions still existed, and before he left Santa Fe for 
his home in Taos, he attempted to mollify further the local population.  Prior to his 
departure north, he issued a proclamation, urging the New Mexicans to reject those 
clamoring for revolution.  He wrote,  
You are now governed by new statutory laws and you also have 
the free government promised to you.  Do not abuse the great 
liberty which is vouchsafed you by it, so you may gather the 
abundant fruits which await you in the future.  Those who are 
blindly opposed, as well as those whose vices have made them 
notorious, are the ambitious persons who aspire to the best 
offices, also those persons who dream that mankind should bow 
to their whims, having become satisfied that they cannot find 
emplohyment in the offices which are usually given to men of 
probity and honesty, exasperated have come forth as leaders of a 
revolution against the present government….Their treason was 
disconvered in time and smothered at its birth.  Now they are 
wandering about and hiding from people, thereby causing 
uneasiness, and they still hold to their ruinous plans….There is 
still another pretext with which they want to alarm you and that 
is the falsehood that troops are coming from the interior in order 
to re-conquer the country.  What help could the department of 
Chihuahua, which is torn by factions and reduced to 
insignificance afford you?  Certainly none….I urge you to turn a 
deaf ear to such false doctrines and to remain quiet, attending to 
your domestic affairs, so that you may enjoy under the law, all 
the blessings of peace, and by rallying around the government, 
call attention to the improvements which you deem material to 
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the advancement of the country and that by doing so you may 




The storm broke over Taos on January 19, 1847.  The governor encountered 
discontent the moment he arrived in Taos on the eighteenth.  A crowd greeted him, 
demanding that he release three Pueblo Indians incarcerated in the town jail on 
charges of theft.  Bent angrily refused to free the prisoners, and pushed through the 
crowd to his home.  The following morning, a crowd approached the jail, calling 
upon Sheriff Stephen Lee to release the men.  Vastly outnumbered, Lee prepared to 
acquiesce to their demands when Cornelio Vigil, prefect of Taos and staunch Bent 
ally, arrived at the jailhouse.  Vigil, “came in and objected, denouncing the Indians 
as thieves and scoundrels.” The crowd charged forward, killed the prefect, “and cut 
his body to pieces, severing all the limbs from it,” before releasing the prisoners.
16
  
Thus, the Taos Revolt began spontaneously.  However, the violence that followed 
was the result of years of pent up rage, rage against the American faction and their 
collaborators, rage against the newly imposed government, and rage against those 
who threatened the land holdings of the local population.
17
   
From the jail, the crowd proceeded to the governor‟s home.  Around six 
o‟clock in the morning, they assembled outside Bent‟s house, shouting for him to 
come out and show himself.  Oral reminiscences state that the members of the 
crowd called out that, “no „American‟ would be left alive in New Mexico.”  The 
most complete eyewitness account of what followed comes from Bent‟s daughter, 
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Teresina.  Five years old at the time of her father‟s death, Teresina first related the 
events of January 19 in an 1881 interview with Army officer and amateur 
ethnographer John Gregory Bourke.  Throughout the testimony, she portrayed her 
father in the best light possible, stressing that he had always had good relations 
with the locals, and that their actions caught him by complete surprise.
18
  The 
family was in bed “when the Mesicans and Indians came to the house,” she 
recalled.  The crowd began trying to break down the doors, while others clambered 
onto the roof.  Bent arose and went out to meet them, asking them what they 
wanted; “we want your head gringo, we do not want for any of you gringos to 
govern us, as we have come to kill you,” they shouted.  Baffled, the governor tried 
to remind them of his past kindnesses.  Had he not always been a good neighbor? 
Had he not treated them when they were sick, and never charged for his services?  
They shouted back that that made no difference to them, and opened fire on him.  
Accounts differ as to the sequence of events that followed.  Teresina remembered 
that her mother implored Bent to mount the horse hitched in the corral behind the 
house and ride to safety.  He rebuffed her, saying that it was unseemly for a 
governor to flee his own home.  Besides, if he was to die he preferred to die with 
his family.  George Bird Grinnell tells of a more bellicose Ignacia Bent.  He 
claimed that she brought Bent a brace of pistols, and urged him to defend himself.  
                                                 
18
 “The True Story,” LAFRF; Garrard, Wah-to-Yah, 176; Simmons, Kit Carson and His Three 
Wives, 74; Hyslop, Bound for Santa Fe, 387; Account of Teresina Bent Scheurich, Box 8342 Folder 
13, Jaramillo-Bent-Scheurich Papers, NMSRCA (hereafter cited as JBSP). 
345 
 
Bent allegedly replied, “No, I will not kill any of them; for the sake of you, my 
wife, and you, my children.  At present my life is all these people wish.”
19
 
The crowd surged forward as the governor retreated into his house.  While 
Bent had attempted to calm the crowd, the women in the house began a frantic 
attempt to escape.  With the aid of their Indian servant, they dug desperately at the 
adobe walls, eventually punching a hole through into the next house, whose 
occupant “with all her strength rendered…assistance, though she was a Mexican.”  
As the men poured into the house, Bent again appealed to them, without effect.  
One of the Indians drew a bead on Ignacia Bent, but Teresina wrote that, just 
before he fired, the family‟s Indian servant lept in front of her mistress, took the 
ball in the chest, and died.  Wounded in the head with arrows, Charles Bent 
attempted to climb through the tunnel into the next house, “but when he was going 
through the arrows that he had in his head hurt him so he pull them out, and 
crushed them against the wall,” Teresina remembered.  Multiple sources agree 
that, once in the adjoining room, Bent called for paper and pen and began to write 
something.  Before he could finish, his assailants poured into the room.  A bullet 
struck him in the chest, knocking him to the floor.  As he lay there, a Pueblo 
Indian stepped forward, snatched up one of the governor‟s pistols, and shot him in 
the face.  Then, according to Grinnell, “They took his scalp, stretched it on a board 
with brass nails, and carried it through the streets in triumph.”  Dick Wooton gave 
a more lurid account of Bent‟s mutilation.  Wooton recalled that the Indians 
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decapitated the governor and paraded his entire head through the streets of Taos, 
“to terrify women and children and those Mexicans whom it was thought were not 
in full sympathy with the rebellion.”
20
 
The crowd then turned its attention to the cowering family.  Unconfirmed 
testimony states that the crowd intended to kill the women and children, but that 
Rumalda Luna and Josefa Jaramillo fell to their knees and begged for the lives of 
the family.  Teresina recalled that, “some of the crowd wanted to kill all the 
family, but some of the Mesicans said no, women folks and children we must not 
kill, but we will not help them for anything.”  Bent‟s friend William Boggs, whose 
wife was present, informed his brother that a Mexican woman saved her life by 
draping a serape over her as she cowered in the corner.  The crowd, bent upon 
looting the house, paid her no attention.  The men then left the family who, still 
clad in their nightclothes, remained huddled in the house throughout that day and 
into the following night.  Early the next morning, a friend brought them food, 
clothes, and blankets.  Two days later, the family escaped to the home of Juan 
Catalina Valdez.  They stayed at the Valdez home until Sterling Price and his 
soldiers arrived from Santa Fe, nearly two weeks later.  Another friendly local 
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took Josefa and Rumalda into her home, disguised them as Indian women, and set 
them to work grinding corn.
21
   
From the governor‟s home, the crowd fanned out throughout the town, 
searching for other American officials and their New Mexican collaborators.  Price 
wrote his superiors, “It appeared to be the object of the insurrectionists to put to 
death every American and every Mexican who had accepted office under the 
American government.”  Lee escaped the riot at the jail, but the assailants quickly 
caught up with him and killed him on the roof of his home.  The rebels trapped 
James W. Leal, scalped him alive, and paraded him through the streets of Taos, 
prodding him with lances.  Tiring of this, they threw him into a ditch, where he lay 
for hours until a Mexican dispatched him with a bullet.
22
  Had Carlos Beaubien 
been in Taos he certainly would have died.  Unable to find him, the Indians 
searched for his son, Narciso.  Garrard, a recent acquaintance of Beaubien, stated 
that the young man and an Indian servant fled, either to the family outhouse or to 
the stable, when they received news of the violence.  There, they hid under a pile 
of straw.  The rebels conducted a swift search of the building, and finding nothing, 
prepared to leave.  At that point, one of the family‟s Indian servants called out to 
them that the two were cowering under the straw.  Garrard has her screaming out, 
“Kill the young ones, and they will never be men to trouble us.”  The searchers 
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doubled back, killed Beaubien, scalped him, and cut off one of his fingers to get 
his ring.
23
   
The lucrative business and familial connections that some local New 
Mexicans had made with the American faction now marked them out for attack.  
The crowd destroyed the home of José Rafael Sena le Luna.  They also killed 
Ignacia‟s older brother, Pablo Jaramillo.  In typical fashion, Wooton adds further 
grahic detail.  He claimed that, “The half-breed children were…marked for 
slaughter, and as the Mexicans and Indians all had dark complexions the color of 
the hair and eyes was made the test of blood.  Spanish women who were married 
to Americans had to disguise their children who had light hair and blue 
eyes….Those who escaped in this way were the fortunate ones, and there were 
comparatively few of them.”
24
 
The revolt spread quickly outward from Taos to the other communities of 
northern New Mexico.  Charles Towne, the lone surviving American in Taos, 
escaped the revolt on his father-in-law‟s mule.  From Taos he rode to Simeon 
Turley‟s mill and distillery at Arroyo Hondo to warn him of the violence.  Turley 
and the Americans at Arroyo Hondo ignored Towne‟s report, whereupon he turned 
his mule south, and brought the news to Santa Fe on January 20.  Like Lee and 
Bent, Turley was deeply involved in business enterprise in New Mexico.  Like 
these men he had also married a Mexican woman.  Nationalists like Martínez, also 
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marked Turley as a potentially disruptive political and economic influence in the 
region, pointing especially to his liquor trade with Indians north of the border.
25
   
John D. Albert left a vivid description of the fight that took place at 
Turley‟s Mill.  The Mexicans and Indians trapped the men in the mill.  The 
besiegers sent forward a party with a flag of truce, and called for the Americans to 
surrender their arms.  Albert recalled that, “I told the boys they could do as they 
pleased, but I knew their treachery would lead us to certain death in the end, and I 
was going to die with my gun in my hands, and not be murdered like a common 
dog.”  Roused by Albert‟s stirring declaration, the men decided unanimously to 
resist.  They shouted their defiance to the attackers.  Then, “the hurrah commenced  
and the air was filled with bullets.” They hammered the walls of the mill, “like 
hail,” shattering all the windows.  The Americans fought all day, and at sundown 
the Mexicans renewed the attack, setting fire to the mill.  “Soon everything was 
ablaze; the uproar of the yelling devils on the outside and the excitement of the 
men on the inner side was deafening,” Albert remembered.  Trapped, the 
Americans attempted to tunnel through the adobe walls to freedom.  Albert 
escaped, “in the confusion,” and fled for the timber-clad hills surrounding the mill.  
Although bullets peppered his coat and clipped the brim from his cap, he escaped 
to safety.  However, he still had a treacherous 140-mile trek over the mountains to 
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the Arkansas River.  Days later, he reached Pueblo with the news of the assault.
26
  
Although Albert believed himself the sole survivor of the attack, two of his 
companions also escaped.  When the attackers fired the mill, Turley, Tom Tobin, 
and William LeBlanc dug through the walls and fled.  The Mexicans and Indians 
caught Turley in the hills and killed him.  Tobin escaped to Santa Fe, while 
LeBlanc continued to the settlement at Greenhorn on the upper Arkansas.
27
  New 
Mexicans also killed eight American traders at Mora, drove off the livestock from 
the Bent-St. Vrain ranch on the Ponil River, and harassed government grazing 
parties near Las Vegas.
28
 
The news of his brother‟s death reached William Bent at a Cheyenne village 
along the Arkansas River.  From Pueblo, Albert had continued down the Arkansas, 
bringing the news of the uprising to Bent‟s Fort.  From the fort, trader Louy 
Simmons carried the message downriver to Bent.
29
  Garrard, staying in the same 
lodge with Bent, reconstructed Simmons‟s account in the mountain vernacular.  
“So when Charles was down to Touse to see his woman, the palous (loafers) 
charged afore sunrise,” Simmons began.  “The portal was too strong fur „em, an‟ 
they broke in with axes, an‟ a Purblo, cached behint a pile of dobies, shot him with 
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a Nor‟west fuse twice, an‟ skulped him.”
30
  The Cheyennes were enraged by the 
news, Garrard wrote.  The chiefs consulted with each other and proposed to Bent 
that they raise a party of warriors to march to Taos and scalp every Mexican they 
found.  Bent tactfully refused the offer.  Doubt and uncertainty mingled with grief 
along the Arkansas.  Might not the Mexicans overwhelm the Santa Fe garrison, 
and march north to the Arkansas?  Certainly Bent‟s Fort offered a tempting prize.  
The following morning, Garrard and Bent departed for the fort.  Upon arriving 
Bent called his men together and explained the situation to them, asking them 
whether they would accompany him south to avenge his brother.  The agitated 
men responded overwhelmingly in the affirmative, “declaring themselves ready to 
wade up to their necks in Mexican blood.”  Anxious for news of their other loved 
ones in Taos, Bent and his men rode south, consciously aware that they knew little 
of the actual situation.  However, before they reached Taos, they encountered an 
Indian servant of George Bent, riding north towards the fort.  The man informed 




Upon receiving the news of Bent‟s death, Price quickly organized his men 
to march north.  Price got word of the uprising on January 20, most likely from 
Charles Towne.  One story says a friendly Indian brought the news, another that a 
messenger from Padre Martínez alerted Price to the unrest.  James Beckwourth 
gave the honor to Towne.  The mountain man was reposing in his Santa Fe home 
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when “a violent rapping at my gate,” caught his attention.  Beckwourth rushed to 
the gate, where he found an exhausted and distraught Towne.  The messenger 
clasped Beckwourth around the neck, “and gave vent to uncontrolled emotion,” as 
he related the story of the massacre and his escape.  Beckwourth then took Towne 
to see Price, who “immediately adopted the most effective measures.”  On January 




Accompanying Price‟s Missouri troops was a volunteer company raised by 
Ceran St. Vrain.  The events in Taos galvanized the American community in Santa 
Fe.  The Santa Fe Republican noted that, “The merchants almost universally 
closed their stores and started with the determination of avenging the death of their 
fellow citizens….all were determined for either death or revenge.”  Most of the 
men St. Vrain recruited, Wooton included, had lost friends or acquaintances in the 
revolt.  Wooton recalled, “Among those who had been so brutally murdered at 
Taos and Arroyo Hondo were men who had been my warmest and best friends 
ever since I had come to the country, and I felt that I should, if possible, do 
something toward securing punishment of their murderers and protecting the 
property which they had left, for the use of those who were entitled to it.”
33
 
Price‟s column had two sharp skirmishes with rebels on the difficult march 
to Taos.  At Cañada, St. Vrain‟s scouts discovered the enemy dug in along a ridge, 
and “three strong houses” at the base of the hills.  The four twelve-pound 
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American howitzers opened fire on the strong points from an elevated position.  
When the Mexicans attempted to divert the attention of the regulars by attacking 
the column‟s supply train, St. Vrain‟s volunteers held them off.  Price then ordered 
a general advance, before which the enemy scattered.  Nightfall prevented pursuit, 
but Price had won a solid victory.  His losses included two killed and six 
wounded; he counted thirty-six enemy dead.  The next skirmish took place at 
Embudo.  Between six and seven hundred rebels once again held a strong, elevated 
defensive position.  “The rapid slopes of the mountains rendered the enemy‟s 
position very strong, and its strength was increased by the dense masses of cedar 
and large fragments of rock which everywhere offered them shelter,” Price wrote.  
Nevertheless, Price‟s men, with St. Vrain‟s on the left, outflanked the defensive 
positions and put the rebels to flight with heavy losses.  Price‟s column reached 
Taos on February 2, 1847, after a march “through deep snow.”  Despite their frost-
bitten feet and “jaded” condition, the Americans were spoiling for a fight.  The 
sights that greeted them in Taos further aroused their ire.  Wooton spoke of sacked 
stores and burned houses.  Beckwourth claimed that the “mutilated and disfigured” 




The battle for Taos took place over two days.  On February 3, after he 
reconnoitered the enemy‟s position, Price ordered his artillery to begin a 
bombardment.  Prepared for Price‟s retribution, the rebels retreated to the Taos 
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Pueblo, a position eminently suited to defense.  Price admitted that he found the 
pueblo, “a place of great strength, being surrounded by adobe walls and strong 
pickets….The town was admirably calculated for defense, every point of the 
exterior walls and pickets being flanked by some projecting building.”  The 
following day, he ordered an assault on the pueblo, focusing upon the parish 
church.  The American batteries began firing at nine o‟clock and continued until 
eleven, with little effect.  Infantry assaults upon the northern and western walls, 
and upon the church, failed.    Around 3:30, Price moved his artillery forward to 
within two hundred yards of the church, and opened fire with grapeshot.  Facing 
little resistance, the gunners wheeled a six pounder to within sixty yards of the 
church doors, blowing holes in the walls and doors.  The Americans continued 
their advance, bringing the gun to within ten yards of the church, and fired three 
rounds of grapeshot into the crowded sanctuary.  The soldiers charged, and “took 
the church without opposition,” as the defenders fled.
35
   
As Price‟s guns raked the church with grapeshot, many of the defenders fled 
the pueblo in an attempt to reach the safety of the mountains.  The colonel, 
however, had placed St. Vrain‟s mounted volunteers on the outskirts of town with 
orders to prevent reinforcement of the enemy, and to cut off any escape attempt.  
St. Vrain‟s men responded with alacrity.  About fifty of the defenders broke for 
the mountains.  The volunteers rode them down.  Wooton recalled that the fighting 
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was bloody, that they “were resisted as stoutly as were the American soldiers upon 
any battlefield of the Mexican War.”  The Americans showed no mercy.  “We 
pursued them, and not much quarter was asked or given,” Wooton stated matter-
of-factly.  Another wrote that the Americans “followed and slew them as long as it 
was daylight, to see them.” The Santa Fe Republican reveled in the thoroughness 
of St. Vrain‟s victory.  The paper gloated that, “scarcely one of the enemy was left 
to tell the tale,” estimating that the volunteers killed eighty-five Indians and 
Mexicans.
36
  There was melodrama among the slaughter.  Legend says that during 
the fight St. Vrain encountered Pablo Chavez, a ringleader of the uprising.  Chavez 
wore the blood-stained coat and shirt of Charles Bent.  The St. Louis Daily Union 
reported that, “Mr. St. Vrain, it seems, the late partner of Charles Bent, has 
wreaked vengeance upon the probable murderer of his friend.”  George Frederick 
Ruxton has one of the characters in his semi-fictional Life in the Far West 
reporting, “The Greasers payed for Bent‟s scalp, they tell me.  Old St. Vrain went 
out of Santa Fe with a company of mountain men, and they way they made „em 
sing out was „slick as shootin.‟ He „counted a coup‟ did St. Vrain. He throwed a 
Pueblo as had on poor Bent‟s shirt. I guess he tickled that niggur‟s hump ribs.”  
Another story says that St. Vrain would have died in the battle had not one of the 
volunteers saved his life.  Manuel Chaves and Dick Wooton both claimed the 
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honor of saving St. Vrain‟s life.
37
  When the smoke of battle cleared, Price had 
won a resounding victory.  His report estimated 150 rebels dead and an unknown 
number wounded.  The Americans lost seven dead in the fighting, in addition to 45 




News of the revolt and the retribution took longer to spread outside of New 
Mexico.  On February 7, Doniphan‟s soldiers encamped at El Paso emerged from 
church services to hear the news that “Governor Bent and all the Americans in 
Taos were assassinated.”
39
  The news also flowed slowly east, along the Santa Fe 
Trail.  On February 16, Donaciano Vigil wrote James Buchanan informing him of 
Bent‟s death, though the letter would not reach Washington for some time.  Bent‟s 
friend James Abert heard about the “fiendish massacre” while encamped along 
Cow Creek.  He lamented to his journal that, “everyone in that country looked 
upon Charles Bent as one in a thousand.”
40
  By early-March, the story appeared in 
the St. Louis papers.  The Reveille received the news from Lucien Maxwell on 
March 9.  A headline in the same day‟s issue told of, “SAD NEWS FROM 
SANTA FE. SLAUGHTER OF GOV. CHAS. BENT AND TWENTY 
AMERICANS – RISING OF THE RABBLE AND THREATENED ATTACK 
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ON SANTA FE, &tc.”  Niles‟ National Register picked up a report from the 
Independence Expositor from March 25 for its eastern readership.
41
  Definitive 
news of Price‟s victory did not reach Missouri until April 1847.  On April 8, 
newspaper editor Robert H. Miller received word from Gallatin, Missouri, of a 
raucous celebration.  The news of victories by Zachary Taylor near Saltillo 
resulted in “the most enthusiastic thrilling of patriotic joy,” Volney Bragg wrote.  
The militia discharged round after round in celebration, while the air resounded 
with “deafening huzzas for great Taylor,” and even the “temperance men” 
celebrated with refreshing “Taylor bumpers.”  Price and his men were not 
“forgotten in these joyous conclamations,” Bragg assured Miller.  Ironically, as 
late as the end of March, the War Department still lacked official confirmation of 
Bent‟s death, let alone the victory at Taos.
42
 
American authorities moved quickly to put on trial those arrested for 
treason in the wake of the violence.  The first trials began in Santa Fe in March.  
The basis of the government‟s case revolved around the treachery and 
ungratefulness of the New Mexican population.  Rather than express gratitude for 
their liberation from years of oppressive government, the local citizenry had risen 
up in treasonous rebellion against the new political order.  As a result of the trials 
in Santa Fe, the court handed down four indictments for treason, with one ultimate 
conviction.  The defendants, the prosecution claimed, had by their actions, 
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maliciously intended to “subvert the laws and constitution of the United States.”  
Not only did the leaders of the rebellion demonstrated terrible judgment, they 
provided an “evil example” for the rest of the population, swaying the rabble, and 
inciting their basest passions against the United States.
43
 
Despite the assumed guilt of the defendants, the conviction of Antonio 
Maria Trujillo for treason caused some Americans great disquiet.  During the trial, 
the prosecuting attorneys produced revolutionary circulars addressed to Trujillo, 
which urged him to raise and arm the men of the region, “in defense of our 
abandoned country.”  Both the prosecution and Judge Joab Houghton chastised 
Trujillo for his lack of loyalty to the United States.  The judge was especially 
harsh in his condemnation of the convicted man.  Houghton seethed, labeling 
Trujillo a reprobate.  “Not content with the peace and security in which you lived 
under the present government secure in all your personal rights as a citizen in 
property in person and in your religion you gave your name and influence to 
measures intended to effect a universal murder…and overthrow of the 
government,” Houghton concluded.  Citing the decision of the “enlightened and 
liberal jury,” Houghton sentenced Trujillo to death by hanging.  The death penalty, 
however, proved unpopular, and an appeal by Donaciano Vigil and other 
prominent citizens soon reached President Polk.  Under instructions from the 
president, Secretary of War Marcy wrote Sterling Price to point out that only 
Congress could decide the legal status of the inhabitants of any territory annexed 
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during war.  As such, Trujillo was not yet a citizen of the United States.  The 
charge for murder might stand, but a conviction for treason, Polk would not 
accept.  Marcy added, however, that the administration shared the sentiments of 




The trials for the Taos rebels began in April.  Lewis Garrard, a young 
easterner vacationing with Ceran St. Vrain and company employee John Hatcher, 
left the only eyewitness account of the trial and the resulting executions.  The 
accused men stood no chance of a fair trial in Taos.  Friends and supporters of the 
slain governor filled the court offices.  Charles Beaubien presided as judge.  Bent‟s 
brother George served as jury foreman, while Ceran St. Vrain acted as court 
interpreter.  Among the other jurors were acquaintances and employees of Bent-St. 
Vrain.  Garrard could not help commenting upon the makeup of the court.  
“American judges sat on the bench, New Mexicans and Americans filled the jury 
box, and an American soldiery guarded the halls.  Verily, a strange mixture of 
violence and justice – a strange middle ground between the martial and common 
law,” he wrote.
45
  The court heard testimony from several Mexican witnesses, 
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including the wives of Kit Carson and Charles Bent.  Señora Bent‟s testimony, 
Garrard noted, was especially damning.  Before the assembly, she calmly pointed 
out her husband‟s murderer.  The accused, however, betrayed no sign of agitation, 
rather he presented “an almost sublime spectacle of Indian fortitude,” the young 
observer marveled.
46
  The jury deliberated for a “few minutes” before returning 
with the verdict.  In the dimly lit courtroom, Judge Beaubien pronounced sentence, 
“in his solemn and impressive manner.”  The jury found all six men guilty, five of 
murder, one of treason.
47
  Due to overcrowding in the jail, Beaubien expedited 
their execution.  The treason conviction left Garrard deeply troubled.  Although he 
agreed wholeheartedly with the murder convictions, he could not bring himself to 




The convicted men died on April 9, 1847.  The day dawned, perhaps 
incongruously,  Garrard thought, with an “unspotted” sky.  Indeed, the entire Taos 
Valley “wore an air of calm repose.” Around nine o‟clock, an escort marched the 
six men to the plaza, under the eyes of 230 American troops and a howitzer.  The 
Mexicans mounted a makeshift gallows – a long board thrown across a wagon, the 
nooses attached to a tree limb.  Before they died, one of the convicted broke down, 
muttering something about his mother and father.  Garrard had far more respect 
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for the accused traitor.  He faced his death like a true patriot, the young American 
recalled.  The man denounced the whole trial as a sham, reaffirmed his innocence, 
and told the Americans assembled in the plaza to go to hell.  The executioner 
slapped the mules, which sprang away from under the tree.  The six bodies 
dangled, swaying back and forth, Garrard wrote.  “While thus swinging, the hands 
of two came together, which they held with a firm grasp till the muscles loosened 
in death,” he reported.  Garrard then helped cut down the bodies, before retreating 
to a local cantina to split a bowl of eggnog with the jubilant Americans.
49
  Years 
later, however, William Boggs recalled the hanging scene differently.  According 
to Boggs, the condemned men lamented their actions, admitting to the assembly 
that the governor had always been a true and generous friend.  They cursed their 
chiefs and the priests for deceiving them, and angrily demanded that the main 
conspirators own up to their actions and face the consequences.  Despite the 
intercessory efforts of Padre Martínez, who wrote Price condemning the American 
juries as “a class of ignorant men…tainted with passion,” the hangings continued 
throughout the rest of April and into May.
50
 
The Americans did not limit their assignation of blame only to the men tried 
and condemned in Santa Fe and Taos.  As soon as word spread of the revolt, 
American authorities scrambled to find villains behind the violence.  Contrary to 
Bent‟s late-December assessment of the rebels as men of no standing, men of the 
highest social standing were prominent among those most discontented with 
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American rule.   However, the revolt was not merely the work of a powerful few, 
who manipulated a gullible mob to do their bidding.  Rather, the violence that 
erupted in Taos cut across class and racial lines.  As noted, the uprising itself 
might have been spontaneous, but the problems contributing to it were 
longstanding, and affected all levels of society in northern New Mexico.
51
 
Some, both Anglo and Hispanic, blamed the violence on the region‟s 
contentious citizenry, and its long history of revolutionary behavior.  The Rio 
Arriba country figured prominently in every major outbreak of civil unrest in New 
Mexican history, from the Spanish period down to the Mexican-American War.  
The native inhabitants of the region played a major role in the Pueblo Rebellion of 
1680, and were among the last subdued by Vargas during the reconquest in the 
late-1690s.  Rebels from the region led the uprising that unseated and killed 
Governor Albino Perez in 1837.  Native New Mexicans themselves recognized a 
deep, underlying streak of independence and belligerence in the inhabitants of Rio 
Arriba.  Oral recollections of the Taos Revolt described the citizens of the region 
as a “rough and ready, fire-eating element.”
52
  Donaciano Vigil went to great 
lengths to convince American authorities that the blame for the violence rested 
solely upon the disgruntled northerners.  In February, he issued a circular to the 
citizens of  New Mexico, laying out the causes of the violence, and those 
responsible for it.  Vigil singled out Taos and its inhabitants for special criticism.  
The valley, he declared, “sheltered in her bosom a class of population wholly 
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demoralized, the history of whose civil existence is a record of a series of crimes.”  
Most notable among these, Vigil cited the 1837 rebellion, and the attacks on 
foreigners during the Texas troubles of 1843.  Vigil did not blame the new 
American regime for bringing violence upon itself.  Rather, the official cited a 
long history of criminal neglect on the part of the Mexican government, which 
failed repeatedly to reign in the rowdy northerners.  Never had officials in Santa 
Fe called the men of Rio Arriba to account.  “The apathetic and criminal conduct 
of the previous administrations with respect to popular commotions, gave…much 
encouragement to the perpetrators of these crimes,” Vigil complained.  Anglos 
added their own commentary on the Taoseños, both Hispanic and Native 
American.  The Pueblos, in particular, James Madison Cutts wrote, “were 
accounted the most warlike and the bravest race in Mexico; certainly the 
circumstances of the murder of Governor Bent…evince their extreme barbarity.”  
The St. Louis Daily Era added that they, “are in a degraded condition, scarcely 
half-civilized, and might be excited to murder without difficulty.”  George 
Frederick Ruxton also gave much the same opinion, writing of the New Mexicans, 
“cruel, as all cowards are, they unite savage ferocity with their want of animal 
courage; as an example of which, their recent massacre of Governor Bent and 
other Americans may be given – one of a hundred instances”.
53
 
Observers like Vigil were also quick to argue that the rabble was 
responsible for the violence in Taos, while the most responsible citizens had held 
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aloof.  He wrote Buchanan of the revolt, “in the north hardly a man of wealth or 
consequence has been concerned.”  He went on to blame the Indians and the 
“lower class of people” for assassinating the Americans and pillaging their homes.  
Murdering Bent was not enough for this “revolutionary army,” Vigil continued.  
He poured out his condemnation of the rebels, calling them a “gang,” 
“scoundrels,” “desperadoes,” and “the rabble.”  Any of the better sorts who 
became mixed up in the rebellion had certainly been intimidated into joining the 
rebel army, Vigil assured Buchanan.
54
  The Missouri newspapers took their 
discussion of the perpetrators a step further by differentiating between the rebels 
and the New Mexican victims.  The rabble was made up of “Mexicans,” the St. 
Louis Daily Era claimed, wreaking their vengeance upon “all the Spaniards 
supposed to be favorable to the American cause.”
55
 
Fickle as the New Mexican “rabble” might be, most Americans attributed 
the violence to a designing few of high social standing.  Lewis Garrard wrote that, 
“It was afterward seen that designing men – artful and learned natives – were 
busily, insidiously sowing the seeds of discontent among the more ignorant class 
of the community.”  Loyal Taos Indians fingered Diego Archuleta, Pablo 
Montoya, and Manuel Antonio Chaves as being among the principal architects of 
the revolt.  Hispanic oral tradition affirms Archuleta‟s leadership.  The Chicano 
newspaper, El Grito del Norte, portrayed Archuleta‟s involvement as a redemptive 
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action.  The same man whom Magoffin bought off with promises of his own 
political fiefdom west of the Rio Grande, turned upon the treacherous Americans 
when Kearny annexed the entire territory.  Another source speaks of Archuleta‟s 
military training and his delusion that a Mexican army was marching from the 
south to compliment the actions of the rebels.
56
  Stories told by both sides agree 
that demagogues kept the rabble awake through the night preceding the violence, 
haranguing them and plying them with liquor in the local cantinas.  Hispanic 
sources lament these actions.  “Archuleta committed the grave mistake of allowing 
them to partake plentifully of liquor which turned them into real savages; and they 
ran out of control, that being the real cause of the butcheries at Taos and the Rio 
Hondo,” Luis Martínez recalled in a 1936 newspaper interview.  Had the leaders 
of the plot not made this mistake, Martínez claimed, Bent and the others probably 
would not have been killed.  On the other hand, L. Bradford Prince informed an 
assembly in Santa Fe that the drinking was part of the plan.  “Demagogues were 
haranguing the population and inflaming their passions,” he thundered.  “Whiskey 
and wine were flowing without stint and the excitement and tumult increased with 
the passing hours…the Mexicans and Indians were aroused to a condition of 
frenzy.”  Vigil also used the language of mental imbalance to attach blame to the 
conspirators.  He wrote scathingly of Montoya‟s “insane passions,” and his “brutal 
sacrifice of defenseless victims.”
57
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Probably the most enigmatic figure in the entire controversy surrounding 
the revolt was Padre Martínez.  Accounts of the priest and the actions he took 
during the time of the revolt are highly biased, making it impossible to make a 
definitive statement regarding his culpability.  Despite disagreement over the role 
he played in northern New Mexican society in general, and his supposed 
connection to the revolt, commentators on both sides agree that the priest was 
probably the most influential New Mexican in the Rio Arriba.  He also possessed a 
keen political sense, and felt he had ample reason to oppose the American Party, 
and Charles Bent in particular.
58
 
Many Anglos, including Bent, felt uneasy about the priest‟s political power 
in the region.  As early as February 1846, Manuel Alvarez wrote James Buchanan 
of the padre‟s machinations.  “I am informed,” the consul wrote, “that on the night 
of the 18
th
 ult. a sermon was delivered to the people of…Taos assembled for the 
purpose by their Curate – bitterly denouncing the annexation of any part of this 
country to the United States…to excite the strongest prejudices against the 
Americans…and endeavoring to arouse the people to a determined resistance.”  
Only days before the revolt, Bent reported a “very strong anti annexation sermon,” 
preached by Martínez in Taos.  Rumors reached the governor that the priest, “has 
directed some of the citizens to attack the soldiers heare and if possible to drive 
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them of, the truth of this I doe not affirm.”
59
  Other friends of the governor, 
including Kit Carson blamed the priests in New Mexico, particularly Martínez, for 
stirring up anti-American sentiment.  Historian Ralph Emerson Twitchell 
concurred, writing that the new political and social regime posed a direct threat to 
the fortunes of the Taos priest.
60
 
Martínez apologists, on the other hand, argue that although he was unable to 
prevent the revolt, the priest took steps to protect the lives of potential victims.  
New Mexican tradition states that the priest‟s home became a safe haven for those 
fleeing the mob.  Luis Martínez recalled that a terrified crowd gathered outside the 
priest‟s house, banging on the door and shouting, “For God‟s sake open the door! 
Open it! The Indians are murdering Don Carlos Bent, Don Luis Lee, and others!”  
According to this story, not only did Martínez give sanctuary to the refugees, he 
also armed his personal retainers, ordered them to construct breastworks, and “to 
repel any assault at all cost.” Martínez goes on to claim that it was the priest who 
first sent word to Price in Santa Fe informing him of the violence and begging for 
reinforcements.
61
  American testimony corroborates the padre‟s actions on behalf 
of the Americans during the revolt.  Specifically, numerous sources mention that 
he saved the life of Elliott Lee, brother of the slain sheriff.  The story goes that Lee 
fled to Martínez‟s home, where the priest hid him under a pile of wheat.  When the 
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rebels came and demanded his return, the padre “interceded for him so strongly 
that they abandoned their purpose,” Richard Smith Elliott wrote.
62
  Other writers 
argue that the political positions the priest and his family held in the period 
following the revolt, are evidence that the Americans could not have blamed him 
for collaborating with the rebels.  If he had, why would the Americans not have 
charged him with anything, let alone honored him with political office.
63
  
Almost as quickly as they sought to uncover the identity of the villains 
behind the revolt, Americans moved to eulogize the fallen governor.  Bent‟s 
brother-in-law, Kit Carson gave his imprimatur to the stories circulating about the 
governor‟s magnanimity and friendliness.  “His death was regretted by all that 
knew him,” Carson wrote.  Even those who had known Bent but a short time 
offered their own pleasant memories.  Frank Edwards recalled that when the news 
reached his mess in Mexico, it affected all of them.  The governor had mingled 
with them in Santa Fe, Edwards wrote, “showing, in many ways, his amiable 
disposition.”  Others mixed their grief with expressions of outright surprise, 
followed quickly by a condemnation of the treachery inherent in the Mexican 
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character.  The governor‟s merciless assassination was his reward for trying to 
better the lot of the benighted populace, they wrote accusingly.
64
 
The American conquest of New Mexico should have represented the 
ultimate triumph for Bent-St. Vrain.  Years of cultivating business ties with the 
local inhabitants of the region placed the partners in a prominent position within 
New Mexico.  Once Bent became governor, he could finally ignore the grumblings 
of the Martínez faction.  However, a decades-worth of frustration over the 
company‟s sometimes shady business practices and political associations 
ultimately played a prominent role in the violence that erupted in January 1847.  
Ignored by the new government, bullied by the volunteers, and fearful of their 
eroding status within the new regime, the New Mexicans rose up against the 
Americans.  Although the immediate violence in Taos was spontaneous, the rebels 
targeted their victims with great care.  Anyone closely associated with the Bents 
and the new government faced violent reprisal.  The familial and business ties that 
once held such potential for mercantile success and land acquisition only 
exacerbated the discontent of the nationalist Mexican faction.  Those New 
Mexicans who allied themselves with the Americans paid a bloody price for their 
dreams of fortune.  In the wake of the revolt, the company‟s fall from prominent 
heights came with dizzying speed.  Charles Bent‟s death proved the catalyst for 
the declining fortunes of the remaining partners.  However, the Americanization of 
New Mexico, disease, and the insatiable demands the American markets placed 
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upon the Company‟s best Indian customers ushered in two years of confusion and 
discontent, ultimately resulting in the dissolution of the most powerful American 






Chapter 14 - Collapse: 1847-1849 
 
 The fortunes of Bent-St. Vrain declined rapidly and precipitously following 
the extension of American power into the Southwest Borderlands.  Before the year 
was over, Ceran St. Vrain and William Bent dissolved a partnership that had lasted 
nearly two decades.  However, because of the convergence of numerous factors, 
many beyond his control, Bent abandoned the Arkansas River post in the summer 
of 1849.  Increased traffic on the Santa Fe Trail during the Mexican-American War, 
combined with a much larger American military presence in the region made 
interactions with local Indian groups tense and often dangerous.  Indians and whites 
clashed over the rapidly diminishing natural resources of the region.  Disease also 
decimated the Southern Cheyennes, Bent‟s best customers.  Finally, the depletion 
of the bison herds, due to both market hunting and natural phenomena made 
profitable business ventures more difficult.  In 1849, rather than turn the fort over 
to the United States, Bent set fire to his post and moved his operations down the 
Arkansas River to the region around the Big Timbers.  William Bent realized that 
the glory days of the Company were over, in part because of the forces the Bent 
brothers and Ceran St. Vrain had helped set in motion almost twenty years before. 
 As early as the 1830s, some in the United States government recognized the 
potential benefits of establishing a military presence on the upper Arkansas River.  
Such a post, John Daugherty informed Superintendant of Indian Affairs William 
Clark, would act as a rendezvous point for fur trappers and Santa Fe traders.  More 
importantly, mounted troops stationed at such a post could routinely patrol the 
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region, “protecting an invaluable commerce with the Mexicans and Indians, and 
maintaining peace and tranquility along that extensive and exposed frontier.”  
Daugherty drove the same points home in a letter to the Secretary of War, Lewis 
Cass.  Stressing the protective nature of such a post, Daugherty assured Cass that 
the soldiers garrisoning a fort along the Arkansas would provide crucial protection 
to traders whose work benefitted the entire economy of the western frontier.
1
  
Writing from Bent‟s Fort in 1835, Colonel Henry Dodge elaborated on the points 
made by Daugherty.  Dodge suggested the establishment of a military position forty 
miles downriver from Bent‟s Fort.  In addition, the officer urged the establishment 
of an Indian agency to serve the tribes of the region.  Such an agency, he wrote, 
would be instrumental in restoring peace to the region.  Intertribal peace, in turn, 
would stimulate the regional economy, securing Bent‟s Fort as the great entrepot of 
the buffalo robe trade.
2
 
 Although generally loath to involve the government in his personal business 
matters, Charles Bent, too, had offered his considered advice regarding the 
potential for a military installation near the company fort on the border.  In a letter 
forwarded to Manuel Alvarez for comment, Bent wrote that, “some point on the 
Arkansas River, between what is known as the big Timber on said river, and the 
foot of the Rocky Mountains, would be most sutable.”  Bent specifically suggested 
constructing the post at the junction of the Arkansas and the Fontaine qui Bouille, a 
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point “about equidistant from the north Platt (the rout to the Origan) and the 
Santefe trace; and at the same time in the hart of the Indian range.”  Such a position 
could cover both the trails along the Platte and the Arkansas while simultaneously 
presenting a strong front against “all the different Indian tribes in the vasinity of 
theas two points,” he concluded.
3
 The trader revealed his true motives for 
suggesting a military presence in the region in a January letter to the 
Superintendant of Indian Affairs.  Liquor smuggling, especially on the part of 
“several renigate Americans,” along the Fontaine qui Bouille, threatened to disrupt 
not only Indian relations, but also the profits of Bent-St. Vrain.  This illicit trade, 
Bent complained, constituted a “great injury” to both local Indians and licensed 
American traders.  Furthermore, the posts from which these independent traders 
operated also catered to Mexican traders whose trade could disrupt the stability of 
relations between the two nations.  A fort, “would (be) sure to keep the Mexicans 
from tampering with the numerous tribes of Indians in the country, in case of war 
between the two countries, and at the same time teach the Indians to respect 
American citizens and their property,” Bent concluded.  Finally, he reiterated the 
possibility for “disagreeable consequences” should the government fail to establish 
a strong presence in the region.  It should be noted, however, that following these 
letters, Bent never again pushed so openly for a direct American military presence 
within his trading territory.
4
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 Increased commercial traffic over the Santa Fe Trail during the Mexican-
American War added a special urgency to calls for the government to anchor itself 
along the Arkansas.  Longtime mountain man and trader Thomas Fitzpatrick, the 
first United States Indian Agent appointed for the Upper Arkansas thought the 
construction of military posts paramount.  He envisioned a fort in the region as just 
one of many in a cordon stretching from the Rio Grande to the Missouri.  
Fitzpatrick recommended building a post on the Mora River southeast of Taos, or 
along the Mountain Branch of the Santa Fe Trail near Bent‟s Fort.  Difficulty 
securing forage, water, and fuel along the Cimarron Branch of the trail, he 
speculated, would lead traders to make greater use of the route over Raton Pass via 
Bent‟s Fort.  He wrote his superiors that, “by establishing posts or depots at 
conspicuous points on those rivers, efficient command over the whole country 
could be had, and from which expeditions could be performed at any season of the 
year to great advantage.”  In addition to a post, Fitzpatrick stressed the necessity of 
appointing an agent well-versed in Indian customs, who possessed a deep 
familiarity with the geography, politics, and trade patterns of the Southern Plains 
and Rockies.  Furthermore, observers including trades and military men urged the 
government to station mounted troops at any fort constructed by the government.  
Strategically positioned forts, garrisoned by mobile troops, under the direction of 
veteran leadership would go far towards securing peace and prosperity for everyone 
in the region, observers like Fitzpatrick concluded.
5
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 Fitzpatrick spent much of 1847 attempting to maintain the peaceful 
relationship between the United States government and the Cheyennes.  Utilizing 
Bent‟s Fort as an agency had advantages, for it gave the agent ready access to 
William Bent‟s expertise regarding the tribe.  Although the Cheyennes had had no 
quarrels with the United States, their close trade ties to the increasingly restless 
Kiowa and Comanche bands south of the Arkansas River, made it imperative that 
Fitzpatrick and Bent continue to cultivate close relations lest the Cheyennes turn 
their attention to raiding American caravans along the Santa Fe Trail.  Despite 
occasional unease, the agent and other government observers were confident of the 
goodwill of the Cheyennes.  The tribe seemed contented with the American 
presence along the Arkansas, and even expressed a desire to settle down at the 
agency, according to Indian agents and military men like Andrew Drips and James 
W. Abert.  In the summer of 1845, for example, Drips wrote the Superintendant in 
St. Louis that the Cheyennes, “are very anxious to have an agent among them.  
They say the Great Father…must have forgotten them entirely – they are well 
disposed towards the whites.”  In 1846, Abert reported a conversation he had with 
the Cheyenne chief Yellow Wolf.  The lieutenant informed his superiors that 
Yellow Wolf was cognizant of the fact that the traditional Cheyenne way of life 
was disappearing.  The buffalo herds were shrinking, and the Cheyennes must 
                                                                                                                                        
Thomas Fitzpatrick to John W. Abert, August 23, 1847, Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Received, 
Upper Platte Agency, Microfilm Reel 889 (hereafter cited as UPA); Fitzpatrick to William Madill, 
August 11, 1848, UPA, Reel 889.  On the necessity of mounted troops, see Stephen Watts Kearny, 





HED 2, Serial 480, 212; H. L. Routt to Robert H.  Miller, December 6, 1847, Folder 2, Robert H.  
Miller Papers, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.  Hereafter cited as MHS. 
376 
 
shortly become farmers after the fashion of the Americans.  After lamenting the 
government‟s lack of attention, and citing his tribe‟s peaceful relations with the 
whites, Yellow Wolf requested that the whites build the Cheyennes “a structure 
similar to Bent‟s Fort, and instruct them to cultivate the ground, and to raise cattle.”  
Throughout the autumn of 1847 and into the winter of 1848, Fitzpatrick echoed 
these sentiments regarding the Cheyennes.  In February 1848, he wrote his 
superiors that, “The Arapahos and Cheyennes have been competing whose conduct 
should be the most pleasing.”
6
   
The predisposition of the Cheyennes towards friendship with the 
Americans, combined with Fitzpatrick‟s efforts, secured peace with the tribes of the 
upper Arkansas.  In the spring of 1847, the agent gathered the Cheyennes at Bent‟s 
Fort for a council in which he reiterated the government‟s peaceful intentions, 
warned the Cheyennes against raiding along the Santa Fe Trail, and pointed out that 
the buffalo herds were diminishing.  Despite the fact that the groups signed no 
formal treaty, Fitzpatrick was cautiously optimistic.  “I have used my best endeavor 
to keep quiet and reconcile the Indians hereabout, and I flatter myself that I have in 
a manner succeeded.  Yet I am still apprehensive of a union between them and the 
Comanches, notwithstanding the Cheyennes have offered their services to fight in 
our behalf,” the agent informed his superiors.  He continued his efforts through the 
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winter, persuading the Cheyennes and most of the Arapahos to refrain from joining 
Kiowa and Comanche raiding parties along the trail, and even convincing some of 
these bands to cease their hostile actions.
7
 
The agent continued similar operations throughout 1848 and 1849.  Despite 
complaints that he lacked an interpreter and adequate supplies of gifts, Fitzpatrick 
held peace talks with the Northern Arapahos and Sioux along the South Platte 
River in February 1848.  Less is known about his specific duties during late-1848 
and 1849.  The agent held a few informal talks with local Indians around Bent‟s 
Fort, and negotiated for the release of some Mexicans held captive by the tribes.
8
   
Cultivating peaceful relations with the Cheyennes was especially important, 
for Indian raiding along the Santa Fe Trail escalated dramatically during the 
Mexican-American War.  By 1849, reports of depredations formed a sizable 
portion of the communication between New Mexican officials and their superiors 
in St. Louis and Washington.  Lack of sufficient manpower, especially mounted 
troops, allowed the Indians to raid at will James Calhoun reported to Madill.  The 
tribes had little respect for the new government, Calhoun continued; “they do not 
believe we have the power to chastise them.  Is it not time to enlighten them upon 
this subject, and put to an end their ceaseless depredations.  At this moment, above 
our established Indian country on the Arkansas, these people are committing every 
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depredation within their power, so far up as Bent‟s Fort.”
9
  Fitzpatrick also 
complained about Indian raiding, and argued for aggressive military action as the 
only way to curtail raiding along the trails.  Much of difficulty in dealing with 
Indians, he claimed, resulted from coddling by the government.  The agent 
complained of the “great forebearance and constant humoring of all their whims,” 
by officials in the Office of Indian Affairs and missionary lobbyists.  As early as 
1847, Fitzpatrick reported that the trail between Bent‟s Fort and Taos, “is becoming 
daily more dangerous for small parties.”
10
  The agent complained that any treaties 
he made were “less than useless,” without military muscle to back his play.  There 
would be no peace on the plains until the United States military demonstrated its 
ability to punish raiding tribes.  Fitzpatrick wrote, “these Indians are not at all 
aware of our capacity or power to chastise them and never will believe it until they 
have proof of the fact, and that can only be done by giving some of these tribes…a 
severe chastisement – that once done I firmly believe would be the means of 
putting a stop to the frequent robberies and murders in that country.”
11
 
Never had the trail been as crowded as in the years between 1846 and 1849.  
In addition to the regular flow of merchant caravans, active troops, discharged 
troops, quartermaster supply trains, surveying parties, and dispatch bearers 
crowded the route along the Arkansas.  In 1849, D. D.  Mitchell noted laconically, 
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“Our relations with the various prairie tribes…are very much changed by our 
territorial acquisitions in New Mexico, and on the Pacific Coast.”  While Mitchell 
did not dispute the legality of the traffic crossing the Southern Plains, he pointed 
out that its increased frequency led to more trouble.  Prior to the war, “there were 
only a few Mexicans and Indians passing through this section of the country,” and 
they purchased safe passage through trade.  Furthermore, he pointed out that Indian 
raiding posed the least threat to white travelers during the winter months, when, 
“there is no passing, and repassing of troops, traders, or immigrants across the 
plains, consequently no Indian depredations can be committed.”
12
  Other observers 
noted this phenomenon long before Mitchell.  In July 1847, M.L. Baker wrote, “the 
whole road is full of hostile Indians who are plundering all the trains not guarded 
by a military escort.”  Fitzpatrick also drew a direct connection between the war 
and increasing Indian hostilities.  “I can say that the country is at present in a far 
less state of security and tranquility than before the commencement of the Mexican 
War or before the marching and countermarching of United States troops to and 
from New Mexico the assertions of the Washington journals to the contrary 
notwithstanding,” he informed his superiors.  In August 1848, he was more frank: 
“The Santa Fe Road at the present time is in…need of some speedy measures for its 
protection.”
13
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American observers noted that, in addition to their sheer volume, the types 
of travelers along the Santa Fe Trail stimulated Indian raiding.  At the beginning of 
the Mexican-American War, the Army faced a severe shortage of experienced 
teamsters.  Private traders employed the most experienced bull-whackers and 
wagoneers.  Because the military required an enormous amount of supplies, 
government officials employed whomever they could find to guard and handle the 
wagons and teams streaming back and forth along the length of the trail.  Most of 
the government teamsters were raw and inexperienced; they let stock stray, 
panicked at the slightest whisper of Indian trouble, and proved singularly inept at 
defending themselves.
14
  William Clark had recognized the importance of 
experienced plainsmen to this overland trade as early as 1831.  He wrote the 
Secretary of War that, “the safety of a Trading party either to Mesico or in the 
direction of the Mountains will depend principally on the material composing it: If 
they are men of great prudence and firmness and withal have a sufficient 
acquaintance with the Indian character, there chance of success is good, but if on 
the contrary, the party is composed of raw young men…their destruction is 
certain.”  Fitzpatrick, characteristically, was more direct.  He informed his 
superiors that, “no sooner than the Indians learned that „greenhorns‟ were again on 
the trail they changed their operations from the south to the north and as I am 
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Increased commercial and military traffic led to more intense conflict over 
diminishing natural resources along the length of the Santa Fe Trail.  Teamsters, 
emigrants, and Indians clashed over access to grass, water, wood, game, and 
campsites.  Although these issues affected all the tribes of the region, the 
Comanches and Kiowas especially felt the pinch of diminishing resources, and they 
proved the most aggressive raiders.
16
  George Bent recalled that, during the Gold 
Rush, emigrants plied the Santa Fe Trail, shooting buffalo, cutting timber, and 
fouling traditional Indian camping grounds.  He noted, “in all the valleys for miles 
away from the river the grass was eaten down into the ground by the emigrants‟ 
hungry horses.”  Fitzpatrick felt that the destruction of game and cutting of timber 
by white travelers was not the fundamental cause of Indian hostility, but he feared 
with good reason that such actions would inevitably heighten tensions between the 
groups, and recommended that the Indians be in some way indemnified “for the 
trespass which they have of late commenced to complain of.”
17
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The most dramatic conflict over resources reported by white travelers was 
the cavalier and wasteful way in which they hunted the region‟s buffalo.  Indeed, 
the very presence of the herds helped underwrite the trade with Santa Fe.  A steady 
supply of buffalo meat allowed traders to dedicate less cargo space to foodstuffs, 
and more to trade goods.  The traffic of soldiers, traders, and emigrants combined 
with hunting expeditions by local tribes, tribes from the Indian Territory, and New 
Mexican ciboleros placed an increased strain upon the regional herds.  During his 
1846 adventure on the prairies, Francis Parkman wrote, “Great changes are at 
hand….With the stream of emigration to Oregon and California, the buffalo will 
dwindle away, and the large wandering communities who depend on them for 
support must be broken and scattered.”
18
  Comments on the wasteful way in which 
white travelers hunted buffalo are common throughout the primary literature of the 
western trails.  George Frederick Ruxton, no great admirer of Americans in general, 
wrote of the “cruel slaughter made by most of the white travelers across the plains, 
who wantonly destroy these noble animals, not ever for the excitement of sport, but 
in cold-blooded and insane butchery.”  In 1843, John C. Frémont‟s waspishly 
tempered cartographer Charles Preuss noted simply, “Shooting buffalo with the 
howitzer is a cruel but amusing sport.”  During the march of the Army of the West, 
Marcellus Ball Edwards criticized the bloodlust of his compatriots.  None of them 
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“feels satisfied with killing a sufficient number to supply all his wants.”  Rather, 
they killed as long their rifles were in range, “either to count in the future the 
number he has destroyed, or to obtain a tongue, a hump rib, or a marrow bone.”  
Because of such practices, Ball reported that the range of the herds had shrunk to 
the area between Pawnee Rock and Bent‟s Fort.
19
 
Indian raiders began striking trading caravans during the summer of 1846.  
Although the Army of the West marched to New Mexico without being harassed, 
wagon trains that followed Kearny were not always as fortunate.  Even the 1846 
eastbound Bent-St. Vrain caravan was attacked.   Comanches struck the company 
caravan in late-May, west of Pawnee Fork, killing one employee.  About one week 
later, traveling scientist Frederick Wislizenus encountered “the grave of the 
unfortunate man,” near the site of the attack.  Raiding during the latter part of the 
summer season prompted Ceran St. Vrain to take greater care in planning the return 
trip to Bent‟s Fort.  Initially, the trader departed ahead of his caravan with a small 
escort.  However, the members of an eastbound government wagon train informed 
him of Indian trouble ahead.  As a result, Lewis Garrard wrote, “he waited for us to 
come up, preferring slow travel and a large company to a small party and uncertain 
possession of his scalp.”
20
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Eighteen forty-seven proved the most hazardous trading season since 
William Becknell‟s first trip over the Santa Fe Trail in 1821.  A Comanche war part 
attacked their wagon train at the crossing of Walnut Creek on May 28, 1847.  The 
attackers killed one man, William Tharp, cutting him off from the caravan while he 
hunted buffalo.  The St. Louis Reveille reported that the attackers were Cheyennes 
and Arapahos, and that “the rascals drove off large numbers of mules and oxen, 
belonging to the party.”  The company lost forty head of stock in the attack.  Less 
than a week later, raiders struck the train at Ash Creek, but inflicting no casualties.  
The men reached Westport on June 9.
21
  Raiding remained a serious problem 
throughout the summer.  Former company employee turned independent trader, 
Alexander Barclay, sought the protection of St. Vrain‟s caravan, “in consequence 
of the depradations of the Comanches during the summer in the neighborhood of 
Pawnee Fork.”  The entire caravan arrived at Bent‟s Fort on September 23, 1847.
22
 
In the autumn of 1847, Fitzpatrick disconsolately wrote his superiors of the 
Indian situation along the trail.  “It is very evident,” he reported, “that our Indian 
affairs in this country and New Mexico are in a very bad state, and nothing having 
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yet transpired to check their ardour and hostile movements, are becoming still more 
insolent and emboldened every day.  Their great success on the Santa Fe road, with 
little or no loss, together with the failure of all the campaigns made by our troops in 
New Mexico against them…have had the worst possible effect.”  The agent 
pleaded with the government to send more troops to the region, and to accelerate 
the size and scope of their operations both along the Arkansas and in New Mexico.  
Indeed, he reported that the news and rumors of American incompetence in New 
Mexico circulated among the tribes of his agency, and “have a strong bearing on 
the dispositions of those under my jurisdiction,” the agent wrote in October.  To 
make matters worse, Fitzpatrick had received rumors of “a combination between 
the disaffected Mexicans, Apaches, and Comanche Indians,” for the purpose of 
“carrying on a guerrilla war against all travelers on the Santa Fe road next 
summer.”
23
  The total costs of the summer‟s raiding, in terms of lives and monetary 
losses, provided Fitzpatrick‟s superiors with startling confirmation of his 
pessimistic assessments.  The agent reported that the Comanches, Kiowas, and 
Pawnees were responsible for the deaths of forty-seven Americans, the destruction 




Such bleak reports prompted the Army to take action during 1847 and 1848.  
In the spring of 1847, an Army detachment began construction on Fort Mann, a 
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tiny outpost on the Arkansas, east of the Cimarron Cutoff.  By June, Comanche 
raiders made occupation untenable, and the post was abandoned.  In November, the 
newly formed “Indian Battalion,” under the command of William Gilpin 
reoccupied Fort Mann.  Gilpin‟s men were singularly unsuited for the task of 
protecting the commerce of the prairies.  Composed mostly of undersupplied and 
undertrained German immigrants, the force accomplished little of note between the 
autumn of 1847 and the final abandonment of Fort Mann a year later.
25
  While 
preparing for a spring campaign, Gilpin wintered his cavalry at Big Timbers, 
subsisting on whatever supplies he could buy from William Bent or the traders at 
Pueblo.  Bent aided the officer in procuring horses and mules for the Battalion‟s 
operations the following spring, accompanying Gilpin‟s column as far south as the 
trader‟s ranch near Mora.  From Mora, Gilpin conducted a fruitless search for 
hostiles along a great stretch of the South Canadian River, before turning north for 
Fort Mann.  Although the Indian Battalion proved incapable of finding Indians, let 
alone subduing them, Army detachments inflicted heavy casualties upon the 
Comanches in two other engagements, ending hostilities along the trail for the 
remainder of 1848.
26
  Despite having loudly and consistently demanding military 
aid, Fitzpatrick was caustic in his assessment of the Army‟s performance in 1848.  
He wrote that, “the Indians seem to have partially ceased their continued warring 
upon our people passing through the country, more particularly on the Santa Fe 
road, inasmuch as fewer attacks have been reported, and comparatively but little 
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loss sustained last season.”  However, the agent did not attribute this trend to 
Gilpin‟s martial prowess.  Rather, Fitzpatrick wrote that in 1846 and 1847, the 
Indians had “secured so much booty by their daring raids upon travelers,” that they 
“are now, and have been the past summer, luxuriating in and enjoying the spoils.”  
He cautioned, though, that raids would undoubtedly continue in 1849.
27
 
In this increasingly unstable environment, William Bent and Ceran St. 
Vrain dissolved a partnership that had lasted for nearly twenty years.  No details 
exist regarding the specifics of the dissolution.  Following the death of Charles 
Bent at Taos, William and St. Vrain reorganized their operations, forming the new 
partnership of St. Vrain and Bent.  William served as the new firm‟s junior partner.  
The men established a store in Santa Fe, located on the town plaza.  The store 
catered to a wide variety of consumer tastes.  Advertisements posted in the Santa 
Fe Republican testify to the diversity of the partners‟ stock of goods.  The 
newspaper proclaimed that this “extensive establishment” housed “a large and 
splendid assortment of goods of every variety from the United States,” at retail 
prices.  The partners sold clothing “of all kinds and qualities excelling in quantity 
and quality any ever opened in Santa Fe.”  Coffee, sugar, tea, jellies, butter, cheese, 
sperm candles, sardines, glassware, mackerel, oysters, raisins, “SUPERIOR 
LIQUORS” and “BOTTLED CHAMPAGNE,” could “be purchased uncommonly 
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  The partners operated the store for a short time, however.  In 
November, Joab Houghton bought out St. Vrain and Bent.  The Santa Fe 
Republican encouraged customers to patronize Houghton‟s establishment.  “No 
man deserves more consideration and respect of the public, and we hope to see him 
liberally patronized in his commercial pursuit,” the paper enthused.  One week 
later, the paper reported that “Capt. St. Vrain has sold out his stock of goods and 
returns to the United States.”
29
  William‟s sister, Dorcas Carr informed Silas Bent 
that, with the dissolution of St. Vrain and Bent, the former partners had settled all 
the debts they owed to the Chouteaus in St. Louis.  Why the men ended the 
partnership is unclear.  Charles Bent seems to have provided the driving energy 
behind the firm, and his death proved disillusioning to his partners.  David 
Lavender cites St. Vrain‟s increasing business connections with the Army in New 
Mexico.  He could make more money freighting and contracting for the military 
than he could in the Indian trade, Lavender concludes.
30
 
 It appears that the instability caused by the greatly enhanced American 
presence on the Arkansas and in New Mexico increasingly undermined the 
profitability of William Bent‟s Indian trade.  The escalating violence that 
accompanied the growing traffic along the Santa Fe Trail made travel and trade 
hazardous.  As noted earlier, Bent wagon trains suffered numerous attacks, 
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resulting in the loss of men and livestock.  While William Bent might urge the 
Cheyennes to maintain peace in the face of aggressive American expansion, other 
tribes did not differentiate between Bent‟s employees and those of other merchants 
or the government.  Company relations with the Comanches, for instance, began 
deteriorating as early as 1846.  Not only did the establishment of Bent‟s Fort on the 
Arkansas have the potential to disrupt the tribe‟s commercial dominance of the 
region, but expansion into the Texas Panhandle further undermined the 
Comanche‟s economic autonomy.  By usurping the role of the Comanches as the 
preeminent economic player in the region, Bent-St. Vrain inadvertently sowed 
seeds of hostility with their new customers.  Increasingly marginalized, the 
Comanches accelerated raiding into Mexico and along the Santa Fe Trail. Much of 
the partners‟ success in the Indian trade resulted from its relative isolation.  Far 
from the centers of American power, visited only occasionally by soldiers or Indian 
agents, relations with the Cheyennes remained stable.  However, with the advent of 
the Mexican-American War and the discovery of gold in California, whites poured 
into the Arkansas River Valley.  Familiarity increasingly bred contempt, discontent, 
and the potential for violent confrontation.  Bent found it increasingly difficult to 
persuade the Cheyennes that they might coexist peacefully with the newcomers.  
The voracious herds accompanying the emigrants and traders, and especially the 
depletion of the buffalo herds sparked retaliatory raiding.  The raids, in turn, 
prompted an increased military presence, which would initiate a new cycle of 
violence in the coming years.
31
 Douglas Comer writes, “The principals of the 
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BSVC had been greatly involved with the preparations for the Mexican War and 
were instrumental to the war‟s success.  It is ironic that the war destabilized the 
area to the extent that the BSVC could no longer survive.”  He continues, “The 
successful conquest of New Mexico by the United States…opened the area to new 
interests that would destroy the company and drive out William Bent‟s adopted 
people.”  Other factors also contributed to the decline in William Bent‟s fortunes.
32
 
Squeezed by so many new arrivals, the Cheyennes also suffered dreadfully 
from disease in the late 1840s.  Numerous scourges struck the Southern Plains in 
the 1840s, undermining the strength and vitality of local Indian groups.  Disease hit 
white travelers and traders as well.  Close, crowded environments, like those at 
Bent‟s Fort, provided a breeding ground for disease.  Douglas Comer speculates 
that one of the reasons for the decline and abandonment of Bent‟s Fort was cholera, 
the product of fouled wells supplying the post with water.  However, disease 
ravaged the tribes of the Southern Plains far worse than any whites in the region.
33
  
Although the great smallpox epidemic that devastated tribes like the Mandans in 
1837 had little effect on groups like the Cheyennes and Comanches, the disease 
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found its way to the region in 1839-1840.  The Kiowas called the winter of 1839-40 
the “Smallpox Winter.”  Their oral tradition states that Osage traders brought the 
disease, which killed many Comanches, Apaches, and Kiowas all over the Staked 
Plains.  The Southern Cheyennes dealt with measles and whooping cough in the 
middle of the decade.  George Bent informed George Bird Grinnell that 1845 was 
the worst year for the “Red Small Pox” among the Cheyennes.  Whooping cough 
came hard on the heels of this epidemic.  Disease, combined with the shifting 
migration patterns of the buffalo herds away from the Arkansas River made 1846 a 
very difficult year for the Southern Cheyennes.  Starvation became a major threat.
34
 
Cholera was the worst disease to strike the Southern Cheyennes during the 
final years of William Bent‟s operations.  The scourge came to Cheyenne country 
in a number of different ways.  California-bound emigrants, traveling along the 
Arkansas and Platte rivers probably infected some Indians.  It is also possible that 
those infected along the trails transmitted the disease to other bands.  The 1849 
cholera epidemic struck as far south as the Kiowa country.  James Mooney writes 
that hundreds of Kiowas died, and some committed suicide rather than succumb to 
the wasting disease.  A Cheyenne story says that the tribe caught the sickness from 
travelers along the Platte.  A raiding party searching for Pawnees happened upon an 
emigrant camp, already devastated by the disease.  Instantly recognizing the 
danger, the warriors fled south.  However, George Bent stated that one young 
warrior rode on ahead to warn the main camp along the Smoky Hill River.  The 
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man rode into camp and cried out that the “whole war party that he was with [was] 
now dying and falling off their horses with cramps.”  The Dog Soldiers in charge of 
the camp immediately ordered the panicked families to scatter.
35
   
Cheyenne and Kiowa sources agree that the Osages brought the worst of the 
disease to the Kiowa sun dance in 1849.  The events of that summer became seared 
into the collective memory of both tribes.  The Kiowas called the summer of 1849 
the “Cramp sun dance” summer.  George Bent recalled that all the tribes of the 
Southern Plains remembered the time “When the Big Cramps Took Place.”  The 
Kiowas held their annual sun dance on Mule Creek, located between Medicine 
Lodge Creek and the Salt Fork of the Arkansas.  The disease had an especially 
devastating psychological effect, because it struck so quickly.  Someone might 
wake up perfectly healthy in the morning, and be dead by noon.  The 1849 sun 
dance “was an awful big gathering” of Cheyennes, Kiowas, Comanches, Osages, 
and some Arapahos.  The Osages had come as traders, bringing with them goods 
like otter skins to barter during the festivities.  Unfortunately, disease travels over 
the same trails as trade goods.
36
 
The epidemic broke out during the middle of the religious ceremonies.  The 
Kiowas say that during the dancing, one man saw a vision, and began to prophesy 
about a coming calamity.  The rest of the people thought him “crazy” until one man 
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sickened and died within hours, then another, until within a few days the disease 
spread through the entire camp.  Kiowa tradition says half the tribe died as a result, 
though James Mooney thinks that figure an exaggeration.
37
  George Bent‟s 
Cheyenne sources provide more detail.  Porcupine Bull told Bent that a Kiowa sun 
dancer fell over and died within the sacred medicine lodge.  Then, an Osage trader 
died within “a few feet” of Porcupine Bull.  The man cried out for everyone to 
leave the lodge and abandon the camp.
38
  Sitting in Lodge remembered that the 
disease struck just as the dance was ending.  A Kiowa sickened and died.  Curious, 
the men, women, and children gathered around the dying man.  An old Kiowa man 
recognized the symptoms and cried out that the cramps had come.  Other Indians 
quickly sickened and died, and a great cry went up throughout the entire camp.  
Sitting in Lodge said, “the Kiowas and Osages made the most noise of 
any…Indians.”
39
   
The Cheyennes joined the chaotic exodus from the sun dance site the same 
day the disease broke out.  Bent recalled that the Cheyennes and Arapahos fled 
north towards their camps along the Arkansas, the Kiowas fled south, the Osages 
east.  The Cheyennes fled all through the night, Bent remembered.  His 
grandmother died during the night.  Near the Arkansas, the panicked Cheyennes 
ran into another band coming south, the same band that caught the disease from the 
sickened emigrants along the Platte.  Thus, the disease closed in upon the Southern 
Cheyennes from two directions.  In the confusion, one warrior, Little Old Man, 
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painted himself for battle, mounted his war horse, and rode through the camp 
shouting, “if I could see this thing if I knew where it came from, I would go there 
and fight it!”  Tradition says that, immediately after dismounting, Little Old Man 
collapsed into his wife‟s arms and died.
40
  Cholera devastated the Southern 
Cheyennes.  Bent‟s sources informed him that a “whole lot of them died and 
cholera was only few days among them.”  It is also possible that some Cheyennes 
contracted the disease in the vicinity of Bent‟s Fort.  Regardless of the exact source 
of the disease, the sickness ruined William Bent‟s trade prospects for 1849.  The 
Cheyennes, scattered and demoralized looked to survival first, and only then 
towards commerce.  The disruption of the epidemic, combined with the increased 




Environmental factors, combined with market hunting also placed great 
pressure on the bison herds of the Southern Plains.  Increasingly erratic migration 
patterns, and shrinking numbers further undercut both the fortunes of both the 
Southern Cheyennes and William Bent.  The bison population on the Southern 
Plains was neither static nor as high as the estimates given by awestruck white 
observers.  The declining number of bison during the first half of the nineteenth 
century is attributable to a number of factors.  Although the demands of the robe 
trade encouraged regional Indians like the Cheyennes and Comanches to increase 
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the number of animals they killed, market demands are not enough to explain why 
many observed their dwindling numbers.  Natural phenomena, combined with 
overhunting increasingly jeopardized both the subsistence base of the Southern 
Cheyennes and the economic basis of the robe trade at Bent‟s Fort.  The margin for 
error was slim in an environment as unforgiving as that of the Southern Plains.  
Those who succeeded adapted.  However, James Sherow observes, “From around 
1820 through the 1860s, the Plains Indians‟ adaptation strategies worked less well 
in a region undergoing rapid environmental change each passing year.”
42
 
Drought contributed greatly to the declining numbers of bison.  Lack of 
rainfall exacerbated the other natural hazards faced by the bison herds: fire, floods, 
wolf predation, and disease.  Without rain, the grass withered and the rivers dried 
up, thereby dramatically limiting the grassland‟s carrying capacity.  Migration onto 
the plains, and the transition to full-blown nomadism, by tribes like the Cheyennes 
and Comanches took place over a period of three and a half centuries, some of the 
wettest on record.  This weather pattern broke around 1850, and rainfall dropped by 
around 30% over the next decade.  Between 1849 and 1862, the Southern Plains 
suffered one of the worst draughts of the nineteenth century.  Prolonged draught 
struck at a time when the population of the region was at an all-time high.  Indian 
groups had converged upon the Southern Plains, taking advantage of the grass, 
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timber, and water found in the Platte and Arkansas river valleys.  However, the 
newcomers, and the vast numbers of horses they brought with them, competed 
directly with the bison for access to these precious locations.  Even in good years, 
water can be difficult to find on the Southern Plains.  Below Pueblo, for example, 
the Arkansas River sometimes ceases to flow during the summer.  The sharp 
decline in precipitation cut deeply into the bison population.  In addition, the herds 
shifted their annual wanderings further east, away from the Cheyennes and 
Comanches.  Traveler Frederick Wislizenus noted the connection between the 
fortunes of the bison and those of the Indian.  “The Indian and the buffalo are 
Siamese twins,” he wrote, “both live and thrive only on one ground, that of the 
wilderness.  Both will perish together.”
43
 
Despite the critical role of environmental degradation in the decline of the 
buffalo herds, human agency was also a critical component.  By itself, subsistence 
hunting contributed to the decline.  In the case of the Comanches, expanding 
military and economic power went hand-in-hand.  As they raided and traded further 
afield, they became richer; as they became wealthier, their population grew, as did 
the demand for meat and hides.  The arrival of traders like the Bents and St. Vrain 
accelerated the pace of Comanche hunting, for now they hunted to satisfy the 
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demands of American markets.  Furthermore, Indians hunting for these markets 
disproportionately targeted buffalo cows for slaughter, since their hides were 
lighter, more pliable, and converted more easily into the robes sought by white 
traders.  Such hunting patterns curtailed the natural reproduction of the herds.  The 
arrival of tribes like the Shawnees and Delawares in Indian Territory only increased 
the number of hunters on the plains.  Hispanic hunters from New Mexico added to 
the number of bison killed each year.
44
   
Anglo observers made the connection between market hunting and 
declining bison numbers.  As early as 1835, an officer with Dodge‟s dragoon 
expedition wrote, “the fact that on this part of the Arkansas two trading 
establishments have been in operation for nine years until very lately, fully 
accounts for the scarcity of buffalo.”
45
  Another officer wrote,  
From all we have been able to learn, we cannot but believe that 
the Buffalo…are rapidly diminishing.  This may be attributed in 
great measure to the inducements held out by the traders, as 
Buffalo Skins are the only commodity the Indians possess to 
give them in exchange for their goods.  We were told by 
persons, who were well acquainted with this country that in 
large tracts through which we passed without seeing a single 
buffalo, they had never failed to find them in great abundance, 
and it is the belief of the traders…living in this country, that 
unless some plan can be adopted to prevent the immense 
slaughter of these animals…the Indians must necessarily in a 
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Some associated with the robe trade at Bent‟s Fort commented on this 
alarming trend as well.  “Our chief dependence here is on the Buffalo for meat 
which are generally found to be within fifteen to thirty miles of the fort,” post clerk 
Alexander Barclay wrote his brother in 1838.  By the summer 1845, his assessment 
was far bleaker.  Although he hoped to enter the robe trade for himself, he noted 
that, “the buffalo are decreasing rapidly,” and that the future, “is all uncertitude.”  
At the close of the year, he wrote his brother, “the Buffalo robe business is 
becoming limited every year from the decrease of the animal itself which is now 
becoming such a rarity with us even at the foot of the Mountains that we have to go 
one or 200 miles to get the first sight of one.”
47
  Reminiscing years later, former 
employee Dick Wooton marveled at the decline of the herds.  “It never occurred to 
me then that I should live long enough to see all the buffaloes killed off,” he said 
sadly.  Long gone were the days when he could ride out, shoot a buffalo, dress the 
meat, and gather the hide, “with about as little trouble as a ranchman has in getting 
a beef out of his herd of cattle.”  When he hunted for the company, he recalled, he 
could kill thirty bison a day, more than enough to supply the needs of the fort‟s 
employees.
48
  William Bent must have recognized the increasing tenuousness of his 
business situation by 1846, for he informed Captain William Emory that he was 
considering moving the Company‟s operations downriver to the Big Timbers where 
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he had better access to water, wood, and the buffalo who sometimes sought shelter 
there during the winter.
49
 
George Bent said his father abandoned the fort along the Arkansas because 
it contained bad memories.  Too many loved ones died within its walls, Bent wrote 
George Hyde in 1913.  “Four of his brothers had died, “he informed the historian, 
“they had lived at this fort and our mother died there and he told our step 
mother…he was disgusted on account of this whenever he looked around where 
they used to live…it made him feel sad and this why he blowed the fort up.”
50
  
William‟s sister, Dorcas, wrote an acquaintance that the deaths of so many family 
members had indeed worked a change in the trader‟s demeanor.  He was “entirely 
changed” by the death of his brother George, she wrote.  “I could myself perceive a 
great change, he says he intends henceforth to devote his life to his brothers 
children they were now his children and he must work for them,” Dorcas informed 
Silas Bent.  Apparently, William Bent became responsible for George‟s children, in 
addition to keeping an eye on those of Charles.
51
  There were indeed many 
unpleasant memories at Bent‟s Fort.  George Bent died there in October of 1847, of 
either consumption or fever.  George had come west with his brothers, and almost 
immediately assumed a position of importance in the company.  He took charge of 
Fort St. Vrain in 1837.  By that same year, if not before, he was a full partner in 
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Bent-St. Vrain.  He was often in charge of Bent‟s Fort while his brothers or St. 
Vrain were away on business.  George also spent much time in Taos, cohabiting 
with a local woman, with whom he had a son.  An obituary in the Santa Fe 
Republican stated, “His loss will create a great void, and one which it will be hard 
to supply.”
52
   
Although sorrow might have played a role, William Bent had more 
pragmatic reasons for abandoning the fort,  especially the great tension between 
Bent and the United States government over Kearny‟s commandeering of the post 
during the war with Mexico.  The Army of the West swarmed over the region, 
eating up post supplies, taking up valuable storage space, and probably scaring 
many potential Indian traders away.  Furthermore, Francis Parkman noted, “It 
seemed as if a swarm of locusts had invaded the country.  The grass for miles 
around was cropped close by the horses of General Kearney‟s soldiery.  When we 
cam up to the fort, we found that not only had the horses eaten up the grass, but 
their owners had made way with the stores of the little trading post; so that we had 
great difficulty in procuring the few articles we required for our homeward 
journey.”
53
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However, Bent‟s dislike of the government most likely had roots that dated 
back to the summer of 1843 when Bent-St. Vrain contracted with the United States 
government to haul 35,000 pounds of supplies to Bent‟s Fort and store them there 
until October 1844.  The government would reimburse them at the rate of $0.08 per 
pound.  The supplies were intended to provide support for dragoons under the 
command of Philip St. George Cooke.  Cooke‟s superiors thought the dragoons 
would be in the field throughout the fall and winter, thus they offered the contract 
to the company.  St. Vrain proceeded to New Mexico to fill the order.  By the time 
he returned to Bent‟s Fort with the supplies, he learned that Cooke had returned to 
Missouri.  Thus, sitting on tons of beef, flour, and other provisions, the partners put 
in a claim against the government for $6, 500.  However, they had a great deal of 
trouble with the government when they tried to redeem their claims, despite the 
recommendations by those reviewing the claim that the government ought to 
uphold its end of the original contract.  Commissary officers offered to sell the 
supplies to Bent-St. Vrain at their original cost.  The partners declined purchase, 
stating that they would only pay prices offered in St. Louis.  It took the Bents and 
St. Vrain three years to collect their claim from the government.  The bureaucratic 
foot-dragging probably did little to endear the government to William Bent, even 
before the arrival of the Army of the West in 1846.
54
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Discontent with the government, however, did not prevent the partners from 
attempting to sell Bent‟s Fort to the Army.  In the summer of 1847, Ceran St. Vrain 
offered to let the government take over the fort for the price of $15,000.  On July 
21, 1847, St. Vrain wrote Lieutenant Colonel Eneas Mackay with the offer.  The 
trader wrote that he knew of the military‟s intentions to construct a chain of posts 
throughout the plains, and offered Bent‟s Fort as a suitable location.  St. Vrain then 
proceeded to give Mackay a brief lesson on the history of the post.  The partners 
had founded it in 1834, “for the purpose of trading with the several tribes of Indians 
in its vicinity.”  The Bents and St. Vrain chose the location “on account of its 
central situation in regard to the largest Indian tribes in that section, and on account 
of its proximity to the settlements of New Mexico.”  Strategically speaking, the fort 
was prime real estate.  Bent‟s Fort had other advantages, St. Vrain continued.  The 
walls were high, thick, and “in good repair.”  There was a good well within the 
walls, and the shops and trading rooms could easily be made into quarters and a 
hospital for the garrison, and storehouses for its goods.  Furthermore, firewood and 
timber, “have been and can always be procured within a convenient distance.”  The 
route to New Mexico via Bent‟s Fort also had advantages over the Cimarron route, 
St. Vrain pointed out.  The route trail was longer by about fifty miles, but the 
supply and quality of wood, water, and forage was much better via the Mountain 
Branch.  Finally, the trader offered an impeccable set of references.  Both Kearny 
and Frémont could vouch for the utility of the fort, and its potential as a military 
post.  These advantages notwithstanding, Mackay turned St. Vrain‟s offer down.
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Unsubstantiated stories state that, following the dissolution of St. Vrain and 
Bent, William also attempted to sell the fort to the Army, only to face rejection as 
well.  David Lavender speculates that St. Vrain‟s initial offer to sell Bent‟s Fort 
caused some tensions within the partner‟s relationship, thereby speeding the break 
up of their partnership.  Rumors circulated that the Army offered Bent anywhere 
between $12, 000 and $50, 000 for the facility.  Others say that the trader initiated 
the talks, and asked for $16,000; the government responded with an offer of 
$12,000.  Affronted, William Bent decided to torch the post rather than accept the 
lower offer.  George Bent stated that these latter amounts caused his father to take 
drastic measures.  Bent wrote George Hyde that, “ as no agreement could be 
reached he loaded what goods he could into his wagon and set fire to the powder 
magazines and blew up the fort.”
56
 
Some confusion surrounds the story of Bent‟s abandonment of the fort in 
1849.  The preponderance of evidence indicates, George Bent‟s reminiscences 
notwithstanding, that William Bent abandoned the post in August 1849.  In October 
1849, the Missouri Republican printed the report of some plains travelers regarding 
the destruction of the fort.  Encamped at Hole in the Rock, the travelers “heard 
distinctly a loud report, resembling that of cannon.”  On August 22, they came 
upon “the rubbish of the buildings,” all that remained of the post.  The paper 
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reported that Utes had fired the fort‟s magazine, causing the tremendous explosion 
and fire.  “The guns and traps were consumed, and it is supposed all the goods, 
books, etc. of Bent‟s concern, had shared the same fate….What had become of Mr. 
Bent, or any one connected with the concern, they could not tell, there was no trace 
of them or their whereabouts.”
57
  The Superintendant of Indian Affairs in New 
Mexico reported a more prosaic story to his superiors.  On October 5, 1849, he 
wrote simply, “One of the owners of Bent‟s Fort, has removed all property from it, 
and caused the fort to be burnt.”
58
 
Contemporaries and historians both debated the extent to which the fort 
itself was damaged.  George Bent stated that his father “blew up the fort,” implying 
almost total destruction.  Others state that Bent simply set fire to the fort.  William 
Arnold argued that Bent did not blow up the fort.  The thickness of the walls and 
the size of the fort made it impractical for the trader to destroy it.  Furthermore, the 
amount of gunpowder required to create such a blast would have made that project 
impractical.  Rather, Arnold speculated that Bent set fire to the ceilings and the 
supporting beams, intending to damage the post just enough to make it unusable by 
anyone else.  While there is certainly evidence of a fire, the fact that others utilized 
the fort‟s buildings in later years, as either a camping spot or a stagecoach station, 
makes George Bent‟s recollections unreliable.  Regardless of the actual damage 
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done, by the summer of 1849, William Bent had abandoned the site where the old 
fort stood for almost twenty years.  With his family, he moved downriver to the 
vicinity of the Big Timbers.  Here, he built another, far more modest trading post, 
living out his life as a merchant and Indian agent.
59
 
The establishment of a permanent American presence in the borderlands, 
combined with environmental degradation and disease ultimately destroyed Bent-
St. Vrain.  American expansion between 1846 and 1849 upset the delicate balance 
of political and economic power in the Southwest.  Most notably, the rapidly 
increasing volume of traffic along the Santa Fe Trail led to a spike in violent 
conflict between white travelers and local Indian groups.  The resulting animosity 
rendered William Bent‟s trade operations nearly impossible.  Environmental factors 
exacerbated the rising interracial tensions.  Drought, deforestation, and the 
shrinking of the buffalo herds adversely affected the fortunes of the region‟s Indian 
tribes.  Finally, the explosion of white migration through the Southern Plains 
brought with it a series of devastating outbreaks of disease.  By 1849, the situation 
had declined to the point that William Bent abandoned the great adobe fort on the 
Arkansas and departed for greener pastures downriver.  Thus, rather than opening 
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new economic opportunities, American expansion radically altered the environment 

























The rise and fall of Bent-St. Vrain‟s fortunes was the result of a unique set 
of geographic, social, economic, and political circumstances.  The primary force 
that shaped the situation was the state – both American and Mexican.  The 
institutional weakness of the state in the borderlands affected the ways in which the 
partners did business, who they allied themselves with, and who they competed 
with.  Far from the centers of state power, the company adapted to local 
circumstances as best they could.  Unable to call upon the military protection of the 
United States they endeavored to accommodate themselves as far as possible to 
Native American trade protocols and social practices.  The weakness of the 
Mexican state presented its own unique set of challenges and opportunities.  
American merchants, aided by their New Mexican counterparts, shifted the 
economic focus of Mexico‟s northern frontier away from Mexico City and towards 
the United States.  However, some of the activities the partners participated in – 
especially the acquisition of land grants and the Indian trade – alienated deeply 
those in New Mexico who favored the maintenance of ties with the mother country.  
The political and economic calculus changed radically with the permanent arrival 
of American power in the region.  The conquest of New Mexico in 1846 unleashed 




Much of the success of Bent-St. Vrain in the 1830s and 1840s came because 
of their conscious accommodation to the longstanding social and economic systems 
they found in the Southwestern Borderlands.  Company profits often resulted from 
the ability of the partners to form solid business and familial contacts with a wide 
network of individuals from Missouri to Santa Fe to the Rocky Mountains.  The 
ties they formed linked the Bents and St. Vrain to a world of business that extended 
far beyond their adobe post on the Arkansas River.  Familial connections in 
Missouri allowed the Bents and St. Vrain to take advantage of increased mercantile 
opportunities.  By eventually aligning itself with the Chouteau family, the company 
gained increased access to credit, suppliers, as well as retailers for its furs and 
buffalo robes.  Contact with the Chouteau‟s and - by extension - the powerful 
American Fur Company drew Bent-St. Vrain into an economy that stretched from 
Europe to the ports of the eastern seaboard, west to St. Louis, and out onto the 
Great Plains.  Recognizing that they did not have the financial clout to make their 
way in the complicated eastern markets, the partners relied upon the expertise of 
the well-capitalized St. Louis merchant elites.   
On the Plains, the partners realized quickly that they must be keenly attuned 
to the desires of their Indian customers.  Not only did the Indians provide the 
valuable buffalo robes, so sought after in the St. Louis markets, the local tribes held 
the upper hand in the region politically and militarily.  Attention to native tastes 
and trade protocol were crucial to financial success.  Furthermore, in an effort to 
enmesh themselves more firmly into the native plains economy, William Bent, 
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Marcellin St. Vrain, and a number of company traders established marital ties with 
various tribes.  Bent‟s marriages proved especially helpful, for they united the 
company with one of the most powerful families in the entire Cheyenne tribe.   
Recognition of the importance of accommodation applied to Bent-St. 
Vrain‟s interactions with New Mexico.  The partners learned Spanish, and 
cultivated contacts with local merchants and government officials.  Furthermore, 
they also established firmer trade ties through marriage into well-placed Taos 
families.  Marriage could bring citizenship, which in turn had the potential to 
expedite the acquisition of baronial land grants on the northern frontier.  As with 
intermarriage into Indian groups, marriage to local Mexican women allowed 
Charles Bent and Ceran St. Vrain to widen their network of customers, suppliers, 
and political contacts. 
The Bents and St. Vrain could not dictate policy on the Plains.  Despite the 
lengths to which the partners went to accommodate themselves to local conditions, 
their actions sometimes had the potential to ensnare them in the tumultuous 
intertribal relationships of the Southern Plains.  The Plains were often a violent 
place.  At one time or another, nearly every tribe was at war with someone else – 
over horses, honor, or to redress past grievances.  The Cheyennes, the best 
customers of Bent-St. Vrain, engaged in longstanding conflicts with the Pawnees to 
the east, and the Shoshones and Utes to the west.  Most serious, though, was the 
decades-long tensions between the Cheyenne/Arapaho alliance and the 
Comanche/Kiowa alliance south of the Arkansas River.  For years, these groups 
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raided one another, occasionally inflicting a grievous military defeat.  While 
intermarriage with the Cheyennes brought the potential for increased trade 
opportunities, the union also had the potential to expose Company traders to 
recriminations from Cheyenne enemies.  It is probable that the alliance with the 
Cheyennes made it impossible for the company to expand its operations into 
Comanche country, until the early-1840s.   
 The Bents and St. Vrain also had to interact with white traders on the 
plains.  In the absence of a strong, regulatory state presence, however, the company 
generally took a more confrontational, often illegal approach to the problems of 
economic competition.  Although the large trading companies usually sought to 
avoid the use of alcohol as a trade item, when faced with stiff competition, they 
broke the law.  Selling alcohol to the Indians was illegal under United States law.  
Yet, confronted by a host of independent, often unscrupulous, traders who traveled 
the length and breadth of the region plying Indian customers with booze, the 
partners responded in kind.  Their use of alcohol as a way to lubricate the wheels of 
trade represented another departure from their general accomodationist trade 
policies, a departure they piously decried.   
The weakness of the Mexican state presented the partners simultaneously 
presented them with their greatest opportunities and challenges.  Charles Bent and 
Ceran St. Vrain settled in Taos, long a haven for American trappers and traders.  In 
Taos, they allied themselves with an increasingly prominent community of 
naturalized Mexican citizens, both American and French.  These newcomers, the 
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Bents and St. Vrain included, often took local wives, thereby attaching themselves 
to a wide network of new political and economic contacts.  While these alliances 
opened up new opportunities, they also proved potentially hazardous.  Mexican 
nationalists never ceased to view the American faction in the province with deep 
suspicion.  The attempts in 1841 and 1843 by Texans to annex New Mexico made 
many in the local populace intensely resentful of the newcomers.  Most 
importantly, however, the type of business Bent-St. Vrain conducted had the 
potential to undermine seriously the military and political stability of northern 
Mexico.  Critics of American traders like Bent urged the Mexican government to 
pay closer attention to their activities north of the Arkansas.  American trading 
posts like Bent‟s Fort provided Indian raiders like the Comanches with a market at 
which to dispose of stolen Mexican livestock and captives.  In return, the raiders 
received guns, liquor, and trade goods.  New Mexico‟s political and economic 
status was shaky enough, without traders like the Bent‟s possibly abetting the raids 
that devastated much of the nation‟s northern frontier.  Still, such shrill 
condemnations of American activity ignored the fact that tribes like the Comanches 
and Kiowas had their own reasons for raiding.   
Finally, when the United States conquered New Mexico in the summer of 
1846, the governmental appointments made by General Stephen Watts Kearny 
caused deep discontent throughout the territory.  Rather than seeking to maintain 
native officials in their former positions, the general handed the reins of power to 
Charles Bent and his cohort.  The events of the first half of the 1840s had made 
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New Mexican nationalists intensely suspicious of the Bents and St. Vrain.  Now, 
conquered by a foreign power, often bullied by an occupying army, and fearful of a 
further erosion of their political and economic rights, the populace of northern New 
Mexico rose up in 1847.  They killed Charles Bent, along with a number of his 
collaborators, both Anglo and Hispanic.  Though the revolt ultimately failed, it 
served as a reminder of the perils of failing to accommodate fully to the political 
and economic system of the host population. 
Although Bent-St. Vrain did not originally set any of these trends into 
motion, its position as the preeminent American trading firm on the Southern Plains 
meant that the actions the partners took accelerated preexisting trends.  The ways in 
which the partners conducted trade and diplomacy did impact the local economy 
and local politics.  However, the company did not dictate policy, as historians 
writing in the first half of the twentieth century claimed.  Rather, the Bents and St. 
Vrain helped connect the Southern Plains and Rockies with broader national 
markets.  Through their actions as Santa Fe traders, they aided in binding the 
economies of Missouri and New Mexico more closely together, thereby easing the 
northern province slowly out of the economic and political orbit of Mexico City.  
The Bents and St. Vrain helped enmesh the Cheyennes and, to a lesser extent, the 
Comanches more firmly into the American market economy.  As the demand for 
buffalo robes increased in Missouri, the Company‟s Indian customers demanded 
adequate compensation for their work.  By providing their customers with the 
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goods they desired, company traders facilitated bargains that were, for the moment, 
equally beneficial. 
However, the economic success the Bents and St. Vrain enjoyed during the 
1830s and 1840s actually undercut their long-term economic prospects.  In a sense, 
they helped sew the seeds of their own failure.  The company‟s actions in the 
buffalo robe trade had an inadvertently negative impact on the native societies of 
the Southern Plains.  By providing a lucrative trading market, they and other 
American traders enhanced already bitter rivalries among the local Indian groups.  
Eager to gain access to the best buffalo hunting grounds, the tribes jostled one 
another for position.  Increased collisions sparked a new series of raids and counter 
raids.  Ironically, however, peace on the Southern Plains after 1840 proved 
increasingly detrimental to the company‟s long-term prospects.  With the scale of 
warfare dramatically decreased, new hunting grounds opened up to erstwhile rivals.  
Warfare had created numerous contested zones in which the buffalo herds 
flourished.  The opening of these zones to hunting began to decrease the number of 
bison in the region, thereby potentially undercutting the economic stability of the 
company.  Finally, the combination of market demands, environmental 
degradation, and white expansion led to a decline in the fortunes of the Indian 
tribes of the Southern Plains.  Although the Bents and St. Vrain did not intend for 
any of this to happen, their very presence, the very way in which they conducted 
business, accelerated these trends, and ultimately helped make their business 
prospects increasingly untenable. 
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In this sense, then, the Bents and St. Vrain were victims of their own 
success.  By establishing such a range of economic and social ties, they became 
economic power players in the region.  Recognizing that success usually followed 
close adherence to local customs and strictures, they built a diverse business 
enterprise.  However, the ways in which they did business – the Indian trade, the 
robe trade, and trade with New Mexico – ultimately undid them.  Hunting for the 
robe trade led to the increasing destruction of the bison herds, trade with the 
Indians along the Arkansas helped destabilize northern New Mexico and caused 
intense distrust and dislike on the part of Mexican nationalists.  Their success made 
Bent‟s Fort a natural choice from which to launch the invasion of New Mexico.  
The successful annexation of the territory, however, caused a rapid decline in 
company fortunes.  On their own, far from the reach of American power, Bent-St. 
Vrain and their local clients flourished.  When the United States began to catch up, 
however, their fortunes began to decline.  
Despite claims by historians enamored of the western march of American 
civilization, Bent-St. Vrain played only a de facto role in the Manifest Destiny 
project.  Traditionally viewed as forerunners of American civilization, an advance 
guard establishing and holding a beachhead in hostile territory, only in hindsight 
did the partners aid in American expansion.  They rarely called upon the United 
States government to do anything.  In general, they preferred to be left alone, to 
operate as they saw fit, without interference or oversight by American officials.  
When they did seek the help of national authorities, the Bents and St. Vrain did so 
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primarily to further their own economic agenda.  They urged the military to provide 
troop escorts along the Santa Fe Trail, to build a post along the Arkansas River, or 
to lobby for a reduction in tariff duties.  Everything they asked for was designed to 
aid the company‟s bottom line.  However, by couching their self-interest in the 
language of national interest, they hoped to see quicker action.  Government 
involvement in the west would protect trade, clamp down on the competition of 
independent traders, or help Americans try to secure a dominant portion in the 
Santa Fe trade.  Thus, any rhetoric about the expansion of American government or 
military power by the partners, should not be read as an invitation for expansion, 
but rather as a cagey attempt to secure the profitability of their business enterprises. 
Compounding the irony, the arrival of American power on the Arkansas 
proved disastrous for the company.  The coming of the Army of the West in 1846 
ultimately proved a cause for unease, not cause for rejoicing.  The Army overran 
the fort.  Kearny‟s livestock ate all the grass.  The soldiers frightened local Indians 
away.  Although the appointment of Charles Bent to the position of Governor of 
New Mexico in a sense represented the height of the company‟s success, it also led 
to the undoing of its enterprise.  Bent‟s appointment caused widespread resentment.  
His death staggered the partnership.  Within months, William Bent and Ceran St. 
Vrain had dissolved their partnership.  The conquest of New Mexico accelerated 
the process of integrating the Far West with the rest of the nation.  Traffic along the 
Santa Fe Trail increased at an alarming rate.  The increased number of teamsters, 
soldiers, mules, oxen, and horses consumed increasingly scarce sources of grass, 
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water, firewood, and buffalo.  Pinched by these new arrivals, many Southern Plains 
Indians lashed back; raiding along the trail intensified to a level never before seen.  
Though Bent helped keep the Cheyennes at peace, the escalating violence made it 
more and more difficult to conduct business.  The very success of the company, at 
the western terminus of the Santa Fe Trail, made their fort along the Arkansas a 
vital cog in the American annexation of the Southwest.  With annexation, though, 
the opportunities for autonomous action and peaceful accommodation for both 
William Bent and local Indian groups declined. 
The American penetration of the Southwest unleashed a wave of destructive 
forces that upset the often precarious balance of economic and political power 
necessary for the success of the Bents and St. Vrain.  American conquest created an 
intense backlash from Mexican nationalists who chafed under the new regime, and 
from Native American groups who found their hunting grounds under intense 
pressure.  The violence spawned by American expansion helped destroy the 
company‟s fortunes.  The weakness of state power – both American and Mexican – 
that existed in the 1840s created space in which New Mexicans, Native Americans, 
and Anglo traders like the Bents could maneuver and interact.  The arrival in force 
of the United States severely circumscribed the options of those operating in the 
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